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18 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1966–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re L.C.green2 sentences2022Evidence is relevant if it “tend[s] to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that evidence.” In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297 (D.C. 2014). 2015For purposes of appellate review, it would be best, when this is so, for judges to articulate their reasons for excluding evidence more precisely. 6 In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. 1977)). 24 determining the relevance of a piece of evidence because the inquiry is fact- specific and proceeds under a flexible standard.”7 This standard requires that the trial judge be given considerable leeway to evaluate the relevance of proffered evidence and exclude it if he reasonably finds it lacking in legitimate probative value—even if app | 2 | 2 |
Monaco v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen2 sentences2019We stated that "[t]he rationale for such flexibility ... is that the 'public need for the use is an important factor in granting or denying a variance,' " Neighbors for Responsive Gov't , 195 A.3d at 58 -59 (quoting Monaco v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment , 407 A.2d 1091 , 1098 (D.C. 1979) ), and we concluded that "this rationale is not limited to situations in which the applicant seeks only to expand or continue an existing, previously authorized use," id. 1987We agree with petitioner and the BZA that our decisions in National Black Child Development Institute v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 483 A.2d 687, 690 (D.C.1984), and Monaco v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 407 A.2d 1091, 1099-1101 (D.C.1979), which recognize that the BZA may apply a more flexible standard for determining hardship when the applicant is a public service or non-profit entity, are inapplicable here. | 1 | 3 |
Troy D. Richardson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022In (William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1099-1100 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), this court adopted Federal Rule 403 which provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 28 prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Rule 403 “essentially presumes the admissibility of relevant evidence, 11 and “[t]he trial court enjoys particularly broad discretion in determining the relevance of a piece of evidence 2019“An accused person’s prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt, and is therefore 43 Plummer v. United States, 813 A.2d 182, 188 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Street v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1992)). 44 Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C. 2014). 45 Riddick v. United States, 995 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 23 admissible.”46 It is relevant and admissible as “direct and substantial proof of the crime charged”47 if the weapon is “linked to both the defendant a | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022In (William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1099-1100 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), this court adopted Federal Rule 403 which provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 28 prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Rule 403 “essentially presumes the admissibility of relevant evidence, 11 and “[t]he trial court enjoys particularly broad discretion in determining the relevance of a piece of evidence | 1 | 1 |
Street v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019“An accused person’s prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt, and is therefore 43 Plummer v. United States, 813 A.2d 182, 188 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Street v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1992)). 44 Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C. 2014). 45 Riddick v. United States, 995 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 23 admissible.”46 It is relevant and admissible as “direct and substantial proof of the crime charged”47 if the weapon is “linked to both the defendant a | 1 | 1 |
Plummer v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019“An accused person’s prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt, and is therefore 43 Plummer v. United States, 813 A.2d 182, 188 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Street v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1992)). 44 Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C. 2014). 45 Riddick v. United States, 995 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 23 admissible.”46 It is relevant and admissible as “direct and substantial proof of the crime charged”47 if the weapon is “linked to both the defendant a | 1 | 1 |
Riddick v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019“An accused person’s prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt, and is therefore 43 Plummer v. United States, 813 A.2d 182, 188 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Street v. United States, 602 A.2d 141, 143 (D.C. 1992)). 44 Richardson v. United States, 98 A.3d 178, 186 (D.C. 2014). 45 Riddick v. United States, 995 A.2d 212, 216 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 23 admissible.”46 It is relevant and admissible as “direct and substantial proof of the crime charged”47 if the weapon is “linked to both the defendant a | 1 | 1 |
Punch v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015For purposes of appellate review, it would be best, when this is so, for judges to articulate their reasons for excluding evidence more precisely. 6 In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. 1977)). 24 determining the relevance of a piece of evidence because the inquiry is fact- specific and proceeds under a flexible standard.”7 This standard requires that the trial judge be given considerable leeway to evaluate the relevance of proffered evidence and exclude it if he reasonably finds it lacking in legitimate probative value—even if app | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mosbygreen1 sentence2014United States v. Mosby, 495 A.2d 304, 305 (D.C.1985) (citing United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170 , 171 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1969)). | 1 | 1 |
Barnett v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence1993Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 20 (D.C.1993) (noting that in this jurisdiction, “exhaustion of remedies is a flexible doctrine ... subject to a number of interrelated exceptions, including inadequate remedy, unavailable remedy, and'futility....” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Barnett v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1160-62 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Group Insurance Administrationgreen1 sentence1993Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 20 (D.C.1993) (noting that in this jurisdiction, “exhaustion of remedies is a flexible doctrine ... subject to a number of interrelated exceptions, including inadequate remedy, unavailable remedy, and'futility....” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Barnett v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1160-62 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Patricia J. McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., Patricia J. McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc.green2 sentences1990Since the adoption of Fed.R.Evid. 408 (“Compromise and Offers to Compromise”), however, federal courts have employed a more flexible standard of assessing prejudice, reflecting the fact that not only formal offers to compromise are inadmissible but also “[ejvidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations.... ” See McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 251 (1st Cir.1985). 1990Since the adoption of Fed.R.Evid. 408 ("Compromise and Offers to Compromise"), however, federal courts have employed a more flexible standard of assessing prejudice, reflecting the fact that not only formal offers to compromise are inadmissible but also "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations...." See McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 251 (1st Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
National Black Child Development Institute, Inc. v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen1 sentence1987We agree with petitioner and the BZA that our decisions in National Black Child Development Institute v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 483 A.2d 687, 690 (D.C.1984), and Monaco v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 407 A.2d 1091, 1099-1101 (D.C.1979), which recognize that the BZA may apply a more flexible standard for determining hardship when the applicant is a public service or non-profit entity, are inapplicable here. | 1 | 1 |
Clerics of Saint Viator, Inc. v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen1 sentence1984Viator, Inc., supra, 320 A.2d at 294 (factors extraneous to land may be considered in determining existence of hardship). 6 Finally, in Monaco , we permitted the BZA to apply a more flexible standard for determining hardship when a “public service,” or nonprofit entity, is the applicant. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. George Gray, Jr.green2 sentences1980It has been stated that a flexible rule is “responsive to the underlying rationale of the corroboration requirement — the avoidance of baseless accusations — and it is far more consonant with the realities of the trial situation than a rule which would compel the Government to prove virtually its entire case twice: once by the victim’s testimony and again by independent evidence.” United States v. Gray, supra 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 277, 477 F.2d at 445 . 1980It has been stated that a flexible rule is “responsive to the underlying rationale of the corroboration requirement — the avoidance of baseless accusations — and it is far more consonant with the realities of the trial situation than a rule which would compel the Government to prove virtually its entire case twice: once by the victim’s testimony and again by independent evidence.” United States v. Gray, supra 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 277, 477 F.2d at 445 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Petition of DIS
green
2 sentences1990We held instead that "each case must be dealt with on its own terms” and that attaching primary significance to one or two factors “runs counter to the flexible framework established in our cases for making this critical decision.” Id. at 1325 . 1990We held instead that "each case must be dealt with on its own terms" and that attaching primary significance to one or two factors "runs counter to the flexible framework established in our cases for making this critical decision." Id. at 1325 . | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Neighbors for Responsive Government v. DC Bd. of Zoning & DC Dept. of General Services
green
1 sentence2019We stated that "[t]he rationale for such flexibility ... is that the 'public need for the use is an important factor in granting or denying a variance,' " Neighbors for Responsive Gov't , 195 A.3d at 58 -59 (quoting Monaco v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment , 407 A.2d 1091 , 1098 (D.C. 1979) ), and we concluded that "this rationale is not limited to situations in which the applicant seeks only to expand or continue an existing, previously authorized use," id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Draude v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment
green
2 sentences2019Where the more flexible standard applies, the party requesting a variance can establish the existence of an extraordinary or exceptional condition by showing "(1) that the specific design it wants to build constitutes an institutional necessity, not merely the most desired of various options[;] and (2) precisely how the needed design features require the specific variance sought." Draude v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment , 527 A.2d 1242 , 1256 (D.C. 1987). 2019Where the more flexible standard applies, the party requesting a variance can establish the existence of an extraordinary or exceptional condition by showing "(1) that the specific design it wants to build constitutes an institutional necessity, not merely the most desired of various options[;] and (2) precisely how the needed design features require the specific variance sought." Draude v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment , 527 A.2d 1242 , 1256 (D.C. 1987). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Lawrence Kearney
green
1 sentence2014United States v. Mosby, 495 A.2d 304, 305 (D.C.1985) (citing United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170 , 171 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1969)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp
red
2 sentences1997Id. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 . 1997Id. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Maher v. People
green
2 sentences1990In revers *541 ing Maher’s conviction, the court offered as its rationale for adopting this flexible standard “the almost infinite variety of facts presented by the various cases as they arise [citation omitted],” id. at 222 , and concluded that “[t]he law can not with justice assume, by the light of past decisions to catalogue all the various facts and combinations of facts which shall be held to constitute reasonable or adequate provocation.” Id. at 222-23 . 1990In revers *541 ing Maher’s conviction, the court offered as its rationale for adopting this flexible standard “the almost infinite variety of facts presented by the various cases as they arise [citation omitted],” id. at 222 , and concluded that “[t]he law can not with justice assume, by the light of past decisions to catalogue all the various facts and combinations of facts which shall be held to constitute reasonable or adequate provocation.” Id. at 222-23 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Cobbledick v. United States
green
2 sentences1980Cohen v. Benefical Industrial Loan Corporation, supra, 337 U.S. at 546 , 69 S.Ct. at 1225 ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 , 60 S.Ct. 540 , 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Wise v. Murphy, D.C.App., 275 A.2d 205 (1971). 1980Cohen v. Benefical Industrial Loan Corporation, supra, 337 U.S. at 546 , 69 S.Ct. at 1225 ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 , 60 S.Ct. 540 , 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Wise v. Murphy, D.C.App., 275 A.2d 205 (1971). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
green
2 sentences1980Cohen v. Benefical Industrial Loan Corporation, supra, 337 U.S. at 546 , 69 S.Ct. at 1225 ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 , 60 S.Ct. 540 , 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Wise v. Murphy, D.C.App., 275 A.2d 205 (1971). 1980Cohen v. Benefical Industrial Loan Corporation, supra, 337 U.S. at 546 , 69 S.Ct. at 1225 ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 , 60 S.Ct. 540 , 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Wise v. Murphy, D.C.App., 275 A.2d 205 (1971). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Wise v. Murphy
green
1 sentence1980Cohen v. Benefical Industrial Loan Corporation, supra, 337 U.S. at 546 , 69 S.Ct. at 1225 ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 , 60 S.Ct. 540 , 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Wise v. Murphy, D.C.App., 275 A.2d 205 (1971). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1976As the Supreme Court stated in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S., at 251 , 78 S.Ct., at 1238 , 2 L.Ed.2d, at 1296 : [T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, [ 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 ] to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . . 1976As the Supreme Court stated in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S., at 251 , 78 S.Ct., at 1238 , 2 L.Ed.2d, at 1296 : [T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, [ 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 ] to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Hanson v. Denckla
green
2 sentences1976As the Supreme Court stated in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S., at 251 , 78 S.Ct., at 1238 , 2 L.Ed.2d, at 1296 : [T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, [ 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 ] to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . . 1976As the Supreme Court stated in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S., at 251 , 78 S.Ct., at 1238 , 2 L.Ed.2d, at 1296 : [T]he requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, [ 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 ] to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Ellen D. Mitchell v. Cynthia D. Ensor, Ellen D. Mitchell v. Cynthia D. Ensor
green
2 sentences1975The court continued, however, and stated that “ . . . we see no reason to preclude its [five per cent] use as a flexible rule-of-thumb for fixing reasonable compensation in ordinary cases.” Id. at 29 n. 4, 412 F.2d at 160 n. 4. 1975The court continued, however, and stated that “ . . . we see no reason to preclude its [five per cent] use as a flexible rule-of-thumb for fixing reasonable compensation in ordinary cases.” Id. at 29 n. 4, 412 F.2d at 160 n. 4. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Williams v. District of Columbia
neutral
1 sentence1966Mun.App., 167 A.2d 893 (1961), where we said that the test of whether too long a period of time had passed between the commission of unlawful acts and the issuance of a warrant is one of reasonableness, although a less flexible standard is applied when the warrant is one that must be based on “positive” knowledge. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.