52 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sevier v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.green2 sentences2008Co., 497 So.2d 1380, 1384 (La.1986), the Court stated: The cases under section 658 [of title 22] have demonstrated that "proof of loss" is a flexible requirement to advise the insurer of the facts of the claim. 2008Additionally, in a matter involving a suit *191 against a fire insurer for penalties and attorney fees, the fourth circuit made the following observation regarding "proof of loss": [I]t is not necessary for proof of loss to be in writing or in any other formal style, Sevier v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 497 So.2d 1380, 1384 (La.1986) ["proof of loss" under Section 658 is a flexible requirement to advise the insurer of the facts of the claim, it is not required to be in any formal style]; Hut of Louisiana, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. | 3 | 3 |
Hut of Louisiana, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co.green2 sentences2008Co., 372 So.2d 687, 688 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1979), rehearing den., . . . 1989Co., 372 So.2d 687, 688 (La.App. 1st Cir.1979), rehearing den., Liberty Mutual's actual knowledge of the Warners' loss in November of 1986, constituted satisfactory proof of loss under LSA-R.S. 22:658(A). | 2 | 2 |
Jack Austin, D/B/A Jack Austin & Associates, Cross v. D. R. Parker and J. A. McAlpin D/B/A M&m Construction Co., Crossgreen2 sentences2008Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). 1986Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.green2 sentences2008Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). 1986Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Riverland Oil Mill v. Underwriters for Lloyd'sgreen2 sentences2008Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). 1986Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). | 2 | 2 |
Bell v. Dept. of Health and Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences2022Bell v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 483 So. 2d 945, 950 ( La. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S. Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 ( 1986). 1990Bell v. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 483 So.2d 945 (La.1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S.Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986). | 1 | 3 |
Brown v. Housing Authoritygreen1 sentence1994Since due process is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances, precisely what process is due in a given case is dependent upon the peculiar facts involved.” Brown v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 590 So.2d 1258, 1260 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Breedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Olivergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Durongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robert Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, Kent State Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2007Even in extraordinary circumstances, an individual whose interests may be affected by a deprivation of life, liberty, or property must be granted a fair procedure before a fair decision maker. [4] In some circumstances, due process may not require a full-blown, trial-type hearing, but that is not to say that some sort of rudimentary precautions afforded by an informal notice and opportunity to respond are not necessary. [5] Due process is a flexible standard, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and courts have been flexible in finding that a meaningful an 2007Even in extraordinary circumstances, an individual whose interests may be affected by a deprivation of life, liberty, or property must be granted a fair procedure before a fair decision maker. [4] In some circumstances, due process may not require a full-blown, trial-type hearing, but that is not to say that some sort of rudimentary precautions afforded by an informal notice and opportunity to respond are not necessary. [5] Due process is a flexible standard, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and courts have been flexible in finding that a meaningful an | 16 | 1986–2019 |
Moore v. Ware
green
2 sentences2019In Moore v. Ware , 01-3341, pp. 12-13 (La. 2/25/03), 839 So.2d 940 , 948-49, the supreme court said: Due process is a flexible standard and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. 2019In Moore v. Ware , 01-3341, pp. 12-13 (La. 2/25/03), 839 So.2d 940 , 948-49, the supreme court said: Due process is a flexible standard and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. | 3 | 2008–2019 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2018Matthews , 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. at 902 ; Casse, 547 So.2d at 1385 . 2018Matthews , 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. at 902 ; Casse, 547 So.2d at 1385 . | 3 | 2009–2018 |
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2002"The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 . 2002"The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 . | 3 | 1999–2002 |
Teeple v. Patton
green
2 sentences2022Bell v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 483 So. 2d 945, 950 ( La. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S. Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 ( 1986). 1990Bell v. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 483 So.2d 945 (La.1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S.Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986). | 2 | 1990–2022 |
Bell v. Department of Health & Human Resources
green
2 sentences2022Bell v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 483 So. 2d 945, 950 ( La. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S. Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 ( 1986). 1990Bell v. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 483 So.2d 945 (La.1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S.Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986). | 2 | 1990–2022 |
Utility Contractors, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences2022Bell v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 483 So. 2d 945, 950 ( La. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S. Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 ( 1986). 1990Bell v. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 483 So.2d 945 (La.1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 827 , 107 S.Ct. 105 , 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986). | 2 | 1990–2022 |
State v. Foret
green
2 sentences2021Foret 628 So.2d at 1121-1123 . 2007Foret 628 So.2d at 1121-1123 . | 2 | 2007–2021 |
Casse v. Sumrall
green
2 sentences2018Matthews , 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. at 902 ; Casse, 547 So.2d at 1385 . 2018Matthews , 424 U.S. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. at 902 ; Casse, 547 So.2d at 1385 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Bergeron v. Bergeron
green
2 sentences2016We are apprehensive of what happened here: applying the more flexible standard of visitation to circumvent the principles and protections announced in Bergeron, [ 492 So.2d 1193 ]. 2008We are apprehensive of what happened here: applying *192 the more flexible standard of visitation to circumvent the principles and protections announced in Bergeron, supra . | 2 | 2008–2016 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp
red
2 sentences2008Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 . 2008Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 . | 2 | 2005–2008 |
Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. UNDERWRITERS FOR LLOYD'S OF NEW YORK
green
2 sentences2008Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). 1986Austin v. Parker, 672 F.2d 508, 520 (5th Cir.1982); Spalitta v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 428 So.2d 824, 827 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983); Riverland Oil Mill, Inc. v. Underwriters for Lloyd's, New York, 368 So.2d 156, 163 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 1365 (La.1979). | 2 | 1986–2008 |
State v. Strain
green
2 sentences1999Strain, supra, which affirmed an DWI (third) conviction which challenged an earlier uncounseled guilty plea to DWI, held that there was a flexible test which applied to Von Moltke 's rule to determine whether there was a valid waiver of counsel in misdemeanor cases. 1999Strain, supra, affirmed a DWI (third) conviction which challenged an earlier un-counseled guilty plea to DWI and held that there was a flexible test which applied to Von Moltke's rule to determine whether there was a valid waiver of counsel in misdemeanor cases. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1966In response-to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1966In response-to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . | 2 | 1963–1966 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1966In response-to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1966In response-to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . | 2 | 1963–1966 |
Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson
neutral
1 sentence2012Id. (citations omitted). 1997-824, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/14/98), 707 So.2d 454, 456 , unit denied sub nom., Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson Through Dept. of Inspection & Code Enforcement, 1998-0403 (La.3/27/98), 716 So.2d 896 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Burguieres v. Pollingue
green
1 sentence2012Id. (citations omitted). 1997-824, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/14/98), 707 So.2d 454, 456 , unit denied sub nom., Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson Through Dept. of Inspection & Code Enforcement, 1998-0403 (La.3/27/98), 716 So.2d 896 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson
green
1 sentence2012Id. (citations omitted). 1997-824, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/14/98), 707 So.2d 454, 456 , unit denied sub nom., Middleton v. Parish of Jefferson Through Dept. of Inspection & Code Enforcement, 1998-0403 (La.3/27/98), 716 So.2d 896 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Wilson v. Jefferson Parish Dept. of Parks & Recreation
green
1 sentence2011Wilson v. Jefferson Parish Department of Parks & Recreation, 95- 470, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/17/96); 668 So.2d 1167, 1170 , writ denied, 96-0413 (La.4/19/96, 671 So.2d 927 ), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Wilson v. JEFFERSON PARISH OF PARKS & RECREATION
green
1 sentence2011Wilson v. Jefferson Parish Department of Parks & Recreation, 95- 470, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/17/96); 668 So.2d 1167, 1170 , writ denied, 96-0413 (La.4/19/96, 671 So.2d 927 ), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Richards v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2002A few years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), the Court rejected the application of a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement in felony drug cases. 2002A few years later, in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), the Court rejected the application of a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement in felony drug cases. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Bartlett, supra. First, the court determined that the state not only authorized the garageman's right to possession of the property, a right afforded by the common law, but also authorized enforcement of the lien by ex parte sale, thereby expanding the common law rights and "entwin[ing] itself into the debtor-creditor relationship arising out of otherwise regular consumer transactions." *599 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 , 379 N.E.2d at 1175 . 1999Bartlett, supra. First, the court determined that the state not only authorized the garageman's right to possession of the property, a right afforded by the common law, but also authorized enforcement of the lien by ex parte sale, thereby expanding the common law rights and "entwin[ing] itself into the debtor-creditor relationship arising out of otherwise regular consumer transactions." *599 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 , 379 N.E.2d at 1175 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Mobley
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Neff v. Rose green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. LaBranch neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Moore green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Knowles green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Grace v. BD. OF TRUSTEES FOR STATE COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., City and County of San Francisco green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Colorado v. Bannister green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Vodopija v. Gulf Refining Co. neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Gibson Collins v. Texas Company green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.