flexible standard (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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flexible standard in Tennessee

9 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Management, Inc.green
tex · 1994 · cited in 2 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2004–2017
2 sentences

2017Id. (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. 1994)).

2004Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex.1994).

22
Cranston v. Combsgreen
tenn · 2003 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tenn.2003).

11
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewiczgreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006The Court pointed out that it had expressly held under the Due Process Clause that “if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in person-am jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State.” Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 ; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”).

2006The Court pointed out that it had expressly held under the Due Process Clause that “if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in person-am jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State.” Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 ; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”).

11
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.green
minn · 1920 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002In State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56 , 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920), we defined an investment contract as '[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment.’ As recently as 1973, this court exhaustively reviewed the history of securities regulation in this state and concluded that although ‘the Howey test is useful in identifying most "investment contracts,” we decline to adopt it as exclusive under our statute.’ State v. Investors Security Corp., 297 Minn. 1, 11 , 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (1973).

2002In State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56 , 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920), we defined an investment contract as '[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment.’ As recently as 1973, this court exhaustively reviewed the history of securities regulation in this state and concluded that although ‘the Howey test is useful in identifying most "investment contracts,” we decline to adopt it as exclusive under our statute.’ State v. Investors Security Corp., 297 Minn. 1, 11 , 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (1973).

11
State v. Investors Security Corporationgreen
minn · 1973 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002In State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56 , 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920), we defined an investment contract as '[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment.’ As recently as 1973, this court exhaustively reviewed the history of securities regulation in this state and concluded that although ‘the Howey test is useful in identifying most "investment contracts,” we decline to adopt it as exclusive under our statute.’ State v. Investors Security Corp., 297 Minn. 1, 11 , 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (1973).

2002In State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56 , 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920), we defined an investment contract as '[t]he placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment.’ As recently as 1973, this court exhaustively reviewed the history of securities regulation in this state and concluded that although ‘the Howey test is useful in identifying most "investment contracts,” we decline to adopt it as exclusive under our statute.’ State v. Investors Security Corp., 297 Minn. 1, 11 , 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (1973).

11
Masada Investment Corp. v. Allengreen
tenn · 1985 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
1 sentence

1990The court held in International Shoe that: [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339, 343 , 85 L.Ed. 278 [(1940)]. 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 ; See also Masada Investment Corp., 697 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn.1985).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
International Shoe Co. v. Washington green
scotus · 1945
2 sentences

1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 .

1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 .

31981–1993
Pennoyer v. Neff red
scotus · 1878
2 sentences

1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 .

1993In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of Internan tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 .

21981–1993
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp red
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

2006The Court pointed out that it had expressly held under the Due Process Clause that “if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in person-am jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State.” Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 ; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”).

2006The Court pointed out that it had expressly held under the Due Process Clause that “if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in person-am jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State.” Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307 , 112 S.Ct. at 1910 ; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”).

12006–2006
State Ex Rel. Commissioner of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc. green
haw · 1971
2 sentences

2002This definition was criticized as being too rigid, particularly its requirement that profits be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. 3 In 1971, the Hawaii Supreme Court became one of the first state courts to openly reject the Howey test and formulate a more flexible test for determining which transactions constitute an investment contract under its state securities laws. 4 See State v. Hawaii Market, 52 Haw. 642 , 485 P.2d 105 (1971).

2002This definition was criticized as being too rigid, particularly its requirement that profits be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. 3 In 1971, the Hawaii Supreme Court became one of the first state courts to openly reject the Howey test and formulate a more flexible test for determining which transactions constitute an investment contract under its state securities laws. 4 See State v. Hawaii Market, 52 Haw. 642 , 485 P.2d 105 (1971).

12002–2002
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin green
scotus · 1990
1 sentence

1990The minimum contacts test was to be a more flexible test which would require less corporate activity in the forum in order to confer personal jurisdiction upon a for eign corporation. 6 Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 7 — U.S. —, 110 5.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990).

11990–1990
Milliken v. Meyer green
scotus · 1941
2 sentences

1990The court held in International Shoe that: [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339, 343 , 85 L.Ed. 278 [(1940)]. 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 ; See also Masada Investment Corp., 697 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn.1985).

1990The court held in International Shoe that: [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339, 343 , 85 L.Ed. 278 [(1940)]. 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 158 ; See also Masada Investment Corp., 697 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn.1985).

11990–1990
Sullivan v. Crowell green
tnwd · 1978
1 sentence

1982Here, the State's justification was to "`put the counties back together' by taking a small number of magisterial districts of a county and isolated in a legislative district and combining them with the larger number of other districts in the county to which they all belong." 444 F. Supp. at 610 .

11982–1982

Where else courts name it

NY 205 (1937–2026) TX 128 (1973–2025) CT 114 (1978–2026) IL 65 (1961–2026) LA 53 (1963–2022) CA 51 (1896–2026) CO 50 (1964–2026) NJ 48 (1960–2026) MN 45 (1896–2025) PA 43 (1964–2025) MI 33 (1979–2026) RI 30 (1951–2023) FL 27 (1967–2025) VT 27 (1993–2026) NC 25 (1963–2025) WI 25 (1922–2022) OH 24 (1968–2025) MD 23 (1957–2024) MO 20 (1963–2017) DC 18 (1966–2022) WA 18 (1967–2016) MA 18 (1929–2014) AK 18 (1977–2023) DE 16 (1979–2026) NM 15 (1992–2010) MT 15 (1983–2024) UT 14 (2000–2023) IA 13 (1973–2024) NH 12 (1975–2021) HI 12 (1960–2010) ME 12 (1972–2023) KS 12 (1974–2021) AL 11 (1967–2007) ID 10 (1969–2022) AZ 10 (1973–2022) OK 10 (1928–2019) OR 9 (1943–2021) TN 9 (1981–2017) IN 9 (1985–2025) NE 8 (1981–2024) GA 8 (1967–2013) WV 7 (1963–2001) SC 7 (1998–2023) VA 7 (1979–2010) SD 6 (1990–2025) AR 5 (1990–2019) WY 5 (1982–2017) MS 4 (2004–2014) KY 4 (1979–2026) ND 3 (1989–2000) NV 2 (2000–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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