Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Massor v. Yatesgreen2 sentences1943The rule is enunciated in the case of Massor v. Yates, 137 Or. 569, 572, 573 , 3 P. (2d) 784 , and, in commenting thereon, this court said: “ * * * This is a flexible rule and it does not make the landlord a guarantor of the safety of the tenant but obliges him only to use that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person engaged in the operation of an apartment house would have exercised under similar circumstances.” In concluding our discussion of this branch of the case, we quote the following from Eestatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, section 357: “A lessor of land is subject to li 1943The rule is enunciated in the case of Massor v. Yates, 137 Or. 569, 572, 573 , 3 P. (2d) 784 , and, in commenting thereon, this court said: “ * * * This is a flexible rule and it does not make the landlord a guarantor of the safety of the tenant but obliges him only to use that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person engaged in the operation of an apartment house would have exercised under similar circumstances.” In concluding our discussion of this branch of the case, we quote the following from Eestatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, section 357: “A lessor of land is subject to li | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Geist
green
2 sentences2017Instead, the court concluded that the flexible standard of “fundamental fairness” is the proper standard for deciding whether parents have received adequate repre- sentation in a termination case.6 Id. at 188-90 . 2017Instead, the court con- cluded that the flexible standard of “fundamental fairness” is the proper standard for deciding whether parents have received adequate representation in a termination case.6 Id. at 188-90 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp
red
1 sentence2021Quill, 504 US at 307-08 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Robinson v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services Division
neutral
2 sentences2018Accordingly, "[i]n the breath test context, we have ruled that the officer can insist that the test be conducted promptly. * * * In the urine test context, it is obvious that a more flexible standard must be applied." Robinson v. DMV , 191 Or. 2018App. 122 , 125-26, 80 P.3d 536 (2003). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences1995The Court noted that the common-law rule recognized that certain situations justified a failure to knock and announce before entry, such as where a threat of physical violence existed, where an officer was in pursuit of a recently escaped arrestee, or “where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given[.]” Id. at 1918-19 . 1995The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.” Id. at 1918 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Arizona v. Washington
green
2 sentences1979We believe, however, that even if cases involving the death or serious illness of the trial judge must be considered as within the "spectrum" as described in Arizona, so as to require application of the flexible standard of review as also described in that case, the facts of this case would place it at the "extreme end" of the "spectrum" as a case in which the trial judge would be allowed to exercise "broad discretion." ( See 434 U.S. at 509 , 98 S.Ct. 824 ) The record shows that Judge Dale did consider and reject the possible alternative of postponement of the trial, and for good reason becau 1979We believe, however, that even if cases involving the death or serious illness of the trial judge must be considered as within the "spectrum" as described in Arizona, so as to require application of the flexible standard of review as also described in that case, the facts of this case would place it at the "extreme end" of the "spectrum" as a case in which the trial judge would be allowed to exercise "broad discretion." ( See 434 U.S. at 509 , 98 S.Ct. 824 ) The record shows that Judge Dale did consider and reject the possible alternative of postponement of the trial, and for good reason becau | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Armstrong
green
2 sentences1977State v. Armstrong, 43 Or 207, 214-15 , 73 P 1022 (1903). 1977State v. Armstrong, 43 Or 207, 214-15 , 73 P 1022 (1903). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Matter of D.
green
1 sentence1976Moreover, after the orders involved in this case were entered, the Court of Appeals overruled the strict rule of Wade in F. v. C., 24 Or App 601 , 547 P2d 175 , rev denied (1976), in which it adopted a more flexible rule requiring independent counsel when, in the judgment of the trial court, it is necessary in the particular case for the protection of the child’s interests. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
F. v. C.
green
1 sentence1976Moreover, after the orders involved in this case were entered, the Court of Appeals overruled the strict rule of Wade in F. v. C., 24 Or App 601 , 547 P2d 175 , rev denied (1976), in which it adopted a more flexible rule requiring independent counsel when, in the judgment of the trial court, it is necessary in the particular case for the protection of the child’s interests. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.