flexible standard in California

2026Interest rates are unconscionable where, “in light of the totality of a transaction’s bargaining context,” they “are so ‘unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh’ as to be ‘unduly oppressive’ or ‘shock the conscience.’” (De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966, 973 .) “Unconscionability is a flexible standard in which the court looks not only at the complained-of term but also at the process by which the contractual parties arrived at the agreement and the larger context surrounding the contract, including its ‘commercial setting, purpose, and effect.’” (Id. at p. 976; see also id. at pp

2026The Legislature made this clear when it enacted section 22302—which applies the unconscionability doctrine to all consumer loans— at the same time that it lifted interest caps on loans exceeding $2,500.” (De La Torre, at pp. 976–977.) The Supreme Court rejected CashCall’s position as resting “on an assumed—but false—equivalence between interest rate caps and unconscionability.” (De La Torre, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 981 .) Instead, the high court held, unconscionability “is a flexible doctrine” that “requires more than just looking at one particular term in a contract, comparing it to a fixed be

2020Adoption proceedings could be jeopardized if the finality of a judgment . . . were uncertain.”].) As one court explained, although the result of this approach “will be harsh in some cases . . . [w]e have considered the desirability of a more flexible standard, but can formulate no rules for the applicability of such a standard under which we could confidently predict that more good would be done than harm.” (In re Isaac J. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 525, 534 .) Father’s motion nevertheless requests that the constructive filing doctrine should apply here and permit him to “extend” his timely notice o

2020Adoption proceedings could be jeopardized if the finality of a judgment . . . were uncertain.”].) As one court explained, although the result of this approach “will be harsh in some cases . . . [w]e have considered the desirability of a more flexible standard, but can formulate no rules for the applicability of such a standard under which we could confidently predict that more good would be done than harm.” (In re Isaac J. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 525, 534 .) Father’s motion nevertheless requests that the constructive filing doctrine should apply here and permit him to “extend” his timely notice o

1995(See Evers v. Dollinger, supra [1984] 95 N.J. 399 [ 471 A.2d 405 ]; Hamil v. Bashline [1978] 481 Pa. 256 [ 392 A.2d 1280 ].) But in the case of a genetically deformed child, it cannot be said that the hereditary condition was caused by the medical practitioner’s negligence when no degree of medical intervention could have worked a cure.

1995(See Evers v. Dollinger, supra [1984] 95 N.J. 399 [ 471 A.2d 405 ]; Hamil v. Bashline [1978] 481 Pa. 256 [ 392 A.2d 1280 ].) But in the case of a genetically deformed child, it cannot be said that the hereditary condition was caused by the medical practitioner’s negligence when no degree of medical intervention could have worked a cure.

1995(See Evers v. Dollinger, supra [1984] 95 N.J. 399 [ 471 A.2d 405 ]; Hamil v. Bashline [1978] 481 Pa. 256 [ 392 A.2d 1280 ].) But in the case of a genetically deformed child, it cannot be said that the hereditary condition was caused by the medical practitioner’s negligence when no degree of medical intervention could have worked a cure.

1995(See Evers v. Dollinger, supra [1984] 95 N.J. 399 [ 471 A.2d 405 ]; Hamil v. Bashline [1978] 481 Pa. 256 [ 392 A.2d 1280 ].) But in the case of a genetically deformed child, it cannot be said that the hereditary condition was caused by the medical practitioner’s negligence when no degree of medical intervention could have worked a cure.

2022(People v. Loker (2008) 44 Ca1.4th 691, 747.) Moreover, Remmer does “not stand for the proposition that any time evidence of juror bias comes to light, due process requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged to have bias.” (Tracey v. Palmateer (9th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 .) Instead, Remmer has been construed as “providing a flexible rule.” (Ibid.) Thus, a full “evidentiary hearing is not mandated every time there is an allegation of jury misconduct or bias. [Citation.] Rather, in determining whether a hearing must be held, the court must consider the content of the allegati

2022(People v. Loker (2008) 44 Ca1.4th 691, 747.) Moreover, Remmer does “not stand for the proposition that any time evidence of juror bias comes to light, due process requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged to have bias.” (Tracey v. Palmateer (9th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 .) Instead, Remmer has been construed as “providing a flexible rule.” (Ibid.) Thus, a full “evidentiary hearing is not mandated every time there is an allegation of jury misconduct or bias. [Citation.] Rather, in determining whether a hearing must be held, the court must consider the content of the allegati

2022(Remmer, supra, 347 U.S. at p. 228 .) In that context, the high court 13 concluded the trial court erred by ruling ex parte on whether there was juror misconduct without first notifying the defendant.

2022(Remmer, supra, 347 U.S. at p. 228 .) In that context, the high court 13 concluded the trial court erred by ruling ex parte on whether there was juror misconduct without first notifying the defendant.

2022(People v. Loker (2008) 44 Ca1.4th 691, 747.) Moreover, Remmer does “not stand for the proposition that any time evidence of juror bias comes to light, due process requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged to have bias.” (Tracey v. Palmateer (9th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 .) Instead, Remmer has been construed as “providing a flexible rule.” (Ibid.) Thus, a full “evidentiary hearing is not mandated every time there is an allegation of jury misconduct or bias. [Citation.] Rather, in determining whether a hearing must be held, the court must consider the content of the allegati

2022(People v. Loker (2008) 44 Ca1.4th 691, 747.) Moreover, Remmer does “not stand for the proposition that any time evidence of juror bias comes to light, due process requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged to have bias.” (Tracey v. Palmateer (9th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 .) Instead, Remmer has been construed as “providing a flexible rule.” (Ibid.) Thus, a full “evidentiary hearing is not mandated every time there is an allegation of jury misconduct or bias. [Citation.] Rather, in determining whether a hearing must be held, the court must consider the content of the allegati

2019(Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1147 .) This is because “[u]nconscionability is a flexible standard in which the court looks not only at the complained-of term but also at the process by which the contractual parties arrived at the agreement and constituted an abuse of discretion’ [citation], or a mistake of law.”].) Nonetheless, we will exercise our discretion to consider the issue, as its resolution impacts UFAA’s other claims. 17 the larger context surrounding the contract, including its ‘commercial setting, purpose, and effect.’ [Citations.]” (De La Torre v. Cash

2019(Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1147 .) This is because “[u]nconscionability is a flexible standard in which the court looks not only at the complained-of term but also at the process by which the contractual parties arrived at the agreement and constituted an abuse of discretion’ [citation], or a mistake of law.”].) Nonetheless, we will exercise our discretion to consider the issue, as its resolution impacts UFAA’s other claims. 17 the larger context surrounding the contract, including its ‘commercial setting, purpose, and effect.’ [Citations.]” (De La Torre v. Cash

2019(Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1147 .) This is because “[u]nconscionability is a flexible standard in which the court looks not only at the complained-of term but also at the process by which the contractual parties arrived at the agreement and constituted an abuse of discretion’ [citation], or a mistake of law.”].) Nonetheless, we will exercise our discretion to consider the issue, as its resolution impacts UFAA’s other claims. 17 the larger context surrounding the contract, including its ‘commercial setting, purpose, and effect.’ [Citations.]” (De La Torre v. Cash

2018It is meant to ensure that in circumstances indicating an absence of meaningful choice, contracts do not specify terms that are "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." ( Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 910 , 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 ; A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473 , 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 ( A & M Produce ) ["Unconscionability is a flexible doctrine designed to allow courts to directly consider numerous factors which may adulterate the contractual process."].) It is true that unconscionability has been subject to

2013Law enforcement officers may arrest a qualified patient for marijuana offenses where they have probable cause, based on all of the surrounding facts including qualified patient status, when they have reason to believe, for instance, that the arrestee does not possess marijuana for his personal medical purposes.” (People v. Strasburg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058 ; see Giannis v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 219, 225 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 145 ] [probable cause is properly decided on summary judgment].) The most salient fact here is the vast quantity of marijuana found gr

2013Law enforcement officers may arrest a qualified patient for marijuana offenses where they have probable cause, based on 8 all of the surrounding facts including qualified patient status, when they have reason to believe, for instance, that the arrestee does not possess marijuana for his personal medical purposes.” (People v. Strasburg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058 ; see Giannis v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 219, 225 [probable cause is properly decided on summary judgment].) The most salient fact here is the vast quantity of marijuana found growing on the Littlef

2006"The balancing standard considers the private interest that will be affected by the agency's action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest, the interest in informing parents of the basis for and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story, and the agency's interest in expeditious decisionmaking as affected by the burden caused by an additional procedural requirement. [Citation.]" ( In re James Q., supra, 81 Cal. App.4th at p. 267 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 .) At this stage in the proceedings, where the focus remains on family reunification, "due

2006“The balancing standard considers the private interest that will be affected by the agency’s action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest, the interest in informing parents of the basis for and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story, and the agency’s interest in expeditious decisionmaking as affected by the burden caused by an additional procedural requirement. [Citation.]” (In re James Q., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 267 .) At this stage in the proceedings, where the focus remains on family reunification, “due process requires the j

1985The Thrifty court concluded that although in the ordinary and usual case of the permanent and full-time employee the statutory objective is well served by the standard formula of subdivision (a) in determining earning capacity, there is “no logical or legal basis for penalizing full-time permanent employees by ‘locking them into’ subdivision (a) and uniformly denying them the benefits of the more flexible test of subdivision (d).” ( 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 944 .) Consequently, it was held that “where, as here, there is specific demonstrable evidence that the injured employee, would, but for the in

1985Appeals Bd. (1975) 46 Cal. App.3d 146 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 199 ]. *216 The Thrifty court concluded that although in the ordinary and usual case of the permanent and full-time employee the statutory objective is well served by the standard formula of subdivision (a) in determining earning capacity, there is "no logical or legal basis for penalizing full-time permanent employees by `locking them into' subdivision (a) and uniformly denying them the benefits of the more flexible test of subdivision (d)." ( 95 Cal. App.3d at p. 944 .) Consequently, it was held that "where, as here, there is specific de

2025(Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1052 (conc. opn. of Werdegar J.).) She rejected that merely “the question why a meal period was missed renders meal period claims categorically uncertifiable.” (Ibid.) She instead proposed a flexible standard, stating that “whether in a given case affirmative defenses should lead a court to approve or reject certification will hinge on the manageability of any individual issues,” leaving the question “for the trial court to decide on remand, in the fullness of its discretion.” (Id. at pp. 1054–1055.) As the high court subsequently explained in Donohue, althoug

2022(See, e.g., Brown & Bryant, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 247 , 251–252 [“whether prosecution of an action was impossible, impracticable, or futile is a matter within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown”].) But upon a determination that such a condition exists, there is no ambiguity in the statute about whether that time should be excluded. 6 The evident purpose of section 583.340 is to ensure that plaintiffs do not face mandatory dismissal under section 583.310 before they have had five years

2021It is meant to ensure that in circumstances indicating an absence of meaningful choice, contracts do not specify terms that are ‘overly harsh,’ ‘unduly oppressive,’ or ‘so one-sided as to shock the conscience.’ [Citations.]” (De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966, 982 .) Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be shown for the defense to be established, but “ ‘they need not be present in the same degree.’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 .) “ ‘The procedural element addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppress

2018(Contra West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Finance Loans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 793 , 469 P.2d 665 [deciding only that a statute making interest rate caps inapplicable to loans over $5,000 means that plaintiff's usury claim must fail]; Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 564 , 203 P.2d 758 [similar]; Raysinger v. Peoples Inv. & Loan Assn. (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 248 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 163 [similar].) And for good reason, as the argument belies a misunderstanding as to what unconscionability means. *982 Unconscionability is a flexible doctrine.

2018(Contra West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Finance Loans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 793 , 469 P.2d 665 [deciding only that a statute making interest rate caps inapplicable to loans over $5,000 means that plaintiff's usury claim must fail]; Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 564 , 203 P.2d 758 [similar]; Raysinger v. Peoples Inv. & Loan Assn. (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 248 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 163 [similar].) And for good reason, as the argument belies a misunderstanding as to what unconscionability means. *982 Unconscionability is a flexible doctrine.

2018It is meant to ensure that in circumstances indicating an absence of meaningful choice, contracts do not specify terms that are "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." ( Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 910 , 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 ; A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473 , 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 ( A & M Produce ) ["Unconscionability is a flexible doctrine designed to allow courts to directly consider numerous factors which may adulterate the contractual process."].) It is true that unconscionability has been subject to

2018It is meant to ensure that in circumstances indicating an absence of meaningful choice, contracts do not specify terms that are "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." ( Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 910 , 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 ; A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473 , 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 ( A & M Produce ) ["Unconscionability is a flexible doctrine designed to allow courts to directly consider numerous factors which may adulterate the contractual process."].) It is true that unconscionability has been subject to

2018(See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1305 , 1317-1319, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ( Morris ) [documenting the use of the two approaches in California]; Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807 , 817-820, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 623 P.2d 165 [explaining the older approach to finding unconscionability]; A & M Produce , supra , 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486-487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 [explaining the alternative framework that has been described as conforming more closely to the UCC]; Perdue , supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 925, fn. 9 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 [stating that both app

2018(See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1305 , 1317-1319, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ( Morris ) [documenting the use of the two approaches in California]; Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807 , 817-820, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 623 P.2d 165 [explaining the older approach to finding unconscionability]; A & M Produce , supra , 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486-487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 [explaining the alternative framework that has been described as conforming more closely to the UCC]; Perdue , supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 925, fn. 9 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 [stating that both app

2018(See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1305 , 1317-1319, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ( Morris ) [documenting the use of the two approaches in California]; Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807 , 817-820, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 623 P.2d 165 [explaining the older approach to finding unconscionability]; A & M Produce , supra , 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486-487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 [explaining the alternative framework that has been described as conforming more closely to the UCC]; Perdue , supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 925, fn. 9 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 [stating that both app

2018(See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1305 , 1317-1319, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ( Morris ) [documenting the use of the two approaches in California]; Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807 , 817-820, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 623 P.2d 165 [explaining the older approach to finding unconscionability]; A & M Produce , supra , 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486-487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 [explaining the alternative framework that has been described as conforming more closely to the UCC]; Perdue , supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 925, fn. 9 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 [stating that both app