flexible standard in Colorado

2015“Probable cause is a flexible standard deriving from a common sense concept of reasonableness.” People v. Grazier, 992 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Colo. 2000).

2015"Probable cause is a flexible standard deriving from a common sense concept of reasonableness." People v. Grazier, 992 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Colo. 2000).

2008This notice requirement establishes "a flexible standard aimed at providing fair notice to the public." Benson v. McCormick, 195 Colo. 381, 383 , 578 P.2d 651, 653 (1978); see maj. op. at 1152.

2008This notice requirement establishes "a flexible standard aimed at providing fair notice to the public." Benson v. McCormick, 195 Colo. 381, 383 , 578 P.2d 651, 653 (1978); see maj. op. at 1152.

2015Because “[p]robability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,” Gall, 30 P.3d at 149 , probable cause is measured not by “a ‘more likely true than false’ level of certitude,” but by a “common­sense, nontechnical standard of reasonable cause to believe,” People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion)).

1992A. “[PJrobable cause is a flexible standard which is to be measured ... by a commonsense, nontechnical standard of reasonable cause to believe.” People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo.1988).

1981Due process is a flexible standard and recognizes that “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” Id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Chiappe v. State Personnel Board, Colo., 622 P.2d 527 (1981); People v. Taylor, supra; In re Franklin, 7 Cal.3d 126 , 101 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 496 P.2d 465 (1972).

1981Due process is a flexible standard and recognizes that “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” Id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Chiappe v. State Personnel Board, Colo., 622 P.2d 527 (1981); People v. Taylor, supra; In re Franklin, 7 Cal.3d 126 , 101 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 496 P.2d 465 (1972).

2015Because “[p]robability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,” Gall, 30 P.3d at 149 , probable cause is measured not by “a ‘more likely true than false’ level of certitude,” but by a “common­sense, nontechnical standard of reasonable cause to believe,” People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion)).

2015Because "[plrobability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment," Gall, 30 P.3d at 149 , probable cause is measured not by "a 'more likely true than false' level of certitude," but by a "common-sense, nontechnical standard of reasonable cause to believe," People v. Melgosa, 753 P.24 221, 225 (Colo.1988) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 (plurality opinion)).

2004People v. Garlotte, supra. Here, again, defendant's argument is premised on his claim that the Act is a civil commitment statute, which we already have rejected.

2003People v. Garlotte, 958 P.2d 469 (Colo.App.1997).

2025Due diligence is a flexible standard that doesn’t require a department to “succeed in 2 its efforts or exhaust every possible option in attempting to do so.” H.J.B. v. People in Interest of A-J.A.B., 2023 CO 48, ¶ 58 . ¶8 Whether a department satisfied its due diligence obligation is left to the juvenile court’s sound discretion.

2025Under those circumstances, the court must direct the department to “exercise due diligence in gathering additional information that would assist the court in determining whether there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” Id.; see also H.J.B. v. People in Interest of A-J.A.B., 2023 CO 48, ¶ 5 . ¶8 Due diligence under section 19-1-126(3) is a flexible standard that does not require the department to “succeed in its efforts” or “exhaust every possible option in attempting to do so.” H.J.B., ¶ 58.

2000Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2598 , 38 LEd.2d 484 (1972); Carberry v. Adams County Task Force on Alcoholism, 672 P.2d 206 (Colo.1983).

1987E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Carberry v. Adams County Task Force on Alcoholism, 672 P.2d 206, 210 (1983); People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d at 1046 .

1995People v. Edwards, 836 P.2d 468 (Colo.1992). *446 A. In the context of a search or seizure, probable cause is a flexible standard.

1995People v. Edwards, 836 P.2d 468, 472 (Colo.1992).

2026LaFleur, ¶ 50; see Hogsett, ¶ 50 (Whether a common law marriage exists calls for “a flexible inquiry into the totality of the circumstances that relies on the factfinder’s credibility determinations and weight of the evidence.”); In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003) (recognizing that the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within the trial court’s sole discretion).

2025People v. Pourat, 100 P.3d 503, 505 (Colo. App. 2004).

2025See A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 28 .

2021Claim Appeals Off., 207 P.3d 895, 899 (Colo. App. 2009); see also Kroupa v. Indus.

2013This "variant of the exigent circumstances exception requires a showing of an immediate crisis inside the home and the probability that police assistance will be helpful in alleviating that eri-sis." Winpigler, 8 P.3d at 446 (citing People v. Malezewski, 744 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1987)).