flexible doctrine in Minnesota

2012“As a flexible doctrine, the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom estoppel is urged.” Id. at 613-14 .

1996“As a flexible doctrine, the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom estop-pel is urged.” Id. at 613-14 .

1990As a flexible doctrine, “the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom estop-pel is urged.” Id. at 613-14 (citing Jeffers v. Convoy Co., 636 F.Supp. 1337, 1339 (D.Minn.1986)).

1990As a flexible doctrine, "the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom estoppel is urged." Id. at 613-14 (citing Jeffers v. Convoy Co., 636 F.Supp. 1337, 1339 (D.Minn.1986)). *636 The parties agree that the issue of Houlihan's liability is identical in both proceedings and thus the first prong of Johnson/Ellis is met.

2006Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1984) (stating that collateral estoppel is not rigidly applied and “is qualified or rejected when [its] application would contravene an overriding public policy”) (quoting Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.1971)); see also Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.1996) (noting that “collateral es-toppel is not rigidly applied” and stating that “[a]s a flexible doctrine, the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom estop-pel is urged”) (quoting Johnson v. Consol.

1995See Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613-14 (Minn.1988); AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1984).

2006Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1984) (stating that collateral estoppel is not rigidly applied and “is qualified or rejected when [its] application would contravene an overriding public policy”) (quoting Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.1971)); see also Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.1996) (noting that “collateral es-toppel is not rigidly applied” and stating that “[a]s a flexible doctrine, the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom estop-pel is urged”) (quoting Johnson v. Consol.

2002In Aufderhar , the supreme court stated the four elements generally required for collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the es-topped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue. 452 N.W.2d at 650 (citation omitted); see also, Falgren v. State, Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.1996) (noting that collateral estoppel is not rigidly applied, and, “[a]s a flexi

2003Humphrey, 402 N.W.2d at 543 (stating in a parenthetical to a Cf citation of Jenson that “this court, utilizing presumptions, adopted a flexible test for disqualification for a ‘substantial relationship’ between a current and prior client representation”).

2003Humphrey, 402 N.W.2d at 543 (stating in a parenthetical to a Cf. citation of Jenson that "this court, utilizing presumptions, adopted a flexible test for disqualification for a `substantial relationship' between a current and prior client representation").

1991Sachs v. Chiat, 281 Minn. 540, 546 , 162 N.W.2d 243, 247 (1968).

1991Sachs v. Chiat, 281 Minn. 540, 546 , 162 N.W.2d 243, 247 (1968).

2025See, e.g., Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 632–42; Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 823–24; Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996); State ex rel.

2025See, e.g., Wensmann, 734 N.W.2d at 632–42; Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 823–24; Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996); State ex rel.

2016See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 , 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (recognizing that voting is a fundamental, but not absolute, right and that the interests of states in “assur[ing] that elections are operated equitably and efficiently” requires “a more flexible standard” when reviewing voting regulations); Clark v. Pawlenty, 755 N.W.2d 293, 311 (Minn. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has employed a flexible approach in which the level of scrutiny is determined by the degree to which 'voters’ rights are adversely affected by the challenged regulation.”). 4 *471 Specifically, we

2016See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 , 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (recognizing that voting is a fundamental, but not absolute, right and that the interests of states in “assur[ing] that elections are operated equitably and efficiently” requires “a more flexible standard” when reviewing voting regulations); Clark v. Pawlenty, 755 N.W.2d 293, 311 (Minn. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has employed a flexible approach in which the level of scrutiny is determined by the degree to which 'voters’ rights are adversely affected by the challenged regulation.”). 4 *471 Specifically, we

2016See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 , 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (recognizing that voting is a fundamental, but not absolute, right and that the interests of states in “assur[ing] that elections are operated equitably and efficiently” requires “a more flexible standard” when reviewing voting regulations); Clark v. Pawlenty, 755 N.W.2d 293, 311 (Minn. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has employed a flexible approach in which the level of scrutiny is determined by the degree to which 'voters’ rights are adversely affected by the challenged regulation.”). 4 *471 Specifically, we

2014See, e.g., Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136 (considering CRI’s proven track record and the corroboration of details about a vehicle and its occupants); State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008) (considering firsthand observations and corroboration of defendant’s name, nickname, physical description, gang affiliation, and vehicle information); State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (Minn. App. 2004) (considering CRI’s track record, firsthand knowledge, corroboration of suspect’s clothing, vehicle information, time and place of arrival, and correlation of the suspect’s given name with his

2014See, e.g., Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136 (considering CRI’s proven track record and the corroboration of details about a vehicle and its occupants); State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008) (considering firsthand observations and corroboration of defendant’s name, nickname, physical description, gang affiliation, and vehicle information); State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (Minn. App. 2004) (considering CRI’s track record, firsthand knowledge, corroboration of suspect’s clothing, vehicle information, time and place of arrival, and correlation of the suspect’s given name with his

2014See, e.g., Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136 (considering CRI’s proven track record and the corroboration of details about a vehicle and its occupants); State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn. App. 2008) (considering firsthand observations and corroboration of defendant’s name, nickname, physical description, gang affiliation, and vehicle information); State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (Minn. App. 2004) (considering CRI’s track record, firsthand knowledge, corroboration of suspect’s clothing, vehicle information, time and place of arrival, and correlation of the suspect’s given name with his

2012See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir.2008) (“Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla are not new law under Teague [because] Strickland set forth the paradigmatic example of a rule of general application; it establishes a broad and flexible standard for the review of an attorney’s performance in a variety of factual circumstances.”); Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1143-44 (9th Cir.2007) (“Each time that a court delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’ requires of defense attorneys with respect to a particular aspect of client representation, it can hardly be thought to have c

2012See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir.2008) (“Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla are not new law under Teague [because] Strickland set forth the paradigmatic example of a rule of general application; it establishes a broad and flexible standard for the review of an attorney’s performance in a variety of factual circumstances.”); Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1143-44 (9th Cir.2007) (“Each time that a court delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’ requires of defense attorneys with respect to a particular aspect of client representation, it can hardly be thought to have c

2012See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir.2008) (“Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla are not new law under Teague [because] Strickland set forth the paradigmatic example of a rule of general application; it establishes a broad and flexible standard for the review of an attorney’s performance in a variety of factual circumstances.”); Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1143-44 (9th Cir.2007) (“Each time that a court delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’ requires of defense attorneys with respect to a particular aspect of client representation, it can hardly be thought to have c

2010See State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn. 2009) (“We have no opportunity to ignore part of the legislature’s definition.”).

2009Although we cannot grant relief from the injunction in this case, we have recognized that mootness is a flexible doctrine, and we will not dismiss a matter as moot if the case "implicates issues that are capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review,” Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn.2005).

2006Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1984) (stating that collateral estoppel is not rigidly applied and “is qualified or rejected when [its] application would contravene an overriding public policy”) (quoting Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.1971)); see also Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.1996) (noting that “collateral es-toppel is not rigidly applied” and stating that “[a]s a flexible doctrine, the focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom estop-pel is urged”) (quoting Johnson v. Consol.

2002In Aufderhar , the supreme court stated the four elements generally required for collateral estoppel to apply: (1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the es-topped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue. 452 N.W.2d at 650 (citation omitted); see also, Falgren v. State, Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn.1996) (noting that collateral estoppel is not rigidly applied, and, “[a]s a flexi

2000See id. at 936 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 .

2000See id. at 936 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 .

1997The manifest necessity standard “is a flexible standard which seeks fairness to the defendant, the government, and the public interest alike.” United States v. Givens, 88 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir.1996).

1997The manifest necessity standard "is a flexible standard which seeks fairness to the defendant, the government, and the public interest alike." United States v. Givens, 88 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 1996).