flexible rule in Pennsylvania

2025The High Court abandoned that mechanical approach in favor of a more flexible rule which permits the place “having the most interest in the problem,” based on a particular factual context, control of the legal issues and allows for application of the policy of the jurisdiction “most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation.” Id. at 806 (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

2014Id.” This flexible approach was first adopted by our Supreme Court in Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964), which held at 203 A.2d 805 -806: “Thus, after careful review and consideration of the leading authorities and cases, we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.

2015See Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 322 , 972 A.2d 487 , 500 n. 5 (2009); compare Jones Memorial Baptist Church v. Brackeen, 416 Pa. 599 , 207 A.2d 861 (1965), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 117 S.Ct. 2312 , 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997).

2015See Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 322 , 972 A.2d 487 , 500 n. 5 (2009); compare Jones Memorial Baptist Church v. Brackeen, 416 Pa. 599 , 207 A.2d 861 (1965), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 117 S.Ct. 2312 , 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997).

2015See Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 322 , 972 A.2d 487 , 500 n. 5 (2009); compare Jones Memorial Baptist Church v. Brackeen, 416 Pa. 599 , 207 A.2d 861 (1965), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 117 S.Ct. 2312 , 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997).

2015See Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 322 , 972 A.2d 487 , 500 n. 5 (2009); compare Jones Memorial Baptist Church v. Brackeen, 416 Pa. 599 , 207 A.2d 861 (1965), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 117 S.Ct. 2312 , 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997).

2021Now echoed in harmony with the eminent criminal-law probable cause standard pronounced in Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 234-38 , the importance of Camara’s proportional balancing test is not overstated: [In Camara] the Court has taken the view that the evidentiary requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not a rigid standard, requiring precisely the same quantum of evidence in all cases, but instead is a flexible standard, [J-39A-2021 and J-39B-2021] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 26 permitting consideration of the public and individual interests as they are reflected in the facts of a particular case.

2021Now echoed in harmony with the eminent criminal-law probable cause standard pronounced in Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 234-38 , the importance of Camara’s proportional balancing test is not overstated: [In Camara] the Court has taken the view that the evidentiary requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not a rigid standard, requiring precisely the same quantum of evidence in all cases, but instead is a flexible standard, [J-39A-2021 and J-39B-2021] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 26 permitting consideration of the public and individual interests as they are reflected in the facts of a particular case.

1999Instead, the Court announced a more flexible test and held that, "the amount of depreciation, if any, to be considered *70 in determining the availability of net income for the purposes of alimony and support awards is best left to the court's discretion `determined from all of the circumstances including the amount of depreciation claimed and the property depreciated.'" [2] Id., 307 A.2d at 152 [3] (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

1999Instead, the Court announced a more flexible test and held that, "the amount of depreciation, if any, to be considered *70 in determining the availability of net income for the purposes of alimony and support awards is best left to the court's discretion `determined from all of the circumstances including the amount of depreciation claimed and the property depreciated.'" [2] Id., 307 A.2d at 152 [3] (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

1986See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Wilkins v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 93 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 367 , 502 A.2d 283 (1985).

1986See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Wilkins v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 93 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 367 , 502 A.2d 283 (1985).

2022Given this reality, the flexible doctrine of primary jurisdiction “creates a workable relationship between the courts and administrative agencies wherein, in appropriate circumstances, the courts can have the benefit of the agency's views on issues within the agency's competence.” Id. at 376 (internal citation omitted).

2009Id. ¶ 39 Finally, we note that “[p]rimary jurisdiction is a flexible doctrine, designed to coordinate the work of agencies and courts.” Com., Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 469 Pa. 578, 593-94 , 367 A.2d 222, 230 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 1600 , 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977).

2009Id. ¶ 39 Finally, we note that “[p]rimary jurisdiction is a flexible doctrine, designed to coordinate the work of agencies and courts.” Com., Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 469 Pa. 578, 593-94 , 367 A.2d 222, 230 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 1600 , 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977).

2009Id. ¶ 39 Finally, we note that “[p]rimary jurisdiction is a flexible doctrine, designed to coordinate the work of agencies and courts.” Com., Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 469 Pa. 578, 593-94 , 367 A.2d 222, 230 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 , 97 S.Ct. 1600 , 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977).

1982Estoppel is a flexible doctrine “used to protect the reasonable expectations of the party who relies on another’s course of conduct to the former’s detriment in order to insure fundamentally fair dealing.” Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 71 , 423 A. 2d 713, 720 (1980).

1982Estoppel is a flexible doctrine “used to protect the reasonable expectations of the party who relies on another’s course of conduct to the former’s detriment in order to insure fundamentally fair dealing.” Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 71 , 423 A. 2d 713, 720 (1980).

2023Expert testimony about false confessions is inadmissible, expert testimony about eyewitness misidentification is not inadmissible, expert testimony about victim responses to sexual violence may or may not be inadmissible, and Isuppose we will address other kinds of experts another day. 29 Indeed, Justice Mundy foreshadows that today's appeal is but "the latest expert-testimony dispute in the Walker line." 30 28 Walker, 92 A.3d at 791 ("A more flexible framework strikes a crucial balance in determining the admission of expert testimony, as well as between protecting a defendant's rights while e

2022The doctrine “‘requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme.’” Weston v. Reading Co., 282 A.2d 714, 723 (Pa. 1971), quoting United States v. Phila.

2021See Middaugh, 196 A.3d at 1087-88 .

2019See id.

2015See Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 322 , 972 A.2d 487 , 500 n. 5 (2009); compare Jones Memorial Baptist Church v. Brackeen, 416 Pa. 599 , 207 A.2d 861 (1965), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 117 S.Ct. 2312 , 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997).

2015See Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 601 Pa. 322 , 972 A.2d 487 , 500 n. 5 (2009); compare Jones Memorial Baptist Church v. Brackeen, 416 Pa. 599 , 207 A.2d 861 (1965), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 , 117 S.Ct. 2312 , 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997).

2006See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 , 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (noting that the full Court agreed in Anderson that "a more flexible standard applies.”).

2006See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 , 112 S.Ct. 2059 , 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (noting that the full Court agreed in Anderson that "a more flexible standard applies.”).

2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s

2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s

2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan,

2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s