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11 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'ngreen1 sentence2013See Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass’n, 293 Kan. 446, 458 , 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (legislature’s revision of existing law creates presumption that legislature intended to change prea-mendment law). | 1 | 1 |
Brennan v. KANSAS INS. GUAR. ASS'Ngreen1 sentence2013See Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass’n, 293 Kan. 446, 458 , 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (legislature’s revision of existing law creates presumption that legislature intended to change prea-mendment law). | 1 | 1 |
Tankersley v. Durishgreen1 sentence1997Furthermore, it has been observed that collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine which can never be rigidly or mechanically applied.” Finally, in Tankersley v. Durish, 855 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. App. 1993), a case where a third parly alleged that neither party to the first action could relitigate a matter, the court noted: “Courts disfavor applying collateral estoppel in the context of a pure question of law.” In deciding that collateral estoppel did not apply and that the state court should consider the merits of the case under Texas law, the court also pointed out that absent application of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley
green
2 sentences2015Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley, 244 Kan. 555, 562 , 770 P.2d 466 (1989) (citing NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 , 93 S. Ct. 2591 , 37 L. 2015Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley, 244 Kan. 555, 562 , 770 P.2d 466 (1989) (citing NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 , 93 S. Ct. 2591 , 37 L. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. New York
green
2 sentences2015Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley, 244 Kan. 555, 562 , 770 P.2d 466 (1989) (citing NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 , 93 S. Ct. 2591 , 37 L. 2015Mohr v. State Bank of Stanley, 244 Kan. 555, 562 , 770 P.2d 466 (1989) (citing NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 , 93 S. Ct. 2591 , 37 L. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1983And that minimum right is measured by a flexible standard which takes account of all the circumstances.’ (p. 813.)” The United States Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo, 407 *594 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), adopted a balancing test to determine whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial had been denied. 1983And that minimum right is measured by a flexible standard which takes account of all the circumstances.’ (p. 813.)” The United States Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo, 407 *594 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), adopted a balancing test to determine whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial had been denied. | 2 | 1974–1983 |
State v. King
green
1 sentence2016Indeed, the King court—which articulated a less flexible rule that evidentiary claims must be preserved for appeal by way of a contemporaneous objection at trial— refused to consider for the first time on appeal an alleged constitutional violation of the defendant's right to remain silent. 288 Kan. at 339-40 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008The concurrence would opt for a more flexible standard, e.g., “the degree of need sufficient to justify denial of the motion to quash will vary to some extent with the burden of producing the requested information.” 498 U.S. at 305 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
1 sentence1999Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services
green
2 sentences1999Dr. Thomas relies on McCart v. Muir, 230 Kan. 618 , 641 P.2d 384 (1982), to support his position; however, the Kansas Supreme Court in Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan. 503 , 701 P.2d 939 (1985), established a more flexible standard for determining pecuniary loss than the one stated in McCart . 1999Dr. Thomas relies on McCart v. Muir, 230 Kan. 618 , 641 P.2d 384 (1982), to support his position; however, the Kansas Supreme Court in Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan. 503 , 701 P.2d 939 (1985), established a more flexible standard for determining pecuniary loss than the one stated in McCart . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
McCart v. Muir
green
2 sentences1999Dr. Thomas relies on McCart v. Muir, 230 Kan. 618 , 641 P.2d 384 (1982), to support his position; however, the Kansas Supreme Court in Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan. 503 , 701 P.2d 939 (1985), established a more flexible standard for determining pecuniary loss than the one stated in McCart . 1999Dr. Thomas relies on McCart v. Muir, 230 Kan. 618 , 641 P.2d 384 (1982), to support his position; however, the Kansas Supreme Court in Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan. 503 , 701 P.2d 939 (1985), established a more flexible standard for determining pecuniary loss than the one stated in McCart . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Smith
green
1 sentence1979And that minimum right is measured by a flexible standard which takes account of all the circumstances.” (p. 813.)’ (p. 616.)” 215 Kan. at 39 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Hemminger
green
2 sentences1974And that minimum right is measured by a flexible standard which takes account of all the circumstances.’ (p. 813.)” (p. 616.) In State v. Otero, 210 Kan. 530 , 502 P. 2d 763 , it is said: “A defendant’s right to a [constitutional] speedy trial cannot be established by any fixed inflexible rule but is to be determined by the balancing of a number of factors in which the conduct of both prosecution and defendant is weighed.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) “The prejudice resulting to an accused from long delay in bringing criminal charges to trial is not limited to, but may be quite apart from that which impairs hi 1974And that minimum right is measured by a flexible standard which takes account of all the circumstances.’ (p. 813.)” (p. 616.) In State v. Otero, 210 Kan. 530 , 502 P. 2d 763 , it is said: “A defendant’s right to a [constitutional] speedy trial cannot be established by any fixed inflexible rule but is to be determined by the balancing of a number of factors in which the conduct of both prosecution and defendant is weighed.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) “The prejudice resulting to an accused from long delay in bringing criminal charges to trial is not limited to, but may be quite apart from that which impairs hi | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Otero
green
2 sentences1974And that minimum right is measured by a flexible standard which takes account of all the circumstances.’ (p. 813.)” (p. 616.) In State v. Otero, 210 Kan. 530 , 502 P. 2d 763 , it is said: “A defendant’s right to a [constitutional] speedy trial cannot be established by any fixed inflexible rule but is to be determined by the balancing of a number of factors in which the conduct of both prosecution and defendant is weighed.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) “The prejudice resulting to an accused from long delay in bringing criminal charges to trial is not limited to, but may be quite apart from that which impairs hi 1974And that minimum right is measured by a flexible standard which takes account of all the circumstances.’ (p. 813.)” (p. 616.) In State v. Otero, 210 Kan. 530 , 502 P. 2d 763 , it is said: “A defendant’s right to a [constitutional] speedy trial cannot be established by any fixed inflexible rule but is to be determined by the balancing of a number of factors in which the conduct of both prosecution and defendant is weighed.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) “The prejudice resulting to an accused from long delay in bringing criminal charges to trial is not limited to, but may be quite apart from that which impairs hi | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.