14 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State, in the Interest of E.R.green2 sentences2006See, e.g., In re E.R., 2000 UT App 143, ¶ 12 , 2 P.3d 948 (noting that "in some contexts we have employed a more flexible standard when cases involve the best interests of children”). . 2006See, e.g., In re E.R., 2000 UT App 143, ¶ 12 , 2 P.3d 948 (noting that "in some contexts we have employed a more flexible standard when cases involve the best interests of children"). [3] K.M.'s companion argument that we should reach these issues under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis is also inadequately briefed. | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Ergreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., In re E.R., 2000 UT App 143, ¶ 12 , 2 P.3d 948 (noting that "in some contexts we have employed a more flexible standard when cases involve the best interests of children”). . 2006See, e.g., In re E.R., 2000 UT App 143, ¶ 12 , 2 P.3d 948 (noting that "in some contexts we have employed a more flexible standard when cases involve the best interests of children"). [3] K.M.'s companion argument that we should reach these issues under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis is also inadequately briefed. | 2 | 2 |
Gillmor v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2004TH. argues, on the other hand, that in light of the law of the case doctrine, Judge Jones was bound by Judge Taylor's prior order and was powerless to deviate from it. 122 While T.H.'s rigid view of the doctrine is often advanced by parties who would benefit from its application, we reiterate that the law of the case doctrine is a flexible principle-not an absolute limit on the court's power nor " 'an inexorable command that rigidly binds a court to its former decisions. " Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 2004T.H. argues, on the other hand, that in light of the law of the case doctrine, Judge Jones was bound by Judge Taylor's prior order and was powerless to deviate from it. ¶ 22 While T.H.'s rigid view of the doctrine is often advanced by parties who would benefit from its application, we reiterate that the law of the case doctrine is a flexible principle-not an absolute limit on the court's power nor "`an inexorable command that rigidly binds a court to its former decisions.'" Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Wright v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2000See Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 651-52 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 2000See Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 651-52 (Utah Ct.App.1997). | 2 | 2 |
Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundationgreen1 sentence2022Additionally, our court has ―adopt[ed] the rule that preinjury releases for recreational activities are not invalid under the public interest exception.‖ Pearce, 2008 UT 13, ¶ 21 (emphasis added). ¶40 The County gloms onto this recreational distinction and suggests that ―[t]raining and education, while not exactly the same as recreational activities, are certainly more like recreation than operational functions like rescuing a hostage or stopping a gunman. | 1 | 1 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.green1 sentence2012See id. 1 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Low v. City of Monticellogreen2 sentences2006See Low v. City of Monticello, 2004 UT 90, ¶ 15 , 103 P.3d 130 (indicating that due process is a flexible standard that tries to ensure fairness). 29 . 2006See Low v. City of Monticello, 2004 UT 90, ¶ 15 , 103 P.3d 130 (indicating that due process is a flexible standard that tries to ensure fairness). 29 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Messenger v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2004Rather, it "merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided." Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 , 32 S.Ct. 739 , 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912). 2004Rather, it "merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided." Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 , 32 S.Ct. 739 , 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
C-B-K Ranch v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2023On remand, the court should begin with the presumption that technological advances are favored and not assign an increased burden to the servient estate from the mere fact that some learning and adjustment are necessitated any time new technology is employed. ¶28 The second part of the applicable legal standard that the district court overlooked is that when a proposed change to an easement would, on its face, impose a burden on the servient 20210584-CA 13 2023 UT App 110 C-B-K Ranch v. Thomas estate, that is not the end of the court’s inquiry. “[I]n considering changes to the use of an easeme | 1 | 2023–2023 |
SRB Investment v. Spencer
neutral
1 sentence2023In that subsection, the supreme court explained that “in considering changes to the use 20220195-CA 14 2023 UT App 120 SRB Investment v. Spencer of an easement or the servient estate, [Utah courts] apply a flexible rule that seeks to accommodate reasonable changes in use.” Id. ¶ 33. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
SRB Investment v. Spencer
green
2 sentences2023Co. v. Spencer, 2020 UT 23, ¶ 33 , 463 P.3d 654 . 2023Co. v. Spencer, 2020 UT 23, ¶ 33 , 463 P.3d 654 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Christensen v. Christensen
green
2 sentences2019For example, footnote 4 allows the parties to “include an upward adjustment to alimony beyond the CPI.” Thus, the amounts listed in Exhibit C are merely estimates. ¶47 In short, we see no support for Janette’s contention that the yearly increase to alimony must be at least “a flat 3% per year.” Accordingly, the court’s “interpretation of the [Decree] was [not] erroneous as a matter of law,” and Janette has therefore failed to “convince us that the [district] court committed error.” See Christensen v. Christensen, 2018 UT App 53, ¶ 5 , 420 P.3d 106 (quotation simplified). 2019For example, footnote 4 allows the parties to “include an upward adjustment to alimony beyond the CPI.” Thus, the amounts listed in Exhibit C are merely estimates. ¶47 In short, we see no support for Janette’s contention that the yearly increase to alimony must be at least “a flat 3% per year.” Accordingly, the court’s “interpretation of the [Decree] was [not] erroneous as a matter of law,” and Janette has therefore failed to “convince us that the [district] court committed error.” See Christensen v. Christensen, 2018 UT App 53, ¶ 5 , 420 P.3d 106 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Adams v. State
green
2 sentences2012Id. § 94 (citing Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 16 , 123 P.3d 400 ). 5 This is a flexible test, and courts must "give appropriate weight to each of those factors according to the cireum-stances of a particular case." Adams, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 16 , 123 P.3d 400 . 2012Id. § 94 (citing Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 16 , 123 P.3d 400 ). 5 This is a flexible test, and courts must "give appropriate weight to each of those factors according to the cireum-stances of a particular case." Adams, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 16 , 123 P.3d 400 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
PHILLIPS BY & THROUGH UTAH, ETC. v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2002We expressed confidence that “the more flexible test articulated in Phillips seems fully capable of performing the necessary screening function without unduly impeding the flow of reliable scientific evidence to the fact finder.” Id. at 397 n. 6. ¶ 58 Rimmasch also set the limits of its own application. 2002We expressed confidence that "the more flexible test articulated in Phillips seems fully capable of performing the necessary screening function without unduly impeding the flow of reliable scientific evidence to the fact finder." Id. at 397 n. 6. ¶ 58 Rimmasch also set the limits of its own application. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.