10 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rosegreen2 sentences2022Rose, 144 Idaho at 767 , 171 P.3d at 258 . 2022See id. | 1 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2012See Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26 , 88 S.Ct. at 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 908 ("A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”); id. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 ("there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer”); id. at 29 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 910 ("[Tjhe limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons ... will have to be 2012See Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26 , 88 S.Ct. at 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 908 ("A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”); id. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 ("there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer”); id. at 29 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 910 ("[Tjhe limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons ... will have to be | 1 | 1 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2012Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 (1972). 2012Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Celebrezzegreen2 sentences2001Under this flexible standard, courts: must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forth by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests *570 make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.” Id. at 434 , 112 S.Ct. at 2063 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 253 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 , 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 558 (1983)). 2001Under this flexible standard, courts: must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forth by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests *570 make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.” Id. at 434 , 112 S.Ct. at 2063 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 253 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 , 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 558 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Breedgreen2 sentences1989This purpose, as we observed in State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 501 , 725 P.2d 202, 206 (Ct.App.1986), “is to provide an incentive for motorists to cooperate in determining levels of blood-alcohol content by a reasonably precise scientific method.” This purpose is better served by interpreting the statute to allow a timely, albeit delayed, assent to a blood-alcohol test than by construing it to give conclusive effect to the motorist’s initial declination. 1989This purpose, as we observed in State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 501 , 725 P.2d 202, 206 (Ct.App.1986), “is to provide an incentive for motorists to cooperate in determining levels of blood-alcohol content by a reasonably precise scientific method.” This purpose is better served by interpreting the statute to allow a timely, albeit delayed, assent to a blood-alcohol test than by construing it to give conclusive effect to the motorist’s initial declination. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sheahan
green
2 sentences2012Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 272 , 77 P.3d at 961 . 2012Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 272 , 77 P.3d at 961 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 831 , 727 P.2d at 1259 . rather, simply conducting an analysis consistent with the flexible inquiry that characterizes caselaw, including Idaho’s, on this issue. 13 In Sheahan, the defendant was charged with killing a bail bondsman in Pinehurst, Shoshone County, 3 who was attempting to apprehend him. 2012Id. at 831 , 727 P.2d at 1259 . rather, simply conducting an analysis consistent with the flexible inquiry that characterizes caselaw, including Idaho’s, on this issue. 13 In Sheahan, the defendant was charged with killing a bail bondsman in Pinehurst, Shoshone County, 3 who was attempting to apprehend him. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Burdick v. Takushi
green
2 sentences2001Under this flexible standard, courts: must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forth by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests *570 make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.” Id. at 434 , 112 S.Ct. at 2063 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 253 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 , 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 558 (1983)). 2001Under this flexible standard, courts: must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forth by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests *570 make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.” Id. at 434 , 112 S.Ct. at 2063 , 119 L.Ed.2d at 253 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 , 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 558 (1983)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Matter of Smith
green
2 sentences1993The Court of Appeals accepted this flexible rule for delayed assent because “it better serves the public interest in obtaining scientific information about the blood-alcohol levels of motorists accused of driving under the influence.” Id. 1993The Court of Appeals accepted this flexible rule for delayed assent because "it better serves the public interest in obtaining scientific information about the blood-alcohol levels of motorists accused of driving under the influence." Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Gaunt v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dept. of Transp.
green
1 sentence1989By approving a flexible rule we believe that this important evidence will be more frequently available and therefore the prophylactic purpose of the implied consent law will be achieved. 666 P.2d at 527 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Massey-Ferguson Credit Corporation v. Peterson
green
2 sentences1983Grant Co., supra, does not expressly overrule the Fuentes requirement of a full adversary hearing before seizure of property under replevin type statutes, the court in Mitchell apparently discarded that requirement for- a more flexible test of procedural fairness which creditors may more easily meet.” Id. at 99, 524 P.2d 1066 . 1983Grant Co., supra , does not expressly overrule the Fuentes requirement of a full adversary hearing before seizure of property under replevin type statutes, the court in Mitchell apparently discarded that requirement for a more flexible test of procedural fairness which creditors may more easily meet." Id. at 99, 524 P.2d 1066 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hanson v. Denckla
green
2 sentences1969However, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), some cautionary notes were added: “[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend [to a more flexible standard of jurisdiction] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts, [citation] Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. 1969However, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), some cautionary notes were added: “[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend [to a more flexible standard of jurisdiction] heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts, [citation] Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.