flexible rule in Michigan

2021“Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule intended to relieve parties of multiple litigation, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication.” Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Kent Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 498, 529 ; 866 NW2d 817 (2014).

2019“Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule intended to relieve parties of multiple litigation, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication.” Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Kent Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 498, 529 ; 866 NW2d 817 (2014).

2019Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule with three purposes: “To ‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication[.]’ ” City of Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).

2019Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule with three purposes: “To ‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication[.]’ ” City of Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).

2016The Court addressed the degree of similarity required under MRE 404(b) for the various purposes of other-acts evidence: As we emphasized in VanderVliet while advancing a more flexible test than the one described in [People v] Golochowicz [ 413 Mich 298 ; 319 NW2d 518 (1982)]: “the Golochowicz approach to modus operandi cases to show identity is not a ‘conceptual template’ to ‘mechanically test’ all misconduct evidence barring use of other permissible theories of logical relevance.” Rather, “[w]here the proponents' theory is not that the acts are so similar that they circumstantially indicate t

2016The Court addressed the degree of similarity required under MRE 404(b) for the various purposes of other-acts evidence: As we emphasized in VanderVliet while advancing a more flexible test than the one described in [People v] Golochowicz [ 413 Mich 298 ; 319 NW2d 518 (1982)]: “the Golochowicz approach to modus operandi cases to show identity is not a ‘conceptual template’ to ‘mechanically test’ all misconduct evidence barring use of other permissible theories of logical relevance.” Rather, “[w]here the proponents' theory is not that the acts are so similar that they circumstantially indicate t

2019Although in most cases parties seek to apply collateral estoppel in the context of two civil proceedings, our Supreme Court has recognized “the application of collateral estoppel in the civil-to-criminal context.” People v Zitka, 325 Mich App 38, 44-45 ; 922 NW2d 696 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2019Although in most cases parties seek to apply collateral estoppel in the context of two civil proceedings, our Supreme Court has recognized “the application of collateral estoppel in the civil-to-criminal context.” People v Zitka, 325 Mich App 38, 44-45 ; 922 NW2d 696 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.[29] This Court has explained that before collateral estoppel may be applied, “the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action.”30 “The issues must be identical, and not merely similar.”31 Ultimately, the dispositive issue in the federal case was whether Ma’s discharge

2017Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.[29] This Court has explained that before collateral estoppel may be applied, “the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action.”30 “The issues must be identical, and not merely similar.”31 Ultimately, the dispositive issue in the federal case was whether Ma’s discharge

2017Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.[29] This Court has explained that before collateral estoppel may be applied, “the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action.”30 “The issues must be identical, and not merely similar.”31 Ultimately, the dispositive issue in the federal case was whether Ma’s discharge

2017Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.[29] This Court has explained that before collateral estoppel may be applied, “the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action.”30 “The issues must be identical, and not merely similar.”31 Ultimately, the dispositive issue in the federal case was whether Ma’s discharge

2017Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.[29] This Court has explained that before collateral estoppel may be applied, “the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action.”30 “The issues must be identical, and not merely similar.”31 Ultimately, the dispositive issue in the federal case was whether Ma’s discharge

2017Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.[29] This Court has explained that before collateral estoppel may be applied, “the ultimate issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the first action.”30 “The issues must be identical, and not merely similar.”31 Ultimately, the dispositive issue in the federal case was whether Ma’s discharge

2016“The doctrine of collateral estoppel must be applied so as to strike a balance between the need to eliminate repetitious and needless litigation and the interest in affording litigants a full and fair adjudication of the issues involved in their claims.” Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 372 ; 429 NW2d 169 (1988).

2016“The doctrine of collateral estoppel must be applied so as to strike a balance between the need to eliminate repetitious and needless litigation and the interest in affording litigants a full and fair adjudication of the issues involved in their claims.” Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 372 ; 429 NW2d 169 (1988).

1985In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96 ; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), the automatic reversal rule of Shekoski was abandoned as unworkable and unjust and a more flexible standard of review was adopted.

1985In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96 ; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), the automatic reversal rule of Shekoski was abandoned as unworkable and unjust and a more flexible standard of review was adopted.

2025To determine whether a use restriction effects a taking, this Court has generally applied the flexible test developed in Penn Central [Transp Co v New York City, 438 US 104 ; 98 S Ct 2646 ; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978)], balancing factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment- backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.] -31- And in The Gym 24/7 Fitness, 341 Mich App at 261-263, this Court touched on inverse condemnation, partial takings, and then summarized takings jurisprudence under Mi

2025To determine whether a use restriction effects a taking, this Court has generally applied the flexible test developed in Penn Central [Transp Co v New York City, 438 US 104 ; 98 S Ct 2646 ; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978)], balancing factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment- backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.] -31- And in The Gym 24/7 Fitness, 341 Mich App at 261-263, this Court touched on inverse condemnation, partial takings, and then summarized takings jurisprudence under Mi

2025Merkur Steel Supply, Inc v Detroit, 261 Mich App 116, 125 ; 680 NW2d 485 (2004).

2025Merkur Steel Supply, Inc v Detroit, 261 Mich App 116, 125 ; 680 NW2d 485 (2004).

2024The Court in Mardlin further observed that Golochowicz was criticized in VanderVliet, in which the Court created a more flexible test and stated that “[d]ifferent theories of relevance require different degrees of similarity between past acts and the charged offense to warrant admission.” Id. at 622 .

2022To determine whether a use restriction effects a taking, this Court has generally applied the flexible test developed in Penn Central, balancing factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment- -12- backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.9] The Taking Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions both “prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.” Chelsea Investment Group LLC v City of Chelsea, 288 Mich App 239, 261 ; 792 NW2d 781 (2

2022To determine whether a use restriction effects a taking, this Court has generally applied the flexible test developed in Penn Central, balancing factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment- -12- backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.9] The Taking Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions both “prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.” Chelsea Investment Group LLC v City of Chelsea, 288 Mich App 239, 261 ; 792 NW2d 781 (2

2022Id.

2020An employer’s policy gives rise to a contractual obligation “only when the circumstances (e.g., the language in the handbook itself, or an employer’s oral statements or conduct) clearly and unambiguously indicate that the parties so intended.” Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 137 ; 507 NW2d 591 (1993).

2020An employer’s policy gives rise to a contractual obligation “only when the circumstances (e.g., the language in the handbook itself, or an employer’s oral statements or conduct) clearly and unambiguously indicate that the parties so intended.” Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 137 ; 507 NW2d 591 (1993).

2020Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to “severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” But when a state election law provision imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions. [Id. at 434 (citations omitted).] See also In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71 , 479 Mich at 21-22 , where the Supreme Court

2019Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule with three purposes: “To ‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication[.]’ ” City of Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).

2019Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule with three purposes: “To ‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication[.]’ ” City of Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340 , 357 n 30; 454 NW2d 374 (1990), quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 94 ; 101 S Ct 411 ; 66 L Ed 2d 308 (1980).

2018“Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.” Id., citing Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-684 ; 677 NW2d 843 (2004).

2018“Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.” Id., citing Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-684 ; 677 NW2d 843 (2004).

2015See Kaeb, ___ Mich App, slip op at 5-6; Shade, 291 Mich App at 26 n 2, 28-29.

2010As we emphasized in VanderVliet while advancing a more flexible test than the one described in Golochowicz: “the Golochowicz approach to modus operandi cases to show identity is not a ‘conceptual template’ to ‘mechanically test’ all 28 Sabin, 463 Mich at 50 . 29 Id. at 61, 67-68 . 30 Id. at 63 . 31 See VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 66 . 32 Golochowicz, 413 Mich at 307-309 . 12 misconduct evidence barring use of other permissible theories of logical relevance.”33 Rather, “[w]here the proponents’ theory is not that the acts are so similar that they circumstantially indicate that they are the work of

1999As even petitioner concedes, the common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. [ Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 (citations omitted).] [17] As will be discussed further below, among the amici curiae referred to by the Court in Wilson was the very same appellate prosecutor who now appears before us in this action. [18] As evidenced in a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 , a statute comparable to our own knock and announce statute. [19] While the appellant prosecutor takes great effort to note that the only ti

1999As even petitioner concedes, the common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. [ Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 (citations omitted).] [17] As will be discussed further below, among the amici curiae referred to by the Court in Wilson was the very same appellate prosecutor who now appears before us in this action. [18] As evidenced in a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 , a statute comparable to our own knock and announce statute. [19] While the appellant prosecutor takes great effort to note that the only ti

1998Indeed, in Toussaint, supra, this Court held that a jury could find that plaintiff Toussaint had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment based on the policy statements set forth in that handbook.

1985Responding to the argument that the new rule would require that verdicts be set aside in cases in which there could be no showing of prejudicial error for failure to give a requested SJI, the Court stated: Whatever wasted effort that will result from the reversal of those few cases wherein a trial court erroneously deviates from the SJI will be overcome *322 by the benefits of conserved trial court time at the instruction stage, certainty to trial counsel as to how the law will be stated to the jury, and a clear and concise instruction for the jury to work with. [ Javis, supra, p 699 .] Four y

1985Responding to the argument that the new rule would require that verdicts be set aside in cases in which there could be no showing of prejudicial error for failure to give a requested SJI, the Court stated: Whatever wasted effort that will result from the reversal of those few cases wherein a trial court erroneously deviates from the SJI will be overcome *322 by the benefits of conserved trial court time at the instruction stage, certainty to trial counsel as to how the law will be stated to the jury, and a clear and concise instruction for the jury to work with. [ Javis, supra, p 699 .] Four y

1985Responding to the argument that the new rule would require that verdicts be set aside in cases in which there could be no showing of prejudicial error for failure to give a requested sji, the Court stated: Whatever wasted effort that will result from the reversal of those few cases wherein a trial court erroneously deviates from the sji will be overcome by the benefits of conserved trial court time at the instruction stage, certainty to trial counsel as to how the law will be stated to the jury, and a clear and concise instruction for the jury to work with. [ Javis, supra, p 699 .] Four years

1985Responding to the argument that the new rule would require that verdicts be set aside in cases in which there could be no showing of prejudicial error for failure to give a requested SJI, the Court stated: Whatever wasted effort that will result from the reversal of those few cases wherein a trial court erroneously deviates from the SJI will be overcome *322 by the benefits of conserved trial court time at the instruction stage, certainty to trial counsel as to how the law will be stated to the jury, and a clear and concise instruction for the jury to work with. [ Javis, supra, p 699 .] Four y