Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2008See Clark , 83 Hawai`i at 304, 926 P.2d at 209 . 2008See Clark, 83 Hawai'i at 304 , 926 P.2d at 209 . | 1 | 1 |
Price v. ZONING BD. OF APP. OF HONOLULUgreen2 sentences2003Relatedly, procedural due process is “not a fixed concept requiring a specific procedural course” but, rather, a flexible doctrine requiring “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Price v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the City & County of Honolulu, 77 Hawai'i 168, 172 , 883 P.2d 629, 633 (1994) (citations omitted). “[W]e address procedural due process claims in two steps: First, we must determine whether a ‘libert/ or ‘property’ interest has been interfered with by the State; second, we must determine what specific procedures are required to satisfy due process.” Bani, 2003Relatedly, procedural due process is “not a fixed concept requiring a specific procedural course” but, rather, a flexible doctrine requiring “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Price v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the City & County of Honolulu, 77 Hawai'i 168, 172 , 883 P.2d 629, 633 (1994) (citations omitted). “[W]e address procedural due process claims in two steps: First, we must determine whether a ‘libert/ or ‘property’ interest has been interfered with by the State; second, we must determine what specific procedures are required to satisfy due process.” Bani, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Banigreen2 sentences2003Relatedly, procedural due process is “not a fixed concept requiring a specific procedural course” but, rather, a flexible doctrine requiring “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Price v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the City & County of Honolulu, 77 Hawai'i 168, 172 , 883 P.2d 629, 633 (1994) (citations omitted). “[W]e address procedural due process claims in two steps: First, we must determine whether a ‘libert/ or ‘property’ interest has been interfered with by the State; second, we must determine what specific procedures are required to satisfy due process.” Bani, 2003Relatedly, procedural due process is “not a fixed concept requiring a specific procedural course” but, rather, a flexible doctrine requiring “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Price v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the City & County of Honolulu, 77 Hawai'i 168, 172 , 883 P.2d 629, 633 (1994) (citations omitted). “[W]e address procedural due process claims in two steps: First, we must determine whether a ‘libert/ or ‘property’ interest has been interfered with by the State; second, we must determine what specific procedures are required to satisfy due process.” Bani, | 1 | 1 |
Arrow Transportation Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000In fact, the federal decisions stress that dormancy is determined by a flexible standard, “so as to be able to assess the facts peculiar to individual cases” “in light of surrounding circumstances.” Rogers Cartage Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 595 F.2d 379 , 382 (7th Cir.1979); see also Arrow Transportation, 300 F.Supp. at 817 ; cf. Gregg Cartage & Storage, 316 U.S. at 83 , 62 S.Ct. 932 (interpreting statute requiring motor carrier to maintain continuous bona fide operation until hearing by ICC, Court observed that cessation of operations for sixty-nine days estab *58 lished that there wa | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kimberly Ann Colemangreen1 sentence1982Accord, U.S. v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976); Kaneshiro v. U.S., 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971); Austin v. U.S., 414 F.2d 1155 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2002Accordingly, the majority should heed the earlier advice of this court: "The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests." Id. at 22, 924 P.2d at 190 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995)). 2002Accordingly, the majority should heed the earlier advice of this court: "The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests." Id. at 22, 924 P.2d at 190 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995)). | 2 | 1996–2002 |
United States v. Hugh MacLeod Pheaster, United States of America v. Angelo Inciso
green
2 sentences1983Under this standard, we must liberally construe the indictment in favor of validity (U.S. v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 361 ) and uphold it, unless there is some showing of substantial prejudice to Motta, “such as . . . that the indictment is ‘so *94 obviously defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense for which conviction was had.’ ” U.S. v. Thompson, 356 F.2d at 226 . 1982Accord, U.S. v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976); Kaneshiro v. U.S., 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971); Austin v. U.S., 414 F.2d 1155 (D.C. | 2 | 1982–1983 |
State v. Francis Noboru Yoshida
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 357 , 354 P.2d at 990 . 2010Id. at 357 , 354 P.2d at 990 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Dixon
green
2 sentences2002Accordingly, the majority should heed the earlier advice of this court: "The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests." Id. at 22, 924 P.2d at 190 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995)). 2002Accordingly, the majority should heed the earlier advice of this court: “The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.” Id. at 22 , 924 P.2d at 190 (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences2000In fact, the federal decisions stress that dormancy is determined by a flexible standard, “so as to be able to assess the facts peculiar to individual cases” “in light of surrounding circumstances.” Rogers Cartage Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 595 F.2d 379 , 382 (7th Cir.1979); see also Arrow Transportation, 300 F.Supp. at 817 ; cf. Gregg Cartage & Storage, 316 U.S. at 83 , 62 S.Ct. 932 (interpreting statute requiring motor carrier to maintain continuous bona fide operation until hearing by ICC, Court observed that cessation of operations for sixty-nine days estab *58 lished that there wa 2000In fact, the federal decisions stress that dormancy is determined by a flexible standard, “so as to be able to assess the facts peculiar to individual cases” “in light of surrounding circumstances.” Rogers Cartage Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 595 F.2d 379 , 382 (7th Cir.1979); see also Arrow Transportation, 300 F.Supp. at 817 ; cf. Gregg Cartage & Storage, 316 U.S. at 83 , 62 S.Ct. 932 (interpreting statute requiring motor carrier to maintain continuous bona fide operation until hearing by ICC, Court observed that cessation of operations for sixty-nine days estab *58 lished that there wa | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Rogers Cartage Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission
neutral
1 sentence2000In fact, the federal decisions stress that dormancy is determined by a flexible standard, “so as to be able to assess the facts peculiar to individual cases” “in light of surrounding circumstances.” Rogers Cartage Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 595 F.2d 379 , 382 (7th Cir.1979); see also Arrow Transportation, 300 F.Supp. at 817 ; cf. Gregg Cartage & Storage, 316 U.S. at 83 , 62 S.Ct. 932 (interpreting statute requiring motor carrier to maintain continuous bona fide operation until hearing by ICC, Court observed that cessation of operations for sixty-nine days estab *58 lished that there wa | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Gordon R. Thompson
green
1 sentence1983Under this standard, we must liberally construe the indictment in favor of validity (U.S. v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 361 ) and uphold it, unless there is some showing of substantial prejudice to Motta, “such as . . . that the indictment is ‘so *94 obviously defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense for which conviction was had.’ ” U.S. v. Thompson, 356 F.2d at 226 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Luther L. Austin v. United States
green
1 sentence1982Accord, U.S. v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976); Kaneshiro v. U.S., 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971); Austin v. U.S., 414 F.2d 1155 (D.C. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Richard Kenichi Kaneshiro, A.K.A. Richard Higa, and George Ekita v. United States
green
1 sentence1982Accord, U.S. v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976); Kaneshiro v. U.S., 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971); Austin v. U.S., 414 F.2d 1155 (D.C. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Dizon
green
2 sentences1982Hence, we concluded that where the complainant, an elderly five-foot, one hundred twelve-pound woman, alone in a deserted school building, bothered by a back ailment, had cut her assailant with a scissors, inflicted scratches on his body, sustained abrasions and broken ribs by the attack, had been confronted by a six-foot, one hundred sixty-five pound defendant, stark naked with a masked face, advancing tiptoed towards her with his arms menancingly raised, the jury had been amply justified in finding that she “did all that she thought was possible or that she was personally capable of doing to 1982Hence, we concluded that where the complainant, an elderly five-foot, one hundred twelve-pound woman, alone in a deserted school building, bothered by a back ailment, had cut her assailant with a scissors, inflicted scratches on his body, sustained abrasions and broken ribs by the attack, had been confronted by a six-foot, one hundred sixty-five pound defendant, stark naked with a masked face, advancing tiptoed towards her with his arms menancingly raised, the jury had been amply justified in finding that she “did all that she thought was possible or that she was personally capable of doing to | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Erwin v. United States
green
1 sentence1982Accord, U.S. v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976); Kaneshiro v. U.S., 445 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971); Austin v. U.S., 414 F.2d 1155 (D.C. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Zeliff v. Sabatino
green
2 sentences1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). 1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Rice v. Price
green
2 sentences1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). 1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Hunt v. Sherrill
green
2 sentences1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). 1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Gnash v. Saari
green
2 sentences1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). 1971Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502 , 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688 , 15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70 , 104 A.2d 54 (1954); Gnash v. Saari, 44 Wash. 2d 312 , 267 P.2d 674 (1954). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Sherrer v. Sherrer
green
2 sentences1965Disinclined as we are to ignore a litigated adjudication of a sister state on the question of its jurisdiction, in view of the doctrine of Sherrer, supra, we will accept the determination of the Oregon court as to its jurisdiction to enter the amended custody decrees, without excluding the possibility of Hawaii likewise having jurisdiction over these children, so as to proceed to the crucial question of whether or not such amended custody decrees should be given full faith and credit under the Constitution of the United States. 1965Disinclined as we are to ignore a litigated adjudication of a sister state on the question of its jurisdiction, in view of the doctrine of Sherrer, supra, we will accept the determination of the Oregon court as to its jurisdiction to enter the amended custody decrees, without excluding the possibility of Hawaii likewise having jurisdiction over these children, so as to proceed to the crucial question of whether or not such amended custody decrees should be given full faith and credit under the Constitution of the United States. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
1 sentence1960In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
1 sentence1960In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.