18 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1929–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jailgreen2 sentences2005The Court held that, under this flexible standard, “a party seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree . . . .” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 393, 384 . 19 Cf. Moore’s Federal Practice § 60.47[2][c] (2004) (under the analogous provision in Fed.R.Civ.P. 60[b][5], factors to be considered in determining whether there is a “significant change in circumstances” vary with type of case and whether complete dissolution of an injunction is sought or only a modification; “if a party seeks to hav 2003See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992): Although we hold that a district court should exercise flexibility in considering requests for modification of an institutional reform consent decree, it does not follow that a modification will be warranted in all circumstances. | 2 | 2 |
Bianchi Bros. v. Gendrongreen2 sentences2004Even where there is only one agreement covering all the terms of a contract, “it may be that the performance under the contract will be divided into different groups, each set embracing performances which are the agreed exchange for each other, the result being that the contract is entire but divisible.” Bianchi Bros. v. Gendron, 292 Mass. 438, 445 (1935). 1983See, e.g., a case where the earlier cases are collected, Bianchi Bros. v. Gendron, 292 Mass. 438, 443-446 (1935). 2 See also Barrows v. Fuller, 253 Mass. 79, 83-84 (1925); Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp., 314 Mass. 351, 357-358 (1943). | 2 | 2 |
Nader v. Citrongreen2 sentences1985See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 (1975); Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 97-98 (1977); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). 1985See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 (1975); Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 97-98 (1977); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseasgreen2 sentences1985See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 (1975); Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 97-98 (1977); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). 1985See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 (1975); Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 97-98 (1977); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
Charbonnier v. Amicogreen2 sentences1985See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 (1975); Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 97-98 (1977); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). 1985See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 (1975); Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 97-98 (1977); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen1 sentence2013Section 3501(c) establishes a flexible presumption that a prearraignment statement by an arrested and detained defendant made more than six hours after arrest will not be admissible, but § 3501(d) provides in part that the otherwise generally applicable six-hour Hmitation in § 3501 will not prohibit the admission in evidence “of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person without interrogation by anyone.” The Commonwealth references two decisions in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has interpreted § 3501(d) to mean that if a defenda | 1 | 1 |
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuitgreen1 sentence2013See United States v Fullwood, 86 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1 |
Kasper v. Board of Appeals of Watertowngreen1 sentence2005See Kasper, supra at 256 ; Chiuccariello, supra at 486 . | 1 | 1 |
Alexis Lichine & Cie. v. Sacha A. Lichine Estate Selections, Ltd.green1 sentence2005In Alexis Lichine & Cie. v. Sacha A. Lichine Estate Selections, Ltd., 45 F.3d 582, 586 (1st Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, commenting on Swift and Rufo , observed that the two cases distinguish between decrees protecting “ ‘rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change’ and decrees [that] involv[e] ‘the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative.’. . . | 1 | 1 |
Potter & McArthur, Inc. v. City of Bostongreen1 sentence2004The law in Massachusetts is consistent with the flexible rule of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 240 (1981), which states that “[i]f the performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises can be apportioned into corresponding pairs of part performances so that the parts of each pair are properly regarded as agreed equivalents, a party’s performance of his part of such a pair has the same effect on the other’s duties to render performance of the agreed equivalent as it would have if only that pair of performances had been promised.” See Potter & McArthur, Inc. v. Boston, 15 Mass | 1 | 1 |
Laffit Pincay, Jr. Christopher J. McCarron v. Vincent S. Andrews Robert Andrews Vincent Andrews Management Corp.green1 sentence2004See Pincay v. Andrews, 2004 WL 2579440 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Schaer v. Brandeis Universitygreen1 sentence2000“Generally, in examining administrative proceedings, the presumption [of fairness in conducting the disciplinary proceeding] favors administrators, and the burden is upon the party challenging the action to produce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption." Gorman, supra at 15 ; see also Schaer v. Brandeis University, 432 Mass. 474 (2000) (university is as a matter of basic fairness not required to abide by the rules of evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Frye v. United Statesred1 sentence1998See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Barrows v. Fullergreen1 sentence1983See, e.g., a case where the earlier cases are collected, Bianchi Bros. v. Gendron, 292 Mass. 438, 443-446 (1935). 2 See also Barrows v. Fuller, 253 Mass. 79, 83-84 (1925); Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp., 314 Mass. 351, 357-358 (1943). | 1 | 1 |
Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp.green1 sentence1983See, e.g., a case where the earlier cases are collected, Bianchi Bros. v. Gendron, 292 Mass. 438, 443-446 (1935). 2 See also Barrows v. Fuller, 253 Mass. 79, 83-84 (1925); Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp., 314 Mass. 351, 357-358 (1943). | 1 | 1 |
American Party of Texas v. Whitegreen1 sentence1978See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. United States Gypsum Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Marlow v. City of New Bedfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the United States Supreme Court modified the criteria for the admissibility of expert testimony based on scientific knowledge by replacing the Frye general acceptance test with a more flexible standard. 1996The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), relying on Fed.R.Evid. 702, had already replaced the Frye test with a more flexible inquiry into whether the scientific evidence was reliable. | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Weinstein v. Chief of Police of Fall River
green
2 sentences1985The cases of Brown v. Neelon, 335 Mass. 357 (1957), and Weinstein v. Chief of Police of Fall River, 344 Mass. 314 (1962), cited by the Commonwealth, were decided under the strict demurrer practice now superseded by the more flexible rule 12(b)(6). 1985The cases of Brown v. Neelon, 335 Mass. 357 (1957), and Weinstein v. Chief of Police of Fall River, 344 Mass. 314 (1962), cited by the Commonwealth, were decided under the strict demurrer practice now superseded by the more flexible rule 12(b)(6). | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Brown v. Neelon
green
2 sentences1985The cases of Brown v. Neelon, 335 Mass. 357 (1957), and Weinstein v. Chief of Police of Fall River, 344 Mass. 314 (1962), cited by the Commonwealth, were decided under the strict demurrer practice now superseded by the more flexible rule 12(b)(6). 1985The cases of Brown v. Neelon, 335 Mass. 357 (1957), and Weinstein v. Chief of Police of Fall River, 344 Mass. 314 (1962), cited by the Commonwealth, were decided under the strict demurrer practice now superseded by the more flexible rule 12(b)(6). | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Doe
green
1 sentence2014It further asks this court to affirm the two-step hearing procedure articulated in Doe, 420 Mass. at 149-150 , in order to ensure that adequate constitutional safeguards are afforded to the public. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Chiuccariello v. Building Commissioner
green
1 sentence2005See Kasper, supra at 256 ; Chiuccariello, supra at 486 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership
green
2 sentences2004La. 1985), in which “good cause” is described as a “stringent standard.” The first observation about that standard is that it derives from federal cases decided prior to the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Pioneer, supra 507 U.S. at 387 -88 & n.3, which established a more flexible standard for use in the federal courts. 2004La. 1985), in which “good cause” is described as a “stringent standard.” The first observation about that standard is that it derives from federal cases decided prior to the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Pioneer, supra 507 U.S. at 387 -88 & n.3, which established a more flexible standard for use in the federal courts. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp
red
2 sentences2001The Court explained that it has “abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s ‘presence’ within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State.” Id. 2001Pursuant to this test, “if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in personam jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
1 sentence1997Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Skinner v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Williamson
green
1 sentence1978No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (access to voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate migration); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation) . 6 We note, however, that although the Supreme Court continues to speak of strict scrutiny as being applicable in this context, cases decided since Williams v. Rhodes, supra, suggest that the Court actually applies a more flexible standard. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Williams v. Rhodes
green
1 sentence1978No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (access to voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate migration); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation) . 6 We note, however, that although the Supreme Court continues to speak of strict scrutiny as being applicable in this context, cases decided since Williams v. Rhodes, supra, suggest that the Court actually applies a more flexible standard. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1978No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (access to voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate migration); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation) . 6 We note, however, that although the Supreme Court continues to speak of strict scrutiny as being applicable in this context, cases decided since Williams v. Rhodes, supra, suggest that the Court actually applies a more flexible standard. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15
green
1 sentence1978No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (access to voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate migration); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation) . 6 We note, however, that although the Supreme Court continues to speak of strict scrutiny as being applicable in this context, cases decided since Williams v. Rhodes, supra, suggest that the Court actually applies a more flexible standard. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Storer v. Brown
green
1 sentence1978See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Jenness v. Fortson
green
1 sentence1978See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Fargo v. Miller green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.