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10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commissiongreen1 sentence2022Instead, a flexible framework is used to determine the standard of review for ordinary election laws, see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995), where courts balance the burden imposed on the challenger’s First Amendment rights against the state’s interests offered to justify that burden, Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 ; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 . | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen1 sentence2020It is a flexible doctrine, calling for “such procedural protection as the particular situation demands.” Samiuddin v. Nothwehr, 243 Ariz. 204 , 211, ¶ 20 (2017) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). | 1 | 1 |
Technical Air Products, Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc.green2 sentences2014Technical Air Products, Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 103 Ariz. 450, 452 , 445 P.2d 426, 428 (1968) (holding that when two claims are “intimately bound up” in the subject matter of the dispute, a logical relationship exists, thereby creating compulsory counterclaims). ¶ 9 The trial court’s order noted that “[i]t is hard to imagine a stronger ease of a ‘logical relationship’ between claims.” Regarding TradeCor, we agree. 2014Technical Air Products, Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 103 Ariz. 450, 452 , 445 P.2d 426, 428 (1968) (holding that when two claims are “intimately bound up” in the subject matter of the dispute, a logical relationship exists, thereby creating compulsory counterclaims). ¶ 9 The trial court’s order noted that “[i]t is hard to imagine a stronger ease of a ‘logical relationship’ between claims.” Regarding TradeCor, we agree. | 1 | 1 |
Atkinson v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Finding that its legislature did not intend to forbid intoxicated individuals from seeking stationary shelter in their cars, the Maryland court opted for a flexible test by which fact finders could "assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case." Id. at 1025-26; see also Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Ala. 1986); State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. 1993). 1995Finding that its legislature did not intend to forbid intoxicated individuals from seeking stationary shelter in their cars, the Maryland court opted for a flexible test by which fact finders could “assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 1025-26; see also Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Ala.1986); State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn.1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lawrencegreen2 sentences1995Finding that its legislature did not intend to forbid intoxicated individuals from seeking stationary shelter in their cars, the Maryland court opted for a flexible test by which fact finders could "assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case." Id. at 1025-26; see also Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Ala. 1986); State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. 1993). 1995Finding that its legislature did not intend to forbid intoxicated individuals from seeking stationary shelter in their cars, the Maryland court opted for a flexible test by which fact finders could “assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 1025-26; see also Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Ala.1986); State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte City of Gadsdengreen2 sentences1995Finding that its legislature did not intend to forbid intoxicated individuals from seeking stationary shelter in their cars, the Maryland court opted for a flexible test by which fact finders could "assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case." Id. at 1025-26; see also Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Ala. 1986); State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. 1993). 1995Finding that its legislature did not intend to forbid intoxicated individuals from seeking stationary shelter in their cars, the Maryland court opted for a flexible test by which fact finders could “assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 1025-26; see also Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So.2d 1144, 1145 (Ala.1986); State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1983See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. at 546-47 , 479 P.2d at 689-91 . “[Tjhe inference of intoxication arising from a positive ... test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.” South Dakota v. Neville, -U.S.-,-, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). 1983See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. at 546-47 , 479 P.2d at 689-91 . “[Tjhe inference of intoxication arising from a positive ... test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.” South Dakota v. Neville, -U.S.-,-, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences1983See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. at 546-47 , 479 P.2d at 689-91 . “[Tjhe inference of intoxication arising from a positive ... test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.” South Dakota v. Neville, -U.S.-,-, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). 1983See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. at 546-47 , 479 P.2d at 689-91 . “[Tjhe inference of intoxication arising from a positive ... test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.” South Dakota v. Neville, -U.S.-,-, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Burdick v. Takushi
green
1 sentence2022Instead, a flexible framework is used to determine the standard of review for ordinary election laws, see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995), where courts balance the burden imposed on the challenger’s First Amendment rights against the state’s interests offered to justify that burden, Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 ; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Anderson v. Celebrezze
green
1 sentence2022Instead, a flexible framework is used to determine the standard of review for ordinary election laws, see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995), where courts balance the burden imposed on the challenger’s First Amendment rights against the state’s interests offered to justify that burden, Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 ; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 409 , 701 P.2d at 1217 . ¶20 The circumstances here, unfortunately, indicate that Mother has been unable to lead a substance-free lifestyle and adequately care for her children. 2015Id. at 409 , 701 P.2d at 1217 . ¶20 The circumstances here, unfortunately, indicate that Mother has been unable to lead a substance-free lifestyle and adequately care for her children. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima County
green
2 sentences2000But in Rothweiler , recognizing that some offenses, non-existent at common law, are nonetheless comparable in both severity and consequence to jury eligible crimes, we formulated a three-part test to establish a more flexible inquiry into the question of eligibility. 100 Ariz. at 42 , 410 P.2d at 483 . 2000But in Rothweiler , recognizing that some offenses, non-existent at common law, are nonetheless comparable in both severity and consequence to jury eligible crimes, we formulated a three-part test to establish a more flexible inquiry into the question of eligibility. 100 Ariz. at 42 , 410 P.2d at 483 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. David S. King, United States of America v. Stanley E. Deal, M. D.
green
2 sentences1991We hold that, under these circumstances, a proper foundation for the introduction of a sound recording has been made if “the trial court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, [is] satisfied that the recording is accurate, authentic, and generally trustworthy.” See King, 587 F.2d at 961 . 1991We hold that, under these circumstances, a proper foundation for the introduction of a sound recording has been made if "the trial court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, [is] satisfied that the recording is accurate, authentic, and generally trustworthy." See King, 587 F.2d at 961 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1985In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), a case involving a judicial proceeding for approval of an account submitted by the trustee of a common trust, the Supreme Court held that due process required individual notice to beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known to the trustee. 1985In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), a case involving a judicial proceeding for approval of an account submitted by the trustee of a common trust, the Supreme Court held that due process required individual notice to beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known to the trustee. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences1983Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8 , 560 P.2d 847 (1977) (consent given 25 minutes after refusal); State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301 , 614 P.2d 931 (1980) (consent given 13 minutes after refusal); Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979) (test given two hours after refusal); Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974). [T]he subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request ... is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test ... would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily 1983Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8 , 560 P.2d 847 (1977) (consent given 25 minutes after refusal); State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301 , 614 P.2d 931 (1980) (consent given 13 minutes after refusal); Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979) (test given two hours after refusal); Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974). [T]he subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request ... is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test ... would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Lund v. Hjelle
green
1 sentence1983Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8 , 560 P.2d 847 (1977) (consent given 25 minutes after refusal); State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301 , 614 P.2d 931 (1980) (consent given 13 minutes after refusal); Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979) (test given two hours after refusal); Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974). [T]he subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request ... is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test ... would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Sedlacek v. Pearson
red
2 sentences1983Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8 , 560 P.2d 847 (1977) (consent given 25 minutes after refusal); State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301 , 614 P.2d 931 (1980) (consent given 13 minutes after refusal); Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979) (test given two hours after refusal); Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974). [T]he subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request ... is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test ... would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily 1983Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8 , 560 P.2d 847 (1977) (consent given 25 minutes after refusal); State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301 , 614 P.2d 931 (1980) (consent given 13 minutes after refusal); Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979) (test given two hours after refusal); Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974). [T]he subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request ... is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test ... would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dept. of Rev.
green
2 sentences1983Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8 , 560 P.2d 847 (1977) (consent given 25 minutes after refusal); State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301 , 614 P.2d 931 (1980) (consent given 13 minutes after refusal); Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979) (test given two hours after refusal); Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974). [T]he subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request ... is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test ... would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily 1983Zahtila v. Motor Vehicle Div., 39 Colo.App. 8 , 560 P.2d 847 (1977) (consent given 25 minutes after refusal); State v. Moore, 62 Hawaii 301 , 614 P.2d 931 (1980) (consent given 13 minutes after refusal); Sedlacek v. Pearson, 204 Neb. 625 , 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979) (test given two hours after refusal); Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974). [T]he subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first refusal when the request ... is made within a reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test ... would still be accurate; when testing equipment or facilities are still readily | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Swann v. Adams
green
2 sentences1973Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967). 1973Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Reynolds v. Sims
green
2 sentences1973Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967). 1973Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 , 87 S.Ct. 569 , 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.