flexible standard in Maryland

2024Rochkind, 471 Md. at 36 .

2023Rochkind, 471 Md. at 36 .

2023See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978). 3 the more flexible standard in determining whether scientific evidence is reliable and admissible); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997) (clarifying that the proper scope of appellate review of a trial court’s rulings on expert admissibility is “abuse of discretion”); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 141–42 (1999) (clarifying that the trial judge’s Rule 702 gatekeeping duties apply to all expert testimony, whether such testimony is based upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge).

2023See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978). 3 the more flexible standard in determining whether scientific evidence is reliable and admissible); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997) (clarifying that the proper scope of appellate review of a trial court’s rulings on expert admissibility is “abuse of discretion”); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 141–42 (1999) (clarifying that the trial judge’s Rule 702 gatekeeping duties apply to all expert testimony, whether such testimony is based upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge).

1975“This Court, speaking through Judge Horney in M & R Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, supra, 215 Md. 340 said: ‘Courts have modified the “certainty” rule into a more flexible one of “reasonable certainty”.

1975“This Court, speaking through Judge Horney in M & R Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, supra, 215 Md. 340 said: ‘Courts have modified the “certainty” rule into a more flexible one of “reasonable certainty”.

2014Similar to our conclusion in Ross , however, we need not decide here whether any per se rule should apply because the doctrine of laches is a flexible doctrine and, moreover, "[flhere may be situations in which such a rule would be inappropriate.” Id. 87 .

2012The Court recognized that “[i]n some cases, the harmlessness of the error is readily apparent,” while other cases “required a more flexible inquiry.” 15 Id., supra, at 663, 20 A.3d 765 .

2012The Court recognized that “[i]n some cases, the harmlessness of the error is readily apparent,” while other cases “required a more flexible inquiry.” 15 Id., supra, at 663, 20 A.3d 765 .

2011The Court in West declined to accept the State’s position that the common law distinction between robbery and larceny should be more flexible, stating ( 312 Md. at 207 , 539 A.2d at 235 ): “The State contends that recent cases ... manifest an evolutionary trend away from common law distinctions between robbery and larceny, toward a more flexible inquiry into the magnitude of the risk posed by the defendant’s conduct.

2011The Court in West declined to accept the State’s position that the common law distinction between robbery and larceny should be more flexible, stating ( 312 Md. at 207 , 539 A.2d at 235 ): “The State contends that recent cases ... manifest an evolutionary trend away from common law distinctions between robbery and larceny, toward a more flexible inquiry into the magnitude of the risk posed by the defendant’s conduct.

2011For example, in Harrison v. State, the Court of Appeals opined at length as to when a criminal defendant waives his attorney-client privilege and whether it is at all possible for a defendant to waive the privilege during cross examination. 276 Md. 122 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975).

2011For example, in Harrison v. State, the Court of Appeals opined at length as to when a criminal defendant waives his attorney-client privilege and whether it is at all possible for a defendant to waive the privilege during cross examination. 276 Md. 122 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975).

2009In order to make that determination, we use the flexible and applied test suggested by the Supreme Court in *755 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975): 3 In determining whether a private damage remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.

2009In order to make that determination, we use the flexible and applied test suggested by the Supreme Court in *755 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 , 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975): 3 In determining whether a private damage remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.

2006Id. (emphasis supplied).

2004A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh `the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate' against `the precise interests put forward by the *21 State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,' taking into consideration `the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.'" Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-434 , 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 , 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (citations omitted).

2004A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh `the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate' against `the precise interests put forward by the *21 State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,' taking into consideration `the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.'" Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-434 , 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 , 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (citations omitted).

2001In KSQHG, Inc. v. Geiserman, 682 So.2d 1190 (Fla.App.1996), appeal dismissed by 695 So.2d 700 (1997), the Florida Court of Appeals offered cogent reasons for such flexibility.

1995“Moreover, the standard focuses on the amount of discretion accorded the issuing agency by law, not on whether or to what degree that discretion is actually exercised.” Gardner, 969 F.2d at 68 .

1995As the Court held in Biser , “It is difficult to image a more flexible standard.” Biser, 991 F.2d 100, 104 .

1989See, e.g., Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603 , 331 S.E.2d 573 (1985); Johnson v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind.1984).

1988Upon retrial of the case, assuming arguendo a determination of liability against Weisman, the trial court will undoubtedly focus on whether the flexibility rule of damages as set forth in Hinkle v. Rockville Motor Co., 262 Md. 502 , 278 A.2d 42 (1971), is an appropriate theory of damages in negligent misrepresentation cases.

1988Upon retrial of the case, assuming arguendo a determination of liability against Weisman, the trial court will undoubtedly focus on whether the flexibility rule of damages as set forth in Hinkle v. Rockville Motor Co., 262 Md. 502 , 278 A.2d 42 (1971), is an appropriate theory of damages in negligent misrepresentation cases.

1986Moreover, we note that in United States v. Bagley, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the Supreme Court adopted a more flexible standard in determining when a defendant is prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.

1986Moreover, we note that in United States v. Bagley, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the Supreme Court adopted a more flexible standard in determining when a defendant is prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.

1966In place of the former rigid tests of ‘residence’ and ‘doing business’, the Supreme Court, in International Shoe, substituted the flexible requirement that a nonresident defendant, against whom a judgment in personam is sought in the forum state, be shown merely to ‘have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” ( 326 U. S., at p. 316 ).” 15 N. Y. 2d at 451.

1957R. 2d 310; Miles v. Webb, 162 Md. 269, 273 , 159 A. 782 .

1957R. 2d 310; Miles v. Webb, 162 Md. 269, 273 , 159 A. 782 .