10 Oklahoma opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Smithgreen2 sentences1993Matter of Smith, 115 Idaho 808 , 770 P.2d 817, 821 (Ct.App.1989). 1993Matter of Smith, 115 Idaho 808 , 770 P.2d 817, 821 (Ct.App.1989). | 2 | 2 |
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brackergreen2 sentences2019See Bracker , 448 U.S. 136 ; see also Ramah Navajo Sch. 2019See Bracker , 448 U.S. 136 ; see also Ramah Navajo Sch. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong
green
2 sentences2002Travelers Indemnity Co., 442 N.E.2d at 356 . ¶ 10 Redcorn insists that depreciation of labor costs is inconsistent with the principle of indemnity. 2002Travelers Indemnity Co., 442 N.E.2d at 356 . ¶ 9 The Davis court found an ambiguity regarding whether the cost of labor associated with roof replacement may be depreciated in an actual-cash-value policy. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Mossak v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
2 sentences1993The court held that the Minnesota statute and the cases interpreting it “preclude us from applying a flexible rule such that a refusal could not be found in the circumstances of this case.” Mossak, id. 435 N.W.2d at 579 . 1993The court held that the Minnesota statute and the cases interpreting it “preclude us from applying a flexible rule such that a refusal could not be found in the circumstances of this case.” Mossak, id. 435 N.W.2d at 579 . | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1980In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1967In connection with its discussion of the changes responsible for the need for increased jurisdiction over nonresidents, the court stated: “ * * * jn reSponse to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 , 161 A.L.R. 1057 . | 2 | 1967–1980 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1980In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1980In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . | 2 | 1967–1980 |
Independent Cotton Oil Co. v. Beacham
neutral
2 sentences1928A flexible rule was therefore provided by section 23 of the Schedule for the transfer of these causes, in that they were transferred directly to the county court of the county in which they were pending at the time of the admission of the state, with authority vested in the Legislature to provide by subsequent legislative enactments for the transfer of any of such cases for their final disposition to those counties where they could be proceeded with, with the least inconvenience and hardship to the ward and guardian and expense to the estate." This court in the case of Independent Cotton Oil C 1928A flexible rule was therefore provided by section 23 of the Schedule for the transfer of these causes, in that they were transferred directly to the county court of the county in which they were pending at the time of the admission of the state, with authority vested in the Legislature to provide by subsequent legislative enactments for the transfer of any of such cases for their final disposition to those counties where they could be proceeded with, with the least inconvenience and hardship to the ward and guardian and expense to the estate." This court in the case of Independent Cotton Oil C | 2 | 1928–1928 |
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt
green
2 sentences1965Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt. 354 U.S. *909 416, p. 418, 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 . 1965Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt. 354 U.S. *909 416, p. 418, 77 S.Ct. 1360 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1456 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.