flexible standard (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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flexible standard in Ohio

24 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1968–2025 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Anderson v. Celebrezzegreen
scotus · 1983 · cited in 4 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1993–2017
2 sentences

2017However, when a law imposes a lesser burden, we apply "a more flexible standard" in which "the state's important regulatory interests" are generally sufficient to justify " 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. ' " Burdick at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 , quoting Anderson at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564 .

1996“Instead, as the full Court agreed in Anderson, 460 U.S., at 788-789 [ 103 S.Ct., at 1569-1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d, at 557-558 ]; id., at 808, 817 [ 103 S.Ct., at 1580, 1584-1585 , 75 L.Ed.2d, at 570, 575-576 ] (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), a more flexible standard applies.

44
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticutgreen
scotus · 1986 · cited in 3 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1993–1996
2 sentences

1996A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.’ Id., at 789 [ 103 S.Ct., at 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d, at 558 ]; Tashjian [v. Republican Party of Connecticut], supra [ 479 U.S. 208 ], at 213-214 [ 107 S.Ct. 54

1996A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.’ Id., at 789 [ 103 S.Ct., at 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d, at 558 ]; Tashjian [v. Republican Party of Connecticut], supra [ 479 U.S. 208 ], at 213-214 [ 107 S.Ct. 54

33
United States v. Ventrescagreen
scotus · 1965 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411 (1993).

11
State v. Evansgreen
ohio · 1993 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411 (1993).

11
State v. Finnellgreen
ohioctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023However, “[p]robable cause to issue an administrative warrant for entry into premises is the subject of a flexible standard of reasonableness given the agency’s particular demand for access and the -15- Case No. 6-22-17 public need for effective enforcement of the regulation involved.” State v. Finnell, 115 Ohio App.3d 583, 589 (1st Dist.1996).

11
cluster 764386green
ca4 · 1999 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020The use of differential diagnosis to determine FELA causation “is appropriate only when considering potential causes that are scientifically known.” Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42 , 2006-Ohio-3561 , 850 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 22 , citing Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir.1999). {¶ 38} While conducting a Daubert analysis of the reliability of the expert’s opinion, the focus of the flexible analysis is on the principles and methodology employed by the witness rather than the conclusions drawn.

11
Burdick v. Takushigreen
scotus · 1992 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017However, when a law imposes a lesser burden, we apply "a more flexible standard" in which "the state's important regulatory interests" are generally sufficient to justify " 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. ' " Burdick at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 , quoting Anderson at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564 .

11
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Partygreen
scotus · 1997 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351 , 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364 , 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) ; Obama for Am. v. Husted , 697 F.3d 423 , 429 (6th Cir.2012) ; Watson at 259, 725 N.E.2d 255 , citing State ex rel.

2017See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351 , 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364 , 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) ; Obama for Am. v. Husted , 697 F.3d 423 , 429 (6th Cir.2012) ; Watson at 259, 725 N.E.2d 255 , citing State ex rel.

11
State ex rel. Watson v. Hamilton County Board of Electionsgreen
ohio · 2000 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351 , 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364 , 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) ; Obama for Am. v. Husted , 697 F.3d 423 , 429 (6th Cir.2012) ; Watson at 259, 725 N.E.2d 255 , citing State ex rel.

11
Blackmer v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1932 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1968–1968
1 sentence

1968See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 .” In Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U. S. 235, 251 , the United States Supreme Court held: “In response to * # * changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (18)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Williams green
ohio · 1983
2 sentences

2004The Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in State v. Williams (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 53 , endorsing a flexible standard.

2004The Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in State v. Williams (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 53 , endorsing a flexible standard.

61990–2019
See v. City of Seattle green
scotus · 1967
2 sentences

2025Id.

2025Id.

31996–2025
Marano v. Gibbs green
ohio · 1989
1 sentence

2021A & B Refuse filed a Morrow County, Case No. 2021 CA 0001 12 declaratory-judgment action against the Ravenna Township Board of Trustees, asking for a determination of whether its landfill operation was subject to regulation under the township zoning code. {¶38} In A & B Refuse, the Court “significantly expanded upon the two factors identified in Marano, holding that ‘the determination of whether a particular entity is a public utility for the purpose of exemption from local zoning restrictions requires a consideration of several factors related to the ‘public service’ and ‘public concern’ char

12021–2021
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green
scotus · 1993
2 sentences

2020In doing so, a trial court may conduct a flexible analysis of the reliability of the expert’s opinion and consider all relevant factors, including these four: “(1) whether the testimony is based on a theory or method that has or can be tested; (2) whether the testimony is based on a theory or method that has been subject to peer review; (3) the error rate of the particular theory or 14. method; and (4) whether the theory or method has gained general acceptance in the field.” Id. b.

2020Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611-12 , 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998), citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 .

12020–2020
Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. green
ohio · 1998
2 sentences

2020Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611-12 , 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998), citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 .

2020Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 611-12 , 687 N.E.2d 735 (1998), citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 .

12020–2020
Valentine v. Conrad green
ohio · 2006
2 sentences

2020The use of differential diagnosis to determine FELA causation “is appropriate only when considering potential causes that are scientifically known.” Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42 , 2006-Ohio-3561 , 850 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 22 , citing Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir.1999). {¶ 38} While conducting a Daubert analysis of the reliability of the expert’s opinion, the focus of the flexible analysis is on the principles and methodology employed by the witness rather than the conclusions drawn.

2020The use of differential diagnosis to determine FELA causation “is appropriate only when considering potential causes that are scientifically known.” Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42 , 2006-Ohio-3561 , 850 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 22 , citing Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir.1999). {¶ 38} While conducting a Daubert analysis of the reliability of the expert’s opinion, the focus of the flexible analysis is on the principles and methodology employed by the witness rather than the conclusions drawn.

12020–2020
Obama for America v. Jon Husted green
ca6 · 2012
1 sentence

2017See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 520 U.S. 351 , 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364 , 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) ; Obama for Am. v. Husted , 697 F.3d 423 , 429 (6th Cir.2012) ; Watson at 259, 725 N.E.2d 255 , citing State ex rel.

12017–2017
In re Election of November 6, 1990 for the Office of Attorney General green
ohio · 1991
2 sentences

2011Gen. of Ohio (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 103, 114 , 569 N.E.2d 447 .

2011Gen. of Ohio (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 103, 114 , 569 N.E.2d 447 .

12011–2011
C. E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. green
ohio · 1978
2 sentences

2003Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280 , 8 O.O.3d 261 , 376 N.E.2d 578 . {¶ 20} Although there is some evidence in the record supporting appellant’s contentions, the probate court chose to rely on other evidence in making its decision. *122 {¶ 21} Appellant fails to realize that the “good cause” standard is a flexible standard that must involve consideration of the original reasons for creating the guardianship.

2003Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280 , 8 O.O.3d 261 , 376 N.E.2d 578 . {¶ 20} Although there is some evidence in the record supporting appellant’s contentions, the probate court chose to rely on other evidence in making its decision. *122 {¶ 21} Appellant fails to realize that the “good cause” standard is a flexible standard that must involve consideration of the original reasons for creating the guardianship.

12003–2003
Reves v. Ernst & Young green
scotus · 1990
2 sentences

2002Id. at 64 , 110 S.Ct. 945 , 108 L.Ed.2d 47 . {¶ 40} In applying the “family resemblance” test, we must examine four factors in connection with the transaction in this cause to determine whether the agreement between the parties is a security.

2002Id. at 64 , 110 S.Ct. 945 , 108 L.Ed.2d 47 . {¶ 40} In applying the “family resemblance” test, we must examine four factors in connection with the transaction in this cause to determine whether the agreement between the parties is a security.

12002–2002
Eastman v. Benchmark Minerals, Inc. neutral
ohioctapp · 1986
1 sentence

1990"Although several tests have been suggested, primary focus is attached to a flexible test of reviewing the transaction to determine whether there is any logical relationship between the claim and the counterclaim." Eastman v. Benchmark Minerals, Inc. (1986), 34 Ohio App. 3d 255, 257 .

11990–1990
Graziano v. Davis green
ohioctapp · 1976
1 sentence

1988We feel that Ohio should adopt a more flexible rule.” Id. at 91 , 4 O.O. 3d at 60, 361 N.E. 2d at 530 .

11988–1988
Hannah v. Larche green
scotus · 1960
2 sentences

1973We recognize that we must apply a flexible standard, that due process embodies “differing rules of fair play . . . [in] differing types of proceedings”, Hannah v. Larche (1960), 363 U. S. 420, 442 , and that “[t]he nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are *93 all considerations which mnst he taken into account”.

1973Ibid.

11973–1973
Pennoyer v. Neff red
· 1878
1 sentence

1968See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 .” In Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U. S. 235, 251 , the United States Supreme Court held: “In response to * # * changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 .

11968–1968
Hess v. Pawloski green
scotus · 1927
1 sentence

1968See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 .” In Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U. S. 235, 251 , the United States Supreme Court held: “In response to * # * changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 .

11968–1968
Young v. Masci green
scotus · 1933
1 sentence

1968See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 .” In Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U. S. 235, 251 , the United States Supreme Court held: “In response to * # * changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 .

11968–1968
Hanson v. Denckla green
scotus · 1958
1 sentence

1968See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 .” In Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U. S. 235, 251 , the United States Supreme Court held: “In response to * # * changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 .

11968–1968
International Shoe Co. v. Washington green
scotus · 1945
1 sentence

1968See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 ; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 .” In Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U. S. 235, 251 , the United States Supreme Court held: “In response to * # * changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 .

11968–1968

Where else courts name it

NY 169 (1937–2026) TX 127 (1973–2025) CT 107 (1978–2026) IL 64 (1961–2026) LA 52 (1963–2022) CA 51 (1896–2026) CO 50 (1964–2026) NJ 45 (1960–2025) MN 45 (1896–2025) PA 43 (1964–2025) MI 33 (1979–2026) RI 30 (1951–2023) FL 27 (1967–2025) VT 25 (1993–2026) WI 25 (1922–2022) OH 24 (1968–2025) MD 23 (1957–2024) NC 22 (1963–2025) MO 20 (1963–2017) MA 18 (1929–2014) WA 18 (1967–2016) AK 18 (1977–2023) DC 18 (1966–2022) NM 15 (1992–2010) MT 15 (1983–2024) UT 14 (2000–2023) DE 13 (1979–2022) IA 12 (1973–2024) NH 12 (1975–2021) ME 12 (1972–2023) HI 12 (1960–2010) KS 11 (1974–2016) AL 11 (1967–2007) NE 11 (1981–2024) IN 11 (1985–2025) OK 10 (1928–2019) ID 10 (1969–2022) AZ 10 (1973–2022) TN 9 (1981–2017) OR 9 (1943–2021) GA 8 (1967–2013) WV 7 (1963–2001) VA 7 (1979–2010) SD 6 (1990–2025) SC 6 (1998–2020) WY 5 (1982–2017) AR 5 (1990–2019) KY 4 (1979–2026) MS 4 (2004–2014) ND 3 (1989–2000) NV 2 (2000–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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