flexible doctrine in New York

2026"Although the statute nowhere defines 'due diligence,' it is a familiar and flexible standard that requires the People 'to make reasonable efforts' to comply with statutory directives" ( Bay , 41 NY3d at 211, quoting People v Bolden , 81 NY2d 146, 155 [1993]).

2026"Although the statute nowhere defines 'due diligence,' it is a familiar and flexible standard that requires the People 'to make reasonable efforts' to comply with statutory directives" ( People v Bay , 41 NY3d at 211, quoting People v Bolden , 81 NY2d 146, 155 [1993]).

2022Instead, the Court of Appeals has opted for a flexible rule that considers "all of the relevant circumstances surrounding" a plea ( Harris , 61 NY2d at 19 ; see also Conceicao , 26 NY3d at 382 ).

2021Nonetheless, we also recognize authority promoting "a flexible rule that considers all of the relevant circumstances surrounding a plea" ( People v Conceicao , 26 NY3d 375, 382-383 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2022Instead, the Court of Appeals has opted for a flexible rule that considers "all of the relevant circumstances surrounding" a plea ( Harris , 61 NY2d at 19 ; see also Conceicao , 26 NY3d at 382 ).

2021Instead, the Court of Appeals has opted for a flexible rule that considers "all of the relevant circumstances surrounding" a plea ( Harris , 61 NY2d at 19 [emphasis removed]; see Conceicao , 26 NY3d at 382 ).

2025"The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate" ( Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d 699, 704 ; see Villaver v Paglinawan , 230 AD3d at 535). "[C]ollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 ; see Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d at 704 ), and it is based on principles of fairness and "the facts and [practical] realities of a particular litigation, rather than rigid rules" ( Buechel v Bain , 97 NY

2025"The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate" ( Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d 699, 704 ; see Villaver v Paglinawan , 230 AD3d at 535). "[C]ollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 ; see Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d at 704 ), and it is based on principles of fairness and "the facts and [practical] realities of a particular litigation, rather than rigid rules" ( Buechel v Bain , 97 NY

2025"The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate" ( Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d 699, 704 ; see Villaver v Paglinawan , 230 AD3d at 535). "[C]ollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 ; see Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d at 704 ), and it is based on principles of fairness and "the facts and [practical] realities of a particular litigation, rather than rigid rules" ( Buechel v Bain , 97 NY

2018"Collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine that 'precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity'" ( Weston v Cornell Univ. , 116 AD3d 1128 , 1129 [2014], quoting Buechel v Bain , 97 NY2d 295, 303 [2001]; see Ryan v New York Tel.

2026Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi) states a broad and flexible rule providing that out-of-court statements may be corroborated by any other evidence tending to support their reliability ( see Matter of Nicole V. , 71 NY2d at 118 ; Matter of Omnamm L. [Kumar L.] , 177 AD3d 973 , 975).

2026Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi) states a broad and flexible rule providing that out-of-court statements may be corroborated by any other evidence tending to support their reliability ( see Matter of Nicole V. , 71 NY2d at 118; Matter of Omnamm L. [Kumar L.] , 177 AD3d 973, 975).

2018Nevertheless, the Justice Center argues that it was not precluded from relitigating those issues because it was neither a party to the previous proceeding nor in privity with a party. "[Privity] is an amorphous concept not easy of application" ( Matter of Juan C. v Cortines , 89 NY2d 659, 667 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and determining whether it exists requires "a flexible analysis of the facts and circumstances of the actual relationship between the party and nonparty in the prior litigation" ( Evergreen Bank v Dashnaw , 246 AD2d 814, 816 [1998]; accord Huntingto

2013Indeed, courts of this state have found that the concept of privity “requires a flexible analysis of the facts and circumstances of the actual relationship between the party and nonparty in the prior litigation” (Evergreen Bank v Dashnaw, 246 AD2d 814, 816 [3d Dept 1998]; see also D’Arata v New York Cent.

2002“No one would contend that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied rigidly.” (Schwartz v Public Adm’r, 24 NY2d 65, 73 .) “In the Schwartz case and subsequent decisions it was emphasized that historically and necessarily collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine which can never be rigidly or mechanically applied * * *.

1995Courts, referring to the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, have instructed that " 'Behind the phrase res judicata lies a rule of reason and practical necessity’ ” (Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 70 [1969]); and have "emphasized that historically and necessarily collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine which can never be rigidly or mechanically applied” (Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 292 ) and "[b]ecause the doctrine is based on general notions of fairness there are few immutable rules” (supra, at 291).

2023The factors listed in Islamic Republic are not exhaustive, and forum non conveniens is a flexible doctrine that depends on the unique facts and circumstances of each case ( 62 NY2d at 479 ).

2023The factors listed in Islamic Republic are not exhaustive, and forum non conveniens is a flexible doctrine that depends on the unique facts and circumstances of each case ( 62 NY2d at 479 ).

2025The New York standard "requires an assessment of the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation" ( People v Watkins , 42 NY3d 635, 639 [2024], citing People v Baldi , 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981], cert denied sub nom.

2000At the outset we note that the courts of this State have not adopted the Strickland test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel claims but continue to apply a flexible standard to analyze claims based upon a deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed under the New York Constitution (see, People v Benevento, supra, at 715; People v Vilardi, 76 NY2d 67, 74 ; People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 ; People v Benn, 68 NY2d 941 ; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 , supra).

2018Nevertheless, the Justice Center argues that it was not precluded from relitigating those issues because it was neither a party to the previous proceeding nor in privity with a party. "[Privity] is an amorphous concept not easy of application" ( Matter of Juan C. v Cortines , 89 NY2d 659, 667 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and determining whether it exists requires "a flexible analysis of the facts and circumstances of the actual relationship between the party and nonparty in the prior litigation" ( Evergreen Bank v Dashnaw , 246 AD2d 814, 816 [1998]; accord Huntingto

2011Privity “is an amorphous concept not easy of application” (Matter of Juan C. v Cortines, 89 NY2d 659, 667 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]) which is determined through “ ‘a flexible analysis of the facts and circumstances of the actual relationship between the party and nonparty in the prior litigation’ ” (Huntington Natl.

2026The Family Court has considerable discretion to decide whether the child's out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse or neglect have been reliably corroborated ( see Matter of Nicole V. , 71 NY2d at 119 ; Matter of Kashai E. [Kashif R.E.] , 218 AD3d 574, 575-576 ).

2026The Family Court has considerable discretion to decide whether the child's out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse or neglect have been reliably corroborated ( see Matter of Nicole V. , 71 NY2d at 119; Matter of Kashai E. [Kashif R.E.] , 218 AD3d 574, 575-576).

1985Serv., supra, p 389): “As a general proposition, unconscionability, a flexible doctrine with roots in equity (see Chesterfield v Janssen, Ves Sen 125, 155-156; 28 Eng Rep 82, 100 [Ch 1750]; Hume v United States, 132 US 406, 411 ), requires some showing of ‘an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party’ (Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445, 449).

1984Serv. ( 50 NY2d 383, 389 ): “As a general proposition, unconscionability, a flexible doctrine with roots in equity * * * requires some showing of ‘an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party’ * * * The concept * * * is not aimed at ‘disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power’ but, instead, at ‘the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise’ ” (emphasis added).

2025To prove ineffective legal assistance using the more flexible standard under New York law, defendant must show that counsel failed to provide "meaningful representation" ( People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]). "[I]t is incumbent on defendant to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's alleged shortcomings" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025To prove ineffective legal assistance using the more flexible standard under New York law, defendant must show that counsel failed to provide "meaningful representation" ( People v Benevento , 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]). "[I]t is incumbent on defendant to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's alleged shortcomings" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2015Collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine grounded on principles of fairness that should not be mechanically applied just because some of its formal prerequisites, like identity of parties, identity of issues, a final and valid prior judgment and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior determination, may be present (see Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003]).

2013We have also recognized that collateral estoppel, a flexible doctrine, “ ‘is applied more flexibly’ ” in the context of the determinations of administrative agencies (Jeffreys, 1 NY3d at 40 , quoting Allied Chem. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 72 NY2d 271, 276 [1988]).

1994Criminal defendants, unlike civil litigants, are protected by constitutional and statutory prohibitions against double jeopardy (see, People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d, at 345-346 , supra; People v Goodman, 69 NY2d, at 37-38 , supra), rendering the litigation-limiting policy underlying collateral estoppel less compelling in a criminal action, particularly in view of the function of a criminal prosecution and society’s interest in the conviction of the guilty and acquittal of the innocent (see, People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d, at 345 , supra). *357 In any case, collateral estoppel, a flexible doctrine, s

1981In the Schwartz case and subsequent decisions it was emphasized that historically and necessarily collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine which can never be rigidly or mechanically applied (Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx, supra, at p 73; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 344 , supra; People v Plevy, 52 NY2d 58 ).

2010Nevertheless, collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine that should not be mechanically applied simply because some of its formal prerequisites may be present (see People v Roselle, 84 NY2d 350, 357 [1994]).

2003Further, whether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular case depends upon “general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation” (id. at 268; see also Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291-292 [1981]; People v Roselle, 84 NY2d 350, 357 [1994] [“(C)ollateral estoppel, a flexible doctrine, should not be mechanically applied just because some of its formal prerequisites, like identity of parties, identity of issues, a final and valid prior judgment and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the prior determination, may be present”]).

2025"The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate" ( Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d 699, 704 ; see Villaver v Paglinawan , 230 AD3d at 535). "[C]ollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 ; see Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d at 704 ), and it is based on principles of fairness and "the facts and [practical] realities of a particular litigation, rather than rigid rules" ( Buechel v Bain , 97 NY

2025"The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel has the burden to show the identity of the issues, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate" ( Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d 699, 704 ; see Villaver v Paglinawan , 230 AD3d at 535). "[C]ollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 ; see Matter of Dunn , 24 NY3d at 704 ), and it is based on principles of fairness and "the facts and [practical] realities of a particular litigation, rather than rigid rules" ( Buechel v Bain , 97 NY

2021Partnership , 22 NY3d 246, 255 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2015Partnership, 22 NY3d 246, 255 [2013]).

2014Collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine that “precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity” (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; see Schultz Constr., Inc. v Franbilt, Inc., 14 AD3d 895, 896 [2005]; Matter of Hickey v Sinnott, 277 AD2d 572, 573 [2000]).

2014Collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine that “precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity” (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; see Schultz Constr., Inc. v Franbilt, Inc., 14 AD3d 895, 896 [2005]; Matter of Hickey v Sinnott, 277 AD2d 572, 573 [2000]).

2021Thus, so long as the record as a whole "affirmatively disclose[s] that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily," the plea will be upheld ( Harris , 61 NY2d at 19 ; see Conceicao , 26 NY3d 375 ; Tyrell , 22 NY3d at 366 ).

2018Therefore, so long as the record as a whole "affirmatively disclose[s] that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily," the plea will be upheld ( People v Harris , 61 NY2d at 19; see also People v Conceicao , 26 NY3d 375 ; People v Tyrell , 22 NY3d at 366).

2017We reach this conclusion mindful that “[c]ollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine [that is] not to be applied automatically just because its formal prerequisites are met” (People v Fagan, 66 NY2d at 816 ; see People v Aguilera, 82 NY2d at 30 ; see also Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 444 [1970]).

1987It is against public policy since the correct determination of guilt or innocence is paramount in criminal cases; therefore, this flexible doctrine should not be applied automatically (People v Fagan, 66 NY2d 815, 816 ; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 345 ).

2013We have also recognized that collateral estoppel, a flexible doctrine, “ ‘is applied more flexibly’ ” in the context of the determinations of administrative agencies (Jeffreys, 1 NY3d at 40 , quoting Allied Chem. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 72 NY2d 271, 276 [1988]).

2013To that end, “among the factors bearing on whether an administrative decision is ‘quasi-judicial’ are ‘whether the procedures used in the administrative proceeding . . . were sufficient both quantitatively and qualitatively, so as to permit confidence that the facts asserted were adequately tested, and that the issue was fully aired’ ” (Jeffreys, 1 NY3d at 40-41 , quoting Allied Chem., 72 NY2d at 276-277 ).

2025"The Family Court, as the trier of fact, has considerable discretion in determining whether the child[ren]'s statements are sufficiently corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of [abuse]" ( Matter of Logan P. [Kendell P.] , 228 AD3d 867 , 869 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Silveris P. [Meuris P.] , 198 AD3d 787, 789 ).

2025"The Family Court, as the trier of fact, has considerable discretion in determining whether the child[ren]'s statements are sufficiently corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of [abuse]" ( Matter of Logan P. [Kendell P.] , 228 AD3d 867 , 869 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Jada W. [Fanatay W.] , 219 AD3d at 744 ; Matter of Silveris P. [Meuris P.] , 198 AD3d 787, 789 ).

2022Rather, we are to employ "a flexible rule that considers all of the relevant circumstances surrounding a plea[,] . . . includ[ing] the seriousness of the crime, actual competent participation by counsel and the timing of the plea" ( People v Edwards , 181 AD3d at 1056 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Nichols , 194 AD3d 1114, 1115 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 973 [2021]).

2021Thus, it is not required that, in each and every circumstance, a plea must be invalidated "simply because the [court] failed to enumerate all the constitutional rights being waived" ( People v Edwards , 181 AD3d at 1056 ; see People v Proper , 133 AD3d 918, 919 [2015]).