flexible standard in New Jersey

1994In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283, 1296 (1958), the Supreme Court, striking down an exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, pointed to a shift from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878), which had required actual presence in a state, to a more flexible standard of "minimum contacts" under International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

1994In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283, 1296 (1958), the Supreme Court, striking down an exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, pointed to a shift from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878), which had required actual presence in a state, to a more flexible standard of "minimum contacts" under International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

1994In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283, 1296 (1958), the Supreme Court, striking down an exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, pointed to a shift from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878), which had required actual presence in a state, to a more flexible standard of "minimum contacts" under International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

1994In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283, 1296 (1958), the Supreme Court, striking down an exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, pointed to a shift from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1878), which had required actual presence in a state, to a more flexible standard of "minimum contacts" under International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

2022However, when the plaintiff suffers from a preexisting condition, as here, the burden of proof to establish causation is lessened. "[B]ecause the preexistent condition itself serves as a 'but-for' cause of the ultimate injury[,]" ibid., in those cases, a more flexible standard requires A-0210-21 8 a plaintiff to show that "as a result of a defendant's negligence, [the plaintiff] experienced an increased risk of harm from that condition, and that . . . increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in causing the injury ultimately sustained." Id. at 375 .

2019However, when the plaintiff suffers from a preexisting condition, as here, the burden of proof to establish causation is lessened. "[B]ecause the preexistent condition itself serves as a 'but-for' cause of the ultimate injury[,]" ibid., in those cases, a more flexible standard requires a A-4845-17T3 10 plaintiff to show that "as a result of a defendant's negligence, [the plaintiff] experienced an increased risk of harm from that condition, and that . . . increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in causing the injury ultimately sustained." Id. at 375 .

1998In Uricoli , our Supreme Court adopted a flexible test in determining whether, or to what extent, an application for accidental disability benefits should be denied where the applicant has been convicted of malfeasance and has been removed from office. 91 N.J. at 77-78 , 449 A.2d 1267 .

1998In Uricoli , our Supreme Court adopted a flexible test in determining whether, or to what extent, an application for accidental disability benefits should be denied where the applicant has been convicted of malfeasance and has been removed from office. 91 N.J. at 77-78 , 449 A.2d 1267 .

2014However, we also recognized the Court "eschewed rigid application of the 'suit within a suit' principle in favor of a more flexible rule." Id. at 398 ; see also Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 361 (2004) (leaving it to the "court's discretion to declare an appropriate trial model").

1987In Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, supra , the Court concluded that "it should be within the discretion of the trial judge as to the manner in which the plaintiff may proceed to prove his claim for damages...." Id. at 343 .

2005Others “advocated a flexible rule which would allow a jury to consider whether the accused actually lost his capacity to act in accordance with ‘his own desire, or motivation, or will’ under the pressure of real or imagined forces.” Id. at 438 , 378 A.2d at 763 .

2005Others “advocated a flexible rule which would allow a jury to consider whether the accused actually lost his capacity to act in accordance with ‘his own desire, or motivation, or will’ under the pressure of real or imagined forces.” Id. at 438 , 378 A.2d at 763 .

1999In most cases the shares to be appraised will not be readily marketable. [ 1968 Commissioners’ Comment to N.J.S.A. 14A:11-3.] “Fair value,” thus, is not synonymous with fair market value. 8 In Lawson Mardon Wheaton, supra, 160 N.J. at 397 , 734 A.2d 738 , we recognized that “there is no inflexible test for determining *375 fair value” and that “an assessment of fair value requires consideration of ‘proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court.’” 1 MacKay, supra, § 9 — 10(c)(1) (citing Dermody v. Sticco,

1999In most cases the shares to be appraised will not be readily marketable. [ 1968 Commissioners’ Comment to N.J.S.A. 14A:11-3.] “Fair value,” thus, is not synonymous with fair market value. 8 In Lawson Mardon Wheaton, supra, 160 N.J. at 397 , 734 A.2d 738 , we recognized that “there is no inflexible test for determining *375 fair value” and that “an assessment of fair value requires consideration of ‘proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court.’” 1 MacKay, supra, § 9 — 10(c)(1) (citing Dermody v. Sticco,

1998But as our industrial society has developed, concerns about children and the great probability of harm to children from dangerous conditions of land led many courts and the Restatement to reject, in the case of children, the premise on which the occupier’s special immunities rested, ie., a judgment that full utilization of land required immunity even at the expense of the lives and limbs of people, and to substitute the more flexible test of negligence which would balance these competing interests on a case to case basis. [Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to

1998But as our industrial society has developed, concerns about children and the great probability of harm to children from dangerous conditions of land led many courts and the Restatement to reject, in the case of children, the premise on which the occupier’s special immunities rested, ie., a judgment that full utilization of land required immunity even at the expense of the lives and limbs of people, and to substitute the more flexible test of negligence which would balance these competing interests on a case to case basis. [Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to

1991Because a reversal is in order on other grounds, we need not separately address this impropriety. [6] In Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Co., et al., 125 N.J. 421 , 593 A. 2d 733 (1991), the Supreme Court recently adopted a more flexible standard to establish the reliability of the theory advanced by a causation expert in a toxic tort case.

1991Because a reversal is in order on other grounds, we need not separately address this impropriety. [6] In Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Co., et al., 125 N.J. 421 , 593 A. 2d 733 (1991), the Supreme Court recently adopted a more flexible standard to establish the reliability of the theory advanced by a causation expert in a toxic tort case.

2019Id. at 274-75 .

2015State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352 , 230 A.2d 384 (1967) (voieeprint).

2015State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352 , 230 A.2d 384 (1967) (voieeprint).

2014We were also "persuaded that emotional distress damages should not be awarded in legal malpractice cases at least in the absence of egregious or extraordinary circumstances." Gautam, supra, 215 N.J.

2014We were also "persuaded that emotional distress damages should not be awarded in legal malpractice cases at least in the absence of egregious or extraordinary circumstances." Gautam, supra, 215 N.J.

2013We conclude that under the more flexible standard of review applied to plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims, they are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their complaint. [Id. at 267-68, 23 A.3d 451 (citations omitted).] Without unnecessarily plowing over the same ground we covered in Guaman I , we return to Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 , 96 S.Ct. 1883 , 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), and some newer cases that we deem pertinent.

2013We conclude that under the more flexible standard of review applied to plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims, they are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their complaint. [Id. at 267-68, 23 A.3d 451 (citations omitted).] Without unnecessarily plowing over the same ground we covered in Guaman I , we return to Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 , 96 S.Ct. 1883 , 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), and some newer cases that we deem pertinent.

2013Verdicchio, supra, 179 N.J. at 24 , 843 A.2d 1042 .

2013Verdicchio, supra, 179 N.J. at 24 , 843 A.2d 1042 .

2012State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 539 , 197 A. 2d 678 (1964); accord Yoskowitz, supra, 116 N.J. at 705 , 563 A. 2d 1 .

2012State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 539 , 197 A. 2d 678 (1964); accord Yoskowitz, supra, 116 N.J. at 705 , 563 A. 2d 1 .

2010With the changing nature of the economy evolved a more flexible standard of jurisdiction "from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff. " Hanson, supra, 357 U.S. at 251 , 78 S.Ct. at 1238 , 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1296 .

2010“In a continuing process of evolution [the United States Supreme Court] accepted and then abandoned ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ and ‘presence’ as the standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over [foreign] corporations.” McGee, supra, 355 U.S. at 222 , 78 S.Ct. at 200-01 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 225 .

2001“The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.” Wilson, supra, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 .

2001“The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.” Wilson, supra, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 .

2000The flexible inquiry of Davis "focuses on the episodic fragments of the [criminal] events." Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 116 , 527 A. 2d 1362 (citing Truglia, supra, 97 N.J. at 521, 480 A. 2d 912 ).

2000The flexible inquiry of Davis "focuses on the episodic fragments of the [criminal] events." Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 116 , 527 A. 2d 1362 (citing Truglia, supra, 97 N.J. at 521, 480 A. 2d 912 ).