flexible standard (Nebraska) · Go Syfert
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flexible standard in Nebraska

11 Nebraska opinions name it 3 courts 1981–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.green
scotus · 1978 · cited in 1 Nebraska opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024Accord See v. City of Seattle, supra note 2 , 387 U.S. at 545 (holding probable cause to issue administrative inspection warrant of commercial building is governed by “a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved”). 39 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 , 98 S. Ct. 1816 , 56 L.

2024Accord See v. City of Seattle, supra note 2 , 387 U.S. at 545 (holding probable cause to issue administrative inspection warrant of commercial building is governed by “a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved”). 39 Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 , 98 S. Ct. 1816 , 56 L.

11
United States v. Ermil Grantgreen
ca8 · 1980 · cited in 1 Nebraska opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991In finding that subsequent cases have not applied the Bram standard literally, the Tippitt court cited the following from United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 316 (8th Cir. 1980): While the Bram test has long been followed, it has not been interpreted to be applied on a strict, per se basis. [Citations omitted.] Rather, as expressed by the Supreme Court, determinations of voluntariness are based upon an assessment of all of the circumstances and factors surrounding the occurrence when the statement is made. [Citations omitted.] This flexible standard allows for judicial determinations of volu

11
United States v. Paul Ferraragreen
ca2 · 1967 · cited in 1 Nebraska opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
1 sentence

1991The “totality of the circumstances” inquiry requires the reviewing court to investigate and analyze “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” [Citation omitted.] The Tippitt court also cited the following from United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 908 , 88 S. Ct. 225 , 19 L.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
International Shoe Co. v. Washington green
scotus · 1945
2 sentences

2022Ed. 2d 683 (1977),] to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 [, 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

2022Ed. 2d 683 (1977),] to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 [, 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

22013–2022
Dirt Road Development v. Hirschman green
neb · 2024
1 sentence

2024The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent. 61 The zon- ing regulations provide that the purpose of a conditional use permit is to control uses to “protect the comfort, conve- nience[,] and appearance, prosperity[,] or general welfare” of 59 See, id.

12024–2024
State v. Seaman green
nebctapp · 2020
1 sentence

2020Id.

12020–2020
State v. Garza green
nebctapp · 2020
2 sentences

2020Probable cause is a flexible standard which depends on the totality of the circumstances; it does not - 224 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 29 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. GARZA Cite as 29 Neb.

2020State v. Seckinger, supra. It does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct - 231 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 29 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. GARZA Cite as 29 Neb.

12020–2020
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan green
scotus · 2015
2 sentences

2017Stat. § 29-411 (Reissue 2016).22 [13] The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that not every entry must be preceded by an announcement.23 “The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should 16 City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 , 191 L.

2017Stat. § 29-411 (Reissue 2016).22 [13] The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that not every entry must be preceded by an announcement.23 “The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should 16 City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 , 191 L.

12017–2017
Pennoyer v. Neff red
· 1878
1 sentence

2013In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 [(1877)], to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 [(1945)].

12013–2013
Wilson v. Arkansas green
scotus · 1995
1 sentence

2003Wilson, supra. The Wilson Court declined, however, *570 to “attempt a comprehensive catalog of the relevant countervailing factors.” 514 U.S. at 936 .

12003–2003
Burdick v. Takushi green
scotus · 1992
1 sentence

1998Therefore, a flexible standard applies to ballot access and voting restrictions: A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights." Burdick v. Takushi , 504 U.S. 428 , 434 (1992) (citations omitted).

11998–1998
Grene v. United States green
scotus · 1967
1 sentence

1991The “totality of the circumstances” inquiry requires the reviewing court to investigate and analyze “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” [Citation omitted.] The Tippitt court also cited the following from United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 908 , 88 S. Ct. 225 , 19 L.

11991–1991
State v. Dawson green
sc · 1911
1 sentence

1991The “totality of the circumstances” inquiry requires the reviewing court to investigate and analyze “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” [Citation omitted.] The Tippitt court also cited the following from United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 908 , 88 S. Ct. 225 , 19 L.

11991–1991
Orange County v. City of Apopka green
fladistctapp · 1974
1 sentence

1981Recent cases so holding include Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So.2d 652 (Fla.App.1974); Oronoco v. Rochester, 293 Minn. 468 , 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972); St.

11981–1981
Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company green
texapp · 1972
2 sentences

1981Recent cases so holding include Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ.

1981Recent cases so holding include Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So.2d 652 (Fla.App.1974); Oronoco v. Rochester, 293 Minn. 468 , 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972); St.

11981–1981
Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester green
minn · 1972
2 sentences

1981Recent cases so holding include Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So.2d 652 (Fla.App.1974); Oronoco v. Rochester, 293 Minn. 468 , 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972); St.

1981Recent cases so holding include Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So.2d 652 (Fla.App.1974); Oronoco v. Rochester, 293 Minn. 468 , 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972); St.

11981–1981

Where else courts name it

NY 169 (1937–2026) TX 127 (1973–2025) CT 107 (1978–2026) IL 64 (1961–2026) LA 52 (1963–2022) CA 51 (1896–2026) CO 50 (1964–2026) NJ 45 (1960–2025) MN 45 (1896–2025) PA 43 (1964–2025) MI 33 (1979–2026) RI 30 (1951–2023) FL 27 (1967–2025) VT 25 (1993–2026) WI 25 (1922–2022) OH 24 (1968–2025) MD 23 (1957–2024) NC 22 (1963–2025) MO 20 (1963–2017) MA 18 (1929–2014) WA 18 (1967–2016) AK 18 (1977–2023) DC 18 (1966–2022) NM 15 (1992–2010) MT 15 (1983–2024) UT 14 (2000–2023) DE 13 (1979–2022) IA 12 (1973–2024) NH 12 (1975–2021) ME 12 (1972–2023) HI 12 (1960–2010) KS 11 (1974–2016) AL 11 (1967–2007) NE 11 (1981–2024) IN 11 (1985–2025) OK 10 (1928–2019) ID 10 (1969–2022) AZ 10 (1973–2022) TN 9 (1981–2017) OR 9 (1943–2021) GA 8 (1967–2013) WV 7 (1963–2001) VA 7 (1979–2010) SD 6 (1990–2025) SC 6 (1998–2020) WY 5 (1982–2017) AR 5 (1990–2019) KY 4 (1979–2026) MS 4 (2004–2014) ND 3 (1989–2000) NV 2 (2000–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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