20 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Glasnapp v. State Banking Boardgreen2 sentences2009We use a flexible standard: The findings of fact must be “ ‘sufficiently definite and certain or specific under the circumstances of the particular case to enable the court to review the decision intelligently and ascertain if the facts afford a reasonable basis for the order without resorting to the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Glasnapp v. State Banking Board, 545 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo.App.1976)). 2009We use a flexible standard: The findings of fact must be "`sufficiently definite and certain or specific under the circumstances of the particular case to enable the court to review the decision intelligently and ascertain if the facts afford a reasonable basis for the order without resorting to the evidence.'" Id. ( quoting Glasnapp v. State Banking Board, 545 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo. App.1976)). | 2 | 2 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1997) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). 2015State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1997) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). | 1 | 2 |
Thomas Host v. BNSF Railway Companygreen1 sentence2017The only case addressing this issue is Host v. BNSF Railway Co., where the Western District held: *871 The weight of authority has rejected bright-line tests for determining whether a locomotive is “in use” in favor of a more flexible test that explores a number of factors and looks primarily at “where the train was located at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured party.” Host, 460 S.W.3d at 102 (adopting the rule from the Eighth Circuit). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hamptongreen1 sentence2015State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1997) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hubbardgreen2 sentences2003See State v. Hubbard, 759 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Mo.App.1988) (finding that stolen automobile that was acquired six months after the theft qualified as "recently stolen property"). 2003See State v. Hubbard, 759 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Mo.App.1988) (finding that stolen automobile that was acquired six months after the theft qualified as “recently stolen property”). | 1 | 1 |
Wood & Huston Bank v. Malangreen1 sentence1993See id. | 1 | 1 |
In re Browngreen2 sentences1988However, in 1955, § 458.010 RSMo 1949, was repealed and replaced by § 475.010(3) RSMo 1969, which reads in part: ... an incompetent is a person who is incapable by reason of insanity, mental illness, imbecility, idiocy, senility, habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, or other incapacity, of either managing his property or caring for himself or both [[Image here]] In Matter of Brown, 527 S.W.2d 395, 400 [5, 6] (Mo.App.1975) the court stated that “clearly it was the purpose of the legislature, in enacting the new statute, to fix a more flexible standard of mental incapacity and to relega 1988Later, in Matter of Armstrong, 573 S.W.2d 141 at 144 [1], the court stated that “while the definition of unsound mind contained in Delany was rejected in Matter of Brown, 527 S.W.2d 395 (Mo.App.1975), the test to be applied to determine the ability of a person to manage his own affairs ... was not mentioned.” Therefore, the court in Armstrong reasoned that the standard to determine the ability to manage one’s own affairs found in Delany was applicable. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Alleged Incompetency of Armstronggreen1 sentence1988Later, in Matter of Armstrong, 573 S.W.2d 141 at 144 [1], the court stated that “while the definition of unsound mind contained in Delany was rejected in Matter of Brown, 527 S.W.2d 395 (Mo.App.1975), the test to be applied to determine the ability of a person to manage his own affairs ... was not mentioned.” Therefore, the court in Armstrong reasoned that the standard to determine the ability to manage one’s own affairs found in Delany was applicable. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Deere and Company v. Pinnellgreen1 sentence1979Deere and Company v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. banc 1970), this Court declared that the ultimate objective of § 506.500 “was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state over *381 nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” But despite the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), state courts must heed the admonition of the Supreme Court that “ ‘the flexible standard of Intern | 1 | 1 |
Roper v. Greenspongreen2 sentences1975Roper v. Greenspon, 272 Mo. 288, 303-304 , 198 S.W. 1107, 1111 [7], 1918D, L.R.A. 126, 132 (banc 1917). 3 Modest independent research discloses at least 15 reported cases (there are others) in which our courts have clearly applied or considered the range of visibility rule in reaching their decision. 4 Our conclusion is, quite contrary to appellant’s argument, that our courts have since 1917 recognized the range of visibility principle as a flexible standard of conduct by which negligence or contributory negligence may be measured. 1975Roper v. Greenspon, 272 Mo. 288, 303-304 , 198 S.W. 1107, 1111 [7], 1918D, L.R.A. 126, 132 (banc 1917). 3 Modest independent research discloses at least 15 reported cases (there are others) in which our courts have clearly applied or considered the range of visibility rule in reaching their decision. 4 Our conclusion is, quite contrary to appellant’s argument, that our courts have since 1917 recognized the range of visibility principle as a flexible standard of conduct by which negligence or contributory negligence may be measured. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission of the State
green
2 sentences2009We use a flexible standard: The findings of fact must be “ ‘sufficiently definite and certain or specific under the circumstances of the particular case to enable the court to review the decision intelligently and ascertain if the facts afford a reasonable basis for the order without resorting to the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Glasnapp v. State Banking Board, 545 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo.App.1976)). 2009We use a flexible standard: The findings of fact must be "`sufficiently definite and certain or specific under the circumstances of the particular case to enable the court to review the decision intelligently and ascertain if the facts afford a reasonable basis for the order without resorting to the evidence.'" Id. ( quoting Glasnapp v. State Banking Board, 545 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo. App.1976)). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Henry B. Folden v. Washington State Department Of Social And Health Services
green
2 sentences1996Id. 1996Id. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1976In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714 , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1976In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714 , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . | 2 | 1976–1987 |
Dennis Deans v. Csx Transportation, Incorporated
green
1 sentence2015There appears to be a split of authority amongst federal circuits about when a locomotive is “in use.” A few circuits apply bright-line tests that hold that a locomotive is not “in use” until it has been assembled, inspected, and released for departure from the yard 7 or until the locomotive is “engaged in moving interstate or foreign traffic.” 8 The weight of authority has rejected bright-line tests for determining whether a locomotive is “in use” in favor of a more flexible test that explores a number of factors and looks primarily at “where the train was located at the time of the accident | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Daubert set out a non-exclusive list of factors for consideration in determining whether the evidence in question meets the flexible standard, including: (1) “whether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; and (4) “ ‘general acceptance.’ ” Id. at 593-94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . 2003Daubert set out a non-exclusive list of factors for consideration in determining whether the evidence in question meets the flexible standard, including: (1) “whether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of error”; and (4) “ ‘general acceptance.’ ” Id. at 593-94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence1981Secondly, State v. Davis, supra, reflects the frequently expressed doctrine that “plain error” is a flexible rule to be sparingly invoked. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hanson v. Denckla
green
2 sentences1979Deere and Company v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. banc 1970), this Court declared that the ultimate objective of § 506.500 “was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state over *381 nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” But despite the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), state courts must heed the admonition of the Supreme Court that “ ‘the flexible standard of Intern 1979Deere and Company v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. banc 1970), this Court declared that the ultimate objective of § 506.500 “was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state over *381 nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” But despite the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), state courts must heed the admonition of the Supreme Court that “ ‘the flexible standard of Intern | 1 | 1979–1979 |
McGee v. International Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1979Deere and Company v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. banc 1970), this Court declared that the ultimate objective of § 506.500 “was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state over *381 nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” But despite the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), state courts must heed the admonition of the Supreme Court that “ ‘the flexible standard of Intern 1979Deere and Company v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. banc 1970), this Court declared that the ultimate objective of § 506.500 “was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state over *381 nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” But despite the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), state courts must heed the admonition of the Supreme Court that “ ‘the flexible standard of Intern | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., City and County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence1979Deere and Company v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. banc 1970), this Court declared that the ultimate objective of § 506.500 “was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state over *381 nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” But despite the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), state courts must heed the admonition of the Supreme Court that “ ‘the flexible standard of Intern | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Lunsford v. Hudspeth
green
1 sentence1976Under the free exercise of this rule, no right or immunity granted by the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, is invaded or impaired.” Lunsford v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 126 F.2d 653 , loc. cit. 655. (l.c. 786). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Perez
green
1 sentence1976They are to exercise a sound discretion on the sub ject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere.” United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1976In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714 , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . 1976In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto 714 , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight
green
1 sentence1963On the contrary, “one is not necessarily contribu-torily negligent as a' matter of law solely because he drives at a speed which prevents his stopping within the distance his headlights reveal objects ahead of him; and that whether he is contributorily negligent as a matter of law depends upon all the circumstances in a particular case.” Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight, (Mo.) 261 S.W.2d 95, 98 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Trantham v. Gillioz
green
1 sentence1963In any event there is a summary of the subject of driving blinded, together with a list of Missouri cases, in 22 A.L.R.2d l. c. 310: “Finding the rule requiring a driver blinded by lights to stop or proceed at his peril impracticable under modern traffic conditions, a number of courts have repudiated or refused to adopt it, applying instead the more flexible standard of ordinary care under the circumstances, (the highest degree of care in Missouri) and holding that a motorist who continues on his course when his vision is interfered with by other lights cannot be held guilty of negligence as a | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.