Editor's notes.

- Prior to the 1983 Constitution, the provisions of this paragraph were combined with the provisions now appearing at Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI, and reference is made to opinions noted under that paragraph.

Waiver is based upon knowledge; it cannot be implied when the fact or the right which is claimed to have been waived by the party in whose favor the right existed is ignorant of the party's right or of any fact which would substantially or materially affect the exercise of that right and tend to prevent a waiver. Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938).

Provisions of this paragraph may be waived by defendant. Fortson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 350, 100 S.E.2d 129 (1957).

Appellate courts must accept factual and credibility determinations made by trial court.

- Factual and credibility determinations of whether a justice of peace was prevented from being a neutral and detached magistrate by the justice's work as a deputy sheriff six years before or by the justice's association with individuals in the sheriff's office made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous. Sanders v. State, 151 Ga. App. 590, 260 S.E.2d 504 (1979).

Writ of habeas corpus cannot be used merely as substitute for writ of error or other remedial procedure to correct errors of law, of which the defendant had opportunity to avail oneself, and no question as to guilt or innocence or as to any irregularity can be so raised, unless it was such as to render the judgment wholly void. Sanders v. Aldredge, 189 Ga. 69, 5 S.E.2d 371 (1939).

Defendant not deprived of right to fair trial.

- Argument that defendant was deprived of the right to a fair trial under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV because the prosecutor injected an irrelevant matter into the trial when the prosecutor asked defendant on cross-examination whether defendant had filed an ante litem notice that defendant intended to sue the city because of the actions of its police officers in the case, failed; this subject of cross-examination was relevant to defendant's financial interest in the outcome of the trial. Golden v. State, 276 Ga. App. 538, 623 S.E.2d 727 (2005).

Failure to object to appointment of magistrate.

- Defendant failed to meet the burden of establishing that defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel's failure to object to the alleged improper appointment of a chief magistrate who presided over the trial, sitting by designation following a request for judicial assistance by the superior court judge assigned to the case, since defendant failed to show that defendant was denied a fair trial by virtue of the appointment. Further, trial counsel testified at defendant's hearing on a motion for a new trial that trial counsel thought it would benefit defendant to have the particular magistrate preside over the trial rather than a superior court judge, which established that the failure to object to the appointment was a matter of trial strategy or tactics, which was not a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Mazza v. State, 292 Ga. App. 168, 664 S.E.2d 548 (2008).

Failure to object to jury.

- Because the defense counsel only sought to have a juror removed before the second day of a three-day jury trial based on that juror's acquaintance with three state witnesses, did not ask the jury pool questions related to such information during voir dire, and did not move for a mistrial when the issue arose during trial, the defendant waived any claim that a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated, and the trial court was not required to grant a mistrial, sua sponte; moreover, because the excused juror was not questioned about any familiarity with the witnesses during voir dire, that juror's selection to sit on the panel was not the result of any concealment or misleading statements. Artega v. State, 282 Ga. App. 751, 639 S.E.2d 634 (2006).

Claim that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance failed as the defendant could not show that any competent attorney would have decided not to object further to the composition of the jury pool. Leslie v. State, 292 Ga. 368, 738 S.E.2d 42 (2013).

Presumption that proceedings in trial court were rightly done.

- In habeas corpus proceedings when the record is silent on the question of whether the defendant did or did not have counsel, or was or was not furnished with a list of witnesses, or was or was not notified of the nature of the offense charged against the defendant, it will be presumed that whatever ought to have been done in the trial court was done and rightly done. Plocar v. Foster, 211 Ga. 153, 84 S.E.2d 360 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 962, 75 S. Ct. 893, 99 L. Ed. 1284 (1955).

Prosecutorial misconduct not found.

- Defendant waived any error in a prosecutor's request during opening statements that the jury "hold (defendant) accountable and send a message that street justice - " as the defendant did not renew an objection after a curative instruction and never moved for a mistrial; further, it was not improper for a prosecutor to appeal to the jury to convict for the safety of the community, or to stress the need for enforcement of the laws and to impress on the jury its responsibility in that regard. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Discharge under habeas writ when judgment absolutely void.

- A discharge under a writ of habeas corpus, after a conviction, cannot be granted unless the judgment is absolutely void; as when the convicting court was without jurisdiction, or when the defendant in the defendant's trial was denied due process of law. Sanders v. Aldredge, 189 Ga. 69, 5 S.E.2d 371 (1939); Aldredge v. Williams, 188 Ga. 607, 4 S.E.2d 469 (1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 661, 60 S. Ct. 512, 84 L. Ed. 1009 (1940).

Erroneous Harris charge did not result in unfair trial since evidence of malice was overwhelming in the malice murder case and, therefore, it was highly probable that the charge did not contribute to the verdict. A Harris charge involved an erroneous presumption that if a defendant used a deadly weapon, intent to kill could be inferred. Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1058, 125 S. Ct. 870, 160 L. Ed. 2d 784 (2005).

Freedom of press subordinate to proper administration of justice.

- No freedoms, including the freedoms of speech and press, are absolute, and liberty of the press is subordinate to the independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. The latter is necessarily true, for only in the courts can freedom of the press and other constitutional rights be preserved. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

District attorney has wide latitude in management of state's case.

- In the trial of an accusation, counsel for the state certainly has as wide a latitude in the management of the state's case as does the private practitioner in representing clients, and can call or refuse to call a particular witness as the state's counsel sees fit. Bonds v. State, 232 Ga. 694, 208 S.E.2d 561 (1974).

Provision for rights to information in possession of state.

- This paragraph provides what information or rights the defendant in criminal case has when the defendant seeks access to certain documents, articles, and statements in the possession of the solicitor general (now district attorney). Walker v. State, 215 Ga. 128, 109 S.E.2d 748 (1959).

Defendant has no right to inspect file of district attorney before trial.

- The defendant in a criminal case does not have the right to inspect the file of the district attorney before the defendant is put on trial. White v. State, 230 Ga. 327, 196 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886, 94 S. Ct. 222, 38 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1973).

State must disclose favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment upon request.

- Constitution requires that, upon request by the defendant, the state disclose all favorable evidence which is material either to guilt or to punishment. "[I]mplicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981).

If defendant asks for "anything exculpatory," such a request really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made. In such a case, the prosecutor will not have violated the prosecutor's constitutional duty of disclosure unless the prosecutor's omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial; the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish "materiality" in the constitutional sense. Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981).

If omitted evidence creates reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.

- This means the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt, whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. Wallin v. State, 248 Ga. 29, 279 S.E.2d 687 (1981).

Preservation of evidence by police.

- State of Georgia did not act in bad faith and commit a due process violation by failing to preserve material evidence when, following a single-car accident involving the defendant's car, the state removed samples of biological evidence from the interior of the defendant's car and sold the defendant's car to a salvage wholesaler who then sold the car to a mechanic, who cleaned, repaired, repainted, and resold the vehicle. The police followed the standard policy of releasing evidence in vehicular homicide cases that the police considered to be solved. State v. Mussman, 289 Ga. 586, 713 S.E.2d 822 (2011).

Constitution does not require police to provide defendant with all police investigatory work, and the mere possibility that an undisclosed item of information might have helped the defendant or might have affected the outcome of a trial, is not sufficient under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); Whitaker v. State, 246 Ga. 163, 269 S.E.2d 436 (1980).

Investigative detention does not amount to "custody".

- One who is under investigative detention or is the subject of a general on-the-scene investigation is not within "custody" within the meaning of Miranda. Bailey v. State, 153 Ga. App. 178, 264 S.E.2d 710 (1980).

Rights do not attach to investigation at crime scene.

- Miranda warnings are not required when a person responds to an officer's initial inquiry at an on-the-scene investigation which has not become accusatory. Japhet v. State, 176 Ga. App. 189, 335 S.E.2d 425 (1985).

Indictments in misdemeanor cases are not guaranteed. Gordon v. State, 102 Ga. 673, 29 S.E. 444 (1897).

There was no fatal variance or due process violation in juvenile petition as the petition contained sufficient information, including the date of the incident and the fact that it involved egg-throwing, to inform defendant of the charge, enable defendant to prepare a defense, and protect defendant from subsequent prosecutions for the same offense; the discrepancy between the delinquency allegations and the evidence regarding the number of windows damaged did not demand reversal as the petition fully informed defendant. In the Interest of M.M., 265 Ga. App. 381, 593 S.E.2d 919 (2004).

Lesser included offense instruction.

- By charging a lesser offense in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6, the trial court did not permit the jury to convict the defendant in a manner not alleged in the indictment in violation of the defendant's due process rights. Rupnik v. State, 273 Ga. App. 34, 614 S.E.2d 153 (2005).

Denial of out of time appeal.

- Because the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved by examining facts appearing in the record, including the plea hearing transcript, and had to instead be developed in the context of a post-plea hearing, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal. Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 435, 637 S.E.2d 384 (2006).

Because the record showed that the defendant entered into a plea freely and voluntarily, and because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, defendant's counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to pursue an appeal, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's out-of-time appeal. McCoon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 490, 669 S.E.2d 466 (2008).

Six year delay in appeal excused.

- Trial court abused the court's discretion by denying the defendant's amended motion for new trial because, contrary to the court's conclusion, the defendant demonstrated prejudice by arguing that the six-year delay in the appellate process caused by the loss of the case file, which frustrated the defendant's ability to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Jones v. State, 322 Ga. App. 310, 744 S.E.2d 830 (2013).

Communications between parishioner and clergy admissible without assistance of counsel.

- Because the defendant requested the future assistance of an attorney, not immediate assistance, and because the defendant knew that the defendant's confession would be handed over to law enforcement, the clergy-parishioner privilege in former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-51 and24-9-22 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-5-502 and24-8-825) was inapplicable; therefore, the defendant's confession to the crimes was voluntary. Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 699 S.E.2d 1 (2010).

Cited in King v. State, 174 Ga. 432, 163 S.E. 168 (1932); Cook v. State, 48 Ga. App. 224, 172 S.E. 471 (1934); Boatright v. State, 51 Ga. App. 80, 179 S.E. 740 (1935); Wright v. State, 184 Ga. 62, 190 S.E. 663 (1937); McKibben v. State, 187 Ga. 651, 2 S.E.2d 101 (1939); Claybourn v. State, 190 Ga. 861, 11 S.E.2d 23 (1940); Williams v. State, 192 Ga. 247, 15 S.E.2d 219 (1941); Morton v. Henderson, 123 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1941); White v. State, 71 Ga. App. 512, 31 S.E.2d 78 (1944); Williams v. State, 199 Ga. 504, 34 S.E.2d 854 (1945); Andrews v. Aderhold, 201 Ga. 132, 39 S.E.2d 61 (1946); Woodruff v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 445, 53 S.E.2d 680 (1949); Boyett v. State, 205 Ga. 370, 53 S.E.2d 919 (1949); McLendon v. Balkcom, 207 Ga. 100, 60 S.E.2d 753 (1950); Cade v. State, 207 Ga. 135, 60 S.E.2d 763 (1950); Harris v. State, 84 Ga. App. 1, 65 S.E.2d 267 (1951); Bradford v. Mills, 208 Ga. 198, 66 S.E.2d 58 (1951); Porch v. Foster, 209 Ga. 697, 75 S.E.2d 420 (1953); Plymouth Record Corp. v. Books, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 753, 90 S.E.2d 336 (1955); Giles v. State, 212 Ga. 465, 93 S.E.2d 739 (1956); Grammer v. Balkcom, 214 Ga. 691, 107 S.E.2d 213 (1959); Yancey v. State, 98 Ga. App. 797, 107 S.E.2d 265 (1959); Alley v. State, 99 Ga. App. 322, 108 S.E.2d 282 (1959); Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 108 S.E.2d 313 (1959); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960); Cadle v. State, 101 Ga. App. 175, 113 S.E.2d 180 (1960); Ledford v. State, 215 Ga. 799, 113 S.E.2d 628 (1960); Josey v. State, 102 Ga. App. 707, 117 S.E.2d 641 (1960); Edwards v. State, 217 Ga. 804, 125 S.E.2d 506 (1962); Cobb v. State, 218 Ga. 10, 126 S.E.2d 231 (1962); Peppers v. Balkcom, 218 Ga. 749, 130 S.E.2d 709 (1963); Pistor v. State, 219 Ga. 161, 132 S.E.2d 183 (1963); Pugh v. State, 219 Ga. 166, 132 S.E.2d 203 (1963); Hunsucker v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 73, 137 S.E.2d 43 (1964); Pippin v. Sheffield, 220 Ga. 179, 137 S.E.2d 627 (1964); Brandeis v. Broome, 220 Ga. 190, 137 S.E.2d 628 (1964); Shelton v. State, 220 Ga. 610, 140 S.E.2d 839 (1965); Blevins v. State, 113 Ga. App. 413, 148 S.E.2d 192 (1966); Lewis v. State, 113 Ga. App. 714, 149 S.E.2d 596 (1966); Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240 (1966); Nichols v. Heffner, 222 Ga. 706, 152 S.E.2d 393 (1966); Mayes v. State Bd. of Cors., 224 Ga. 454, 162 S.E.2d 344 (1968); Grice v. State, 224 Ga. 376, 162 S.E.2d 432 (1968); Studdard v. State, 225 Ga. 410, 169 S.E.2d 327 (1969); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), commented on in 21 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1969); Spell v. State, 225 Ga. 705, 171 S.E.2d 285 (1969); Butler v. State, 226 Ga. 56, 172 S.E.2d 399 (1970); Robinson v. State, 226 Ga. 461, 175 S.E.2d 505 (1970); Mitchell v. State, 226 Ga. 450, 175 S.E.2d 545 (1970); Lingo v. State, 226 Ga. 496, 175 S.E.2d 657 (1970); Robinson v. State, 123 Ga. App. 243, 180 S.E.2d 258 (1971); Nance v. State, 123 Ga. App. 410, 181 S.E.2d 295 (1971); Morris v. State, 228 Ga. 39, 184 S.E.2d 82 (1971); Goodwin v. Smith, 439 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1971); Wallace v. Ault, 229 Ga. 717, 194 S.E.2d 88 (1972); Moye v. State, 129 Ga. App. 52, 198 S.E.2d 514 (1973); Elrod v. Caldwell, 232 Ga. 876, 209 S.E.2d 207 (1974); West v. Hopper, 232 Ga. 830, 209 S.E.2d 310 (1974); Alexander v. State, 134 Ga. App. 201, 213 S.E.2d 560 (1975); Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, 220 S.E.2d 922 (1975); Barrentine v. State, 136 Ga. App. 802, 222 S.E.2d 103 (1975); Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 658, 222 S.E.2d 160 (1975); State v. King, 137 Ga. App. 26, 222 S.E.2d 859 (1975); Dodd v. State, 236 Ga. 572, 224 S.E.2d 408 (1976); Fryer v. State, 138 Ga. App. 124, 225 S.E.2d 437 (1976); Crowder v. State, 237 Ga. 141, 227 S.E.2d 230 (1976); State v. Cox, 140 Ga. App. 30, 230 S.E.2d 87 (1976); Brown v. State, 238 Ga. 98, 231 S.E.2d 65 (1976); Meeks v. State, 142 Ga. App. 452, 236 S.E.2d 119 (1977); Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341, 241 S.E.2d 173 (1977); Williams v. State, 144 Ga. App. 410, 241 S.E.2d 261 (1977); Leonard v. State, 146 Ga. App. 439, 246 S.E.2d 450 (1978); Tanner v. State, 242 Ga. 437, 249 S.E.2d 238 (1978); Brown v. State, 242 Ga. 536, 250 S.E.2d 438 (1978); Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981); Ellis v. State, 248 Ga. 414, 283 S.E.2d 870 (1981); Hurst v. State, 160 Ga. App. 830, 287 S.E.2d 677 (1982); State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288, 290 S.E.2d 149 (1982); Kesler v. State, 249 Ga. 462, 291 S.E.2d 497 (1982); Berryhill v. State, 249 Ga. 442, 291 S.E.2d 685 (1982); R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982); Bryant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 872, 296 S.E.2d 168 (1982); Ellis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 366, 296 S.E.2d 726 (1982), appeal dismissed, 462 U.S. 1113, 103 S. Ct. 3079, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1344, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119, 103 S. Ct. 3087, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1348 (1983); Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365, 301 S.E.2d 294 (1983); Kemp v. Spradlin, 250 Ga. 829, 301 S.E.2d 874 (1983); Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267, 336 S.E.2d 812 (1985); LeGallienne v. State, 180 Ga. App. 108, 348 S.E.2d 471 (1986); Willis v. State, 183 Ga. App. 408, 359 S.E.2d 194 (1987); Beaman v. City of Peachtree City, 256 Ga. App. 62, 567 S.E.2d 715 (2002); Pearce v. State, 256 Ga. App. 889, 570 S.E.2d 74 (2002); Davenport v. State, 289 Ga. 399, 711 S.E.2d 699 (2011); Bunn v. State, 291 Ga. 183, 728 S.E.2d 569 (2012).

Right not extended to participants in civil disputes.

- Constitution provides for effective assistance of counsel for one charged with a criminal offense, not participants in a civil dispute. Calhoun v. Maynard, 196 Ga. App. 219, 395 S.E.2d 645 (1990); Finch v. Brown, 216 Ga. App. 451, 454 S.E.2d 807 (1995); Bergmann v. McCullough, 218 Ga. App. 353, 461 S.E.2d 544 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1141, 116 S. Ct. 1433, 134 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1996).

No misunderstanding upon part of judge shall forfeit this substantial right of the defendant when the defendant is being tried for a crime that might involve the defendant's liberty. Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938).

Custodial interrogation.

- Defendant's ambiguous statements and inquiries during an interview following the defendant's arrest were not an unambiguous request for counsel. Gonzalez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (2007).

Inadequate invocation of right to counsel.

- Because the defendant's statement that the defendant should not talk in the absence of "real talk" was insufficient to trigger the interrogating agent's duty to cease questioning, the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's later statements to the police. Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 696 S.E.2d 629 (2010).

Failure to give sufficient Miranda warnings.

- After a trial court did not give sufficient Miranda warnings as required by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV, the defendant did not knowingly waive the right to counsel during arraignment; thus, the defendant's motion to exclude statements made to a prosecutor during a pro se plea bargain were properly excluded. State v. Pinkerton, 262 Ga. App. 858, 586 S.E.2d 743 (2003).

Refusal to sign Miranda waiver form.

- Defendant's refusal to sign a Miranda waiver form was not an invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel. Hunter v. State, 273 Ga. App. 52, 614 S.E.2d 179 (2005).

Not yet under arrest at traffic stop.

- Defendant was not under arrest for Miranda purposes at the time field and chemical sobriety tests were conducted, because when officers approached the defendant as the defendant exited the vehicle, the officers had not made a decision to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence, but were pursuing an investigation of an allegation of domestic violence; although the defendant was detained, there was no evidence that the officers did or said anything to indicate that the defendant would be detained more than a short time. Burnham v. State, 277 Ga. App. 310, 626 S.E.2d 525 (2006).

Constitution does not require compensation for services of court-appointed counsel.

- A request by a judge of a trial court that an attorney represent an indigent defendant in a criminal case is tantamount to a demand with which the attorney must necessarily comply, but the attorney's professional services, work product, and necessary out-of-pocket expenses in providing competent representation are not required by the Constitution to be compensated. Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S. Ct. 393, 17 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1966).

Defendant is not entitled to have counsel and also to self representation. A defendant is entitled to either, not both. Simmons v. State, 186 Ga. App. 886, 369 S.E.2d 36, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 919, 369 S.E.2d 36 (1988).

Defendant has no right to simultaneous representation by counsel and self-representation. Coursey v. State, 196 Ga. App. 135, 395 S.E.2d 574 (1990).

Defendant does not have a right to simultaneous representation by counsel and self-representation. Snell v. State, 203 Ga. App. 27, 416 S.E.2d 360 (1992).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's pro se request for a continuance because the defendant was represented by counsel when the defendant filed the pro se motion, thus, that motion was of no legal effect whatsoever; a criminal defendant does not have the right to self-representation and also be represented by an attorney. Earley v. State, 310 Ga. App. 110, 712 S.E.2d 565 (2011).

Translation of witness testimony.

- Defendant was not denied defendant's due process rights because the trial court instructed an interpreter to translate only a witness's testimony for the benefit of the jury, and not to otherwise interpret peripheral proceedings for the witness that were unrelated to the content of the witness's testimony; the defendant failed to show how the defendant was denied the right to participate in a meaningful way in the proceedings. Puga-Cerantes v. State, 281 Ga. 78, 635 S.E.2d 118 (2006).

No violation for failure to allow self-representation.

- When defendant requested self-representation at trial but, upon hearing the trial court's warnings about self-representation admitted to being incapable of self-representation, the trial court did not err by proceeding with the trial with the existing appointed counsel representing the defendant. Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga. App. 690, 586 S.E.2d 386 (2003).

Pro se demand invalid if defendant has counsel.

- Because, at the time defendants filed their pro se demand for discharge pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170, they were represented by counsel, the trial court was clearly authorized to find that the pro se demand was of no legal effect whatsoever. Goodwin v. State, 202 Ga. App. 655, 415 S.E.2d 472 (1992).

Refusal to delay resulted in denial of right to counsel.

- When the attorney chosen and employed by the defendant in a criminal case is absent from trial to aid in the birth of the attorney's child, the trial court erred in refusing to delay the trial at least sufficiently to determine whether the trial could be held with representation by selected counsel and without undue delay and denied the defendant the right of counsel of defendant's own choice. Long v. State, 119 Ga. App. 82, 166 S.E.2d 365 (1969).

Failure to furnish counsel at hearing to revoke probation not unconstitutional.

- A proceeding to revoke a probated sentence of one convicted of a criminal offense is not a criminal proceeding, and the failure of the court to supply that person with counsel is not a denial of the right to counsel unless a statute provides for benefit of counsel at such a hearing. Dutton v. Willis, 223 Ga. 209, 154 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

Failure to furnish counsel to one convicted of a criminal offense at the hearing to revoke one's probation does not violate the right to counsel. Reece v. Pettijohn, 229 Ga. 619, 193 S.E.2d 841 (1972).

Fact that defendant was not represented by an attorney in a prior revocation proceeding did not affect the admissibility of the orders entered therein. Wolcott v. State, 278 Ga. 664, 604 S.E.2d 478 (2004).

Claim procedurally barred.

- Defendant was procedurally barred from bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as defendant proceeded directly with an appeal, without first filing a motion for new trial or otherwise demanding an evidentiary hearing on any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; as there was no evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, there was nothing to review on appeal. Terrell v. State, 268 Ga. App. 173, 601 S.E.2d 500 (2004).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally barred because the defendant's appellate counsel appeared in time to file a motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial but failed to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Machado v. State, 300 Ga. App. 459, 685 S.E.2d 428 (2009).

Because the defendant waived the defendant's ineffective assistance claim, the court of appeals did not address the claim; although the defendant raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the defendant's new trial motion, the defendant did not allege that counsel was ineffective for failure to object to the admission of the pretrial identification evidence, but on appeal, that ground represented the sole basis for the defendant's ineffective assistance claim. Bell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 853, 703 S.E.2d 680 (2010).

Because the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance were not raised on a motion for new trial, the claims could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Martinez v. State, 289 Ga. 160, 709 S.E.2d 797 (2011).

Not error to deny continuance when co-counsel present and defendant uninjured.

- When none of the statutory requirements necessary for the granting of a continuance were put forth by co-counsel when the case was called, and there has been no showing that the defendant was injured by the absence of defendant's lead counsel, there was no merit in the complaint that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for continuance because of the absence of counsel, and that the defendant had been denied defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. Blair v. State, 166 Ga. App. 434, 304 S.E.2d 535 (1983).

Denial of a requested continuance, after an attorney volunteered to assume the representation of an accused who had been told that the accused was not eligible for appointed counsel, was denial of counsel. Butler v. State, 198 Ga. App. 217, 401 S.E.2d 43 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 401 S.E.2d 43 (1991).

Consideration of a person's prior uncounseled convictions for driving under the influence in determining an appropriate sentence for a subsequent conviction does not violate any constitutional right to counsel because the driving under the influence statute (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391) is not an enhanced penalty statute since it neither increases the maximum confinement authorized nor converts a misdemeanor offense into a felony. Moore v. State, 181 Ga. App. 548, 352 S.E.2d 821, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904, 108 S. Ct. 247, 98 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1987).

When denial of right, judgment making habeas corpus writ absolute was correct.

- When the undisputed facts showed a denial of the accused's right to counsel, the trial court's judgment making the writ of habeas corpus absolute was correct. Balkcom v. Turner, 217 Ga. 610, 123 S.E.2d 918 (1962).

Judge is trier of fact in habeas corpus proceeding.

- When a habeas corpus proceeding is instituted for the release of a prisoner upon the grounds that the prisoner was deprived of the prisoner's constitutional rights to the benefit of counsel and to trial by jury, and there is an issue of fact on the allegations made by the movant, the trial judge becomes the trier; and when there is ample evidence to support the judge's judgment, it will not be set aside. Mathis v. Scott, 199 Ga. 743, 35 S.E.2d 285 (1945).

Court's failure to inform of danger of self representation.

- Defendant was improperly held in contempt and sentenced to two days' imprisonment because a trial court failed to inform the defendant of the dangers of self-representation and did not obtain from the defendant a knowing waiver of the constitutional right to counsel when the only mention of counsel was a vague colloquy between the defendant and the trial court. Merritt v. State, 261 Ga. App. 597, 583 S.E.2d 283 (2003).

Defendant's required showing of deficient performance prejudicing defense.

- To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant is required to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant's defense. A trial court's determination with respect to counsel's effectiveness will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Davis v. State, 264 Ga. App. 128, 589 S.E.2d 700 (2003).

Inmate seeking habeas corpus relief and alleging that the inmate received ineffective assistance of counsel when the inmate's trial attorney prevented the inmate from testifying needed to show that, had the inmate testified, it was reasonably probable that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; the trial court, in granting habeas relief, relied on an erroneous legal standard by holding that the inmate was not required to show prejudice. Turpin v. Curtis, 278 Ga. 698, 606 S.E.2d 244 (2004).

No conflict of interest.

- Upon a review of the specific statements identified by the defendant supporting a conflict of interest claim between the defendant and the codefendant, no evidence of antagonism was found as the specific statements identified merely amounted to mutual expressions of indifference over the outcome of the criminal charges and not "finger pointing" as alleged by the defendant's counsel; hence, counsel from the same public defender's office were not automatically disqualified from their respective representations. Burns v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (2006).

Practice of courts to appoint counsel to represent indigents.

- Georgia courts have uniformly adopted the practice of assigning counsel to represent indigent criminals in all cases when they were unable to employ counsel to represent them. Summerour v. Fortson, 174 Ga. 862, 164 S.E. 809 (1932).

An impoverished defendant who is unable to employ or arrange for counsel must be afforded an attorney when the defendant requests it in order to meet the constitutional guaranty and to afford due process. Perry v. State, 120 Ga. App. 304, 170 S.E.2d 350 (1969).

Failure to appoint counsel for indigent is violation of constitutional right.

- While Georgia has no statute requiring the appointment of counsel for an accused unable to employ own counsel, the Supreme Court has construed this paragraph to mean that if the accused is not financially able to employ counsel and desires the court to appoint one to represent the accused, the court must do so, and failure to do so violates the accused's constitutional right to benefit of counsel. Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 86 S.E.2d 511 (1955); Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S. Ct. 393, 17 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1966), commented on in 18 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (1967); McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 741 S.E.2d 303 (2013);.

Lack of counsel for indigent persons being tried for crimes is a deprivation of their constitutional rights. Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766 (1964).

Court of appeals erred in deferring to the public defender's own policy not to appoint new counsel for purposes of appeal and denying the indigent defendant's request to raise an ineffectiveness claim as part of a new trial motion as the defendant was constitutionally entitled to appointment of conflict-free counsel to represent the defendant on appeal. Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 657 S.E.2d 842 (2008).

Defendant's petition for habeas corpus was improperly denied on the basis of procedural default as the trial court improperly failed to appoint counsel to represent the defendant on appeal after a motion for new trial was denied as the trial court was aware of the defendant's desire to appeal and the defendant's indigency; the defendant was prejudiced as the defendant's notice of appeal filed pro se was untimely. Davis v. Frazier, 285 Ga. 16, 673 S.E.2d 215 (2009).

Failure to rule on motion for appointment.

- Failure to rule on a motion to appoint counsel, based on an affidavit of indigency, for an appeal was harmless error because the defendant's trial counsel handled the appeal. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006).

Defendant being provided pro bono representation.

- An indigent defendant was constitutionally entitled to the appointment of counsel even though the defendant was being provided pro bono representation by an attorney who was receiving compensation from sources other than the defendant. Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 764, 438 S.E.2d 905 (1994).

Defendant's case was remanded to the trial court with direction to appoint qualified appellate counsel as defendant's motion for appellate counsel had never been acted upon; defendant had been denied the right to appointed counsel on appeal, even though defendant was represented by pro bono counsel. Speight v. State, 279 Ga. 87, 610 S.E.2d 42 (2005).

Discretion of court.

- When the trial court determined that a nonindigent defendant failed to use reasonable diligence to retain counsel and failed to present any evidence of special circumstances militating in favor of the court's exercising the court's discretion to appoint counsel, the court did not abuse the court's discretion in failing to appoint counsel. McQueen v. State, 240 Ga. App. 15, 522 S.E.2d 512 (1999).

Because the determination of whether a defendant was indigent, and thus entitled to have counsel appointed to pursue an appeal, was within the discretion of the trial court, and this determination was not subject to review, the Court of Appeals of Georgia declined to look behind the trial court's determination of indigence. Breazeale v. State, 290 Ga. App. 632, 660 S.E.2d 376 (2008).

Defendant must not be coerced into accepting counsel not of defendant's own choosing and defendant may proceed a defense without counsel. Rogers v. State, 156 Ga. App. 466, 274 S.E.2d 815 (1980).

State may not constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon the person, when the person insists that the person wants to conduct the person's own defense. Taylor v. Hopper, 596 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1083, 100 S. Ct. 1039, 62 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1980).

A trial judge does not have a duty to attempt to force unwanted counsel upon a defendant who has resolutely declared the defendant's purpose to dismiss that counsel. Taylor v. Hopper, 596 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1083, 100 S. Ct. 1039, 62 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1980).

Counsel of choice.

- Defendant was denied the right to counsel of defendant's own choosing and obtained a reversal of defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm, as a result of the trial court judge's denial of a motion for a continuance, which was grounded on the fact that the defendant's retained counsel was hospitalized; the trial court failed to make an inquiry as to whether the absence of defense counsel was attributable to the defendant and merely stated that because appointed counsel was in the courtroom, the defendant was adequately represented. Turman v. State, 272 Ga. App. 570, 613 S.E.2d 126 (2005).

Defendant failed to show that the trial court's refusal to appoint the defendant's preferred counsel to represent the defendant was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the defendant's letters to the trial court stating the defendant's dissatisfaction with the defendant's lawyer provided any objective considerations favoring the appointment of defendant's preferred counsel; the defendant's scant testimony at the hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial as to why the defendant preferred in particular the lawyer named in the defendant's letters fell short of providing objective considerations favoring the appointment of the defendant's preferred counsel. Ware v. State, 307 Ga. App. 782, 706 S.E.2d 143 (2011).

Defendant was not denied the trial counsel of the defendant's choosing when the trial court declined to continue the trial proceedings after the defendant indicated that the defendant had retained new counsel because the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the defendant requested a continuance for purposes of delay; therefore, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's request for a continuance and instead proceeding with the defendant's appointed counsel who was prepared for trial. Calloway v. State, 313 Ga. App. 708, 722 S.E.2d 422 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court disqualified one of the defendant's two lawyers because the lawyer also represented a witness who ultimately testified against the defendant, and the prospects of the lawyer advising the witness about any deal that might be proposed by the state to secure the witness's testimony against the defendant or cross-examining the witness on behalf of the defendant were rife with serious ethical problems. Heidt v. State, 292 Ga. 343, 736 S.E.2d 384 (2013).

Defendant was not prejudiced by the appointment of counsel eight days prior to trial when on the day set for trial defense counsel requested a continuance, stating that defense counsel had not had an opportunity to talk with all the witnesses, but the trial court denied this motion, stating that counsel would be given an opportunity to interview witnesses prior to their testimony; defendant contended that these interviews were inadequate to prepare the defendant's attorney for trial, but the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the motion for continuance since no showing was made that any prospective witness not interviewed by the defense would have been beneficial to the defendant. Newberry v. State, 250 Ga. 819, 301 S.E.2d 282 (1983).

Failing to interview witnesses whose testimony was not relevant.

- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to identify a defendant's three "new eyewitnesses" who were to have provided "helpful information" for the defendant; the witnesses saw what occurred after the defendant's arrest, not the criminal events that led to the defendant's arrest. McCarty v. State, 269 Ga. App. 299, 603 S.E.2d 666 (2004).

Right to counsel triggered by probated or suspended sentence.

- Appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's conviction of the defendant, on driving on a revoked license charge, on the ground that the defendant was not entitled to appointed counsel since defendant was not actually given a prison sentence but was instead given a probated sentence as the right to counsel was triggered when the defendant, who was indigent, was given a probated or suspended sentence. Barnes v. State, 275 Ga. 499, 570 S.E.2d 277 (2002).

Appointment of preferred counsel.

- Although an indigent defendant has no right to compel the trial court to appoint an attorney of defendant's own choosing, when a defendant's choice of counsel is supported by objective considerations favoring the appointment of the preferred counsel, and there are no countervailing considerations of comparable weight, it is an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's request to appoint the counsel of defendant's preference. Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991).

Counsel's motion to withdraw properly denied.

- Given that a trial counsel represented that the trial counsel could be ready for trial and that the trial counsel's request to withdraw was filed four days before the trial was scheduled to commence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the trial counsel's motion to withdraw. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

Reasons for failure to obtain counsel.

- After defendant challenged the trial court's failure to appoint a lawyer to represent defendant even though defendant was not indigent, the action was remanded for a determination of whether the trial court delayed the proceedings long enough to ascertain whether the defendant acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to obtain an attorney and whether the absence of an attorney was attributable to reasons beyond the defendant's control. Nunnally v. State, 261 Ga. App. 198, 582 S.E.2d 173 (2003).

Defendant failed to show good reason to discharge court-appointed counsel.

- Defendant did not have a good reason for discharging a court-appointed attorney and substituting another one after the attorney had interviewed all of the defendant's witnesses, except for one witness who had not returned calls; the trial court properly advised the defendant that the trial would take place in four days, as scheduled, and that the defendant could either be represented by the court-appointed attorney, another attorney, or the defendant could be self represented. Nicely v. State, 277 Ga. App. 140, 625 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in giving the defendant the option of proceeding pro se and denying trial counsel's motion to withdraw from representation because the trial court conducted a thorough investigation of the allegations, and the defendant was unable to articulate any support for the claim of threats, beyond stating repeatedly the defendant's belief that counsel needed more time. Billings v. State, 308 Ga. App. 248, 707 S.E.2d 177 (2011).

Defendant not entitled to counsel in habeas proceeding.

- Dismissal of an inmate's habeas petition without a hearing was proper as the petition failed to state any viable claim for pre-conviction habeas corpus relief since: (1) the inmate was not entitled to appointed counsel in the habeas corpus proceeding; (2) the habeas court was not required to make a determination of the inmate's mental state as it was an issue to be addressed in the context of the criminal prosecution; and (3) the inmate did not seek issuance of the writ on the ground that the inmate had tendered proper bail in connection with the inmate's then-pending prosecution on the criminal charge. Britt v. Conway, 281 Ga. 189, 637 S.E.2d 43 (2006).

Appointment of new counsel not warranted.

- Because the defendant's sole claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal lacked merit, the trial court did not err in denying a motion for the appointment of new counsel. Dingler v. State, 281 Ga. App. 721, 637 S.E.2d 120 (2006).

In the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault in connection with robbery of a fast food restaurant, trial court did not err by refusing to appoint new trial counsel after the defendant made it known that the defendant was dissatisfied with trial counsel and had filed a bar complaint against trial counsel; trial court gave the defendant choice between keeping current trial counsel or proceeding pro se, and the defendant chose to proceed with current counsel. Holsey v. State, 291 Ga. App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (2008).

Right to employ counsel of own selection.

- This constitutional right entitles everyone to exercise one's own free choice in the selection of the attorney one wishes to employ to represent one. Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780, 64 S. Ct. 87, 88 L. Ed. 468 (1943), overruled on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955).

Representation by associate of the lead attorney did not violate defendants' constitutional right to counsel because, although defendant made a post-trial claim that defendant did not approve of the substitution, defendant did not object when the attorney informed the trial court that defendant had given permission for the associate to assume the role of defense counsel should that prove necessary; the trial court was authorized to find that defendant failed to rebut the presumption of effectiveness of the trial counsel by clear and convincing evidence. Cox v. State, 279 Ga. 223, 610 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Reasonable opportunity to procure counsel.

- This provision guarantees a person who is unable to employ counsel the right to have counsel appointed for that person by the court; and such provision entitles an accused who is able to employ counsel a reasonable opportunity to procure counsel of the accused's own selection. Fair v. Balkcom, 216 Ga. 721, 119 S.E.2d 691 (1961).

This paragraph confers upon every person indicted for crime a most valuable and important constitutional right, and entitles the person to be defended by counsel of the person's own selection whenever the person is able and willing to employ an attorney and uses reasonable diligence to obtain those services. No person meeting these requirements should be deprived of the person's right to be represented by counsel chosen by that person, or forced to trial with the assistance only of counsel appointed for the person by the court. Long v. State, 119 Ga. App. 82, 166 S.E.2d 365 (1969); Wallis v. State, 137 Ga. App. 457, 224 S.E.2d 91 (1976).

Defendant must use reasonable diligence to obtain services of counsel.

- This paragraph has been interpreted to confer upon every criminal defendant the right to be represented by counsel of the defendant's own selection whenever the defendant is able and willing to employ one, and uses reasonable diligence to obtain counsel's services. Reid v. State, 237 Ga. 106, 227 S.E.2d 24 (1976); Lewis v. State, 188 Ga. App. 205, 372 S.E.2d 482 (1988).

When a non-indigent defendant, an "almost" illiterate chicken coop builder, acted with reasonable diligence in the defendant's attempts to obtain an attorney, an attorney should have been appointed for the defendant. Flanagan v. State, 224 Ga. App. 272, 480 S.E.2d 299 (1997).

No right to representation by someone unauthorized to practice law.

- While it is true that a defendant may proceed in a defense without counsel, a defendant may not expand the right to counsel to include representation by someone else unauthorized to practice law. Pfeiffer v. State, 173 Ga. App. 374, 326 S.E.2d 562 (1985).

Whether a particular defendant has exercised "reasonable diligence" in procuring counsel of choice is a factual question, and the grant or denial of a request for continuance on grounds of absence of retained counsel is a decision within the sound discretion of the trial judge, reversible only for an abuse of that discretion. Shaw v. State, 251 Ga. 109, 303 S.E.2d 448 (1983).

Inquiry as to defendant's "reasonable diligence."

- Since the trial of the defendant had been continued in order to accommodate the defendant's request to obtain different counsel and the defendant had been told when the case would be tried and warned of the dangers of proceeding without counsel and the defendant appeared without counsel on the date set, before proceeding to trial the court should have made an inquiry as to whether the defendant's failure to obtain counsel was attributable to the defendant's own lack of diligence. Hasty v. State, 210 Ga. App. 722, 437 S.E.2d 638 (1993).

Violation of rights when court denies postponement for procuring of counsel.

- A judge's refusal of the request of a defendant for postponement, which in effect deprives the defendant of an opportunity to use normal facilities and resources to procure counsel of defendant's own choice, violates this paragraph. Walker v. State, 194 Ga. 727, 22 S.E.2d 462 (1942).

Trial court abused the court's discretion when the court denied the defendant's motion for a continuance and forced the defendant to proceed to trial without the assistance of counsel when, following the defendant's discovery that the defendant's retained attorney could not represent the defendant, the defendant makes a good faith, albeit unsuccessful, effort to obtain substitute counsel. Shaw v. State, 251 Ga. 109, 303 S.E.2d 448 (1983).

No error to refuse continuance when ample time for defendant to employ counsel.

- It is not error for the trial court to refuse to grant a continuance in order to obtain the services of counsel when the defendant had ample time to employ counsel, had made no real attempt to employ counsel prior to trial, was represented by appointed counsel, and there was no evidence in the record that the defendant's appointed counsel had inadequate time to prepare for trial. Miller v. State, 156 Ga. App. 469, 274 S.E.2d 818 (1980).

After continuance, defendant cannot reject appointed counsel.

- After being afforded a continuance to obtain counsel, a defendant cannot reject appointed counsel and insist that the defendant's preliminary hearing be further delayed while the defendant tries to obtain the services of one particular, prominent attorney who has not agreed to take the case. Eiland v. State, 246 Ga. 112, 268 S.E.2d 922 (1980).

Violation of rights to deny defendant counsel of defendant's own selection.

- Improper denial of the defendant's right to be represented by counsel of the defendant's own choosing is violative of this paragraph and former Code 1933, § 27-403 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-7-24), and abrogates the right of procedural due process. Johnson v. State, 139 Ga. App. 829, 229 S.E.2d 772 (1976).

Disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal matter was an abuse of discretion, although a client of the defense attorney's law firm was the employer of a witness for the state, because the relationship between the law firm and the firm's client was not reasonably likely to impair a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the witness. Lewis v. State, 312 Ga. App. 275, 718 S.E.2d 112 (2011), cert. denied, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 238 (Ga. 2012).

Party may select chief counsel.

- The spirit of this constitutional provision entitles a person charged with a crime to the privilege and benefit of counsel of the person's own selection, and this right of selection must also extend to the right to select the counsel who shall lead in the conduct of the person's case. Chivers v. State, 5 Ga. App. 654, 63 S.E. 703 (1909).

Indigent defendant has no absolute right to discharge counsel and have another substituted.

- A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be defended by counsel of defendant's own selection whenever the defendant is willing and able to employ such counsel. However, an indigent criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to discharge one court-appointed counsel and have another substituted in that counsel's place. A request of this sort addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court. Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 257 S.E.2d 543 (1979).

Court under no obligation to appoint counsel for accused who has means.

- If the accused has means to employ counsel, and is out upon bond and has opportunity to secure counsel, and neglects or refuses to do so, the court is under no obligation or duty to appoint counsel to represent the accused. Elam v. Rowland, 194 Ga. 58, 20 S.E.2d 572 (1942).

When the accused has exercised the accused's own free choice of counsel and has engaged an attorney to represent the accused, the accused has no right under the Constitution to have the court appoint an attorney to represent the accused without charge. Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780, 64 S. Ct. 87, 88 L. Ed. 468 (1943), overruled on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955).

When a defendant is financially able to employ counsel and is given the privilege to do so, it is not error for the court to fail to appoint counsel for the defendant. McGhee v. State, 71 Ga. App. 52, 30 S.E.2d 54 (1944).

When counsel whom the defendant believed the defendant had employed informed the court on the day of the defendant's hearing for probation violation that the defendant had not made the necessary arrangements with counsel and that counsel could not represent the defendant, but there was nothing in the record to show that the defendant was financially unable to employ counsel, it was not error for the court to fail to appoint counsel for the defendant. McGhee v. State, 71 Ga. App. 52, 30 S.E.2d 54 (1944).

Obtaining of counsel is matter of contract between party and attorney. Walker v. State, 17 Ga. App. 321, 86 S.E. 735 (1915).

No deprivation of rights when court honors request to conduct own defense.

- Defendant is not deprived of the defendant's constitutional rights when a trial court honors defendant's request to conduct the defendant's own defense. Taylor v. Hopper, 596 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1083, 100 S. Ct. 1039, 62 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1980).

Appointed counsel entitled to reasonable time for preparation.

- Right to "benefit of counsel" includes a reasonable time for preparation of the case. Blackman v. State, 76 Ga. 288 (1886).

The constitutional guaranty of "benefit of counsel" means something more than the mere appointment by the court of counsel to represent the accused; the accused is entitled to a reasonable time for preparation by such counsel to properly represent the accused on the trial. Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. 460, 141 S.E. 196 (1928); Edwards v. State, 204 Ga. 384, 50 S.E.2d 10 (1948); Burkett v. State, 131 Ga. App. 662, 206 S.E.2d 848 (1974).

Benefit of counsel guaranteed by this paragraph is not satisfied merely by the defendant being represented by counsel on defendant's trial, but defendant's counsel is entitled to a reasonable time after counsel's employment to prepare for defendant's defense in order that counsel may adequately and effectively represent the client. Smith v. Greek, 226 Ga. 312, 175 S.E.2d 1 (1970); Tucker v. State, 136 Ga. App. 456, 221 S.E.2d 664 (1975).

Constitutional privilege would amount to nothing if counsel for accused not allowed sufficient time to prepare defense.

- The Constitution of this state provides that every person accused of a crime shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel, but it is useless to appoint counsel to represent one so accused unless the attorney so appointed is given at least a reasonable opportunity to prepare the case entrusted to the counsel. Edwards v. State, 204 Ga. 384, 50 S.E.2d 10 (1948).

This constitutional guaranty amounts to nothing unless the counsel selected by the accused or appointed by the court are given a reasonable time to ascertain the character of the case that the accused is called upon to defend. Fair v. Balkcom, 216 Ga. 721, 119 S.E.2d 691 (1961).

Accused denied benefit of counsel when reasonable time to prepare not given.

- When it appears that the defendant was put to trial upon an indictment for a capital felony, the defendant has not been apprised that an indictment had been found against the defendant, and that counsel appointed for the defendant were only permitted to confer with their client for two or three minutes before the court announced that "the case would go to trial," the defendant was denied the constitutional benefit of counsel. Jackson v. State, 176 Ga. 148, 167 S.E. 109 (1932).

Constitutional requirement of benefit of counsel is, in effect, denied when counsel appointed to defend the accused is not given a reasonable time to prepare a defense before trial. Edwards v. State, 204 Ga. 384, 50 S.E.2d 10 (1948).

Constitutional requirement of counsel is denied in substance when court-appointed counsel is not given a reasonable time to prepare a defense before trial. If reasonable time is not given for such preparation, the accused is afforded only the privilege of counsel and not the benefit of counsel. Edwards v. State, 106 Ga. App. 535, 127 S.E.2d 475 (1962).

Facts and circumstances determine sufficiency of time allowed for preparation.

- Whether or not a reversal is to be adjudged because counsel were not allowed sufficient time to prepare a case for trial is to be determined by the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E.2d 241 (1940).

When counsel was appointed to represent a defendant charged with rape, assault, possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, and cruelty to children on the Friday before the week trial was scheduled to begin, and was given a one-week continuance, counsel should have had more time to prepare, given the gravity of the charges, but defendant showed no prejudice from counsel's short preparation time, as it was not shown that any of the things counsel would have done, given more time, would have resulted in evidence favorable to defendant or a different result of the trial in which defendant was found guilty. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 1, 601 S.E.2d 392 (2004).

Preparation of defendant for trial adequate.

- Defendant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective in insisting that the defendant testify without adequate preparation because the defendant's contention that counsel forced the defendant to testify was refuted by trial counsel's testimony to the contrary at the new trial hearing; trial counsel testified that trial counsel prepared the defendant to testify by telling the defendant to explain about the relationship with the victim, the defendant's location at the time of the crime, why the defendant made a telephone call from a neighbor's house, and various other matters. Although the defendant denied having this discussion, the trial court was authorized to disbelieve the defendant. Ransom v. State, 297 Ga. App. 902, 678 S.E.2d 574 (2009).

Instance when insufficient time allowed.

- Peremptorily forcing one indicted for a criminal offense to trial immediately after the appointment of counsel not familiar with the case to defend that defendant, without giving counsel an opportunity to make an investigation of the case or prepare for the defense is, although no other ground for a postponement or continuance of the case be urged, cause for a new trial. Long v. State, 119 Ga. App. 82, 166 S.E.2d 365 (1969).

Continuance denied despite short period given appointed counsel to prepare.

- When counsel were appointed to defend the accused on the charge of murder, slightly less than 24 hours before the case was called for trial, the court did not abuse the court's discretion in overruling a motion then made for a continuance on the ground that the defendant's counsel had not had sufficient time within which to prepare for trial. Cannady v. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E.2d 241 (1940), commented on in 3 Ga. B.J. 55 (1940).

Ten minute period is too short a time. Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777, 79 S.E. 1128 (1913).

Court abused discretion in denying continuance.

- When facts show that court-appointed attorney was wholly unprepared for trial, after retained counsel withdrew on date of trial from case, and the court denied the motion for continuance or postponement, this was an unconstitutional abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 215 Ga. 362, 110 S.E.2d 635 (1959).

Defendant's duty to employ or request attorney in advance.

- Defendant must be afforded benefit of counsel, and this includes time sufficient for counsel to prepare for trial, but when the defendant was apprised of the charge against the defendant at a previous term of court and fails and neglects to procure counsel or ask the court to do so for the defendant there is no error in refusing a request for additional time on the ground that the counsel has had insufficient time to prepare the defense. It is the defendant's duty to employ an attorney to aid in the preparation of the defendant's defense sufficiently in advance of the trial of the case. Duke v. State, 104 Ga. App. 494, 122 S.E.2d 127 (1961); Bradshaw v. State, 132 Ga. App. 363, 208 S.E.2d 173 (1974).

Accused has right to private consultation with the accused's attorney. Hill v. State, 119 Ga. App. 612, 168 S.E.2d 327 (1969).

A prisoner should always be accorded the privilege of conferring freely with counsel at all reasonable times. Morris v. Peacock, 202 Ga. 524, 43 S.E.2d 531 (1947).

Attorney hired by mother could not invalidate defendant's Miranda waiver.

- Waiver of Miranda rights was not invalid due to police officers' failure to tell a defendant that an attorney hired by the defendant's mother had arrived at the station, because the attorney, without having consulted the defendant, was not empowered to invoke the defendant's personal rights. Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 562, 629 S.E.2d 213 (2006).

Accused entitled to new trial when right to counsel denied.

- It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal case to have the benefit of counsel but the defendant can waive this right. If the record shows that the accused did not have counsel, it is not cause for a new trial unless it further appears that the right to have counsel was denied the accused. Bailey v. State, 50 Ga. App. 92, 176 S.E. 909 (1934); Fortson v. State, 96 Ga. App. 350, 100 S.E.2d 129 (1957).

Right to counsel aids in protection of right to fair and impartial trial.

- Right to counsel is guaranteed to the accused by the fundamental law of this state, in order that the accused and the accused's counsel may see to it that the accused has a fair and impartial trial and that nothing is done that would in any wise tend to the accused's prejudice. Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938).

Trial court's actions did not deny defendant's right to counsel.

- Because the trial court questioned both the defendant and trial counsel about their communications, made several suggestions about how to settle any differences, allowed the defendant and counsel a break during trial to attempt to settle any differences, and then continued the trial on the premise that it would be unfair to the defendant to bring in a new lawyer halfway through the trial to continue representing the defendant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the defendant to proceed with trial counsel and did not deny the defendant a right to counsel; moreover, there was no indication in the record that trial counsel was unwilling or unable to effectively represent the defendant. McCoy v. State, 285 Ga. App. 246, 645 S.E.2d 728 (2007).

Subsequent custodial police interview violated right to counsel.

- While non-custodial and custodial statements were properly admitted, as not vitiating the defendant's constitutional rights once defendant invoked the right to counsel, a subsequent interview initiated by police violated this right; as a result, cocaine seized through information obtained from the interview had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

Counsel protects accused from ignorance of the accused's constitutional and legal rights.

- Purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from the accused's own ignorance of the accused's legal and constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant failure to claim the accused's rights removes the protection of the Constitution. Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 634, 15 S.E.2d 873 (1941), later appeal, 193 Ga. 661, 19 S.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 626, 63 S. Ct. 36, 87 L. Ed. 506 (1942).

Constitutional provision restrains courts and legislature from denying right to counsel.

- This provision absolutely guarantees one accused of a crime the right to have the assistance of counsel and be heard at one's trial, and was no doubt inserted in the Constitution to abrogate the common-law practice under which prisoners accused of a felony were denied such right, and to restrain the legislature from denying it by statute. Harris v. Norris, 188 Ga. 610, 4 S.E.2d 840 (1939).

The right of benefit and privilege of counsel should be strictly guarded and preserved. Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938); McGhee v. State, 71 Ga. App. 52, 30 S.E.2d 54 (1944).

Privilege belongs to every citizen and cannot be denied.

- This is a privilege which belongs to every citizen of this state without the slightest reference to the citizen's condition in life, and cannot be legally denied the citizen by the courts. Summerour v. Fortson, 174 Ga. 862, 164 S.E. 809 (1932).

Threshold right to assistance of counsel is no less momentous to accused deciding whether to plead guilty than to an accused who stands trial. McBryar v. McElroy, 510 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Conflict of interest not proven.

- Because, at the time of trial, the public defender's office was no longer representing the confidential informant involved in two sales of cocaine charged against defendant, and no evidence was presented that counsel was less vigorous in counsel's cross-examination, the trial court did not err in denying counsel's motion to withdraw. Banks v. State, 270 Ga. App. 221, 606 S.E.2d 34 (2004).

Defendant did not establish a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict of interest because the fact that attorneys from one public defender's office were representing the defendant and the accomplice was not sufficient, standing alone, to show an impermissible conflict of interest; nothing in the record indicated that counsel bypassed any meritorious defenses, that the accomplice's plea bargain was negotiated at the expense of the defendant, or that counsel's ability to cross-examine the accomplice was constrained; and there was no evidence that the defendant's counsel shared any privileged or confidential information with or obtained such information from the attorney representing the accomplice. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 404, 807 S.E.2d 418 (2017).

Average defendant does not have skill for self representation.

- The right to counsel embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect oneself when brought before a tribunal with power to take the defendant's life or liberty. McBryar v. McElroy, 510 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of right to counsel for misdemeanor prosecutions.

- Although the right to counsel extends to misdemeanor prosecutions when imprisonment may result (Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972)), the Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted Argersinger as requiring that a defendant in a misdemeanor criminal prosecution be entitled to counsel only when the defendant is sentenced to actual imprisonment. Capelli v. State, 203 Ga. App. 79, 416 S.E.2d 136 (1992).

Right extends to all prosecutions.

- Right to private counsel attached in all criminal prosecutions not merely those resulting in imprisonment or fine; the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel since there was no evidence of relinquishment of the right. Barnes v. State, 261 Ga. App. 112, 581 S.E.2d 727 (2003).

Pro se defendant has no right to standby counsel, and therefore, since the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of defendant's right to counsel, including the presence of standby counsel, the defendant had no room to complain when the trial court did not provide defendant with standby counsel. Bush v. State, 268 Ga. App. 200, 601 S.E.2d 511 (2004).

Pro se defendant's failure to subpoena witnesses.

- When the defendant was offered ample opportunity to subpoena witnesses, but did not comply with basic rules of criminal procedure, declining assistance, declining to make a proffer of their testimony, and failing to present the state with a list 10 days before trial, the defendant was not denied the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself effectively, based on a failure to timely serve subpoenas on defense witnesses. Clark v. State, 278 Ga. App. 412, 629 S.E.2d 103 (2006).

Question was not a request for counsel.

- Question by a defendant as to whether the defendant would have been arrested if the defendant asked for an attorney was not a clear request for counsel that required cessation of police questioning or clarification before continuing the interrogation and there was no evidence that the statement was given in fear of injury or for a hope of benefit; additionally, while the investigator lied to the defendant throughout the interview about the existence and amount of inculpatory evidence, nothing suggested that the investigator sought to procure a false statement. Wright v. State, 279 Ga. App. 155, 630 S.E.2d 656 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress because the defendant's question about counsel was equivocal. Dunlap v. State, 291 Ga. 51, 727 S.E.2d 468 (2012).

Right to choice of counsel.

- Because the defendant was properly advised about retaining appointed counsel, but requested a change of counsel at trial, the trial court could have concluded that the request was a dilatory tactic; consequently, the trial court did not err in requiring the defendant to choose between representation by appointed counsel and proceeding pro se. Mondragon v. State, 270 Ga. App. 780, 607 S.E.2d 914 (2004).

Right to self-representation.

- Because the defendant failed to make an unequivocal assertion of a right to self-representation, and raised no objection after being informed that defense counsel and an associate would assist in the defense, the right was not violated. Moore v. State, 280 Ga. App. 894, 635 S.E.2d 253 (2006).

Defendant's pro se representation did not warrant reversal of convictions, despite the fact that the defendant's waiver of counsel was not knowingly and voluntarily made, as any error in the waiver was harmless, given that: (1) stand-by counsel assisted the defendant with procedural matters, jury instructions, and closing argument; (2) the state presented strong evidence of the defendant's guilt; (3) the defendant understood the nature of the charges filed; and (4) the defendant filed numerous pro se motions prior to trial, and successfully moved to exclude two potential jurors and to sequester witnesses; thus, as a result of the defendant's actions, the defendant was not mentally incompetent. Granville v. State, 281 Ga. App. 465, 636 S.E.2d 173 (2006).

Trial court did not err in refusing to appoint the defendant counsel at the motion to suppress hearing and allowing the defendant to represent oneself at trial as the trial court found that the defendant made an informed and voluntary choice to relinquish the right to counsel; the trial court repeatedly informed the defendant of the dangers of self-representation and the defendant was advised of the nature of the charges and the possible punishment. Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (2012).

Right to counsel in one case did not extend to unrelated murder investigation.

- Defendant was not deprived of counsel in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 when the defendant made statements to police in the murder case after the defendant had been assigned counsel on a theft charge that occurred in a different county hours after the murder; the appointment of counsel in the theft case did not extend to the murder case, as they were not closely related, and the theft involved different victims from the murder, occurred well after the murder, and occurred at a different location than the murder. Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006).

Assistance of counsel denied.

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal of the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea. It was obvious that the defendant had attempted to appeal the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw and that the defendant's request for counsel to help the defendant pursue the defendant's appeal had never been ruled upon; prejudice was presumed and the harmless error analysis did not apply since there had been a total denial of the assistance of counsel. Stockton v. State, 298 Ga. App. 84, 679 S.E.2d 109 (2009).

Elements of effective and competent counsel.

- As to the requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, the services of counsel meet the requirement of the due process clause when the counsel is a member in good standing at the bar, gives the client complete loyalty, serves the client in good faith to the best of counsel's ability, and counsel's service is of such character as to preserve the essential integrity of the proceedings at a trial in a court of justice. Counsel is not required to be infallible. Counsel may make some mistakes. A client is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Jones v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 262, 79 S.E.2d 1 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 956, 74 S. Ct. 682, 98 L. Ed. 1101 (1954).

When inadequate representation of counsel is alleged, the reviewing court normally considers whether the defendant had a defense which was not presented; whether trial counsel consulted with the accused and adequately investigated the facts and the law; and whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation, rather than from unwise trial tactics. Ealy v. State, 251 Ga. 426, 306 S.E.2d 275 (1983).

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant who pleads guilty must show that the defendant's counsel erred and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 897, 581 S.E.2d 407 (2003).

First defendant did not show that the first defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; the first defendant could not show that the failure to challenge the joint trial of the first defendant and the second defendant was error and the first defendant's claim that the first defendant should have challenged the opening and closing statements of the second defendant's counsel that the first defendant was the gunman did not show ineffective assistance because an objection would have been futile given the fact that the statements of the second defendant's counsel were not evidence. Bennett v. State, 266 Ga. App. 502, 597 S.E.2d 565 (2004).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit because the defendant failed to: (1) show prejudice resulting from counsel's alleged ineffectiveness by failing to impeach two witnesses on cross-examination with prior statements they made; and (2) make and, in all likelihood, could not have made, a strong showing that the identification testimony would have been suppressed had trial counsel so moved. Rivers v. State, 283 Ga. 1, 655 S.E.2d 594 (2008).

In determining prejudice on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, a defendant has to show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different; Georgia cases that deviated from that standard by eliminating the reasonable probability language, thereby putting a more stringent burden on the defendant, are thus disapproved. Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009).

Case was remanded for a hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of first appellate counsel because the supreme court could not determine from the record whether the defendant was unable to meet the standard for ineffective assistance of first appellate counsel since the trial court's order did not specifically address the issue. Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 731 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

Defendant not entitled to perfect counsel but reasonably competent counsel.

- Constitutional right to assistance of counsel means not errorless counsel and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820, 256 S.E.2d 907, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957, 100 S. Ct. 437, 62 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1979); Suits v. State, 150 Ga. App. 285, 257 S.E.2d 306 (1979); Zant v. Campbell, 245 Ga. 368, 265 S.E.2d 22 (1980); Birt v. Hopper, 245 Ga. 221, 265 S.E.2d 276 (1980); Rosser v. State, 156 Ga. App. 463, 274 S.E.2d 812 (1980); Galloway v. State, 165 Ga. App. 536, 301 S.E.2d 894 (1983); Johnson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 773, 302 S.E.2d 626 (1983); Jackson v. State, 167 Ga. App. 509, 306 S.E.2d 757 (1983); Veit v. State, 182 Ga. App. 753, 357 S.E.2d 113 (1987).

United States Constitution does not guarantee every criminal defendant the assistance of perfect, errorless counsel, or counsel judged by hindsight nor will the court grant habeas relief upon a mere showing that the defense counsel's strategy foundered; even an erroneous sentence estimate by defense counsel does not vitiate the voluntariness of the defendant's plea. McBryar v. McElroy, 510 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Defendant is entitled to counsel likely to render and in fact rendering reasonably effective assistance; of course, this standard does not require errorless counsel, nor is it intended to require that an attorney's performance be ideal in every strategic or substantive particular. Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 718 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Burger v. Zant, 467 U.S. 1212, 104 S. Ct. 2652, 81 L. Ed. 2d 360 (1984).

It is only necessary that counsel's performance fall within a sphere of reasonable legal skill and practice. Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 718 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Burger v. Zant, 467 U.S. 1212, 104 S. Ct. 2652, 81 L. Ed. 2d 360 (1984).

Relief from conviction when trial was farce, or representation in bad faith.

- It is the general rule that relief from a final conviction on the ground of incompetent or ineffective counsel under this paragraph will be granted only when the trial was a farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate opportunity for a conference and preparation. Lawyers are not required to be infallible. The ability and faithfulness of an attorney is not to be judged by whether the lawyer won or lost the verdict. Beavers v. State, 132 Ga. App. 94, 207 S.E.2d 550 (1974).

Lack of skill and incompetency of attorney is imputed to defendant who employed the attorney, the acts of the attorney thus becoming those of the client and so recognized and accepted by the court, unless the defendant repudiates them by making known to the court at the time of the defendant's objection to or lack of concurrence in them. A defendant cannot seemingly acquiesce in the attorney's defense of the defendant or the defense's lack of it and, after the trial has resulted adversely to the defendant, obtain a new trial because of the incompetency, negligence, fraud, or unskillfulness of the defendant's attorney. Jones v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 262, 79 S.E.2d 1 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 956, 74 S. Ct. 682, 98 L. Ed. 1101 (1954).

Requirements for showing ineffective counsel.

- Defendant did not show that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, as defendant did not show either part of the two-part Strickland test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, namely that counsel performed deficiently or that defendant was sufficiently prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance; accordingly, defendant's allegation that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel was insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that counsel performed effectively. Bishop v. State, 266 Ga. App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (2004).

In order to show counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to the defense. Defendant did not show ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) since counsel was not obligated to raise a novel legal issue challenging the vagueness of the robbery by snatching statute; (2) since counsel was not obligated to raise a challenge under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-53.1 as there was no showing that two prior indictments were quashed, which was a prerequisite to application of the statute; and (3) since there was no prejudice to the defendant in counsel failing to request a verbal description from the victim of the victim's reenactment of the crime. Hughes v. State, 266 Ga. App. 652, 598 S.E.2d 43 (2004).

Ineffective assistance of counsel.

- Appeals court rejected the defendant's contentions that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) discuss the details of the pretrial motions filed on the defendant's behalf; (2) call a cohort as a defense witness; (3) impeach a prosecution witness during cross-examination; (4) file a claim of misconduct against the prosecuting attorney after the first trial in this case resulted in a mistrial; (5) move the trial court to exclude the newly discovered evidence during the second trial; and (6) subpoena and introduce the medical records of the victims, as the defendant failed to show how counsel's actions impacted the trial of the defendant, the defendant was granted a mistrial, counsel could not be ineffective for failing to file a frivolous motion, and counsel did subpoena the records about which the defendant complained. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

When issue must be raised.

- Since appellate counsel did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the earliest possible moment, namely defendant's motion for a new trial, that claim was procedurally barred. Harden v. State, 278 Ga. 40, 597 S.E.2d 380 (2004).

When the defendant attempted to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to appointed counsel's pre-trial ineffectiveness, but was cut off from making this argument by the trial court, apparently because the trial court mistakenly believed that the claim related to the defendant's own ineffectiveness, the claim was raised at the earliest practicable moment. Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007).

Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the defendant's guilty plea was waived because it was not raised below. Blackmon v. State, 297 Ga. App. 99, 676 S.E.2d 413 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal to vacate a void sentence because the defendant's remedy had to be pursued in a habeas corpus action; the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be resolved by reference to facts contained in the record and had to be developed in a post-plea hearing. Shelton v. State, 307 Ga. App. 599, 705 S.E.2d 699 (2011).

Right does not attach before defendant charged.

- Given the totality of the circumstances, and the defendant's age, education, and knowledge of both the substance of the charge and nature of the rights to an attorney and to remain silent, because the defendant voluntarily gave a statement to a police detective about an uncharged armed robbery, absent any threats, coercion, or promises in exchange for doing so, the statement was admissible. Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007).

Claim of ineffective assistance not preserved.

- Because the defendant failed to provide any citations to either the law or the record, let alone an application of authority to that record amounting to legal argument, in support of an ineffective assistance of counsel assertion, this issue was deemed abandoned on appeal. Gore v. State, 272 Ga. App. 156, 611 S.E.2d 764 (2005).

Defendant's failure to file a motion for new trial asserting the ineffectiveness of trial counsel barred review of the claim on appeal. Swan v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Aug. 15, 2005).

Defendant failed to preserve defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as the defendant failed to raise it in defendant's motion for a new trial; additionally, defendant failed to request an evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim, which waived defendant's right to an evidentiary hearing. Capps v. State, 273 Ga. App. 696, 615 S.E.2d 821 (2005).

Because the defendant failed to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the first practicable opportunity, specifically when newly appointed counsel filed an amended motion for a new trial, the claim was waived. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. 437, 637 S.E.2d 709 (2006).

Defendant waived the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as if a motion for new trial filed by a trial counsel was without effect because the defendant was not then represented by the trial counsel, and if the defendant filed a timely and effective pro-se notice of appeal, then the defendant was in the same position as a new counsel, and the defendant was required to raise the ineffectiveness of the trial counsel at the defendant's first opportunity and the failure to timely raise the ineffectiveness issue in the trial court barred consideration of the issue on appeal; alternatively, if the defendant was represented by the trial counsel when the latter filed a motion for new trial, then the pro-se notice of appeal was premature so long as the motion remained pending and the defendant then could have pursued an ineffective assistance claim through the defendant's post-trial counsel, but elected not to do so. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006).

Defendant abandoned claims of insufficient investigation and trial preparation when the claims were merely general and bald assertions, unsupported by argument or citation of authority. Sampson v. State, 282 Ga. 82, 646 S.E.2d 60 (2007).

In a battery prosecution, setting aside the defendant's failure to object to a second attorney's representation at trial, a denial from the defendant's first attorney of an alleged promise to represent the defendant after that counsel's suspension had expired gave the trial court sufficient grounds for finding that no such promise occurred, eliminating the defendant's denial of the right to counsel claim; moreover, inasmuch as the defendant failed to challenge the trial court's finding that the second attorney's representation was effective, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial. Northington v. State, 287 Ga. App. 96, 650 S.E.2d 760 (2007).

A defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to reserve objections to a "level of certainty" jury charge was waived because the defendant did not raise the issue in the defendant's written motion for new trial or at the hearing on the motion. Olivaria v. State, 286 Ga. App. 856, 650 S.E.2d 422 (2007).

Because the defendant did not claim below that trial counsel was ineffective for opening the door to impeachment, the defendant failed to timely raise this argument, and thus the claim was waived for purposes of appeal; as a result, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Lipsey v. State, 287 Ga. App. 835, 652 S.E.2d 870 (2007).

Because the record on appeal failed to show that the defendant moved to withdraw a guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the only evidence on this issue was the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, none of the defendant's complaints could be resolved by the transcript, and, thus, the defendant was not entitled to any further relief on the claim. Duffey v. State, 289 Ga. App. 141, 656 S.E.2d 167 (2007).

Because the defendant abandoned a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness necessary to the defense, as the defendant completely failed to identify the witness, and presented no argument, reference to the record, nor citations of authority to support the claim, that claim presented no basis to support the defendant's amended motion for a new trial. Moreover, even if the claim had not been deemed abandoned, the appeals court found it lacked merit. Bennett v. State, 289 Ga. App. 110, 657 S.E.2d 6 (2008).

Because the defendant had not sought a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant had not preserved the issue for appellate review; moreover, because defense counsel had not been called upon to explain counsel's actions, those actions were presumed strategic. Banks v. State, 290 Ga. App. 887, 660 S.E.2d 873 (2008).

Defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of the validity of the defendant's prior convictions was procedurally barred because the defendant had not raised the issue in the defendant's motion for new trial. The defendant could not resuscitate the issue by raising the issue under the guise of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. McGlocklin v. State, 292 Ga. App. 162, 664 S.E.2d 552 (2008).

Because the defendant, through new counsel, could have, but did not, raise an ineffectiveness claim at the hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the issue was waived. Boykins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 654, 680 S.E.2d 665 (2009).

Although the defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a special demurrer regarding the time frame for molestation claims, this issue was not raised in the motion for new trial or the amended motion for new trial filed by appellate counsel, and was never raised or argued in the hearing on the motion for new trial; this constituted a failure to assert the matter at the earliest practicable opportunity and, thus, was a waiver of the right to pursue the issue on appeal. Sarratt v. State, 299 Ga. App. 568, 683 S.E.2d 10 (2009).

Because the defendant's allegation of ineffective assistance based on unconstitutional vagueness was not raised on motion for new trial by appellate counsel, who had been appointed following the defendant's conviction, it was waived; the defendant did not raise the purported deficient performance at the hearing on the amended motion for new trial. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 687 S.E.2d 799 (2010).

Defendant's contentions that defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by presenting inconsistent theories of defense, which did not directly rebut the state's case, and by failing to request a charge on theft by taking as a lesser included offense of armed robbery were not before the court of appeals to review and were deemed waived because the contentions were not presented to the trial court as bases for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court did not rule on those claims. Miller v. State, 305 Ga. App. 620, 700 S.E.2d 617 (2010).

Because the defendant did not support the assertion that trial counsel was ineffective by citation to the record or argument or even a description of the manner in which the defendant alleged trial counsel's performance was deficient, the enumeration of error was deemed abandoned. Arroyo v. State, 309 Ga. App. 494, 711 S.E.2d 60 (2011).

Defendant's enumerations asserting ineffective assistance were deemed abandoned because the enumerations were not supported by argument or by citations to the record or to relevant authority as required by Ga. Ct. App. R. 25(c)(2); to the extent the claims involve trial counsel's decisions as to whether to object to testimony, to introduce evidence, or to request a particular jury charge, the enumerations concerned matters of trial tactics and strategy. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Habeas court erred in granting the petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief because the court should not have reached the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance since those claims had been waived; the petitioner never claimed that appellate counsel committed ineffective assistance by failing to timely raise claims that trial counsel was ineffective. Tompkins v. Hall, 291 Ga. 224, 728 S.E.2d 621 (2012).

Ineffective assistance of counsel not properly before appellate court.

- Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly before the appellate court as the defendant was represented on appeal by trial counsel; the defendant was apprised of the need for new counsel to pursue the ineffectiveness issue and waived appellate review by electing to retain the defendant's trial counsel as the defendant's counsel on appeal. Capps v. State, 273 Ga. App. 696, 615 S.E.2d 821 (2005).

Claims of ineffective assistance were not properly before the court on appeal because they were not raised as ineffective assistance claims in the defendant's motion for new trial. Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 651 S.E.2d 718 (2007).

Remand warranted when ineffectiveness claim could not be resolved by the appellate record.

- Because the defendant's claim as to the pre-trial ineffective assistance of appointed counsel could not be resolved by the record on appeal, the trial court's denial of a new trial as to that claim was reversed, and the case was remanded for a hearing on that claim only. Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007).

Case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing and determination on the defendant's ineffective assistance claim because the defendant's argument that the defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to call an expert could not be decided as a matter of law based on the existing record. Elrod v. State, 316 Ga. App. 491, 729 S.E.2d 593 (2012).

Defendant failed to proffer testimony of witness whom defendant argued counsel should have contacted.

- A defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument failed because the defendant had not proffered at the hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial the testimony of the witnesses whom the defendant argued that defense counsel should have contacted. Williams v. State, 287 Ga. App. 361, 651 S.E.2d 768 (2007).

Hearing required on pro se motion for substitute counsel.

- When the issue of the effectiveness of appointed counsel is raised in motions for substitute counsel and for a new trial, the trial court, in order to insure that the defendant's right to counsel has been and will continue to be afforded, should conduct a hearing as to the basis of the defendant's motion for appointment of new counsel. DeLoach v. State, 198 Ga. App. 880, 403 S.E.2d 866 (1991).

Effective counsel regardless of whether attorney is retained or court-appointed.

- Unless a defendant charged with a serious offense has counsel able to invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that distinguish the system of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself and, when a state obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it is the state that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of liberty; thus, since the state's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the state in the defendant's conviction, there is no basis for drawing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers. McBryar v. McElroy, 510 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

A defendant is entitled to an attorney likely to render and, in fact, rendering reasonably effective assistance, whether that attorney be retained or court-appointed; this standard is to be applied with particular care in capital cases. Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 718 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, Burger v. Zant, 467 U.S. 1212, 104 S. Ct. 2652, 81 L. Ed. 2d 360 (1984).

General rule that incompetence of counsel does not constitute ground for new trial.

- Incompetence, negligence, or unfaithfulness of the defendant's counsel who was selected by the defendant in the trial of a criminal case does not as a general rule constitute a ground for a new trial, nor call for application of constitutional guarantees of the defendant's full right to the benefit of counsel, nor for application of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jones v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 262, 79 S.E.2d 1 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 956, 74 S. Ct. 682, 98 L. Ed. 1101 (1954).

Receipt of fee from family and indigent fund was not proven to have made counsel ineffective based upon a conflict of interest argument even though counsel was wrong to have accepted money from both sources. Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1058, 125 S. Ct. 870, 160 L. Ed. 2d 784 (2005).

Responsibility of appointed counsel to give full representation.

- However low or poor the defendant may be, the defendant can rely upon this right, and the same due responsibility rests upon counsel appointed by the court to represent the defendant as if counsel received the fullest pecuniary compensation. Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344, 195 S.E. 316 (1938).

Presumption that appointed counsel properly represented client.

- When one accused of crime was upon one's trial defended by an attorney at law appointed for this purpose by the presiding judge, it will, unless there be clear and convincing proof to the contrary, be presumed that this attorney did the attorney's duty in the premises and properly represented the client. Brown v. State, 76 Ga. App. 7, 45 S.E.2d 80 (1947).

In evaluating an attorney's performance for purposes of considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Horne v. State, 260 Ga. App. 640, 580 S.E.2d 644 (2003).

With regard to the defendant's convictions for aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation after a bench trial, because the defendant failed to call trial counsel at the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial, the defendant was unable to establish that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial based on trial counsel: (1) failing to adequately investigate the case; (2) failing to present an interview report as evidence; and (3) failing to object to hearsay testimony regarding the victims' abuse allegations; therefore, the presumption remained that trial counsel strategically elected not to offer the interview report as evidence. Further, even if the child victim's statements were not admissible under the child hearsay statute, there was no ineffective assistance since the defendant confirmed the statements through the defendant's own trial testimony. Brumbelow v. State, 289 Ga. App. 520, 657 S.E.2d 603 (2008).

Strong and convincing proof to contrary necessary to overcome presumption that counsel properly represented client.

- Attorneys are officers of the court and are presumed to do as the law and their duty require them. When an attorney is appointed by the court to defend a person accused of crime who is unable to employ counsel, it is to be presumed that the attorney will discharge the attorney's full duty in the premises. It is also to be presumed that the court, in appointing counsel for this purpose, will appoint attorneys who have sufficient skill and learning to defend the accused properly. Before a court should grant a new trial upon the ground that counsel failed to do their duty in this respect, there should be strong and convincing proof to overcome the presumption to the contrary. Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 193 Ga. 661, 19 S.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 626, 63 S. Ct. 36, 87 L. Ed. 506 (1942).

In the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that counsel assigned to represent the interests of an accused are of sufficient experience and possess the requisite legal attainment to satisfy the constitutional requirement of the privilege and benefit of counsel. Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 193 Ga. 661, 19 S.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 626, 63 S. Ct. 36, 87 L. Ed. 506 (1942).

In a burglary case, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial, which was based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because the defendant did not carry the burden of showing that the counsel's performance was deficient. Burdette v. State, 276 Ga. App. 695, 624 S.E.2d 253 (2005).

Acquittal on most serious charges supports effectiveness of counsel.

- Defendant's acquittal on the three most serious charges strongly supported the conclusion that defense counsel was effective. Noellien v. State, 298 Ga. App. 47, 679 S.E.2d 75 (2009).

Acquittal on number of counts shows effectiveness.

- Trial counsel successfully obtained directed verdicts of acquittal on a number of the charges against defendant, which strongly supported the conclusion that the assistance actually rendered fell within that broad range of reasonably effective assistance. Sarratt v. State, 299 Ga. App. 568, 683 S.E.2d 10 (2009).

Defense counsel's decision to have the defendant's entire interview with police played to the jury did not amount to ineffective assistance, but was one of informed trial strategy, as counsel was able to use the entire interview to show that it was improperly conducted; moreover, such was particularly true when the jury acquitted the defendant of several offenses charged in the indictment. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 506, 636 S.E.2d 694 (2006).

Differences in conduct of defense amongst varying lawyers does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.

- While another lawyer or other lawyers, had they represented the petitioner upon petitioner's trial, might have conducted petitioner's defense in a different manner, and might have exercised different judgments with respect to the matters referred to in the petition, the fact that petitioner's attorneys chose to try the petitioner's case in the manner in which it was tried and made certain decisions as to the conduct of the defense with which the petitioner and the petitioner's presently employed attorneys now disagree, does not require a finding that their representation of the petitioner was so inadequate as to amount to a denial to petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Caldwell, 228 Ga. 776, 187 S.E.2d 844 (1972); Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 192, 264 S.E.2d 715 (1980); Chapman v. State, 154 Ga. App. 532, 268 S.E.2d 797 (1980).

Decisions as to what witnesses to call and what motions to file are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client. Jackson v. State, 167 Ga. App. 509, 306 S.E.2d 757 (1983).

Simply because other lawyers might have exercised different judgments and conducted the defendant's defense in a different manner does not require a finding that defense counsel's representation of the defendant was so inadequate as to amount to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. Mason v. State, 180 Ga. App. 235, 348 S.E.2d 754 (1986).

Competence of counsel was issue of fact and properly decided by trial court.

- When a ground of the motion for new trial was that the attorney who was employed by the defendant and who represented the defendant upon the trial was of unsound mind and incompetent to try the case, and was supported by the affidavits of two lawyers, and the state made a countershowing by introducing affidavits of four lawyers to the effect that the attorney was of sound mind and was skilled and competent, an issue of fact for decision by the trial judge was presented, and the judge's decision thereon would not be disturbed by the Supreme Court. Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780, 64 S. Ct. 87, 88 L. Ed. 468 (1943), overruled on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955).

Defendant must make affirmative showing of counsel's incompetency.

- Because the defendant failed to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with affirmative evidence showing an infringement of rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of a prior guilty plea, and the defendant failed to show that an objection by trial counsel to the introduction of the prior plea would have been successful, a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, thus warranting a new trial, lacked merit. Lattimore v. State, 282 Ga. App. 435, 638 S.E.2d 848 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea to five counts of theft by taking as the defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective by failing to show how counsel's alleged failure to review the evidence until shortly before trial either prejudiced the trial or influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty. Pruitt v. State, 323 Ga. App. 689, 747 S.E.2d 694 (2013).

Ineffective counsel established as to one charge but not as to other.

- Because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to the defendant's felon status or to obtain a jury charge limiting the jury's consideration of the defendant's criminal history, such failures prejudiced the defendant's defense sufficiently to require a new trial on a charge of aggravated assault; however, given the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the altercation, no prejudice resulted to warrant reversal and a new trial on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. Starling v. State, 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007).

A new trial based on counsel's alleged ineffectiveness was properly denied because the defendant's numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit; the defendant failed to show that: (1) the number of different instructions sought; (2) any additional investigation or preparation; (3) an objection to evidence of the prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim, and request for a contemporaneous limiting instruction; and (4) a request for an instruction on a defense not alleged, would have changed the outcome of the trial, and the tactical decision as to which defense to pursue was part of a reasonable trial strategy. Breazeale v. State, 290 Ga. App. 632, 660 S.E.2d 376 (2008).

Because the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request jury voir dire to determine whether jurors had seen the defendant wearing handcuffs, and because sufficient evidence supported the defendant's burglary conviction to make a directed verdict of acquittal unnecessary, a motion for a new trial was properly denied. Brown v. State, 289 Ga. App. 297, 656 S.E.2d 582 (2008).

Because the trial court was entitled to believe counsel's testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial that counsel advised the defendant of the right to testify at trial and that counsel met numerous times with the defendant, with ample opportunity to discuss all aspects of the case with counsel, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in support of a motion for a new trial had to be rejected. Warren v. State, 283 Ga. 42, 656 S.E.2d 803 (2008).

Court of appeals rejected the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, because, even if: (1) the arrest warrant had been excluded; (2) two witnesses had been cross-examined regarding their identification of the defendant as the shooter; and (3) the nontestifying eyewitnesses' statements had not been relayed to the jury by the police officer, there was no reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted of both crimes. Bradley v. State, 283 Ga. 45, 656 S.E.2d 842 (2008).

Ineffective counsel not shown.

- A new trial was unwarranted because: (1) the decision not to present the defendant's love interest as an alibi witness was clearly strategic, and thus, could not serve as the basis for an ineffectiveness claim; and (2) counsel's alleged failure to specifically object to the victim's testimony on bolstering and not on leading and speculation grounds impermissibly expanded the enumerated error. Scott v. State, 288 Ga. App. 738, 655 S.E.2d 326 (2007).

Since defendant's trial counsel testified at the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial as to the strategic reasons counsel had for taking certain actions that counsel did in the defense of defendant and counsel's explanations were supported by the record, defendant did not show that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in defending the defendant because no showing was made that counsel performed deficiently. Glenn v. State, 279 Ga. 277, 612 S.E.2d 478 (2005).

Defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied because defendant did not establish that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was aware of all of the charges against the defendant, defendant did not inform counsel that there were jurors that defendant wished to have stricken, it was sound trial strategy to not cross-examine the witness because the witness's testimony would have hurt defendant, counsel did not request a charge on the voluntariness of defendant's confession because it contradicted the defense of coercion, the evidence adequately demonstrated that defendant was intoxicated when defendant committed the assault and robbery, and the discrepancy in the victim's testimony regarding the car the perpetrator drove was not material since defendant confessed to the crime. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

Because trial counsel's actions involved strategic decisions or failed to harm defendant and defendant could only pursue a claim against appellate counsel through a habeas corpus proceeding, defendant did not carry the burden of proving ineffective assistance. Miller v. State, 273 Ga. App. 171, 614 S.E.2d 796 (2005), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 90 (Ga. 2007).

Despite the fact that defendant failed to satisfy defendant's responsibility under the Rules of the Georgia Court of Appeals after a review of the record in the appellate court's discretion, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed as defendant's trial counsel's stipulation to a witness's prior testimony, made under oath, before the judge, and subject to trial counsel's searching cross-examination on defendant's behalf regarding this same case, did not constitute an unreasonable or incompetent strategy. Stuart v. State, 274 Ga. App. 120, 616 S.E.2d 855 (2005).

Because, inter alia, defendant's counsel requested a full and complete recordation of the trial, there was no evidence that a change of venue was warranted, counsel thoroughly investigated the case, and there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant failed to demonstrate any deficiency by trial counsel or that defendant was prejudiced thereby. Hampton v. State, 279 Ga. 625, 619 S.E.2d 616 (2005).

Despite defendant's numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, none had merit as counsel was not ineffective in failing to: (1) raise a statute of limitations defense concerning the conviction for voluntary manslaughter; (2) challenge the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 17-2-2(h); (3) object to testimony by defendant's former spouse that defendant was a beneficiary of the victim's life insurance policy; (4) make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's comment in opening argument that defendant failed to contact the police, as such would have been meritless; (5) object to inadmissible evidence of defendant's bad character; (6) request a limiting similar transaction instruction contemporaneously with the testimony of the similar acts; (7) object when the prosecutor gave a personal opinion as to defendant's guilt; (8) object to testimony and argument as to defendant's future dangerousness; (9) file a motion to suppress statements defendant made to law enforcement after the defendant retained counsel; (10) request a jury charge with respect to the potential motive, interest, or bias of the state's witnesses; (11) object when a state's witness testified to the witness's belief of the veracity of another witness; (12) reserve objections to the final charge of the trial court; and (13) object to the prosecutor's argument of facts not in evidence. Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (2009).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected as the defendant's broad assertions that trial counsel was not adequately prepared, provided weak advocacy, engaged in superficial cross-examination, and failed to object to certain testimony regarding trial tactics. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 884, 635 S.E.2d 240 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial on grounds that trial counsel was ineffective as the defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different if counsel would have: (1) filed a motion for funds to hire an expert on the reliability of cross-racial eyewitness identification and proffer what the testimony of this expert would have been; (2) verified that funds had been withdrawn from the respective ATM machines on the date of the crime or ascertain whether surveillance cameras might have refuted the state's evidence that the defendant was in the carjacked vehicle; and (3) proffered favorable testimony the defendant alleged could have been provided by the two victims suggesting complicity. Pringle v. State, 281 Ga. App. 230, 635 S.E.2d 843 (2006).

Because the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to remove biased jurors from the panel, object to the admission of a shotgun shell and jewelry that were the subject of the motion to suppress, and properly address material inconsistencies in one codefendant's testimony, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit. Vega v. State, 285 Ga. App. 405, 646 S.E.2d 501 (2007).

Because trial counsel was not ineffective in: (1) failing to seek suppression of criminal acts which took place in other jurisdictions and to which the defendant was connected because they were part of the crime spree that began with the murder of the victim, as such was admissible; (2) failing to seek a mistrial when an objection to the state's opening statement, although overruled, had some merit; (3) failing to object to jury instructions on mere presence and parties to a crime, as the charges were correct statements of the law and supported by the evidence; (4) making statements in closing argument that were actually in furtherance of the defense's theory of the case; (5) entering into a stipulation with the prosecutor; and (6) failing to move for a directed verdict of acquittal, as the evidence supported the defendant's convictions, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit. Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 644 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Because the defendant failed to identify any defense strategy that trial counsel failed to pursue, the defendant failed to carry the burden of showing either deficient performance by counsel or any resulting prejudice that had to be established in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Zapien-Chavez v. State, 285 Ga. App. 319, 646 S.E.2d 311 (2007).

Despite the defendant's contrary claims, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to subpoena witnesses necessary to support a defense and failing to adequately raise all issues in the defendant's motion to suppress and motion for independent analysis of the suspected narcotics as: (1) the defendant failed to supply sufficient information about the whereabouts of the witnesses; (2) the defendant failed to produce those witnesses at the motion for a new trial hearing; (3) counsel's strategy in handling the suppression motion showed an appropriate exercise of discretion; and (4) under the theory of defense presented, counsel was not ineffective by failing to obtain an independent examination of the substance tested. McTaggart v. State, 285 Ga. App. 178, 645 S.E.2d 658 (2007).

The trial court properly denied the defendant a new trial based on numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as counsel was not ineffective in failing to: (1) make meritless objections; (2) raise what was considered a novel legal argument; (3) file futile motions that would not have changed the outcome of trial; (4) require corroboration of the defendant's confession; and (5) anticipate that the defendant's wife might mislead the defense; moreover, the defendant's claim that counsel was inadequately prepared for trial was belied by the record. Daly v. State, 285 Ga. App. 808, 648 S.E.2d 90 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 659 (Ga. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1039, 128 S. Ct. 2441, 171 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2008).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on claims of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel as the only evidence offered to support this claim was the defendant's own hearsay testimony as to what the desired witnesses were expected to testify to at trial, and such evidence was insufficient; further, defendant failed to show that counsel's decision to forgo calling such witnesses was unreasonable. Brigman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 481, 639 S.E.2d 359 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit, because counsel: (1) adequately explained the decision not to call the defendant's spouse; (2) adequately met with the defendant to discuss the trial strategy and regarding the defendant's decision to waive the right to a jury trial; and (3) had reason to decline objection to the admission of an audio recording of the colloquy between the officers and the defendant at the scene, as that decision supported counsel's trial strategy. Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 656 S.E.2d 238 (2008).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit because: (1) the evidence supported the defendant's convictions, and thus a directed verdict was unwarranted; (2) Georgia law did not authorize a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in criminal cases; and (3) the defendant failed to show that counsel's representation and trial strategy was patently unreasonable. Arellano v. State, 289 Ga. App. 148, 656 S.E.2d 264 (2008).

Defendant did not prove that trial counsel was ineffective when the defendant did not cite to any facts in the record to support the claim, when the defendant failed to present any admissible evidence regarding what an alleged alibi witness would have said if counsel had called the witness to testify at trial, and when contrary to the defendant's claim, counsel cross-examined the victim about past drug convictions. Moreover, even if counsel was ineffective, the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming, so the defendant did not show prejudice. Rouse v. State, 295 Ga. App. 61, 670 S.E.2d 869 (2008).

Defense counsel's failure to object or move for a mistrial based on the state's introduction of evidence relating to a witness's misconduct that fell short of a conviction was not ineffective assistance under circumstances in which counsel's decisions not to object to the state's pursuit of the topic of the witness's misdemeanor driving violations, and to attempt to rehabilitate the defendant by showing the minor nature of one of them, were objectively reasonable; when the state broached the subject of the witness's incarceration just before the night in question, it might have gone on to uncover proof of that fact, which would have been admissible as contradictory of the witness's testimony that the witness was in the car with the defendant on the night before the defendant's arrest. Defense counsel could not have been faulted for failing to complete the state's work for it, or for declining to highlight any of this testimony. Noellien v. State, 298 Ga. App. 47, 679 S.E.2d 75 (2009).

Although the defendant's prior convictions might or might not have been actually admissible against the defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609), trial counsel's belief in that regard was only one of several reasons for advising the defendant not to testify; thus, evidence supported the trial court's finding that such advice was not deficient performance. Clements v. State, 299 Ga. App. 561, 683 S.E.2d 127 (2009).

Denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was appropriate because the defendant did not prove that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant never testified that, had the defendant proceeded to trial, the defendant wished to take the stand despite the defendant's extensive criminal history, nor did the defendant explain how the defendant or the defendant's lawyer could have made more effective use of a photograph had the defendant had more time to study the photograph prior to trial. Sims v. State, 299 Ga. App. 698, 683 S.E.2d 668 (2009).

Defendant failed to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because, inter alia, with regard to counsel's failure to call various witnesses at trial, counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that counsel made a strategic decision not to call these witnesses as the witnesses' testimony would have undermined the defendant's justification defense at trial. Rector v. State, 285 Ga. 714, 681 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1081, 130 S. Ct. 807, 175 L. Ed. 2d 567 (2009).

After defendant was convicted of aggravated child molestation, child molestation, three counts of aggravated sodomy, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on counsel's performance; counsel's waiver of opening argument and decision to provide a brief closing statement were strategic determinations falling within the realm of trial tactics. Counsel discussed the discovery materials with defendant, prepared a trial notebook, and consulted with defendant while preparing to cross-examine the state's witnesses; counsel was not required to object to properly admitted evidence of similar transactions. Bazin v. State, 299 Ga. App. 875, 683 S.E.2d 917 (2009).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant did not show that: (1) the defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for immunity from prosecution/plea in bar based upon the defendant's claim of self-defense as it was a matter of trial strategy and the defendant could not demonstrate how the failure to pursue such a claim harmed the defendant; (2) the defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury charge on the use of force in defense of habitation; (3) the defense counsel was ineffective in failing to test the thoroughness and good faith of the State of Georgia's investigation; (4) the defense counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the case or meet with the defendant prior to trial; and (5) the defense counsel was ineffective in failing to interview and cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses as the defendant did not establish a reasonable probability that further interviews and cross-examination would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1266, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 954 (Ga. 2011).

During the defendant's trial for child molestation and sexual exploitation of children, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to properly follow-up on other cases involving the child victims because there was only one other instance involving the children and the allegations were that their mother's new husband had touched the children improperly while bathing the children; there was no evidence in the record to show that the allegations were false, and it appeared that that was a separate case that was being investigated at the time of trial. Vaughn v. State, 307 Ga. App. 754, 706 S.E.2d 137 (2011).

Defendant's trial counsel did not represent the defendant under an impermissible conflict of interest because the representation of a testifying witness in a prior case was by another attorney in the public defender's office, not the defendant's counsel, and the prior representation was concluded and was wholly unrelated to the defendant's case. Furthermore, the defendant's attorney did not impeach the witness because the testimony of the witness was not harmful to the defendant. Finally, the defendant also failed to establish deficient performance based upon any alleged failure of the defendant's attorney to object to the admission of a DVD containing a recording of a five-hour police interview with an accomplice as this decision was part of the defense attorney's trial strategy and the trial court gave a curative instruction to the jury stating that the jury had to disregard any police statements in the recording opining on the character of the defendant. Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 705 S.E.2d 649 (2011).

Defendant did not demonstrate either a Fifth Amendment or Sixth Amendment violation because the defendant made no showing of deficient performance by appointed defense counsel and pointed to no particular instance manifesting a conflict with counsel; because counsel did not entirely fail to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, the defendant was not constructively denied counsel. Smith v. State, 312 Ga. App. 174, 718 S.E.2d 43 (2011).

In light of the defendant's statements to the police that placed the defendant at the scene of a crime and showed that the defendant carried a gun, the defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's explanation of the defendant's right to testify and explanation regarding the potential benefits of testifying. Lytle v. State, 290 Ga. 177, 718 S.E.2d 296 (2011).

Because a search warrant affidavit established probable cause even without the representation that the affiant saw the informant buy drugs from the defendant, and because the state introduced sufficient corroborating evidence of an accomplice's testimony that the drugs found in the basement of the house belonged to the defendant, the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress or request a jury charge on accomplice testimony. Dickerson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 320, 718 S.E.2d 564 (2011).

Because the testimony by defendant's accomplices, a confidential informant, and the officer who participated in the drug sale, in conjunction with the audio and video tapes of the transaction, overwhelmingly established the defendant's guilt, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been any different; consequently, the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective. Williams v. State, 312 Ga. App. 693, 719 S.E.2d 501 (2011).

Defendant failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant did not show that the result of the defendant's trial would have been different if the defense counsel had provided argument to support a motion for directed verdict, or if the counsel had been fully aware of the defendant's immigration status. Medrano v. State, 315 Ga. App. 880, 729 S.E.2d 37 (2012).

Although the defendant contended the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective because the defendant chose to pursue a theory of defense in which the defendant argued that the defendant was unaware that the defendant was being arrested and, thus, could not have knowingly resisted, instead of pursuing a defense in which the defendant argued that defendant legally resisted an unlawful arrest, counsel's decision as to which theory of defense to pursue is a matter of strategy and tactics; and, as a general rule, matters of tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant had not shown that counsel's strategy was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen that strategy. Zeger v. State, 306 Ga. App. 474, 702 S.E.2d 474 (2010).

Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel made a strategic decision not to make a frivolous objection to identification testimony, failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance, and a motion to sever the defendant's trial from that of a codefendant would not have been successful. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 80, 729 S.E.2d 404 (2012).

Because mere allegations, without evidence explaining how trial counsel's alleged failures affected the outcome of the trial, could not support the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and counsel's reasons for not objecting to an officer's testimony amounted to trial strategy, the defendant's claims were rejected on appeal. Slaughter v. State, 282 Ga. App. 276, 638 S.E.2d 417 (2006).

Joint representation.

- When three of four defendants each confirmed, on the record, that the defendants had discussed the case thoroughly with their counsel, and each stated that there were no conflicts of interest and each of them also stated that they were satisfied to proceed with one counsel representing all three of them, and since the trial court's decision to allow one counsel to represent the three was based on their statements to the court, if any error occurred, it was induced by these defendants' statements and induced error is impermissible. Accordingly, it was not error under the circumstances to allow one attorney to represent three of the four defendants, and the multiple representation did not result in ineffective assistance of counsel. Shirley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 456, 304 S.E.2d 468, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983).

Since counsel's testimony contradicted the defendant's regarding the nature and quantity of consultation and counsel's decision not to consider a co-indictee as a valuable witness was strategic or tactical, the defendant's guilty plea was not void due to ineffective assistance of counsel. McCutchen v. State, 276 Ga. 532, 579 S.E.2d 732 (2003).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment since: (1) trial counsel jointly represented defendants, a husband and a wife; (2) the trial court questioned the defendants about the joint representation and they testified that they understood the potential problems with joint representation; (3) any error was induced by the defendants; (4) there was no evidence that defendant husband would have been offered a better deal if he had testified against defendant wife; and (5) defendant wife's argument that trial counsel was unable to argue that the methamphetamine in the safe belonged to the defendant husband completely ignored the defendant wife's testimony that she put the methamphetamine in the safe and that her husband was lying to protect her, and the notes about the various drug sales. Christopher v. State, 262 Ga. App. 257, 585 S.E.2d 107 (2003).

Trial counsel was not ineffective because counsel initially represented second defendant as well as third defendant when counsel withdrew from representing both defendants after counsel sensed a potential conflict. Baggs v. State, 265 Ga. App. 282, 593 S.E.2d 734 (2004).

Trial counsel's failure to file a motion to sever a defendant's case from a codefendant's did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel; since trial counsel testified that counsel made a tactical decision not to file a motion to sever after consultation with the defendant, and since the defendant had not shown that defendant would have benefited from a separate trial, there was evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that trial counsel rendered effective assistance. Hubbard v. State, 274 Ga. App. 184, 617 S.E.2d 167 (2005).

Codefendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a case in which the codefendant and defendant were represented by different attorneys from the same public defender's office as no actual conflict of interest developed and the codefendant did not show that the codefendant's attorney would have done anything differently to defend the codefendant had the same office not been representing both defendants or that any conflict of interest impaired the codefendant attorney's performance; the codefendant's claim that the codefendant did not knowingly waive on the record any conflicts of interest stemming from the joint representation was rejected as the codefendant failed to show that an actual conflict of interest resulted from the joint representation. Burns v. State, 274 Ga. App. 687, 618 S.E.2d 600 (2005), aff'd, 281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (2006).

Since the defendant did not object at trial to defense counsel's joint representation of the defendant and a codefendant, the defendant was required to demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected defense counsel's performance in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the joint representation; because there was no testimony to the contrary, an appellate court presumed that counsel's actions were strategic and fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Kendrick v. State, 279 Ga. App. 263, 630 S.E.2d 863 (2006).

With regard to defendant's convictions for first degree arson, criminal damage to property in the second degree, threatening a witness in an official proceeding by unlawfully causing economic harm to a family member, and use of intimidation with the intent of influencing a witness to change the witness's testimony in an official proceeding, the defendant was not denied the right to legal representation free from conflicts of interest because the defendant's attorney also represented the codefendant as the defendant's alibi defense was not inconsistent with codefendant's, rather, the alibis were corroborative of each other and mutually supportive since the defendant and the codefendant both stated that each returned to the codefendant's house without incident and the defendant thereafter went to the defendant's parent's house. The defenses were synergistic rather than antagonistic, and the representation by the same attorney did not give rise to any conflict of interest, potential or actual. Shelnutt v. State, 289 Ga. App. 528, 657 S.E.2d 611 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0977, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 518 (Ga. 2008).

Habeas court did not err in granting the appellee's petition for writ of habeas corpus because there was no error in the habeas court's finding of an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected plea counsel's performance since the fact that the codefendant alone was paying counsel's fees created a strong incentive for counsel to prioritize the codefendant's interests in the matter over the appellee's interest, and counsel not only failed to pursue an alternative defense theory on behalf of the appellee, counsel failed even to recognize the possibility that one could exist; even though the appellee and the codefendant pursued a unified defense in that their accounts of the incident were consistent, the record reflected that the appellee was the less culpable of the two in the crime, as it appeared that the appellee's participation was limited to the role of a passive witness who happened to be driving when the codefendant initiated the brief, apparently unpremeditated interaction with the victim. State v. Mamedov, 288 Ga. 858, 708 S.E.2d 279 (2011).

Advising on the right to testify.

- Because defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise on the right to testify and by failing to object to the admission of certain hearsay testimony by child witnesses, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for new trial. Brock v. State, 270 Ga. App. 250, 605 S.E.2d 907 (2004).

No Georgia authority existed for expanding the constitutional obligation to advise the defendant of the right to testify to require counsel to "re-advise" the defendant of the right to testify after the state presented rebuttal evidence. Thomas v. State, 282 Ga. 894, 655 S.E.2d 599 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for pressuring defendant into waiving defendant's right to testify as the trial court painstakingly informed defendant that defendant had a right to testify and that the decision was up to the defendant, not defendant's counsel; further, defendant was given the night to make a decision and affirmed defendant's intention not to testify the next day. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not adequately advising the defendant of the right to testify, as the record showed that counsel discussed the issue both before and at trial and advised the defendant to avoid cross-examination, as the defendant had made a complete statement to the police which was played for the jury. Giddens v. State, 276 Ga. App. 353, 623 S.E.2d 204 (2005).

Advice of counsel as to whether or not to testify was trial strategy generally not subject to challenge for ineffectiveness, and since the defendant presented no evidence that defense counsel prevented the defendant from making the decision about testifying, the defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel; additionally, the defendant failed to show how the defense case was prejudiced by having a codefendant's attorney at counsel table or how the refusal of the trial court to allow defendant access to the victim's email prejudiced the defense. King v. State, 279 Ga. App. 302, 630 S.E.2d 905 (2006).

Defendant's claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately advise the defendant of the defendant's right not to testify failed as the defendant did not rebut the presumption that counsel acted as an effective legal representative and properly advised the defendant of the defendant's rights since there was no testimony that counsel failed to inform the defendant of the defendant's constitutional rights or the risks of testifying. Mayberry v. State, 281 Ga. 144, 635 S.E.2d 736 (2006).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as the defendant followed the trial counsel's advice not to testify; the trial counsel did not improperly prevent the defendant from doing so. Revells v. State, 283 Ga. App. 59, 640 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Appeals court rejected the defendant's claims that trial counsel forced the defendant into testifying without adequately preparing the defendant to do so, as that claim was refuted by counsel's contrary testimony, which the trial court was authorized to believe. Thomas v. State, 285 Ga. App. 290, 645 S.E.2d 713 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 610 (Ga. 2007).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for advising a defendant not to testify on the defendant's own behalf because the defendant lied to counsel about two other men killing the victim and defense counsel found that the evidence did not support that claim. Hamilton v. State, 297 Ga. App. 47, 676 S.E.2d 773 (2009).

Defendant failed to make a case for the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because trial counsel could hardly be found to be deficient for not considering the defendant as a key witness in the defendant's own defense and for having to move forward with defendant's defense without the defendant's cooperation; trial counsel testified that counsel went to the jail to visit the defendant perhaps two or three times and then ceased to do so because the defendant refused to answer most of counsel's questions, would not give counsel defendant's version of events, would not help with the defense, and told counsel that the defendant did not want to talk to counsel. Sanford v. State, 287 Ga. 351, 695 S.E.2d 579 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1514, 179 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for advising the defendant not to testify because the defendant acknowledged that counsel told the defendant that the defendant would cause more damage to the defendant's case if the defendant testified and acknowledged trusting counsel thereby choosing not to testify; even assuming that trial counsel did advise the defendant that the defendant could be impeached by certain evidence and that such advice was incorrect, the defendant did not show that the defendant was prejudiced thereby because the defendant never said what the defendant's testimony would have been had the defendant testified at trial. Johnson v. State, 290 Ga. 382, 721 S.E.2d 851 (2012).

Advising on the right to jury trial.

- Defendant failed to show ineffective assistance for advising the defendant to waive a jury trial and not to testify because trial counsel discussed the advantages and disadvantages of waiving a jury, filed the waiver of jury trial form with defendant's understanding and consent, and the defendant made the decision not to testify at the close of the state's case. Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 629 S.E.2d 596 (2006).

On a claim that trial counsel was ineffective in advising a defendant to waive the right to a jury trial, the proper inquiry is whether the defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had the defendant not waived the right to a jury trial on advice of counsel. Given the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if tried before a jury; accordingly, the defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective in advising the defendant to waive a jury trial failed. Hendrix v. State, 284 Ga. 420, 667 S.E.2d 597 (2008).

In a defendant's prosecution for criminal trespass, ineffective assistance of counsel was not shown because trial counsel testified that counsel had discussed the issue of whether or not to waive a jury trial in counsel's initial consultation with the defendant and the defendant's parent and received no indication that the defendant did not understand the defendant's rights. Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. App. 416, 677 S.E.2d 433 (2009).

Advice to waive jury trial.

- Counsel was not ineffective for advising a murder defendant to waive the right to a jury trial. This advice was based on reasonable trial strategy as the defendant testified that counsel believed that a judge, having been exposed to cases involving similar violence, would be more lenient than a jury; moreover, the defendant's acquittal of murder and conviction on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter strongly supported the conclusion that counsel was effective, and the defendant was advised by the trial court that the decision to waive a jury trial rested with the defendant. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 725, 662 S.E.2d 817 (2008).

Failure to challenge arrest warrant.

- Defendant's plea counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the legality of arrest warrants because all four of the supporting affidavits unquestionably satisfied the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-4-41(a), and based on the information provided in the supporting affidavits, the officer in the case supplied the issuing magistrate with sufficient information to support an independent finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrants; the defendant failed to demonstrate that the defendant's plea counsel's failure to challenge the legality of the warrants prejudiced the defendant because even if counsel had challenged the warrants and was able to suppress any inculpatory statement the defendant made, there was nothing to suggest that the defendant's guilty plea resulted from such a statement. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).

Failure to file plea in abatement to dismiss arrest warrant and indictment.

- Defendant failed to show that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to file a plea in abatement to dismiss an arrest warrant and an indictment because the allegedly inaccurate and incomplete information in the affidavit supporting the warrant did not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant and was not necessary to a finding of probable cause. Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 770, 700 S.E.2d 350 (2010).

Failure to challenge indictment.

- Defendant failed to prove that both defendant's appointed and retained counsel were ineffective since it was not error for the defendant's appointed counsel not to file a demurrer challenging certain counts of the indictment, and the defendant's retained lawyer consulted with the defendant on numerous occasions, thoroughly investigated the case, and was fully prepared for trial. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to quash the indictment as the failure to raise a meritless motion could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Because the indictment complied with O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), counsel was not ineffective for not challenging it. Smith v. State, 274 Ga. App. 568, 618 S.E.2d 182 (2005).

Since the record showed that the victim could not recall the exact dates when the events alleged in the indictment occurred, the state was not able to identify a specific date for the offenses, and the defendant offered no other evidence that the indictment was imperfect in form or substance or that the defendant's ability to present a defense was impaired, the defendant failed to establish that a special demurrer would have been successful or that defense counsel's failure to file such pleading before trial affected the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, the defendant's ineffective assistance claim lacked merit. Berman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 867, 632 S.E.2d 757 (2006).

Despite an inmate's claim to the contrary in a petition for habeas relief, trial counsel was not ineffective in not contesting the failure of the indictment to state venue, by inducing the inmate's guilty plea, in failing to advise the inmate of the inmate's Boykin rights, by failing to object to the prosecutor's conduct at the plea hearing, and by failing to advise the inmate about parole eligibility. Wright v. Hall, 281 Ga. 318, 638 S.E.2d 270 (2006).

Defense counsel's performance was deficient in failing to challenge the defendant's charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on the basis that the indictment erroneously alleged that the crime was committed on a date after the indictment was issued; since this was the second time the defendant had been indicted for that offense, if trial counsel had timely challenged that count, any future prosecution for that crime would have been barred, and thus prejudice to the defendant was shown. Langlands v. State, 280 Ga. 799, 633 S.E.2d 537 (2006).

In a child molestation prosecution, since the defendant did not show that the state could have identified a specific date of the crimes in the indictment, or that the state's failure to do so prejudiced the defense, trial counsel's failure to pursue a special demurrer to the indictment did not effect the outcome of the trial and hence was not ineffective assistance. Stillwell v. State, 294 Ga. App. 805, 670 S.E.2d 452 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0493, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 222 (Ga. 2009).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the felony murder count of an indictment because the indictment contained sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice that the defendant was accused of the death of the victim as a result of an aggravated assault when the indictment alleged a specific, offensive use of the defendant's hands and feet and that when the defendant's hands and feet were used in a particular way they were objects which were likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury; the absence of self-defense, like general intent, did not have to be expressly alleged in an indictment, and even if some such allegation were necessary, language in the indictment asserting that defendant acted unlawfully and contrary to the laws of the state, the good order, peace and dignity thereof was sufficient. Lizana v. State, 287 Ga. 184, 695 S.E.2d 208 (2010).

Defendant's ineffective assistance claims failed because the defendant could not show deficient performance on the ground that defense counsel erroneously advised the defendant to enter a plea of guilty upon a defective indictment since the indictment was valid and sufficient. Belcher v. State, 304 Ga. App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (2010).

Defendant failed to show that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to file a plea in abatement to dismiss an arrest warrant and an indictment because the allegedly inaccurate and incomplete information in the affidavit supporting the warrant did not suggest an intentional or reckless falsehood on the part of the affiant and was not necessary to a finding of probable cause. Jones v. State, 287 Ga. 770, 700 S.E.2d 350 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of an indictment because pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54 the indictment showed that it was a "True Bill," was signed by the grand jury foreperson, and was filed with the clerk's office with the clerk of the court's name prior to the defendant's arraignment, since the defendant and counsel signed the indictment; even if the defendant was able to show that counsel was deficient for failing to challenge an imperfect indictment, the defendant was unable to establish prejudice because the filing of a demurrer would not have prevented the state from reindicting and trying the defendant. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Because the armed robbery count of the indictment sufficiently alleged the elements of armed robbery, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the armed robbery charge, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial as to the ineffective assistance claim; that the property was taken from the person or immediate presence of another is necessarily inferred from the allegation of a use of an offensive weapon to accomplish the taking, and the alleged offense of "armed robbery" can be accomplished only via a taking from the person or immediate presence of another. Patterson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 793, 720 S.E.2d 278 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0574, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 327 (Ga. 2012).

Defendant failed to show that trial counsel's performance was deficient for not filing a demurrer to the count of the indictment charging the defendant with enticing a child for indecent purposes in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-5(a) because the indictment alleged that the defendant enticed the victim to a place and penetrated the victim's vagina with the defendant's penis. Burke v. State, 316 Ga. App. 386, 729 S.E.2d 531 (2012).

Any attempt by trial counsel to file a demurrer to the count of an indictment charging the defendant with child molestation, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)(1), would have been futile because nothing in the child molestation statute specifically prohibited the state from prosecuting the defendant on the ground that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim; while sexual intercourse is not an element of child molestation, an adult's act of sexual intercourse with a child falls within the parameters of the child molestation statute. Burke v. State, 316 Ga. App. 386, 729 S.E.2d 531 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a special demurrer to the indictment because the defendant did not show that the length of the period in which the indictment alleged the crimes were committed materially affected the ability to present a defense; the charges against the defendant were based on funds the defendant retained, which were disbursed to the defendant on different dates and which related to the representation of specific indigent defense clients. Clarke v. State, 317 Ga. App. 471, 731 S.E.2d 100 (2012).

Failure to request a change of venue.

- Trial counsel's failure to seek a change of venue on the ground of pretrial publicity as ineffective assistance of counsel since the only pretrial publicity shown in the record was a single newspaper article published the week before trial, did not amount to ineffective assistance since there was no evidence that the trial's setting was inherently prejudicial or that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853, 596 S.E.2d 597 (2004).

Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to move for a change in venue as there was no evidence that the trial's setting was inherently prejudicial or that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible. Moore v. State, 274 Ga. App. 432, 618 S.E.2d 122 (2005).

Alleged failure of a defendant's trial counsel to present evidence in support of a motion for a change of venue in defendant's prosecution for malice murder did not demonstrate that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; the defendant presented no evidence post-trial to suggest that the trial's setting was inherently prejudicial or that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible, and since a complete failure to make a motion for change of venue would not have constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under those circumstances, the failure to support the motion adequately likewise did not show ineffectiveness under those circumstances. Green v. State, 281 Ga. 322, 638 S.E.2d 288 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict as to venue was rejected as: (1) there was sufficient evidence of venue as to the obstructing a police officer and battery charges as they occurred when defendant was arrested, and an officer testified that the officer apprehended the defendant in Floyd County; (2) there was ample evidence that the robbery took place in Rome, but there was no testimony that Rome was in Floyd County, and the trial court did not take judicial notice of the City's location; and (3) if counsel had moved for a directed verdict based on venue, the trial court would have allowed the state to reopen its case and to present additional evidence of venue. Hinkle v. State, 282 Ga. App. 328, 638 S.E.2d 781 (2006).

Trial counsel's failure to seek a change of venue on the ground of pretrial publicity as ineffective assistance of counsel failed since the only pretrial publicity shown in the record was a single newspaper article published the week before trial since there was no evidence that the trial's setting was inherently prejudicial or that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853, 596 S.E.2d 597 (2004).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to venue. Flanders v. State, 285 Ga. App. 805, 648 S.E.2d 97 (2007).

Failure to object to venue.

- Trial counsel's failure to object to venue could not constitute grounds for ineffective assistance because the state established venue. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Pretermitting whether the decisions not to move for a directed verdict for lack of venue and to stipulate to venue fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant could not prove that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Indeed, if defense counsel either moved for a directed verdict as to the lack of venue or decided against ultimately stipulating to venue, the trial transcript clearly showed that the state was prepared to reopen the evidence to recall a witness to prove venue. Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga. App. 190, 744 S.E.2d 413 (2013).

Failure to file transfer motion under

§ 15-11-30.5. - Given the children services department's opposition to transferring a mother's reunification plan to the county where the mother was living, and given that transfer is not mandatory under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-30.5, the mother's attorney was not deficient in failing to file a transfer motion. Moreover, since there were significant grounds for finding parental misconduct or inability other than the mother's failure to comply with the case plan, there was no reasonable probability that the trial court would not have terminated the mother's parental rights had counsel successfully moved to transfer the plan to another county. In the Interest of C.G., 279 Ga. App. 730, 632 S.E.2d 472 (2006).

Failure to file motion to transfer.

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to petition to have defendant's case transferred to juvenile court as defendant was 16 when the crime was committed; as the case involved an armed robbery, it could not be transferred to juvenile court. Hall v. State, 274 Ga. App. 842, 619 S.E.2d 344 (2005).

Failure to move to sever.

- In an armed robbery prosecution, counsel's failure to move to sever the trial of defendant from that of the codefendant was not shown to be ineffective assistance because the defendants did not present antagonistic defenses, and there was no likelihood of confusion because there were only two defendants who acted in concert. Shannon v. State, 275 Ga. App. 550, 621 S.E.2d 540 (2005).

Because a codefendant's statements were non-custodial and were made in furtherance of a conspiracy, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the statements were admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 and did not violate Bruton; consequently, defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel's failure to request a severance constituted ineffective assistance. Hankerson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 545, 621 S.E.2d 772 (2005).

Defendant's claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request that the defendant's trial be severed from the codefendant's trial because the admission into evidence of the codefendant's recorded statement, which implicated the defendant, violated the Sixth Amendment right to confront the codefendant, failed because first, the codefendant testified before the jury and was subject to cross-examination, so the admission of the codefendant's statement was not, in fact, a Bruton violation, and, second, the codefendant's incriminating statement was made shortly after the crimes occurred, was made prior to arrest, and was a non-custodial statement to an acquaintance rather than police officers, so the statement was more properly characterized as an admissible declaration of a co-conspirator, rather than a confession; further, the defendant's trial counsel provided several strategic reasons for choosing not to request a motion to sever, which did not form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 539, 630 S.E.2d 410 (2006).

Trial counsel's defense strategy in failing to move for severance of defendant's armed robbery trial from that of a codefendant did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, as such was reasonable, even if it wasn't successful, given that: (1) the jury was unlikely to confuse the evidence applicable to either defendants; (2) the defenses were not mutually antagonistic; and (3) the defendant might have actually benefitted from being able to point to the codefendant as being the controlling figure in the robberies. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. App. 479, 636 S.E.2d 547 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 for failure to request a bifurcated trial on felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; because the possession count was a predicate offense for the felony murder count, the prior conviction that was admitted into evidence was relevant to the felony murder count, and it was not necessary to sever the possession count. Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006).

The defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to move to sever a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge and in failing to object to the admission of the defendant's prior felony convictions, as: (1) the prior drug convictions were not objected to because they helped in the presentation of counsel's defense strategy that the defendant had a long history of drug problems, and was a drug addict and not an armed robber; and (2) the prior felonies were never read to the jury, there was no evidence that the jury members actually read the indictment, the indictment did not go out with the jury, and the court instructed the jury that they had to decide the case based on the evidence given to them. Einglett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 497, 642 S.E.2d 160 (2007).

Defendant did not show that defense counsel was ineffective and thus was not entitled to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea; defense counsel did not file a motion to sever because a codefendant's motion to sever had already been denied, and even if defense counsel's failure to interview certain witnesses was deficient, the defendant did not show that but for the allegedly deficient performance the defendant would have proceeded to trial. Moon v. State, 286 Ga. App. 360, 649 S.E.2d 355 (2007).

Counsel's failure to seek severance of the defendant's trial from that of the driver of a car in which drugs were found did not constitute ineffective assistance. Trial counsel testified that counsel wanted the driver in the case so that counsel could "blame the drugs on" the driver, and this strategic decision did not constitute deficient performance. Gresham v. State, 295 Ga. App. 449, 671 S.E.2d 917 (2009).

In a defendant's prosecution for malice murder and cruelty to children, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to sever the defendant's trial from that of the codefendant, the parent of the five-year-old victim, as such a decision was a matter of trial strategy and trial counsel was able to cross-examine the parent as to any hearsay statements regarding the defendant's prior difficulties with the victim. Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 57, 673 S.E.2d 249 (2009).

In a defendant's prosecution for armed robbery, trial counsel was not ineffective due to the abandonment of a motion to sever the defendant's trial from that of a codefendant. Defendant argued that severance from the defendant's codefendant would have prevented the introduction of a phone call made from the codefendant's phone to a taxi service from which a taxi driver who was robbed was dispatched, however the evidence would have been admissible against the defendant regardless of severance because the phone call had been made in furtherance of a conspiracy. Troutman v. State, 297 Ga. App. 196, 676 S.E.2d 836 (2009).

Even if defense counsel's withdrawal of a motion to sever could be considered deficient performance, the defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant failed to show that the defendant was prejudiced as the count the defendant argued should have been severed was against the defendant's codefendant, and the defendant failed to point to any evidence in the record that could plausibly support the defendant's contention that the jury might not have believed that the defendant, who was charged with armed robbery along with the codefendant, was not involved in the burglary that the codefendant was charged with committing. Killings v. State, 296 Ga. App. 869, 676 S.E.2d 31 (2009).

Defendant failed to show that the defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to sever the defendant's trial from that of the codefendants because a motion to sever would have been futile since one of the codefendants filed a motion to sever the trial, and the motion was denied. Cruz v. State, 305 Ga. App. 805, 700 S.E.2d 631 (2010).

Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel, even though defendant's trial counsel failed to object to the joining of the defendant and the codefendant for trial, because trial counsel testified that the counsel had found no legal basis upon which to object to the joinder of the defendant's case with that of the codefendant. Furthermore, the trial counsel testified that the counsel did not object to the joinder or move later for severance as a matter of trial strategy because counsel believed that having the defendant tried with the codefendant enhanced the counsel's strategy of placing the blame on the codefendant as the codefendant gave a statement to the police that all of the narcotics found by the police belonged to the codefendant. Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 889, 714 S.E.2d 593 (2011).

Trial counsel's failure to renew a motion to sever did not constitute deficient performance because the strategic decision fell within the wide latitude of presumptively reasonable conduct engaged in by trial attorneys; counsel testified that counsel did not renew the motion to sever because counsel had impeached the codefendant on cross-examination and believed that the trial court would not grant severance at that stage of the proceedings. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 706, 715 S.E.2d 85 (2011).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to move to sever the defendant's case from that of the codefendant because counsel testified that counsel did not move to sever since counsel believed that if the two defendants were tried together, the chances of the codefendant implicating the defendant would diminish; trial counsel further testified that counsel thought the dangers of severance outweighed any benefits and that, even with the benefit of hindsight, counsel would have made the same decision. Anderson v. State, 311 Ga. App. 732, 716 S.E.2d 813 (2011).

Defendant failed to show either that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to request a bifurcated trial on the charge alleging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or that the defendant was prejudiced because trial counsel chose as part of the trial strategy not to seek bifurcation, and due to the lack of evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict on the firearm possession count. Newkirk v. State, 290 Ga. 581, 722 S.E.2d 760 (2012).

Trial counsel's failure to move to have the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony tried separately did not amount to ineffective assistance as the possession charge was an underlying felony for the felony murder counts and, therefore, bifurcation was not authorized. Leonard v. State, 292 Ga. 214, 735 S.E.2d 767 (2012).

Failure to request a competency hearing.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing as the decision was reasonable since counsel observed nothing to suggest "low or even moderate intelligence" and concluded that defendant was quite intelligent and capable of assisting with defendant's own defense; counsel testified that if counsel believed a competency evaluation was required, counsel would have ensured that one was conducted. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 987, 126 S. Ct. 571, 163 L. Ed. 2d 478 (2005).

Because: (1) the record did not demonstrate that the defendant's sanity or competency was or should have been a significant issue at trial; and (2) the defendant failed to support an assertion that competency should have been raised, the defendant failed to prove the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to counsel's failure to request an independent psychiatric examination. Thus, a new trial on this ground was unwarranted. Jennings v. State, 282 Ga. 679, 653 S.E.2d 17 (2007).

In an armed robbery prosecution, defense counsel was not ineffective for not evaluating the defendant's competency as: (1) the defendant had been evaluated in connection with another case and found competent; (2) a forensic evaluator met with the defendant and told counsel the defendant would be found competent; and (3) counsel testified that although the defendant's behavior was odd, the defendant was able to communicate and discuss trial issues with counsel . Shabazz v. State, 293 Ga. App. 560, 667 S.E.2d 414 (2008).

Habeas court correctly concluded that ineffective assistance of trial counsel could not be used to excuse the procedural default of the petitioner's claim that the petitioner was mentally incompetent during trial because the information that trial counsel then had available to them, including the information that trial counsel unreasonably failed to obtain, would not have led constitutionally effective counsel to pursue a claim of incompetence to stand trial and would not be reasonably probable to have resulted in a finding that the petitioner was incompetent had such a plea been pursued; the petitioner failed to prove that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding the petitioner's competence to stand trial because trial counsel withdrew the petitioner's plea of incompetence only after satisfying themselves that counsel was able to communicate effectively with the petitioner, and the trial court had an extensive opportunity to observe the petitioner in pre-trial and trial proceedings and to interact directly with the petitioner, and the court did not see sufficient indications of incompetence to pursue further evaluation. Perkins v. Hall, 288 Ga. 810, 708 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to assess the defendant's competency to stand trial as counsel observed nothing that caused counsel to believe that the defendant was not competent. Brinkley v. State, 320 Ga. App. 275, 739 S.E.2d 703 (2013).

Defendant failed to show that trial counsel's deficient performance in failing to investigate whether the defendant was suffering from delusional compulsion at the time of the offense had a reasonable probability of altering the outcome of the defendant's trial; the defendant presented no evidence that the defendant was legally insane or suffering from delusional compulsion at the time of the offense or at any other time. Hatfield v. State, 321 Ga. App. 904, 743 S.E.2d 560 (2013).

Ineffectiveness for failure to request psychological examination.

- Although the defendant claimed that the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a psychological examination, which allegedly would have shown that the defendant was not competent to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter a guilty plea, the defendant failed to offer the results of any mental evaluation at either of the hearings on the motion to withdraw the plea; as a result, the defendant could only have speculated that a mental evaluation would have shown that the defendant was not competent to enter a valid plea. Such speculation was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that any deficient representation resulted in the defendant entering a guilty plea instead of insisting on a trial and did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Frye v. State, 298 Ga. App. 415, 680 S.E.2d 431 (2009).

Failure to have defendant psychiatrically evaluated.

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for statutory rape and two counts of child molestation involving a stepchild, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a result of failure to have the defendant evaluated for mental illness and incompetence before trial or before sentencing was rejected because defense counsel testified at the defendant's motion for a new trial hearing that: (1) defense counsel did not know of the defendant's alleged prior history of psychiatric problems; (2) the defendant appeared to understand the communications that defense counsel had with the defendant; and (3) defense counsel did not explore the need for a psychological evaluation of the defendant because defense counsel did not see it as an issue. Haygood v. State, 289 Ga. App. 187, 656 S.E.2d 541 (2008).

No error in failing to conduct competency hearing.

- Trial court did not err in failing sua sponte to conduct a competency hearing to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the defendant's right to counsel because the information available and evidence presented to the trial court prior to trial provided no real indication that the defendant was incompetent to waive the defendant's right to counsel. Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 702 S.E.2d 415 (2010).

Failure to file an answer.

- After an accused failed to appear or otherwise file an answer in a condemnation proceeding filed against the accused in connection with the accused's arrest for possession of methamphetamine, and the accused failed to show that counsel was ineffective in failing to file an answer, the state was properly granted judgment. Walters v. State of Ga., 269 Ga. App. 883, 605 S.E.2d 458 (2004).

Failure to seek to redact portion of prior plea.

- Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek to redact the portion of a defendant's first offender plea that related to carrying a concealed weapon. The plea to carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor, was not an element of the current charge of the possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b). Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 658 S.E.2d 750 (2008).

Failure to file motion to suppress.

- Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress because the fact that the defendants were in a police car during the show-ups did not taint the identifications obtained and there was no evidence that the victims knew that the defendants were in handcuffs; further, there was nothing unfair in the officer's statements to the victims. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress a BB gun and tennis shoes seized from defendant's house as the failure to file a suppression motion did not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel and the defendant did not make a strong showing that the evidence, which was seized pursuant to a search warrant, would have been suppressed had a motion been filed. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005).

Failure to file motion to suppress confession.

- Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not moving to suppress defendant's confession on the ground that it was obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest that was not supported by probable cause because the arrest was supported by probable cause as the arresting officer had information which allowed a prudent person to believe that the defendant had committed a crime, so such a motion would have been futile. Robinson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 502, 623 S.E.2d 711 (2005).

Defendant failed to show that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek suppression when the defendant did not show that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed if the motion had been prosecuted; further, there was overwhelming, undisputed evidence of the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, such that the result of the trial would not have been different if the items seized from the car and residence were suppressed. Leppla v. State, 277 Ga. App. 804, 627 S.E.2d 794 (2006).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence of cash found in defendant's pocket, as the motion would have been denied due to the officer's reasonable suspicion to justify stopping defendant for an investigation and a permissible pat down for weapons before placing the defendant in the back of the patrol car. Fitzgerald v. State, 279 Ga. App. 67, 630 S.E.2d 598 (2006).

Failure to file motion to suppress defendant's statements.

- Malice murder and accompanying life sentence were upheld on appeal because counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a motion to suppress defendant's two statements; attempting to suppress the first statement would have been futile because the defendant was not under arrest and not subject to a custodial interrogation, and the second statement was made after a waiver of Miranda rights. Wiggins v. State, 280 Ga. 627, 632 S.E.2d 80 (2006).

Because the defendant did not assert a possessory interest in a car in which the defendant was a passenger or in items seized from the car, the defendant failed to show that the defendant had standing to contest the admissibility of those items, and since it was also unclear what was known to the officer at time of the defendant's arrest, the defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress those items. Callahan v. State, 280 Ga. App. 323, 634 S.E.2d 102 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly rejected by the trial court given evidence that: (1) counsel did not stipulate as to the weight of the marijuana seized; (2) counsel's failure to file a suppression motion did not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel, and the defendant failed to show that the challenged evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed; (3) defendant's decision not to testify was the defendant's own; and (4) a continuing witness objection would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Parnell v. State, 280 Ga. App. 665, 634 S.E.2d 763 (2006).

Failure to file motion to suppress drug evidence.

- Counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to file a motion to suppress marijuana and identification found in an idling car, as the search did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII; it was proper for a drug sniffing dog to walk around the outside of the defendant's vehicle, a location in which police and the dog were permitted to be, and to alert to the presence of drugs. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 83, 635 S.E.2d 372 (2006).

Defendant's identification in a line-up was not unduly suggestive in violation of due process under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I, and defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to file a motion to suppress the line-up identification; the testimony regarding the line-up established that the defendant was not showing gold teeth, that all of the participants held their numbers in the same place while the victims separately identified the defendant, and that the officers used no suggestive techniques during the line-up. Robinson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 76, 635 S.E.2d 380 (2006).

Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to file a motion to exclude the introduction of the defendant's videotaped statement admitting to having sex with the victim and for failing to move to exclude or object to evidence of a prior molestation; there was no basis for such a motion as the defendant's videotape showed the defendant being advised of and waiving the defendant's Miranda rights under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV, and the evidence of the prior molestation was admissible at trial and no compliance with Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3 governing similar transactions was required. Hutchens v. State, 281 Ga. App. 610, 636 S.E.2d 773 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea based on the defendant's claim that the defense counsel failed to appeal the denial of a suppression motion was properly rejected because it was not ineffective assistance to fail to make a meritless appeal and the motion to suppress was properly denied because the defendant voluntarily reinitiated discussions with law enforcement officers after the interview was terminated due to the defendant's request for counsel. Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 637 S.E.2d 20 (2006).

Trial counsel, representing the first of two defendants, was not ineffective, despite claims that counsel allowed character evidence to be presented to the jury, failed to move to suppress the identification evidence against that defendant, and failed to object to the trial court's consideration at sentencing of a Georgia Criminal Information Center report pertaining to that defendant as: (1) the challenged portions of the defendant's statement were an integral part of a criminal confession, and such statements were not rendered inadmissible because the language used therein indicated that the accused committed another and separate offense; (2) the identification evidence was properly admitted as not unduly suggestive; and (3) nothing of record showed that the sentence the trial court ordered was based upon the defendant's criminal record report. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. App. 469, 638 S.E.2d 869 (2006), cert. dismissed, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 135 (Ga. 2007).

Warrantless arrest of the defendant was authorized on the ground that a sale of cocaine was committed in the officers' presence, and after the defendant retreated into a motel room, the exigencies of the situation demanded and excused an immediate entry into the room for the officer to arrest the defendant without a warrant; hence, as suppression of the evidence seized thereafter would not have been granted, counsel was not ineffective in failing to file for the suppression of evidence. Fortson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 120, 640 S.E.2d 693 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit as: (1) trial counsel's decisions not to seek suppression of a bloody jacket seized from the defendant's home was strategic, and not to challenge, were strategic; and (2) the defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel objected to evidence of the victim's good character or evidence of the defendant's bad character. Parker v. State, 281 Ga. 490, 640 S.E.2d 44 (2007).

Trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to seek suppression of the identification evidence or attack the reliability of identification evidence on grounds that such was impermissibly suggestive, as: (1) the showup was preceded by a photo array against which no attack was made; and (2) counsel's strategy in handling the state's failure to elicit in-court identification testimony from a particular witness was reasonable. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 640 S.E.2d 280 (2007).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the identification of the defendant by the eyewitness, because, based on the witness's prior knowledge of the defendant, such was an independent basis for the challenged identification, making a motion to suppress futile. Dumas v. State, 283 Ga. App. 279, 641 S.E.2d 271 (2007).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in not filing a motion to suppress the defendant's videotaped statement on the ground that it had been induced by a promise of leniency; even if the statement could have been excluded, the statement, which allowed the jury to hear evidence that was unfavorable to the victim, was consistent with the defendant's theory of justification. Carpenter v. State, 285 Ga. App. 296, 645 S.E.2d 709 (2007).

Trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking to suppress evidence; before conducting a pat-down, officers had not obtained any information that would support a reasonable belief that the defendant was armed or dangerous, and there was prejudice in that the evidence supporting the convictions all resulted, directly or indirectly, from the search. Perez v. State, 284 Ga. App. 212, 643 S.E.2d 792 (2007).

Failure to request determination or suppression of videotape.

- In a child molestation case involving the defendant's 13-year-old child, defense counsel was not ineffective for not requesting that the trial court determine the reliability of the victim's videotaped statement under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820) or for not objecting to the statement's admission; the victim spontaneously told the victim's foster mother about the incidents when the victim was upset, and the victim repeatedly expressed love for the defendant and a desire not to get the defendant into trouble. Foster v. State, 286 Ga. App. 250, 649 S.E.2d 322 (2007), cert. dismissed, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 875 (Ga. 2007).

Because a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle that the defendant and the defendant's cohorts were riding in would have been futile, as the evidence showed they abandoned the vehicle on foot after being involved in a high-speed chase with police, the defendant's trial counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to file the motion. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 287 Ga. App. 872, 652 S.E.2d 891 (2007).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not seeking to suppress the evidence seized in the search of the defendant's home based upon the alleged insufficiency of the search warrant affidavit; there was no showing that the information in support of the warrant was patently false or that there was any intent to mislead the judge in seeking the search warrant. Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 651 S.E.2d 718 (2007).

Despite ineffective assistance of counsel claim being raised for the first time on appeal, the appeals court found that the claim, which was based on counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress challenging the admission of a juvenile's purported confession to the police, required remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the result of the proceeding would have been different if a motion to suppress had been granted. In the Interest of J.T., 289 Ga. App. 248, 656 S.E.2d 580 (2008).

A defendant had not shown that counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to suppress the defendant's videotaped statement: even if the defendant had sufficiently articulated a desire to have counsel present, the defendant had waived the right by initiating discussion with police without any further prompting or interrogation by them; furthermore, the videotape supported the conclusion that the defendant was not prevented by any intoxication from knowingly waiving the defendant's Miranda rights and giving a voluntary statement. Stanley v. State, 283 Ga. 36, 656 S.E.2d 806 (2008).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress a holster when the admission of the holster did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The information in an affidavit contained sufficient information for the magistrate to come to the commonsense conclusion that evidence of contraband could be found at the defendant's apartment, and an officer saw the holster in plain view in an area in which the officer had a right to be while searching for contraband. Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 658 S.E.2d 750 (2008).

Failure to file motion to suppress blood and urine tests.

- Defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to defendant's trial and conviction for aggravated assault and drug possession as a result of trial counsel's failure to move to suppress the test results of defendant's urine and blood, and evidence of a tube of cocaine found in the vehicle which defendant was driving, as the bodily fluids were unlawfully obtained from defendant while unconscious and without a warrant, and there was evidence affirmatively showing that persons other than defendant had equal opportunity to possess the cocaine that was found on the floor of the vehicle. Coney v. State, 290 Ga. App. 364, 659 S.E.2d 768 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, the defendant failed to establish that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a motion to suppress the evidence found in the defendant's room as the evidence showed that a preliminary motion to suppress was filed and that trial counsel concluded that, based on the Fourth Amendment waivers of the defendant and others involved, pursuit of the motion would have been fruitless. Corn v. State, 290 Ga. App. 792, 660 S.E.2d 782 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective by affirmatively stating that counsel had no objection to the admission of a handgun and bullets seized from a pickup truck the defendant was driving because even if trial counsel waived counsel's motion to suppress the handgun and bullets, it did not prejudice the defendant since the defendant could not succeed on the merits of the motion to suppress; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from the pickup truck because the search was authorized under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 166, 692 S.E.2d 766 (2010).

Defendant did not carry the defendant's burden of showing that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's custodial statement because counsel participated in a hearing to determine the admissibility of the statement. Hester v. State, 304 Ga. App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (2010).

Failure to file suppression motion for jailhouse phone call.

- In an armed robbery prosecution, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress cash recovered from a search of the appellant's clothing as the police had probable cause to arrest the appellant after finding the appellant in the area of the robberies and matching the appellant to the description of one of the suspects. Furthermore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress recordings of an appellant's telephone calls while the appellant was in jail because while O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(4) prohibited any person from intentionally and secretly intercepting a telephone call by use of any device, instrument, or apparatus, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66(a) provided an exception to this rule when one of the parties to the communication had given prior consent and that consent was implied based on the statements during the recording that all jail phone calls were recorded or monitored. Boykins-White v. State, 305 Ga. App. 827, 701 S.E.2d 221 (2010).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to file a second motion to suppress until the morning of trial, and thus failing to secure a transcript of the hearing on the motion because trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the arresting detective, who admitted that the detective had previously testified to three different versions of the defendant's alleged statement; therefore, even assuming that trial counsel was deficient by failing to secure a transcript before trial to impeach the detective, the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant since the arresting detective admitted to the detective's contradictory statements and, thus, the inconsistencies were known to the jury even though the prior inconsistent testimony was not read verbatim into the record. Cannon v. State, 288 Ga. 225, 702 S.E.2d 845 (2010).

Trial counsel's failure to pursue a meritless motion to suppress body armor did not constitute ineffective assistance because the defendant did not make a strong showing that the body armor would have been suppressed had the defendant's counsel pursued a motion to suppress; a police officer had an arrest warrant for the defendant when the officer found the defendant in an apartment hiding in a shower, and even if the officer was not authorized to arrest the defendant outside the jurisdictional limits of the county, the defendant did not introduce evidence at the motion for new trial hearing that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant or that the defendant had standing to object to the search of the apartment. Nyane v. State, 306 Ga. App. 591, 703 S.E.2d 53 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0420, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2011).

Trial counsel was not effective for failing to file a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence of the defendant's statement to the police based on a violation of Miranda because the defendant made no showing that such a motion would have been successful; the defendant spoke English, the interviewing officer informed the defendant of the defendant's Miranda rights, and the defendant acknowledged understanding those rights before giving the defendant's statement. Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga. App. 679, 703 S.E.2d 116 (2010).

Codefendant did not demonstrate that the codefendant's trial counsel was deficient for failing to seek suppression of the codefendant's custodial statement because the codefendant failed to provide a meritorious basis to contest its admission; the codefendant was not a suspect in the crimes at the time of the codefendant's arrest, the codefendant was informed of the codefendant's Miranda rights, the codefendant did not ask for an attorney, and the statement was made without threat of force or promise of reward. Wilson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 827, 703 S.E.2d 400 (2010).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding that the defendant failed to show that the defendant's plea counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress an inculpatory statement that the defendant allegedly made to the police after the defendant's arrest because, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant made an inculpatory statement that caused the defendant to plead guilty, the trial court had every right to disbelieve defendant's self-serving testimony in favor of counsel's testimony that counsel was not aware of the defendant making any inculpatory statement and that no record of such a statement existed in any of the files the state provided to the counsel; in addition, there was no mention of such a statement during the defendant's guilty-plea hearing. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).

Defendant's trial counsel was not deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence because the defendant failed to show that police officers lied under oath during the trial; therefore, the defendant was unable to show that, if defense counsel had filed a motion to suppress on that basis, the trial court would have granted the motion. Bass v. State, 309 Ga. App. 601, 710 S.E.2d 818 (2011).

Defendant failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged deficiencies of trial counsel, the outcome of the trial would have been different because the defendant could not show prejudice due to trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the approximately $1,500 discovered when the defendant was searched; even if the evidence had been excluded, the remaining evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming. Lowe v. State, 310 Ga. App. 242, 712 S.E.2d 633 (2011).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress evidence found on the defendant's person because any motion to suppress would have been without merit; when the officers lawfully approached and questioned the defendant, the smell of alcohol on the defendant's person and emanating from a cup, and the officers' earlier observations of the defendant staggering and stumbling in the middle of the roadway, gave the officers probable cause to arrest the defendant for unlawfully walking upon the roadway while under the influence of alcohol, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-95, and the cocaine and digital scales subsequently found in the defendant's pockets were discovered pursuant to a lawful search incident to an arrest. White v. State, 310 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011).

Defendant failed to establish that trial counsel's failure to timely file a motion to suppress evidence a police officer seized from the defendant's vehicle prejudiced the case because the warrantless search of the vehicle was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; the objective facts known to the officer after the car was lawfully stopped gave the officer probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband, and those facts included the smell of marijuana in the car, flakes of what the officer suspected to be marijuana on the floorboards of the car, and the defendant's visible agitation during the traffic stop. Brown v. State, 311 Ga. App. 405, 715 S.E.2d 802 (2011).

Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to suppress the eyewitnesses identifications of the defendant because trial counsel could not have suppressed the evidence on the theory that various witnesses' accounts of the shooter were inconclusive or inconsistent since issues regarding the eyewitnesses' credibility were for the jury to resolve; the defendant made no argument on appeal that the pretrial identification procedures used by the police were unduly suggestive. Funes v. State, 289 Ga. 793, 716 S.E.2d 183 (2011).

Trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to renew the motion to suppress after evidence was presented at trial because there was no evidence that a renewed motion would have been granted or that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's performance. Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 717 S.E.2d 447 (2011).

Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to suppress identification evidence and testimony because the admission of a deceased victim's identification statement was made the subject of a motion in limine filed by trial counsel and, thus, there could be no error as counsel did not fail to seek the exclusion of the admission of the victim's identification; the victims' identification of the defendant was merely one of the credibility of eyewitnesses to the incident, which had to be resolved by the trier of fact. Gandy v. State, 290 Ga. 166, 718 S.E.2d 287 (2011).

Failure to challenge search of computer.

- Trial counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge the search of the defendant's computer because no basis existed under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-24 for suppressing the results of forensic computer analysis; the analysis required expert skill, and the computer examination was conducted at the direction of Georgia peace officers to enable the officers to complete the officers' own investigation. Twiggs v. State, 315 Ga. App. 191, 726 S.E.2d 680 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress because probable cause to arrest the defendant and to search the defendant incident to that arrest had been shown on undisputed facts; therefore, the defendant could not make the requisite strong showing that a motion to suppress the evidence found during that search would have been meritorious. Coney v. State, 316 Ga. App. 303, 728 S.E.2d 899 (2012).

Trial counsel's failure to move for suppression of an in-court identification by the victims did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, because the identifications were appropriate given that the victims had ample opportunity to see the defendant at the scene of the crime and there were not impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification procedures involved in the case. Taylor v. State, 318 Ga. App. 115, 733 S.E.2d 415 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to move to suppress evidence found during a search of the defendant's father's home because, even if the appellate court disregarded the allegedly incorrect statements about the defendant being positively identified as a perpetrator, the affidavit in support of the search warrant accurately stated that an eyewitness had positively identified the codefendant as a murder suspect and that the codefendant was apprehended in the residence the state desired to search. Therefore, the search was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant and the evidence was admissible. Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 743 S.E.2d 1 (2013).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file an out-of-time motion to suppress that lacked merit. Bradley v. State, 322 Ga. App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (2013).

With regard to a defendant's convictions for child molestation, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial as the defendant failed to show that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel failing to move to suppress the photographic lineup evidence wherein the two victims identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The reviewing court agreed with the trial court that the photographic lineup was not impermissibly suggestive since the lineup depicted six black and white photographs of men of similar race, age, hairstyle, and complexion; thus, the defendant failed to prove that there would have been any merit to the motion to suppress. Mohammed v. State, 295 Ga. App. 514, 672 S.E.2d 483 (2009).

Because the jury was authorized to accept a cashier's identification testimony, because a photographic array was not impermissibly suggestive, and because nearly every weakness in the identification testimony was addressed in trial counsel's closing argument, the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. Clowers v. State, 299 Ga. App. 576, 683 S.E.2d 46 (2009).

Suppression of identification and photographic lineup.

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and related crimes, the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress victim's pre-trial photographic lineup and subsequent in-court identifications of the defendant, as there was no basis upon which trial counsel could have successfully moved to have the identifications suppressed since the photographic lineup was not shown to have been unduly suggestive and in-court identification was unquestionably admissible; thus, there was no possibility that the suppression motion would have been successful. Gibson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 183, 661 S.E.2d 850 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for robbery by sudden snatching, the defendant failed to establish that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress based on the patrol officer having no articulable suspicion to stop the defendant pursuant to the purported generic car description that was broadcast as the defendant failed to make a strong showing that the motion to suppress would have been granted on the asserted ground. Cray v. State, 291 Ga. App. 609, 662 S.E.2d 365 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, even if the defendant had not waived the issue of defense counsel being ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, the challenge was meritless since the search warrant properly named the package the police sought to seize, which the defendant picked up at a mailing store, and the warrant did not need to name the defendant's vehicle, which the defendant entered into with the package. Ferguson v. State, 292 Ga. App. 7, 663 S.E.2d 760 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's convictions for possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime, and numerous other crimes, the defendant failed to establish that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress with regard to challenging the contraband evidence obtained after the police stopped the defendant's vehicle as an officer attempted to stop the defendant's vehicle for failing to maintain the traffic lane, which was a valid basis for making a traffic stop. As such, there was no basis to file a motion to suppress the contraband discovered in the defendant's vehicle after the stop. Ray v. State, 292 Ga. App. 575, 665 S.E.2d 345 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for distributing cocaine, the defendant failed to establish that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel failing to move to suppress the evidence obtained during a traffic stop as the motion to suppress would have been futile as the evidence showed that the officer had reasonable suspicion if not probable cause to stop the vehicle based on carefully constructing an orchestrated buy and using a confidential informant. Beck v. State, 292 Ga. App. 472, 665 S.E.2d 701 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1863, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 922 (Ga. 2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress. The seizure of one defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the seizure was supported by exigent circumstances, and the other defendant lacked standing to contest an officer's search of a garage and had not asserted an ownership interest in a van located in the garage. Dade v. State, 292 Ga. App. 897, 666 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

As an officer's statement to the driver of a vehicle that it would be better for the driver if the driver cooperated because a female officer and a drug dog were on the way did not amount to improper coercion, the defendant could not show that it was likely that a renewed motion to suppress on this ground would have been successful, and the defendant thus failed to make the strong showing necessary to establish ineffective assistance. Darden v. State, 293 Ga. App. 127, 666 S.E.2d 559 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's convictions for child molestation and aggravated sexual battery, the trial court properly rejected the defendant's contention that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel's failure to object to the admission of an indictment evidencing the defendant's guilty plea to a prior conviction as such evidence was admissible, and the judgment entered thereon, as a complete record of a witness's criminal conviction for purposes of impeachment. Further, pretermitting whether defense counsel's failure to object to the additional document admitted constituted deficient performance, the defendant failed to show prejudice from the alleged deficiency as the defendant had already admitted to prior convictions during direct examination. Daniel v. State, 292 Ga. App. 560, 665 S.E.2d 696 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1931, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 891 (Ga. 2008).

In an armed robbery prosecution, a warrant issued by a judge in DeKalb County to search the defendant's home gave the correct DeKalb County address and directions to that address, but included a scrivener's error indicating the property was located in Gwinnett County. As that error was not so material as to destroy the validity of the search warrant, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to move to suppress clothing found pursuant to the warrant. Fuller v. State, 295 Ga. App. 439, 672 S.E.2d 438 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0749, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 220 (Ga. 2009).

Because the defendant failed to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious Fourth Amendment argument, there was no merit to the argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress or motion in limine to exclude the evidence obtained from a search of the defendant's apartment. Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 849, 672 S.E.2d 619 (2009).

Defendant's armed robbery conviction was upheld on appeal as the defendant failed to show that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel failing to move to suppress items found in the defendant's vehicle shortly after the robbery linking the defendant to the crime as the defendant failed to prove that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed if the motion had been made. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 639, 673 S.E.2d 30 (2009).

Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress a videotape of the defendant's encounter with police; since the videotape was properly authenticated, such a motion would have been denied. Steillman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009).

Because a police officer was authorized to stop the defendant's vehicle based on a suspicion that the defendant had illegally dumped trash, and because the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, the items seized from the vehicle would not have been suppressed; accordingly, the defendant's ineffective assistance claim failed and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's Alford plea. Bishop v. State, 299 Ga. App. 241, 682 S.E.2d 201 (2009).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because the defendant could not make the requisite strong showing that had trial counsel filed a timely motion to suppress, a photographic array that was presented to a reserve deputy sheriff who witnessed the crimes would have been suppressed; the photo array did not present an all but inevitable identification of the defendant because an investigator assembled six pictures of men bearing similar characteristics, such as the same race and same general age range, similar facial features and hair styles, the photographs appeared to have been taken from the same distance, and the photographs displayed similar backgrounds. Smith v. State, 303 Ga. App. 831, 695 S.E.2d 86 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek to suppress out-of-court eyewitness identifications as there was no evidence that the challenged pre-trial photographic identification was impermissibly suggestive. Biggins v. State, 322 Ga. App. 286, 744 S.E.2d 811 (2013).

Failure to submit any written motions to suppress certain lineup identification evidence does not support defendant's allegation of ineffective legal representation at trial when the trial court entertained such motions made orally and conducted a hearing thereon outside the presence of the jury. Aparicio v. State, 166 Ga. App. 793, 305 S.E.2d 649 (1983).

Failure to file special demurrer.

- Even if the defendant's first counsel was deficient in failing to file a special demurrer, the defendant did not show that such prejudiced the defense since the second trial counsel filed a special demurrer just before trial, which the trial court considered and denied; in any event, had the special demurrer been granted, the state could have re-indicted the defendant, and therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit. Bowden v. State, 279 Ga. App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (2006).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a special demurrer requiring the state to allege a specific date on which the alleged offenses occurred. Because defendant did not allege the defense of alibi, the specificity of dates would not have been helpful. Stanford v. State, 288 Ga. App. 463, 654 S.E.2d 173 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 461 (Ga. 2008).

Failure to raise a merger issue.

- Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise a merger issue before the trial court as defendant was convicted of only one count of rape. Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 in failing to argue at trial and on appeal that the inmate's statutory rape and incest convictions should have merged into the inmate's rape conviction as a matter of fact since all of the crimes arose out of the same incident, as the crimes of statutory rape and incest were not established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the crime of rape; the inmate's convictions of statutory rape under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3 and incest under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22 were not included pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1) in the rape conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1, as statutory rape, which required evidence as to the victim's age and that the victim was not the inmate's spouse, and incest, which required proof of the victim's relation to the inmate, had elements not required for rape. Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006).

Plea counsel performed deficiently in failing to argue for the merger of the defendant's convictions and sentences for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charges did not require proof of a fact that the armed robbery charges did not likewise require, and the defendant's aggravated assault convictions unquestionably merged into the defendant's armed-robbery convictions; the armed robbery counts in the indictment provided that the defendant unlawfully, with intent to commit theft, did take property from the person of the victim, by use of an offensive weapon, and the aggravated assault counts provided that the defendant did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of the victim with a steel rod, a deadly weapon, an object, which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury, by beating the victim about the head and face with the steel rod. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).

Since merger of the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery was not authorized, counsel's failure to pursue a meritless motion could not constitute ineffective assistance. McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 741 S.E.2d 303 (2013).

Failure to request continuance.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to request a continuance after an expert witness on eyewitness identification was obtained; there was no evidence that the defendant, who was indigent and had requested funds for the hiring of an expert witness, was prejudiced as a result of the timing of the defendant's receipt of funds to hire an expert witness. Robinson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 76, 635 S.E.2d 380 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 for failure to request a continuance to locate potential exculpatory witnesses; the defendant failed to show prejudice, as the defendant did not show that the testimony of such witnesses would have been relevant and favorable. Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006).

In a defendant's prosecution for child molestation, the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a continuance when the defendant's roommate, whose whereabouts were unknown for 18 months, suddenly reappeared on the eve of trial because trial counsel had an adequate opportunity to interview the roommate before the trial began and the roommate answered questions as expected based on trial counsel's review of the roommate's pretrial statements. Moe v. State, 297 Ga. App. 270, 676 S.E.2d 887 (2009).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated child molestation and three counts of child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 were appropriate because the defendant failed to prove that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant admitted that the defendant did not inform counsel that the defendant wanted to call the defendant's aunt and mother until the day before jury selection and counsel told the defendant that it would probably not be possible to get another continuance; even assuming that counsel could have obtained another continuance, the defendant's counsel was not given an opportunity to testify about why counsel did not attempt to get a continuance or whether there were strategic reasons for not calling the defendant's aunt and mother as witnesses. Watson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 702, 683 S.E.2d 665 (2009).

Defendant could not show that defendant's trial counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional conduct when counsel failed to request a continuance or challenge the admission of the defendant's videotaped police interview after the prosecutor did not produce the videotape to the defense until the day of trial because counsel requested and received a continuance, and thus secured an opportunity to review the videotape prior to trial. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a continuance to review evidence and have the evidence tested by the defendant's own expert because the defendant presented no evidence at the motion for new trial hearing to support the defendant's bald assertion that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had counsel sought a continuance or independent expert testing; even assuming that the defendant could properly raise a claim of ineffectiveness against counsel, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial on that ground. Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 702 S.E.2d 415 (2010).

Decision by trial counsel not to move for a continuance after an alibi witness did not appear and could not be located to testify on the defendant's behalf did not show the counsel's ineffectiveness because trial counsel testified that the alibi witness indicated by telephone that the witness did not want to testify and that defense counsel would not like what the witness had to say if counsel forced the witness to testify, and the trial court was authorized to credit counsel's testimony regarding the alibi witness; because trial counsel's investigation revealed that the supposed alibi witness was reluctant, unfavorable, and possibly prepared to commit perjury, the decision not to call such a witness was a reasonable exercise of professional judgment, and the tactical decision to proceed without the alibi witness's testimony was made after consultation with the defendant, who confirmed on the record that counsel agreed with the decision not to request a continuance. Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. 545, 705 S.E.2d 159 (2011).

Trial counsel was deficient on the ground that counsel's motion for continuance did not comply with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-25 because the witness in question had not been subpoenaed, and, thus, counsel could not comply with the statute; the defendant did not show that the trial court's denial of the motion for continuance was reversible error and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Presley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 528, 705 S.E.2d 870 (2011).

Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a continuance after a witness, who would have testified that another person confessed to killing the victim, failed to appear for trial because without some explanation as to why the witness did not appear at trial or some evidence that the witness had been located in the ensuing months, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the witness would testify at trial, and thus failed to carry the burden to show prejudice; the defendant failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different because the defendant did not establish that the witness's testimony would have been admissible at trial since there was no evidence that the confessor made the confession spontaneously or that the confessor and the witness were close friends. Martinez v. State, 289 Ga. 160, 709 S.E.2d 797 (2011).

Requesting continuance and sacrificing right to speedy trial.

- Defendant had not shown deficient performance on the part of trial counsel in seeking a continuance; counsel replaced former counsel who was found to have a conflict of interest three days before the scheduled start of defendant's trial, and was immediately faced with a dilemma, to preserve defendant's demand for trial that had been mistakenly filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 and be unprepared for the upcoming trial, or waive defendant's demand for trial by seeking a continuance in order to prepare for trial. Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561, 651 S.E.2d 674 (2007).

Failure to object when comments made about defendant's silence.

- Failure to object to a police detective's comment that the defendant responded to some questions during a police interview after the defendant was Mirandized, but that the defendant refused to answer other questions, was deficient performance by the counsel, but the conviction did not require reversal because the defendant could not show prejudice as the state did not comment or capitalize on the defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent, it was merely a passing comment which was quickly moved away from during the trial, and there was other strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. Hines v. State, 277 Ga. App. 404, 626 S.E.2d 601 (2006).

With regard to convictions for aggravated assault and related crimes, the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or move for a mistrial when a security officer commented on the defendant's pre-arrest silence, namely that the defendant did not speak up as to owning the type of vehicle used to perpetrate the crimes; even if testimony on the defendant's pre-arrest silence had been objectionable, the defendant failed to show any prejudice since other evidence showed that the defendant drove to police station in the defendant's truck and consented to search of that vehicle. Gibson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 183, 661 S.E.2d 850 (2008).

Prosecutor's remark was unlikely to be interpreted as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify and was not intended to comment on the defendant's decision not to testify, but was instead intended to address, albeit inartfully, the defendant's closing argument challenging the veracity and motives of those witnesses who were involved in the subject crimes. Thus, the failure of trial counsel to object to the remarks did not constitute deficient performance. Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 667 S.E.2d 62 (2008).

In a prosecution for battery and aggravated assault, defense counsel's failure to object to a police officer's single gratuitous reference to the defendant's post-arrest silence was not reversible error because, in view of the strong evidence of the defendant's guilt, this error was unlikely to have affected the outcome of the trial. Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (2008).

In an armed robbery prosecution, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the state's questions regarding the defendant's prearrest silence. As the defendant first raised the issue of that silence while testifying, and the prosecutor's questions regarding the defendant's failure to report an alleged crime against the defendant or to seek police protection only incidentally involved a reference to the defendant's silence, any objection would have been meritless. Dinkins v. State, 295 Ga. App. 289, 671 S.E.2d 299 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when the state asked the arresting officer if the defendant made a statement while in custody. The testimony was not given to prove the defendant's guilt or innocence, but could be characterized as a narrative recitation of the events surrounding the defendant's arrest by the authorities. Hardy v. State, 301 Ga. App. 115, 686 S.E.2d 789 (2009).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel when defendant's attorney failed to object to testimony from a detective regarding the defendant's post-arrest silence because although the testimony was improper, and trial counsel was deficient in failing to object, the defendant could not establish that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant's defense; trial counsel testified that counsel was unable to explain why counsel had not objected to the testimony but confirmed that counsel's failure to do so did not arise from a strategical decision, but the defendant, who aroused the suspicions of a security guard patrolling a high crime area during the late night hours, was caught in actual possession of nearly 240 grams of cocaine valued between $8,000 and $10,000, in addition to possessing a large amount of currency, and the state did not comment further regarding defendant's failure to give a statement, nor did the state make reference to it during closing argument. Arellano v. State, 304 Ga. App. 838, 698 S.E.2d 362 (2010).

Trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's argument that the defendant's failure to come in and speak with police after an arrest warrant issued was evidence of defendant's guilt constituted ineffective assistance because counsel's failure to object arose not from strategy but from counsel's mistaken belief that the argument was not objectionable, and the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error; twice during closing the state deliberately and unequivocally argued that the jury could use the defendant's silence against the defendant and view the defendant's failure to come forward and speak with police as evidence of the defendant's guilt, despite the absence of any evidence showing that the defendant was aware that a warrant had issued for the defendant's arrest, and there was no physical evidence linking the defendant to the crimes. Scott v. State, 305 Ga. App. 710, 700 S.E.2d 694 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel's decision not to object to a police officer's passing reference to the defendant's post-arrest silence was a valid exercise of reasonable professional judgment; given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, there was no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to object, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481 (2010).

Counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments on the ground that the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's exercise of the defendant's right to remain silent by remarking on the defendant's failure to testify at trial did not amount to deficient performance because the challenged remarks were not improper; the prosecutor made the comments while seeking to persuade the jury that the defendant's statements and behavior shortly after the crimes were inconsistent with the defendant's theory of self-defense, and the remarks were not intended to comment on the defendant's failure to testify or would have been received as such by the jury. Lacey v. State, 288 Ga. 341, 703 S.E.2d 617 (2010).

Trial court's finding that the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments regarding the defendant's decision not to take the stand and testify at trial was not clearly erroneous because appellate counsel never asked trial counsel why trial counsel did not object to the statements; therefore, because trial counsel was never asked to explain the failure to object during the motion hearing, the defendant failed to meet the burden of making an affirmative showing that the purported deficiencies in trial counsel's representation were indicative of ineffectiveness and were not examples of a conscious and deliberate trial strategy. Herndon v. State, 309 Ga. App. 403, 710 S.E.2d 607 (2011).

Defendant's claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to pervasive comments on the defendant's pre-arrest silence failed because the defendant made an insufficient showing of prejudice; there was strong evidence of the defendant's guilt of felony murder, including that it was undisputed that the defendant was the only adult caring for the victim when the victim received mortal injuries and that the defense that the victim fell from the bed was not supported by the medical evidence. Whitaker v. State, 291 Ga. 139, 728 S.E.2d 209 (2012).

Failure to object to closure of courtroom.

- Defendant, who was charged with, inter alia, child molestation, did not show that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to closure of the courtroom during the victims' testimony, and because defendant did not object to improper questions posed to and responses given by the state's witnesses, as defendant did not show the courtroom's closure prejudiced defendant. Certain questions and responses were proper under the rule allowing expert opinion testimony about whether a victim's psychological evaluation was consistent with sexual abuse, and there was no reasonable probability that improper testimony about the likelihood that a victim would disclose this kind of sexual abuse to please the victim's mother contributed to the verdict. Hunt v. State, 268 Ga. App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (2004).

Failure to object to clearing of courtroom for young victim's testimony.

- With regard to the defendant's convictions on two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree and one count of aggravated battery, the defendant failed to establish that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the clearing of the courtroom when the child victim testified as defense counsel testified at the new trial hearing that defense counsel did not object to the closing of the courtroom because defense counsel recognized that the victim was very young and defense counsel believed it to be appropriate under the circumstances. As a result, defense counsel's decision not to object clearly constituted an exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Glover v. State, 292 Ga. App. 22, 663 S.E.2d 772 (2008).

Failure to object to sheriff testifying as witness also acting as bailiff during trial.

- Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a county sheriff serving as a bailiff during the defendant's trial on charges of, inter alia, arson because the sheriff was a key witness for the state. Even if the sheriff never directly discussed the case with the jurors, the defendant was prejudiced as the sheriff continually associated with the jurors during half the trial and thus denied the defendant the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Bass v. State, 285 Ga. 89, 674 S.E.2d 255 (2009).

Failure to object to comment on victim's credibility.

- Defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to defendant's trial and conviction for child molestation based on trial counsel's failure to object to certain testimony by the investigating officer that commented upon the victim's credibility as, even though trial counsel did not object, the trial court gave a curative instruction that specifically informed the jury to disregard the officer's testimony commenting on the victim's credibility, which was adequate to correct any harm. Williams v. State, 290 Ga. App. 841, 660 S.E.2d 740 (2008).

Defendant did not show that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the state's comment during closing argument regarding an experts' opinion regarding child molestation victims' credibility. Nor did the defendant show that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different but for the purported deficient performance of trial counsel. Cobb v. State, 309 Ga. App. 70, 709 S.E.2d 9 (2011).

Failure to object to impermissible questions/comments on defendant's pre-arrest silence from prosecution.

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, although the defendant's trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor's impermissible questions and comments relating to the defendant's pre-arrest silence regarding the defendant's failure to contact the police to inform the police of the alleged accidental shooting, the defendant was not prejudiced by the deficiency based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including eyewitness accounts and evidence that the deceased victim was unarmed, which negated the defendant's accidental shooting and self-defense theories. Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 647, 670 S.E.2d 421 (2008).

Failure to object to identification of defendant.

- Defendant failed to show that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to an in-court identification of the defendant by the aggravated assault victim because the defendant neither asked trial counsel why no objection was made to the in-court identification nor made any showing that the identification would have been suppressed had an objection been made; the defendant made no affirmative showing that the purported deficiency in counsel's representation was indicative of ineffectiveness as opposed to being an example of a conscious, deliberate, and reasonable trial strategy. Newsome v. State, 288 Ga. 647, 706 S.E.2d 436 (2011).

Trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to a convenience-store clerk's allegedly tainted in-court identification of the defendant because the clerk's identification of the defendant had an independent origin, and thus, any objection would have lacked merit; although the clerk did admit to seeing a photograph of the defendant prior to trial, the clerk testified that the in-court identification of the defendant was not based on a photograph but rather on the clerk's recognition of the defendant from the time of the robbery. Anderson v. State, 311 Ga. App. 732, 716 S.E.2d 813 (2011).

Defendant did not show ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant failed to establish prejudice resulting from the defense counsel's failure to file pretrial motions regarding identification. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Trial counsel's failure to object when the prosecutor asked a police officer if the defendant was the person in the surveillance video and the officer said yes did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel testified that it was a strategic decision made based on counsel's opinion that counsel would lose credibility by making such an objection. Spinks v. State, 322 Ga. App. 387, 745 S.E.2d 653 (2013).

Failure to raise inconsistent verdict issue.

- Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise an inconsistent verdict issue before the trial court as Georgia did not recognize the inconsistent verdict rule. Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to the jury verdict after the jury found the defendant guilty of burglary and not guilty of the underlying charge of criminal damage to property; Georgia does not recognize an inconsistent verdict rule, which would permit a defendant to challenge the factual findings underlying a guilty verdict on one count as inconsistent with the findings underlying a not guilty verdict on a different count. Ursulita v. State, 307 Ga. App. 735, 706 S.E.2d 123 (2011).

Failure to comply with reciprocal discovery.

- Because any error in the trial court's exclusion of the evidence of the male victim's prior convictions was harmless, the defendant's trial counsel could not have been found ineffective due to an alleged failure to comply with reciprocal discovery. Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, 287 Ga. App. 872, 652 S.E.2d 891 (2007).

Defendant had not shown that counsel was ineffective for not engaging in reciprocal discovery under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1. The defendant offered no evidence that counsel was unprepared or unaware of the salient evidence before trial and had not shown that the outcome would have been different had counsel opted into discovery. Anuforo v. State, 293 Ga. App. 1, 666 S.E.2d 50 (2008).

Premature filing of notice of alibi.

- In an armed robbery prosecution, trial counsel was not ineffective for disclosing the defendant's alibi defense before the prosecution filed a demand for notice of alibi under O.C.G.A. § 17-16-5(a) because counsel knew that such a demand was going to be filed, and the defendant was not prejudiced by the premature disclosure. Fuller v. State, 295 Ga. App. 439, 672 S.E.2d 438 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0749, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 220 (Ga. 2009).

Failure to object to order appointing judge.

- Defendant's claim that an order appointing a senior judge to preside over defendant's trial was insufficient under O.C.G.A § 15-1-9.2(b) was not timely filed given it was filed after the motion for a new trial. Furthermore, counsel's failure to object to the appointment of the judge did not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel. Strozier v. State, 277 Ga. 78, 586 S.E.2d 309 (2003).

Defendant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to an order appointing a judge because defendant failed to show that defendant was denied a fair trial by virtue of the appointment order; defendant did not satisfy the prejudice component of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object that the order appointing a trial judge had expired by the time the defendant went to trial on a cocaine trafficking charge because the defendant failed to establish that the expiration of the order in any way denied the defendant a fair trial. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 854, 670 S.E.2d 506 (2008).

Failure to request bench trial.

- Defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because the defendant never stated that the defendant wanted a bench trial and the counsel's decision to try the child molestation case before a jury was plainly strategic. Iles v. State, 278 Ga. App. 895, 630 S.E.2d 148 (2006).

Failure to file motion to suppress evidence.

- Because the information in an affidavit provided the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for issuing the search warrant, a motion to suppress the search warrant would have been futile; accordingly, defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective. Jarrett v. State, 299 Ga. App. 525, 683 S.E.2d 116 (2009).

No obligation to file meritless motions.

- When the defendant's trial counsel did not move for a mistrial after hearsay was admitted and the court on appeal determined such evidence was properly admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule, the failure to move for a mistrial did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because such a motion would have been meritless; furthermore, when defendant's counsel failed to object to the defendant's exclusion during jury selection and the court on appeal determined that the defendant had waived the right to be present during jury selection because of the defendant's disruptive behavior, the failure to object to the defendant's removal did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because such a motion would have been meritless. Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga. App. 690, 586 S.E.2d 386 (2003).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a meritless motion for a directed verdict because the evidence established that the defendant was guilty of both armed robbery and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and failing to object to an officer's opinion testimony identifying the defendant in a store security videotape, because the defendant's identification did not rest entirely on the videotape identification since a custodian identified the defendant in a pretrial photographic lineup. Bryson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 512, 729 S.E.2d 631 (2012).

Defendant was not rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress a stop of defendant's car when that motion was meritless; the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of defendant's criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop of defendant's car when the officer received information from a known, law-abiding, and concerned citizen, who testified at trial and who, on the day in question, had the opportunity to personally observe the defendant's suspicious activities. Saxon v. State, 266 Ga. App. 547, 597 S.E.2d 608 (2004).

Defendant was unable to show that the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective because: (1) the failure to pursue a futile objection with regards to the similar transaction evidence did not constitute ineffective assistance; and (2) two of the reasons that defendant's trial counsel did not object were either that counsel determined that the statement was not objectionable enough or counsel did not want to further highlight the remark. McGuire v. State, 266 Ga. App. 673, 598 S.E.2d 55 (2004).

Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve an objection to the denial of a motion for a mistrial; the motion was based on a deadlocked jury and it was not error to fail to preserve a claim that the jury deliberated without one member present; further, defendant failed to show that the jury deliberated with only 11 members present, so the motion would not have been successful. Brantley v. State, 271 Ga. App. 733, 611 S.E.2d 71 (2005).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as there was no evidence that the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated such that counsel was unable to be effective; defendant failed to show that counsel was deficient in failing to file a motion to withdraw or that there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different but for the alleged deficiency. Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 213, 614 S.E.2d 834 (2005).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel disregarded defendant's request that counsel file a motion to recuse the trial judge because there were no grounds for recusing the trial judge; defendant could not show either deficient performance or prejudice. Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 213, 614 S.E.2d 834 (2005).

Defendant did not show that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by not filing discovery motions because the state had an open file policy and a hearing was held on counsel's objection to the admission of defendant's pre-Miranda statement to the police, so no prejudice was shown. Brown v. State, 273 Ga. App. 577, 615 S.E.2d 628 (2005).

Because the victim's passing reference to "all of the really bad things that have happened to me in my life" and the testimony of the victim's grandmother that the victim's mother had been unable to raise the victim because of the mother's drug problems, did not represent victim impact statements, as neither addressed the impact of the crime at issue, trial counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing to object to the testimony, as any objection to the testimony would have been meritless. Anthony v. State, 282 Ga. App. 457, 638 S.E.2d 877 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit as: (1) the defendant failed to give any specific examples of prejudice; (2) the defendant, after consultation with counsel, testified freely and voluntarily; and (3) any objections counsel might have made to a videotaped statement would have lacked merit as those statements included evidence of prior difficulties, admissible without notice and without the need for a pretrial hearing; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial on those grounds. Campbell v. State, 282 Ga. App. 854, 640 S.E.2d 358 (2006).

Trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal was proper with respect to the defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 6 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to object to testimony by a probation officer, as the officer's statement that under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-2(a)(3), the defendant did not have to register as a sex offender if the defendant was afforded treatment as a first offender was a correct statement of law at the time; accordingly, counsel's failure to object thereto was not ineffectiveness, as any such objection would have lacked merit. Ethridge v. State, 283 Ga. App. 289, 641 S.E.2d 282 (2007).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal as such failed to show any meritorious ground, and the defendant's failure to timely file an appeal did not result from the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as it was apparent from the transcript of the plea hearing that the issues sought to be raised in the out-of-time appeal completely lacked merit. Hicks v. State, 281 Ga. 836, 642 S.E.2d 31 (2007).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of entrapment in a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the defendant was not entrapped by law enforcement and the defendant did not admit to committing the charged crimes. Therefore, counsel was not required to make a motion that was without merit. Logan v. State, 309 Ga. App. 95, 709 S.E.2d 302, cert. denied, No. S11C1101, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 579; cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 823, 181 L. Ed. 2d 533 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to pre-autopsy photographs of murder victims; each of the photographs was relevant to some point of a forensic pathologist's testimony, and thus the photographs were admissible. Conway v. State, 281 Ga. 685, 642 S.E.2d 673 (2007).

Testimony by an officer about inconsistencies between the defendant's statements did not amount to improper bolstering or comment on the defendant's veracity; thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to them. Gonzalez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (2007).

A witness's testimony about statements made by the defendant during the commission of the battery would have been admissible as res gestae, even if they related to previous crimes; thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it. McClain v. State, 284 Ga. App. 187, 643 S.E.2d 273 (2007).

Because a pre-trial motion to quash was not the proper method to attack an indictment for any defect not appearing on its face, and the defendant did not argue that there was a defect on the face of the indictment justifying a motion to quash, but instead counsel attacked the validity of the protective order supporting the indictment through both an original and renewed motion for directed verdict, trial counsel was not ineffective. Shafer v. State, 285 Ga. App. 748, 647 S.E.2d 274 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1498, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 642 (Ga. 2007).

Meritless objection to evidence not required.

- In a case involving sexual offenses against a child, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection to evidence of the defendant's prior arrest for assault and battery against the victim's mother; the evidence was properly admitted to explain the victim's delay in reporting the crime. Borders v. State, 285 Ga. App. 337, 646 S.E.2d 319 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1374, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 640 (Ga. 2007).

Because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection to the introduction of evidence that was deemed relevant, and none of the prosecutor's closing remarks were objectionable in the manner alleged by the defendant on appeal, trial counsel was not found to be ineffective. Williamson v. State, 285 Ga. App. 779, 648 S.E.2d 118 (2007).

Defense counsel's failure to demur to the indictment and to request an additional limiting instruction concerning properly admitted similar transaction evidence did not amount to deficient performance, as those actions would have been unavailing and the outcome of the trial would not have been different but for counsel's alleged omissions. May v. State, 287 Ga. App. 407, 651 S.E.2d 510 (2007).

Rape conviction was upheld on appeal as the defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on defense counsel's failure to object to certain testimony from the victim about the defendant's history of selling drugs and failure to subpoena certain medical records, as: (1) testimony from the victim that the defendant gave the victim drugs before some of the sexual encounters between them was admissible as part of the res gestae; and (2) the medical records were generally consistent with the victim's testimony, and therefore no prejudice resulted from failing to subpoena them. Mitchell v. State, 287 Ga. App. 517, 651 S.E.2d 821 (2007).

Defendant had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel since the stop and search of the defendant's vehicle were authorized by information that the car was stolen, and thus a motion contesting the stop would have been futile, and the defendant had not shown how additional time spent with counsel prior to trial would have benefitted the defendant's defense; also, the defendant in arguing that defense counsel had failed to interview potential witnesses had not identified any witness or proffered testimony that would have been favorable to the defense, and counsel's choice to argue that marijuana did not belong to the defendant instead of arguing that the substance was not marijuana was a strategic decision. King v. State, 287 Ga. App. 375, 651 S.E.2d 496 (2007).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the defendant's initial post-trial counsel's performance lacked merit, as counsel was neither professionally deficient nor prejudicial because: (1) the defendant waived any right to be present at the two juror interviews; (2) no deficiency could result from counsel's failure to raise meritless objections; and (3) the trial court specifically found that the defendant adequately understood the nature of the charges, comprehended the proceedings, despite being under the influence of prescribed anti-depressants, and was capable of aiding the defense. Hampton v. State, 282 Ga. 490, 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007).

Because the defendant failed to show that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and the objections the defendant claimed should have been made were deemed meritless, counsel could not be found to be ineffective. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for armed robbery and other crimes, the defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel from failure to: (1) adequately prepare the defendant for trial; (2) keep the defendant adequately updated with respect to issues relevant to the defense; and (3) discuss post-trial motions; the defendant failed to meet the burden of proving that any such alleged deficiency prejudiced the defendant in any manner. Defense counsel's failure to file a written motion to sever would have been pointless, as the trial court had considered the defense's oral motion; there was no evidence in the record that other witnesses existed that could have been called on the defendant's behalf; and trial counsel did not represent the defendant with regard to the defendant's motion for a new trial, therefore, the alleged failure of trial counsel to prepare the defendant for the motion for new trial hearing could not have constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for not using the word "pretextual" in making Batson challenges. Although counsel did not use the word "pretextual," counsel sought to rebut the prosecutor's explanations by arguing either that the strike was not race-neutral or that, considering the totality of the jury's responses to questions on voir dire examination, there was no factual basis for the strike. Nelson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (2008).

A defendant had not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to give certain pretrial notices. The trial court had not excluded the evidence based on counsel's failure to comply with court rules; moreover, there was no prejudice because a witness had testified at trial as to the evidence the defendant claimed that counsel should have introduced. Nelson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (2008).

Defense counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict did not constitute ineffective assistance because the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for armed robbery; therefore, defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict and counsel's failure to move for the directed verdict did not entitle the defendant to a new trial. The failure of counsel to pursue a meritless motion did not constitute ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Range v. State, 289 Ga. App. 727, 658 S.E.2d 245 (2008).

Trial counsel's delay in pursuing a defendant's motion for new trial after the defendant was convicted of felony murder did not result in a denial of the defendant's due process rights and did not constitute ineffective assistance as the record showed that much of the ten-year delay between the filing of the motion for new trial and the motion's resolution was due to the defendant's own inaction after counsel advised the defendant that counsel did not intend to pursue the motion for new trial or any other appellate process because counsel was unable to discern any error or merit to an appeal. Browning v. State, 283 Ga. 528, 661 S.E.2d 552 (2008).

Because defendant neither asked for corrective action nor moved for a mistrial after the trial court's finding that a juror did not fall asleep, counsel was not ineffective because any objection or motion on the subject would have been unmeritorious. Peterson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 128, 668 S.E.2d 544 (2008).

While a juror initially stated during voir dire that the juror was unsure if the juror could be unbiased, but later stated the juror would try to be impartial and would follow the trial court's instructions, defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to strike the juror for cause as such a motion would have been denied. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899 (2008).

Even assuming that defense counsel's failure to move for a mistrial following a comment by the State of Georgia was deficient, the defendant did not show ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant did not show that a mistrial would have been granted had counsel done so. Baker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 884, 706 S.E.2d 214 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C0940, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 517 (Ga. 2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial when a state's witness interjected bad character evidence because the witness's improper remarks were fleeting, unsolicited, and nonresponsive to the prosecutor's examination questions, and since the defendant did not show that the defendant was otherwise entitled to a mistrial based upon the circumstances, trial counsel's failure to pursue a meritless motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; the trial court sustained the objections to the improper testimony and instructed the prosecutor and witness to restrict the examination and responses, the witness and prosecutor complied with the trial court's instructions, and there was no further mention of the bad character evidence. Boatright v. State, 308 Ga. App. 266, 707 S.E.2d 158 (2011).

Trial counsel's failure to renew a non-meritorious motion for directed verdict provided no ground for claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 711 S.E.2d 660 (2011).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial, based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, because, even assuming that two jurors saw the defendant in shackles and handcuffs as the jurors returned from lunch, it could not have been presumed that the jury was unfairly tainted by the defendant's appearance as the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. Furthermore, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial, based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, because there was no fatal variance between the indictment that alleged that the defendant committed armed robbery by use of a pellet pistol and evidence that showed that the weapon used was a BB gun. Because no fatal variance existed, the defendant's assertion that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failure to raise the issue on appeal also failed as the issue of variance was without merit. Jones v. State, 312 Ga. App. 15, 717 S.E.2d 526 (2011).

Trial counsel's failure to raise a novel legal argument, that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-43 was unconstitutionally vague, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Washington v. State, 271 Ga. App. 764, 610 S.E.2d 692 (2005).

Missed deadlines.

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by missing the deadline for disclosing a witness's written statement as defendant personally chose to proceed with the trial without the witness and defendant could not argue that the state should have requested a continuance instead of defendant. Clark v. State, 271 Ga. App. 534, 610 S.E.2d 165 (2005).

Failure to show defendant discovery.

- In denying the defendant a new trial, the trial court expressly found that trial counsel was not ineffective, specifically finding that: (1) counsel's decision not to provide the defendant with a copy of the discovery was based on the fact that the defendant could not read and was going to rely on someone else at the jail to read the documents, and that counsel was concerned that showing the discovery to another inmate might produce a "snitch;" and (2) prior to trial, counsel spent two and a half hours with the defendant going over the state's evidence. Hence, the trial court concluded that counsel had a good reason for not giving the defendant a copy of the discovery, and that counsel was exceptionally effective in representing the defendant's interests. White v. State, 281 Ga. 20, 635 S.E.2d 720 (2006).

Failure to disclose and use excuplatory evidence.

- In a case in which defendant claimed mistaken identity and there was no question that defendant's dental records would have disproved the state's argument that defendant might have acquired the gold teeth after a robbery and would have corroborated the impeached and biased testimony of the defense witnesses, defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose the exculpatory evidence after opting in to reciprocal discovery and failed to use the evidence; because there was a reasonable possibility that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different, defendant was entitled to a new trial. Gibbs v. State, 270 Ga. App. 56, 606 S.E.2d 83 (2004).

Time with a client.

- Counsel was not ineffective for insufficiently reviewing the state's discovery with the defendant, as there was no magic amount of time the counsel had to spend in actual conference with a client, nor did the defendant show how additional communications with counsel would have changed the trial's outcome. Giddens v. State, 276 Ga. App. 353, 623 S.E.2d 204 (2005).

Defendant was not afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel met with the defendant 15 to 20 times prior to trial, investigated all leads provided by the defendant, spoke with numerous witnesses and potential witnesses, including the minor molestation victim's grandmother, brothers, great aunts, and mother, as well as all other witnesses the defendant mentioned, and reviewed the victim's videotaped interview with authorities. Iles v. State, 278 Ga. App. 895, 630 S.E.2d 148 (2006).

On remand, a Georgia trial court properly found that the defendant did not receive the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as the record clearly showed that counsel: (1) met with the defendant to prepare for trial and go over discovery; (2) met with the prosecutor to discuss the case; (3) discussed legal issues and possible defenses with the defendant; and (4) properly decided to withhold copies of documents from the defendant, who was incarcerated, out of an abundance of caution that other inmates would steal them, learn the details of the case, and then offer to testify against the defendant in order to receive preferable treatment. Williams v. State, 281 Ga. 196, 637 S.E.2d 25 (2006).

Defendant did not show ineffective assistance of counsel during the defendant's trial for armed robbery and other crimes on the ground that the defense attorney only met with the defendant once before the trial; there existed no magical amount of time which counsel was required to spend in actual conference with a client, and more importantly, the defendant did not describe how additional pre-trial communications would have changed the outcome of the trial and therefore failed to establish that the defense was prejudiced. Metoyer v. State, 282 Ga. App. 810, 640 S.E.2d 345 (2006).

Defendant failed to establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to confer meaningfully with the defendant because the defendant did not specifically describe how additional communications with counsel could have changed the outcome of the trial; there exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with a client. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 542, 712 S.E.2d 851 (2011).

Time to prepare for trial.

- Because defendant's attorneys did not move for a continuance and obtain a longer time to prepare the case, because they allowed irrelevant or otherwise illegal evidence to be admitted without objection, because they relied solely on the statement of the defendant to the jury without introducing testimony, and because they themselves did not actively pursue the motion for new trial are not matters which would constitute a denial of the right to due process, but at most would amount to alleged negligence or errors of judgment. Wilcoxon v. Aldredge, 193 Ga. 661, 19 S.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 626, 63 S. Ct. 36, 87 L. Ed. 506 (1942).

When counsel was appointed to the case approximately two weeks before the defendant's trial was scheduled to begin, the counsel had only a short period of time in which to prepare for this case, counsel had duties in other courts, and counsel's mother's illness occupied a great deal of counsel's out-of-court time, the defendant was not given effective assistance of counsel. Cochran v. State, 262 Ga. 106, 414 S.E.2d 211 (1992).

Defendant did not show defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel was not prepared for trial since defendant did not point to any instances in the record that reflected counsel's lack of preparedness. Berry v. State, 262 Ga. App. 375, 585 S.E.2d 679 (2003).

When defense counsel admitted, at a hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, that counsel could have done more to prepare defendant's case, defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant did not show that counsel's additional investigation would have caused a different verdict in defendant's trial. Parker v. State, 274 Ga. App. 347, 617 S.E.2d 625 (2005).

Defendant did not show the prejudice required for ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice was not presumed as counsel did not entirely fail to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; counsel presented a coherent theory of voluntary manslaughter and mutual combat, and testified to extensive preparation for trial, including several meetings with defendant totaling over 13 hours, as well as other meetings with defendant's family. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel as defendant did not specify how trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial or how defendant was prejudiced. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. App. 544, 623 S.E.2d 725 (2005).

Counsel, who spent one full work week and two weekends preparing for the trial, met with defendant three times to discuss trial strategy, talked to each witness, and read every police report and statement included in the state's file and outlined and compared them to prepare for trial, was not ineffective; even assuming, arguendo, that trial counsel was inadequately prepared, defendant failed to show prejudice. Robertson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 231, 626 S.E.2d 206 (2006).

Defendant also failed to establish the claim that the attorney was ineffective in asking for a continuance to prepare for trial since, even if defendant's attorney should have proceeded to trial unprepared, in order to try to force the state to comply with a deadline imposed by a habeas decision, defendant failed to show prejudice as there was no evidence that the state would not have been able to satisfy the deadline. Fortson v. State, 280 Ga. 435, 629 S.E.2d 798 (2006).

Defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in a rape charge after: trial counsel testified that trial counsel met with defendant many times; hired an investigator who interviewed every relevant witness, including one who, contrary to defendant's claim, did not corroborate defendant's claim of consensual sex with the victim; and that defense counsel went over everything with defendant; defendant pointed to nothing in the record indicating that trial counsel was not prepared for trial or did not understand the facts or law pertaining to the case; defense counsel's failure to file a motion in limine to prohibit the use of the term "rape" did not constitute ineffective assistance; and other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were unpreserved since defendant failed to raise them in the motion for a new trial. Nguyen v. State, 279 Ga. App. 129, 630 S.E.2d 636 (2006).

Defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied as trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to prepare notes and questions for use during direct and cross-examination; the defendant did not show how any alleged deficiency prejudiced the defendant's case. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 870, 635 S.E.2d 259 (2006).

Although the defendant alleged on appeal that trial counsel should have interviewed additional witnesses, conducted a more thorough investigation, presented the defendant's medical record, and discussed further developments, defenses, and the defendant's right to appeal, the defendant failed to present any evidence to support those claims; further, the defendant's testimony at a hearing on the motion to withdraw a guilty plea simply presented a matter of witness credibility, which was for the trial court to decide. Foster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 584, 636 S.E.2d 759 (2006).

Trial counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to sufficiently investigate or attempt to understand the facts and law upon which the various charges were based; trial counsel had significant previous experience with child molestation cases such as the defendant's, and the defendant failed to point to any specific evidence in the record demonstrating that trial counsel was unprepared or did not understand the case. Mikell v. State, 281 Ga. App. 739, 637 S.E.2d 142 (2006).

Appellate court rejected the defendant's contention that trial counsel was ineffective: (1) in failing to investigate another molestation charge filed against the defendant; (2) by failing to interview the defendant's mother; (3) in not investigating the state's failure to obtain a warrant to determine whether the defendant's computer contained or could access pornographic material; (4) by referring to the defendant's prior criminal record on DUI charges; (5) in introducing several letters from the defendant's daughter into evidence; and (6) by characterizing the defendant in closing argument as guilty of drunken and boorish behavior, as the trial court was authorized to believe counsel's testimony regarding counsel's sufficient preparation for trial, and finding that without a proffer of evidence concerning the defendant's computer, the defendant could not show a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial on grounds that trial counsel was ineffective. Carey v. State, 281 Ga. App. 816, 637 S.E.2d 757 (2006).

Although a defendant asserted that certain statements by the defendant's trial counsel about inadequate time to review discovery materials provided by the prosecution indicated that the trial counsel was insufficiently prepared for the defendant's malice murder trial, no ineffective assistance of counsel was shown; the trial court noted on the motion for a new trial that the record showed that trial counsel had reviewed the material provided by the prosecution, had investigated the case, had filed and argued pre-trial motions, and had adequate time to prepare for trial, and the defendant did not point out any occurrence at trial that demonstrated a lack of preparation. Green v. State, 281 Ga. 322, 638 S.E.2d 288 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on counsel's failure to call certain witnesses on the defendant's behalf and failure to adequately meet with the defendant to prepare for trial were rejected as the defendant presented nothing more than bare allegations that trial counsel should have acted differently; the defendant did not identify the potential witnesses, proffer their testimony, indicate what other steps counsel might have taken, or indicate how additional preparation would have altered the outcome of the trial. Hinkle v. State, 282 Ga. App. 328, 638 S.E.2d 781 (2006).

Defendant's defense attorney did not provide ineffective assistance in the defendant's child molestation trial by failing to prepare adequately; the record supported a finding that the attorney's preparation was not deficient because the attorney testified to spending 70 to 100 hours preparing for the trial, including filing pre-trial motions, reviewing the state's file on the case, interviewing witnesses, discussing defenses with the defendant, conveying a negotiated plea offer to the defendant, and pursuing a defense that a different perpetrator had committed the offenses against the victim. Wheat v. State, 282 Ga. App. 655, 639 S.E.2d 578 (2006).

Because the defendant was unable to establish prejudice resulting from trial counsel's alleged shortcomings, specifically that counsel was unprepared for trial, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked merit. Bradford v. State, 287 Ga. App. 50, 651 S.E.2d 356 (2007).

Defendant did not meet the defendant's burden to demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently by failing to explain the risks of retaining new counsel on the eve of the defendant's trial as counsel testified that counsel interviewed all of the witnesses; met with the defendant the day before trial and for one or two hours on the morning of trial; and believed counsel had plenty of time to prepare for the misdemeanor trial. As the trial court was entitled to credit counsel's testimony and disbelieve the defendant's, it was authorized to find that counsel was adequately prepared. Bagley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 513, 680 S.E.2d 565 (2009).

Defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective due to counsel's alleged failure to adequately prepare the case and consult with the defendant prior to trial, although there were two public defenders that represented the defendant during the criminal proceedings, there was testimony from the second public defender that the case had been fully investigated and was ready to be tried, and that there was no reason to pursue further defenses. Simmons v. State, 309 Ga. App. 369, 710 S.E.2d 193 (2011).

Defendant did not show that trial counsel was unprepared for trial on the ground that counsel received thousands of pages of medical records shortly before trial because the defendant failed to establish that the receipt of the medical records shortly before trial was counsel's fault, and to the extent counsel's preparation was affected thereby, that preparation did not constitute deficient performance on counsel's part. Eskew v. State, 309 Ga. App. 44, 709 S.E.2d 893 (2011).

Total failure to prepare for trial required a disposition that there was evidence of ineffectiveness so pervasive that a particularized inquiry into prejudice would be unguided speculation. Cochran v. State, 262 Ga. 106, 414 S.E.2d 211 (1992).

Upon the state's appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(7), the appeals court found that the defendant was properly granted a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, given counsel's failure to interview any of the state's witnesses, present a viable defense to the charge of involuntary manslaughter, and adequately investigate whether the victim's death might have been an accident. State v. McMillon, 283 Ga. App. 671, 642 S.E.2d 343 (2007).

Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the defendant's attorney's lack of preparation for trial and failure to present a defense; at trial, the defense called no witnesses and presented no other evidence on the defendant's behalf, and trial counsel's belief as to what testimony that witnesses proposed by the defendant might offer was formulated without the attorney ever having contacted those witnesses. Johnson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 147, 643 S.E.2d 556 (2007).

Failure to prepare defendant adequately for trial.

- Defendant failed to show that defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately prepare the defendant for trial because trial counsel testified that counsel met with the defendant at least four times prior to trial to discuss the case, and the defendant failed to demonstrate how additional time with counsel would have changed the outcome of defendant's case; trial counsel testified that counsel believed that counsel and the Spanish interpreters counsel used were able to effectively communicate with the defendant and that the defendant never gave counsel any indication that defendant was unable to understand Spanish. Cruz v. State, 305 Ga. App. 805, 700 S.E.2d 631 (2010).

Defendant, in the absence of a proffer showing how further preparation would have changed the defendant's testimony such that it would have affected the outcome of the case, could not meet the defendant's burden of making an affirmative showing that specifically demonstrated how defense counsel's failure to have properly prepared the defendant for cross-examination would have affected the outcome of the defendant's case. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Duty of defense counsel to fully investigate case.

- Counsel for a defendant not only has the right, but it is counsel's plain duty towards the client, to investigate the case fully and to interview any persons who might be able to assist counsel in ascertaining the truth concerning the event in controversy. Wilson v. State, 93 Ga. App. 229, 91 S.E.2d 201 (1956).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial based on the defendant's claim that the defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance as defendant did not show that counsel did not fulfill the duty to fully investigate the defendant's case; the trial court was entitled to believe the attorney's testimony that the attorney went and spoke with neighbors defendant said could provide an alibi and that none of them could do so over defendant's testimony that counsel claimed a lack of time to interview them, and could believe that phone records defendant said would help defendant's case did not exist as the defendant did not provide those records personally or indicate what they contained that would have helped the defendant's case. Roberts v. State, 262 Ga. App. 629, 585 S.E.2d 920 (2003).

Because defendant's own friends and acquaintances could not verify that defendant was at a nightclub on the night of the murder, it was highly questionable that total strangers would be likely to provide any corroboration; thus, under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that the attorney performed effectively because the attorney did an investigation and there was no constitutional or statutory requirement that counsel actually visit the nightclub; therefore, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed. Wicks v. State, 278 Ga. 550, 604 S.E.2d 768 (2004).

Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to conduct a proper pretrial investigation as defendant failed to show that a grand juror was not qualified because the grand juror was a convicted felon; further, even if a grand juror was the father of a prosecution witness, defendant failed to show prejudice as the disqualification of a grand juror under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-70 was not a viable ground for quashing an indictment. Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Trial counsel for an inmate provided ineffective assistance because the counsel did not adequately investigate a factual defense to the crimes or obtain available testimony confirming their client's own statements that other people committed the crimes and threatened to harm the inmate for speaking up, and witnesses discovered by habeas counsel showing that another person: (1) possessed the victims' van about the time of the murder; (2) was seen, along with another person, about that time, to be acting strangely; (3) had what appeared to be bloodstains on that person's clothes; and (4) was distributing quarters after the victims, who ran a coin-operated laundry, had been abducted and killed. Terry v. Jenkins, 280 Ga. 341, 627 S.E.2d 7 (2006).

Because: (1) defendant failed to show that prejudice by the attorney's failure to view a surveillance tape or tender it into evidence; (2) defendant's contention that the counsel could have done more to prepare for trial and aid in the defense was mere speculation; (3) counsel advised defendant on the possible penalties; and (4) defendant failed to clarify what constitutional rights were involved and how counsel's failure to advise caused harm, counsel could not be deemed ineffective. Navarro v. State, 279 Ga. App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to obtain certain forensic evidence and for failing to investigate the case; trial counsel's conduct in failing to obtain the forensic evidence was reasonable in light of counsel's fear that it would link the defendant to the evidence, and, contrary to the defendant's claim, defense counsel investigated the case by interviewing witnesses, visiting the crime scene, and reviewing the hospital records and all of the police reports. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 64, 635 S.E.2d 358 (2006).

Defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied since defense counsel was not ineffective in: (1) failing to investigate the victim's reputation for violence and introduce evidence of that victim's prior violent acts; (2) failing to investigate the defendant's medical records; (3) failing to investigate a state witness's convictions for crimes of moral turpitude and request an impeachment charge concerning that witness; (4) advising defendant not to testify; and (5) failing to present evidence or argument at sentencing. Cross v. State, 285 Ga. App. 518, 646 S.E.2d 723 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 680 (Ga. 2007).

Defendant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to adequately investigate; although the defendant claimed that trial counsel failed to interview certain individuals, the defendant made no proffer of their expected testimony other than a general assertion that counsel would have discovered valuable information had counsel done so, and there was no showing that the evidence contained in certain records would have been relevant and favorable to the defendant. Brooks v. State, 286 Ga. App. 209, 648 S.E.2d 724 (2007).

The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on appeal from the defendant's convictions of child molestation and aggravated child molestation because: (1) venue was adequately shown by the testimony of a single witness; (2) the defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to prepare for trial, investigate the case, subpoena important documents, interview key witnesses, and object to damaging testimony; and (3) the defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel's alleged shortcomings. Brooks v. State, 286 Ga. App. 209, 648 S.E.2d 724 (2007).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on appeal from the defendant's convictions of child molestation and aggravated child molestation because: (1) venue was adequately shown by the testimony of a single witness; (2) the defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to prepare for trial, investigate the case, subpoena important documents, interview key witnesses, and object to damaging testimony; and (3) the defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel's alleged shortcomings. Brooks v. State, 286 Ga. App. 209, 648 S.E.2d 724 (2007).

Defendant failed to establish that defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel with regard to defendant's drug-related convictions as, although defendant successfully met the burden of showing that defense counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness due to defense counsel failing to advise defendant about all of the evidence in the state's case against defendant due to defense counsel failing to examine the state's open file, defendant failed to establish but for defense counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, namely that defendant would not have accepted the state's plea offer. Cleveland v. State, 290 Ga. App. 835, 660 S.E.2d 777 (2008).

As the defendant did not point to any exculpatory evidence or alibi a friend might have provided, the defendant did not establish that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the friend. Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (2009).

Defendant's assertion that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the lighting at an apartment complex failed as the defendant did not demonstrate what an investigation would have shown with respect to the sufficiency of the lighting and how the lighting might have affected the victim's ability to identify the defendant as the person who robbed the victim at gunpoint. Killings v. State, 296 Ga. App. 869, 676 S.E.2d 31 (2009).

Failure to investigate impact of defendant's medical condition.

- Defendant, who was convicted of violating Georgia's Peeping Tom Statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-61, was entitled to a new trial since defendant's counsel failed to investigate the impact of defendant's multiple sclerosis, which might have been sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant acted with the purpose of spying on the victim. Fedak v. State, 304 Ga. App. 580, 696 S.E.2d 421 (2010).

Defendant failed to show that defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to hire an investigator and by failing to interview the victim, the police officers involved, and the fourth male at the scene because trial counsel testified that counsel spoke to several of the investigating officers about the case and to the victim's roommate, who initially contacted the police, and that counsel attempted to locate the fourth male at the scene but was told by the man's family members that the man had left the country; the defendant's argument concerning the alleged failures was foreclosed by defendant's failure to make any proffer of what the allegedly necessary investigations would have uncovered. Cruz v. State, 305 Ga. App. 805, 700 S.E.2d 631 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain and review the tape, transcript, and forensic report for an interview of the defendant's son and the victim's school and medical records because the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if defendant's counsel had obtained and reviewed the information; the differences between the son's first and second interview after a prolonged period of counseling were brought out in the trial, and the school records were unlikely to have had an impact on the outcome of trial. Wade v. State, 305 Ga. App. 382, 700 S.E.2d 827 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3066, 180 L. Ed. 2d 893 (2011).

Defendant failed to meet the defendant's burden of proving deficient performance on the ground that defendant's trial counsel failed to investigate an additional suspect because counsel testified that counsel investigated every person who could have been connected to the case and that counsel also investigated relevant phone records and police files that could have revealed other suspects in the victim's murder; despite counsel's efforts, counsel was unable to connect any additional suspect to the shooting. Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 702 S.E.2d 151 (2010).

Defendant could show no harm due to trial counsel's failure to thoroughly investigate the facts of the case and to interview all potential witnesses because trial counsel testified that the victim and the victim's mother refused to speak to defense counsel, and the defendant did not identify any other witnesses or their potential testimony that should have been presented. Neal v. State, 308 Ga. App. 551, 707 S.E.2d 503 (2011).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because the defendant could not show prejudice with regard to the defendant's assertions that counsel failed to fully investigate the case and call essential witnesses when the defendant made no proffer as to what a thorough investigation would have uncovered or what the essential witnesses would have said. Ware v. State, 307 Ga. App. 782, 706 S.E.2d 143 (2011).

Evidence supported a conclusion that the defendant failed to carry the burden of showing deficient performance or prejudice relating to counsel's preparation for trial because counsel testified that counsel and an investigator had interviewed numerous individuals in connection with the case; the defendant made no proffer as to what a more thorough investigation would have uncovered. Jackson v. State, 310 Ga. App. 476, 713 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because counsel attempted to interview some of the state's witnesses, but some of the witnesses, including the state's main eyewitness, refused to speak to counsel. Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 715 S.E.2d 113 (2011).

Claim that counsel performed deficiently by failing to adequately prepare for trial and failing to investigate potential witnesses failed because two of the witnesses the defendant claimed should have been interviewed testified at trial and a third was interviewed but it was determined that the third witness's testimony would not have established an alibi defense. Griffin v. State, 292 Ga. 321, 737 S.E.2d 682 (2013).

Counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to obtain phone records or a surveillance video that the defendant alleged would have provided the defendant with an alibi because counsel testified that the defendant never told counsel about those items. Riles v. State, 321 Ga. App. 894, 743 S.E.2d 552 (2013).

Pretermitting whether counsel's investigation could be characterized as inadequate, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim still failed because the defendant failed to show that a more thorough investigation would have yielded any significant exculpatory evidence and, thus, the defendant failed to show prejudice. Norton v. State, 293 Ga. 332, 745 S.E.2d 630 (2013).

Failure to research eyewitness identification.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective for not adequately researching the issue of eyewitness identification, since the counsel questioned the witness at length about the witness's opportunity to observe the defendant and the identification, the counsel cross-examined an officer vigorously about the lineup procedure, and the counsel reasonably believed the various scientific theories on eyewitness identification would not help because the defendant had admitted to being at the crime scene. Mobley v. State, 277 Ga. App. 267, 626 S.E.2d 248 (2006).

Failure to admit witnesses pre-trial testimony.

- Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel, despite any deficient performance in counsel's lack of diligence in obtaining witness three's (W3) testimony at trial as the outcome of the trial would not have been different if W3's pre-trial testimony had been admitted since it: (1) would have contradicted the defendant's testimony that witness one (W1) told the victim not to stab the defendant; (2) would have corroborated witnesses one's (W1) and two's (W2) testimony that they did not see the victim stab the defendant; and (3) would not have established that W1 and W2 saw the victim with a knife during the altercation. Hill v. State, 291 Ga. 160, 728 S.E.2d 225 (2012).

Failure to call witness.

- Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel as the attorney concluded that, in its totality, a witness's testimony was more damaging than beneficial to the defense; the decision, after consultation with defendant, not to call the witness was a matter of trial strategy. Nicely v. State, 277 Ga. App. 140, 625 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel to defendant in a case in which defendant was found guilty in a jury trial of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, but was acquitted of trafficking in methamphetamine as the trial counsel's decision not to call two witnesses who could not have provided exculpatory evidence was a tactical decision and did not merit a finding that counsel provided ineffective assistance. Chancellor v. State, 270 Ga. App. 87, 606 S.E.2d 105 (2004).

Defense counsel did not give ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to call certain witnesses as which witnesses to call was in the exclusive province of the attorney, after consultation with the client; defense counsel conferred with defendant after counsel indicated that counsel wanted to call defendant's accomplices as witnesses and explained to defendant that defendant had the right to testify, defendant testified, and the only further mention of the witnesses was by the trial judge, who directed that the witnesses be brought to the courtroom, after which the defense rested, without calling the witnesses. Reynolds v. State, 267 Ga. App. 148, 598 S.E.2d 868 (2004).

Fact that trial counsel failed to subpoena one of the witnesses whose attendance defense counsel could not procure did not show that the trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, as trial counsel's decision may have been tactical and, in any event, defendant did not show that defendant was prejudiced because the evidence so overwhelmingly established defendant's guilt that the testimony of the missing witness would not have affected the outcome. Cain v. State, 277 Ga. 309, 588 S.E.2d 707 (2003), overruled in part by Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320, 627 S.E.2d 587 (2006).

Failure to investigate character witnesses.

- Because the defendant failed to show that any prejudice resulted from trial counsel's failure to investigate potential character witnesses and failure to "re-advise" the defendant of the right to testify following the state's introduction of rebuttal evidence, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial on these grounds. Thomas v. State, 282 Ga. 894, 655 S.E.2d 599 (2008).

Failure to call witness on self-defense.

- When a witness had originally given a statement that supported the defendant's self-defense claim, but later recanted this statement, defense counsel was not ineffective for calling the witness; the defendant had insisted that the witness be called, and doing so at least allowed the jury to hear the witness's original statement. Shelton v. State, 281 Ga. 660, 641 S.E.2d 536 (2007).

Failure to call codefendant.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a codefendant's testimony as an exculpatory witness who would have exonerated the defendant, as such amounted to a strategic decision; moreover, the failure to make a meritless objection to the court's failure to give the defendant's requested charge on accessory after the fact could not be deemed evidence of ineffectiveness. Buruca v. State, 278 Ga. App. 650, 629 S.E.2d 438 (2006).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call the codefendant as a witness because the codefendant was not a consistent witness. Simmons v. State, 289 Ga. 773, 716 S.E.2d 165 (2011).

Defendant's assertion that, under former O.C.G.A. § 17-8-71, defense counsel could have called a witness for impeachment and not lost the right to conclude final arguments, was erroneous; even if defense counsel provided deficient performance in failing to introduce evidence at trial, the defendant failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different but for the alleged deficient performance. Rolland v. State, 280 Ga. 517, 630 S.E.2d 386 (2006).

Because the defendant failed to show that: (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient in failing to call a forensic interviewer as a witness, and that failure prejudiced the defense and would have changed the outcome of the trial; (2) trial counsel's decision not to object to the properly admitted testimony from a forensic interviewer as to the opinion rendered on the victim's intelligence and reactions to certain questions which were consistent with abuse was not ineffective; and (3) the defendant could not show that the failure to call the trial attorney affected the outcome of a motion for a new trial, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims against both trial and appellate counsel lacked merit. Freeman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 185, 638 S.E.2d 358 (2006).

Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in the child molestation case because counsel failed to call witnesses to testify that the victim's mother, to whom the victim had first complained of the alleged molestation, had repeatedly made allegations of molestation that witnesses claimed were false; this was highly relevant, as it impacted upon the victim's credibility and upon the mother's credibility. Goldstein v. State, 283 Ga. App. 1, 640 S.E.2d 599 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0623, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 338 (Ga. 2007).

Appeals court rejected the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call certain witnesses who were associated with the local government, contending that their testimony would have established that the prosecution was politically motivated, absent evidence regarding what their testimony would have been at trial and that such would have affected the outcome. Brown v. State, 285 Ga. App. 453, 646 S.E.2d 289 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1503, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 672 (Ga. 2007).

Failure to present alibi witness.

- In a prosecution against the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4, because the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present an alibi witness, and because the defendant failed to offer evidence that a medical examiner or witnesses from the Department of Family and Child Services would have been favorable to a defense, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit. Herrington v. State, 285 Ga. App. 4, 645 S.E.2d 29 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 548 (Ga. 2007).

Failure to call spouse.

- On appeal from convictions on one count of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of sexual assault, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial as the defendant failed to show that any prejudice resulted from counsel's failure to call the defendant's wife to testify for the defense, and the appeals court refused to speculate that the wife's testimony would have led to an acquittal. Lee v. State, 286 Ga. App. 368, 650 S.E.2d 320 (2007).

Failure to call future spouse.

- Defendant did not show prejudice from trial counsel's failure to call the defendant's future spouse and the future spouse's sibling as character witnesses. Even if counsel's decision could be considered unreasonable, the evidence supported a finding that both persons were biased toward the defendant; given this finding, the trial court was authorized to conclude that introduction of the character evidence likely would not have made a difference at trial. Gresham v. State, 295 Ga. App. 449, 671 S.E.2d 917 (2009).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked merit because while the defendant claimed that the defendant's love interest should have been called as a witness, the defendant did not present the love interest's testimony at the hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial and, thus, the defendant could not demonstrate that any prejudice resulted from the love interest's absence at the trial. Crawford v. State, 297 Ga. App. 187, 676 S.E.2d 843 (2009).

Because the defendant was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel based on the counsel's failure to call certain witnesses as the testimony that these witnesses would have provided would not have affected the outcome of the trial, and counsel was not ineffective to the extent that the defendant was denied the right to testify at trial, the trial court properly denied the defendant a new trial. Finch v. State, 287 Ga. App. 319, 651 S.E.2d 478 (2007).

In a termination of parental rights matter, trial counsel was not ineffective, as the parent never informed counsel of any evidence or witnesses that would assist the parent's defense and never informed trial counsel or the parent's caseworker that the parent would not be attending the termination hearing. In the Interest of S.B., 287 Ga. App. 203, 651 S.E.2d 140 (2007).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to call a witness who would have testified that the victim fabricated claims of molestation as: (1) the witness did not inform counsel of the witness before trial; (2) counsel articulated valid reasons for not calling the witness; (3) counsel challenged the state's evidence, arguing that the claims were fabricated; and (4) the defendant failed to show that any prejudice resulted from counsel's actions. Noe v. State, 287 Ga. App. 728, 652 S.E.2d 620 (2007).

Defendant did not show ineffective assistance when trial counsel used a third party's confession to challenge the thoroughness of the police investigation, but instead focused on challenging the voluntariness of the defendant's taped statement. The defendant did not show that this strategic decision was an unreasonable one or that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's decision not to call the third party based on counsel's assessment that the party lacked credibility. Boseman v. State, 283 Ga. 355, 659 S.E.2d 364 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for malice murder, the defendant failed to establish that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a result of trial counsel failing to call certain additional witnesses since at the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial, trial counsel testified that various tactical reasons existed for not calling the various additional witnesses. Ventura v. State, 284 Ga. 215, 663 S.E.2d 149 (2008).

In an armed robbery prosecution, defense counsel was not deficient for not calling alleged alibi witnesses because counsel interviewed the witnesses and deemed the witnesses unhelpful; and as the defendant failed to produce the witnesses at the motion for a new trial, the defendant could not show prejudice or ineffective assistance. Shabazz v. State, 293 Ga. App. 560, 667 S.E.2d 414 (2008).

Defendant, who claimed that counsel was ineffective, did not show that the outcome of the trial would had been different if a certain eyewitness testified. Because the eyewitness stated that the eyewitness did not see who fired the shots in question, because other witnesses testified consistently with the eyewitness's pretrial statement that the defendant had been wrestled to the ground, and because those witnesses added that they saw the defendant fire a gun despite being wrestled to the ground, the defendant did not show that if the eyewitness had testified at trial, there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Savior v. State, 284 Ga. 488, 668 S.E.2d 695 (2008).

If a witness claimed no knowledge of a statement and refused to testify about the statement at a motion for new trial hearing, it could not be assumed the witness would have testified differently or more fully at trial. Defendant failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the result of defendant's trial would have been different, but for counsel's failure to produce the witness at trial. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 249, 671 S.E.2d 268 (2008).

Defendant, who admitted firing a gun to frighten four victims, argued that defense counsel was ineffective for not calling a witness who would have testified that the defendant had not pointed the gun at the victims. As the state, to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, was not required to show that the defendant pointed the gun at the victims, but only that the defendant placed the victims in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving violent injuries, there was not a reasonable probability that, had counsel called this witness, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Hudson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 692, 675 S.E.2d 578 (2009).

There was no ineffectiveness of trial counsel in the defendant's criminal matter as decisions regarding whether to cross-examine a witness or whether to call a witness were within counsel's trial strategy; further, since there was no showing that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel's failure to object or to call a witness, there was no ineffectiveness shown. Christian v. State, 297 Ga. App. 596, 677 S.E.2d 767 (2009).

Failure to call parent.

- Defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure the presence of the defendant's father to testify at trial; however, the defendant did not call the father as a witness at the motion for new trial hearing, and without a proffer, was not able to show that trial counsel performed deficiently in not calling the father as a witness at trial. In any event, the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming, so no prejudice was shown. Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 678 S.E.2d 900 (2009).

Because the defendant made no showing that trial counsel's failure to call the defendant or the defendant's mother as a witness was indicative of ineffectiveness as opposed to a deliberate and reasonable trial strategy, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the defendant had not carried the defendant's burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel; the defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's tactical decision not to call the defendant's mother fell within the broad range of professional conduct, and the defendant failed to show how the witness' testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial when the same evidence the defendant contended the mother would have testified to was admitted through other witnesses. Gibson v. State, 290 Ga. 6, 717 S.E.2d 447 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to depose the defendant's father, a potential alibi-type witness who died prior to trial, as counsel's decision was a reasonable strategy since portions of the father's testimony would not have been beneficial to the defense. Chalk v. State, 318 Ga. App. 45, 733 S.E.2d 351 (2012).

Although the defendant argued that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because, inter alia, counsel failed to locate and call witnesses, the testimony of one of the witnesses was contradictory to the defense theory that the defendant was not at the scene of the incident, and this strategy was reasonable; the defendant thus failed to establish the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Ransom v. State, 298 Ga. App. 360, 680 S.E.2d 200 (2009).

Despite the absence of any physical evidence, the victims' testimonies were sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aggravated child molestation and child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4; counsel's strategic decisions in failing to call impeachment witnesses did not amount to deficient performance. Barnes v. State, 299 Ga. App. 253, 682 S.E.2d 359 (2009).

Trial counsel's performance was not constitutionally flawed because counsel could not be ineffective for failing to interview and call a potential alibi witness of whom counsel was not informed, and the trial court was authorized to credit counsel's testimony regarding the alibi witnesses whose names counsel was given; the defendant did not show that the testimony of the alibi witnesses would have been relevant and favorable because neither alleged alibi witness testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial. McIlwain v. State, 287 Ga. 115, 694 S.E.2d 657 (2010).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because the defendant did not show that trial counsel's failure to further investigate and present testimony constituted deficient performance when the defendant neither identified any relevant witnesses nor put forward any evidence as to the testimony the witnesses would have given. Smith v. State, 303 Ga. App. 831, 695 S.E.2d 86 (2010).

Failure to call victim.

- Trial counsel's tactical decision that the defense would be better served if the victim did not take the witness stand was not deficient because the prosecutor explained in the prosecutor's opening that the state would not call the victim as a witness since the victim's injuries caused short-term memory loss, leaving the victim unable to recall what happened before, during, and after the relevant events, and trial counsel testified that the victim refused to talk to counsel's investigator prior to trial and that the counsel was pleased that the victim would not be a witness since it was better to go to trial without a sympathetic victim; because the defendant did not call the victim as a witness at the motion for new trial hearing or present a legally acceptable substitute for the victim's testimony, it was impossible for the defendant to show prejudice resulting from the victim's absence at trial. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 395, 696 S.E.2d 686 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to confront the victim at trial when counsel testified that counsel did not call the victim to the stand because counsel thought that the victim's testimony would have done more damage than help; the mere existence of a defendant's right to confront a witness at trial cannot be taken to mean that it is always in the defendant's interest to do so. Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 45, 706 S.E.2d 577 (2011).

Failure to call homeless victim.

- Defendant argued that defense counsel performed ineffectively by failing to investigate and learn prior to trial that the homeless victim would not be called by the state to testify. Defendant, however, has failed to show how this alleged deficiency by trial counsel prejudiced the defendant in any way. Thus, the defendant cannot prove that the alleged failure to investigate so prejudiced the defendant that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for that deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (2010).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when defendant's trial counsel failed to call additional witnesses because the defendant did not identify in the defendant's brief, nor did the defendant call to testify at the motion for new trial hearing, any witnesses who could have allegedly added the "material evidence" that the defendant claimed was missing from the defendant's defense. Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 702 S.E.2d 151 (2010).

Defendant did not show that defendant's trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professional judgment in failing to secure the attendance of a witness because counsel had already announced ready for trial based on the defendant's assurance that no witness would come forward for the state, and the defendant did not inform counsel of the witness's existence until the eve of trial; counsel immediately proceeded to interview the witness but did not have sufficient time to procure and serve a subpoena before trial the next day, and the defendant could not demonstrate that the defendant's defense was prejudiced by counsel's failure to secure the witness's attendance at trial because the witness did not testify at the new trial hearing, and no substitute was offered for the witness's testimony. Presley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 528, 705 S.E.2d 870 (2011).

Defendant failed to show that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant did not show that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's performance in that counsel did not call an alibi witness to testify at the hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial or provide a legally recognized substitute for the witness's testimony; the defendant made no affirmative showing that the purported deficiency in counsel's representation was indicative of ineffectiveness, as opposed to being an example of a conscious, deliberate, and reasonable trial strategy. Newsome v. State, 288 Ga. 647, 706 S.E.2d 436 (2011).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call additional witnesses because the defendant failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's tactical decision to forego putting the subject witnesses on the stand was within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct; trial counsel testified that counsel decided not to present the other witnesses because counsel thought that the other witnesses would not "stand up well to cross-examination," that the jury would perceive variances in the testimony, that counsel was worried about credibility issues, and that counsel thought the defendant's "best chance" at establishing an alibi was with "one good clean witness." Smiley v. State, 288 Ga. 635, 706 S.E.2d 425 (2011).

Ineffective assistance of counsel was not shown because a juvenile failed to make an affirmative showing that specifically demonstrated how counsel's failure to investigate and present testimony from an investigator and the victim's friend would have affected the outcome of the juvenile's case. To the extent that the juvenile relied upon trial counsel's testimony to establish the investigator's and the friend's expected statements and to prove that the trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to explore their testimony, such evidence was hearsay and had no probative value. In the Interest of D.M., 308 Ga. App. 589, 708 S.E.2d 550 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to locate and call witnesses who purportedly would have corroborated the defendant's claim that the defendant had a prior, consensual sexual relationship with the victim because the defendant failed to show that the purported deficiency of the defendant's trial counsel prejudiced the defendant's defense, given that the defendant failed to proffer the testimony of any of the alleged potential witnesses at the hearing on the motion for a new trial; because the defendant failed to make such a proffer, it was impossible for the defendant to show that there was a reasonable probability the results of the proceeding would have been different and thus impossible for the defendant to succeed on the ineffective assistance claim. Alvarez v. State, 309 Ga. App. 462, 710 S.E.2d 583 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call a witness to rebut similar transaction evidence at defendant's trial because the purported testimony of the witness was questionable, and trial counsel's tactical decision not to call the witness was not unreasonable. Espinosa v. State, 309 Ga. App. 877, 711 S.E.2d 425 (2011).

Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because, although counsel did not present all three witnesses identified by the defendant as corroborating the defendant's claim of self-defense, counsel did present one witness who established the defendant's claim. Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 715 S.E.2d 113 (2011).

Failure to call police officer.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to subpoena the police officer who took the fourth victim's statement after the robbery in order to show that the fourth victim's trial testimony was inconsistent with the statement provided to the officer as the inconsistency that was alleged, whether the victim was pushed against a fence or pulled to the ground by the robber, was not material to the case. Wickerson v. State, 321 Ga. App. 844, 743 S.E.2d 509 (2013).

Failure to call character witnesses.

- Counsel's decision not to present character witnesses on the defendant's behalf because the defendant had a substantial history of prior burglaries did not amount to ineffective assistance. Riles v. State, 321 Ga. App. 894, 743 S.E.2d 552 (2013).

Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena and present evidence as counsel testified that the single witness presented at the motion for a new trial was not called as a witness because the witness was a negative. Bradley v. State, 322 Ga. App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (2013).

Failure to challenge competency of witness.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective for falling to challenge the competency of child witnesses because both victims were asked to demonstrate their understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie and both stated that they would tell the truth; the defendant gave no basis upon which, had defense counsel challenged their competency, the trial court would have ruled the children incompetent to testify, and defense counsel was not required to make a meritless objection. Vaughn v. State, 307 Ga. App. 754, 706 S.E.2d 137 (2011).

Failure to object to cross-examination of defendant.

- In a prosecution for the murder of the defendant's romantic companion, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to cross-examination of the defendant about "the cycle of violence" that occurred in some domestic relationships. As there was evidence that the defendant assaulted the victim in the past, the question was proper and an objection would have been meritless. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 676 S.E.2d 196 (2009).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the state's cross-examination of the defendant because the state's questioning was similar to that which the trial court had already permitted, primarily eliciting specifics regarding the occasions when the defendant spoke to investigating officers, and counsel's strategic decision not to highlight such cumulative information was a legitimate trial strategy that fell within the range of reasonable professional conduct. Kendrick v. State, 287 Ga. 676, 699 S.E.2d 302 (2010).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make an objection regarding the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination because the prosecutor's questions exploring any inconsistencies or omissions concerning the statements that the defendant voluntarily made to the police were proper and the defense counsel was not required to make an objection that lacked merit. Gilyard v. State, 288 Ga. 800, 708 S.E.2d 329 (2011).

Because the prosecutor's question to the defendant on cross-examination was unlikely to be interpreted as a comment on the defendant's silence, the failure of the defendant's trial counsel to object to the question did not constitute deficient performance; the prosecutor's question did not imply that the defendant should have spoken to police officers or other government agents between the arrest and the trial, and, because the defendant did testify at trial, the question could not be construed as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial. Willis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 414, 710 S.E.2d 616 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1356, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2012).

Defendant could not show that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the prosecutor's alleged "testimony" because the record did not support the defendant's assertion that the prosecutor, in posing leading questions to the defendant during cross-examination, "testified" against the defendant. Boatright v. State, 289 Ga. 597, 713 S.E.2d 829 (2011).

Questioning of investigator.

- Trial counsel's questioning of an investigator to show the investigator's bias against the defendant was not ineffective assistance even though it divulged defendant's previous arrest by inspector and the defendant's refusal to give a statement when arrested. Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 793, 499 S.E.2d 642 (1998).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when the lead investigator was allowed to "interpret" the recordings of inmate phone calls by explaining the meaning of certain words and phrases because the investigator's qualifications as a narcotics investigator were established by the investigator's testimony at trial, and the investigator made it clear that the investigator was explaining the meaning of certain slang terms used during the conversations based on the investigator's experience with drug investigations. Lowe v. State, 310 Ga. App. 242, 712 S.E.2d 633 (2011).

Defendant could not complain on appeal about defense counsel's failure to object to an investigator's bolstering of the victim's credibility in a child molestation case, as defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to object; defense counsel elicited the testimony from the witness while on cross-examination, and, as a result, there was no basis for counsel to object to the testimony. Menard v. State, 281 Ga. App. 698, 637 S.E.2d 105 (2006).

Use of alibi witnesses.

- Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when defendant's trial counsel called alibi witnesses who in pretrial interviews told stories that were consistent with the defendant's story that the defendant was not present at the time of the purse snatchings for which the defendant was on trial, but who on cross-examination told stories that were inconsistent, often conflicting, and harmful to the defendant's alibi; the decision to call such witnesses involved a matter of trial strategy and did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Browne v. State, 261 Ga. App. 648, 583 S.E.2d 496 (2003).

Cross-examination of rape victim.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective in counsel's cross-examination of a rape victim, after the victim changed her testimony since: (1) the trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the victim regarding changed testimony; (2) the trial counsel pointed out that the victim had testified just minutes before that she had talked to husband about her testimony; and (3) the trial counsel argued to the jury that the victim's changed testimony was suspect. Johnson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 443, 587 S.E.2d 775 (2003).

Counsel opening door to admission of character evidence.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective in opening the door to the admission of character evidence by cross-examining a detective who executed a search warrant as to whether the defendant lived in the room searched as the examination was a matter of sound trial strategy. Furthermore, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's "Golden Rule" argument as the prosecutor did not improperly argue that the jurors should relive the rape, but properly argued that the jurors should consider how a person could appear calm or even relieved after such a heinous attack. Johnson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 443, 587 S.E.2d 775 (2003).

Examination of witnesses.

- Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at the defendant's trial for malice murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony since the defendant's counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of the state's witnesses, including using prior inconsistent statements to impeach; defense counsel had no reasonable grounds for seeking a change of venue or sequestration of the jurors; and defense counsel had no reasonable basis for believing that a expert would be able to testify as defendant wished. Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 485, 591 S.E.2d 812 (2004).

Habeas court was clearly erroneous in denying the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and in finding that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel since: (1) trial counsel testified that counsel did not know of a potentially exculpatory witness disclosed by the state at the plea hearing; (2) as counsel was not aware of the witness, counsel's failure to explore the possible defense could not have been a matter of trial strategy; (3) the plea transcript showed counsel's apparent anger at the defendant for initially denying the defendant's guilt and thwarting the plea proceedings, which raised questions about the voluntariness of the pleas; and (4) there was a reasonable probability that, had the defendant been advised of the serious problems with the state's case against the defendant, including the existence of the potentially exculpatory witness, the defendant would have insisted on going to trial. Heyward v. Humphrey, 277 Ga. 565, 592 S.E.2d 660 (2004).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in the defendant's attorney's failure to call witnesses to testify to the nature of the defendant's acquaintance with the victim and to impeach the victim's testimony that the victim had never "partied" or smoked marijuana with the defendant as: (1) the proffered testimony went merely to the details of the admitted acquaintance between the defendant and the victim before the incident, not to the facts surrounding the incident itself or the charges against the defendant; (2) the only purpose of the evidence was to impeach the victim's testimony regarding how well the victim knew the defendant, an issue on which trial counsel cross-examined the victim; and (3) the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of the evidence. Joyner v. State, 267 Ga. App. 309, 599 S.E.2d 286 (2004).

Defendant failed to establish that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel was not deficient for failing to call a witness that defendant was not asked to call and there was no error in the trial court for giving more credence to trial counsel's testimony under the circumstances than it did to defendant's evidence of alibi. Davis v. State, 267 Ga. App. 668, 600 S.E.2d 742 (2004).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the introduction of a police officer as a "gang task force" member given the minimal reference to the "gang task force" during voir dire as well as the fact that prosecutors never tried to link the defendant to gang activity; no reasonable probability existed that the jury would have reached a different verdict had counsel objected. Olarte v. State, 273 Ga. App. 96, 614 S.E.2d 213 (2005).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV, during a trial for malice murder and other crimes; defense counsel interviewed the out-of-state witnesses the defendant believed should have testified and determined that their testimony would not have been helpful to the defendant and the counsel made "full discovery" in the case and provided all of it to the defendant. Green v. State, 279 Ga. 455, 614 S.E.2d 751 (2005).

Because the state's questions to a witness were not leading, had answers that were obvious, or were answered by the witness or other witnesses, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. Capers v. State, 273 Ga. App. 427, 615 S.E.2d 126 (2005).

Counsel's failure to make hearsay objections to certain testimony was not ineffective assistance as the first witness's testimony was within the witness's personal knowledge and the other witness's testimony was cumulative of the first witness's testimony; the failure to make a best evidence objection to the admission of an Alabama "Case Action Summary" was not ineffective assistance as a Case Action Summary could be introduced as sufficient proof of a prior felony conviction. Brooks v. State, 273 Ga. App. 691, 615 S.E.2d 829 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not objecting to a witness's testimony because: (1) the testimony fit in with the counsel's reasonable trial strategy; and (2) the witness's comment that the witness went to interview the defendant, without stating whether such an interview was completed, was not an impermissible comment on the defendant's assertion of the right to remain silent. Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga. App. 806, 616 S.E.2d 148 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to withdraw in order to testify as to counsel's conversation with a victim; counsel was permitted to ask the victim about their conversation and the trial court's finding that counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to forego additional, cumulative impeachment of the victim by not withdrawing and remaining as the experienced advocate moving forward with defendant's pending demand for a speedy trial, was not clearly erroneous. Ford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (2005).

Defendant did not show that trial counsel performed deficiently in the defendant's trial on statutory rape and child molestation charges or that any alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense, and, thus, did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel as: (1) the trial court's alleged failure to give a curative instruction regarding a remark a witness made that bolstered the victim's credibility was not error since defense counsel had asked the question to which the remark was made and did not object, which meant the defendant could not challenge the failure to give the instruction as error; and (2) the victim's comment to a witness shortly after the victim had sex with the defendant was admissible as res gestae evidence and, thus, defense counsel could not be ineffective for failing to object to it. Drummond v. State, 275 Ga. App. 86, 619 S.E.2d 784 (2005).

Because counsel's decision to use a witness's testimony to attack the witness's credibility rather than object to the testimony was not patently unreasonable, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; counsel attacked the testimony on cross-examination, pointing out the witness's failure to mention in previous testimony that a woman was at the defendant's house seeking to buy drugs, and indirectly challenging the witness's veracity. Quimbley v. State, 276 Ga. App. 174, 622 S.E.2d 879 (2005).

Counsel was not ineffective at trial as: (1) counsel's method of cross-examining the victim and another witness with a transcript from the preliminary hearing revealed several inconsistencies; (2) counsel did not fail to fully explore how the victim came to identify defendant as the attacker, in spite of the victim's steadfast claims supporting the identification; and (3) counsel's decision to refrain from calling the defendant's doctor as a witness, which was made after consultation with the defendant, was a proper tactical decision. Oliver v. State, 278 Ga. App. 425, 629 S.E.2d 63 (2006).

Since neither trial counsel, defendant, nor any other witness testified at the motion for a new trial hearing, the appellate court had no way of knowing whether counsel interviewed defendant's friend, a potential alibi witness, before trial, and if counsel did, whether the friend confirmed the story that the defendant had concocted; the defendant thus failed to carry the burden of showing either deficient performance or prejudice relating to the allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview the friend before trial. Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected as the defendant's claim that trial counsel was not knowledgeable about the child hearsay statute and failed to highlight the unreliability of the child victim's statement to a nurse was based on mere speculation that a more thorough cross-examination would have altered the outcome at trial. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 884, 635 S.E.2d 240 (2006).

Denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial was proper as the trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by abandoning the questioning of the defendant's housemate regarding the defendant's crying after the defendant's arrest as the decision was a tactical decision that the counsel had succeeded in placing the gist of the housemate's anticipated testimony before the jury, even though the counsel later critiqued the counsel's performance. Temples v. State, 280 Ga. App. 874, 635 S.E.2d 249 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to call any witnesses at the defendant's trial for aggravated assault; the record showed that the proposed witnesses' testimony at the ineffectiveness hearing was contradictory on the issues of where the gun was pointed, whether the defendant was upset, and whether the defendant spoke to the victim, and, although the defendant claimed that counsel did not consult with the defendant about trial strategy until the trial ended, the trial court was authorized to believe trial counsel's testimony. Long v. State, 281 Ga. App. 356, 636 S.E.2d 88 (2006).

In a prosecution for rape, kidnapping, and sodomy, the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel merely because counsel failed to impeach the victim's credibility with evidence concerning a 1996 drug arrest as: (1) that evidence was irrelevant to the circumstances surrounding the defendant's attack on the victim; and (2) the victim never opened the door to an issue of good character. Pierce v. State, 281 Ga. App. 821, 637 S.E.2d 467 (2006).

A defendant had not shown that counsel was ineffective for putting a witness's pretrial statement into evidence: counsel testified that the statement was put into evidence so that the jury could see the inconsistencies between it and the witness's testimony in court, and the portion of the statement describing the defendant as the individual who stabbed the victim in the chest merely echoed the witness's trial testimony. Stanley v. State, 283 Ga. 36, 656 S.E.2d 806 (2008).

Because defense counsel obtained testimony from a codefendant that the codefendant had substantial motivation to testify against the defendant, counsel's failure to ask about specific effects of the codefendant's plea deal was not patently unreasonable. Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, it was unlikely that additional impeachment of the codefendant would have changed the outcome of the trial. Daugherty v. State, 291 Ga. App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 792 (Ga. 2008).

Trial court did not err in concluding that a defendant failed to show that the defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that counsel failed to obtain testimony from one of the state's witnesses because although the defendant claimed on appeal that the witness's testimony would have supported the defendant's defense that the victims were coconspirators, the evidence showed that the defendant did not inform trial counsel that the witness had any information regarding the defendant's prior knowledge of the victims; even if the defendant had made trial counsel aware of such knowledge, the witness's vague recollection was unlikely to have changed the outcome of the case. Brown v. State, 299 Ga. App. 782, 683 S.E.2d 874 (2009).

Defense counsel was not ineffective in asking the codefendant's father if the father told the defendant to hide a gun because defense counsel testified that the testimony was used to shift responsibility to the codefendant; counsel's examination of the father was cumulative of prior testimony elicited by the prosecutor. Chance v. State, 291 Ga. 241, 728 S.E.2d 635 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to interview witnesses because the defendant did not proffer any specific evidence tending to show that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the omissions; the defendant failed to assert or show how any of the potential evidence would have affected the defendant's conviction. Coney v. State, 316 Ga. App. 303, 728 S.E.2d 899 (2012).

Trial counsel's failure to object to three instances of testimony indicating that the defendant was facing charges for "other robberies" at the time of the instant case did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel testified that no objections were made because counsel did not want to bring the jury's attention to the testimony and the decisions were not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made those decisions. Brown v. State, 321 Ga. App. 765, 743 S.E.2d 452 (2013).

Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because the defendant failed to show what evidence might have been revealed if counsel had cross-examined the defendant's cousin about an unrelated indictment to show any bias the cousin might have had to color the cousin's testimony in favor of the state and how it would have produced a different result. Mathis v. State, 293 Ga. 35, 743 S.E.2d 393 (2013).

Trial counsel's decision not to cross-examine two witnesses about certain criminal charges did not amount to ineffective assistance because it could not be said that no reasonable attorney would have decided against attempting to ask about the charges given their limited probative value to show bias and the cross-examination that counsel did conduct. Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 745 S.E.2d 637 (2013).

Obligations of counsel.

- Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to interview witnesses who could have corroborated the defendant's claim that the defendant's encounter with a victim was consensual because the defendant's claim that the two alleged witnesses could corroborate the defendant's defense was not supported by the record; counsel testified that counsel tracked down the female friend who the defendant claimed had given the defendant a ride to the victim's house on the night of the attack and that the friend denied doing so, and counsel testified that counsel attempted to locate the drug dealer who the defendant claimed could corroborate that the defendant and the victim knew each other but that counsel was unable to do so because the defendant only gave counsel the dealer's first name and the name of the apartment complex where the defendant believed the drug dealer lived. Mattox v. State, 305 Ga. App. 600, 699 S.E.2d 887 (2010).

Defendant did not show that defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to procure a witness in support of an alibi defense because trial counsel testified that counsel did not attempt to find the witness since, among other reasons, the defendant did not provide counsel with a last name for the witness; the defendant did not produce any evidence to show that a competent attorney exercising reasonable diligence under the same circumstances would have been able to locate the witness; and no evidence was presented as to what testimony the witness would have given at trial. Miller v. State, 305 Ga. App. 620, 700 S.E.2d 617 (2010).

Defendant juvenile did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel because the defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the defendant's case would have been different if defendant's trial counsel had cross-examined the victim about whether the defendant's use of alcohol affected the defendant's memory of the events; during the defendant's testimony, the defendant admitted that the defendant followed the victim off a train and struck the victim. In the Interest of J. W., 306 Ga. App. 339, 702 S.E.2d 649 (2010).

Failure to obtain additional witness.

- When the defendant alleged the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining an additional witness, but trial counsel testified that the decision to proceed without obtaining the additional witness was made in consultation with the defendant, the trial court properly found that counsel's decision to proceed without the additional witness was not ineffective assistance. Forehand v. State, 270 Ga. App. 365, 606 S.E.2d 589 (2004).

Decision to go to trial without certain witness.

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately advise the defendant of the defendant's options to go to trial without a certain witness or to go to trial later with the witness as the parties and the trial court discussed the subject for more than 60 transcript pages and the trial court clearly outlined the defendant's options more than once; furthermore, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present medical evidence of the defendant's injuries from a gunfight and defendant's hospital stay as the defendant and the defendant's mother testified about the defendant's injuries and the defendant could not show that defendant was prejudiced by the omission. Clark v. State, 271 Ga. App. 534, 610 S.E.2d 165 (2005).

Testimony from mentally retarded victim.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a victim's testimony because the 31-year-old mentally retarded victim was non-responsive on the witness stand as the mother testified that the victim functioned "like a two year old or less"; defendant failed to show prejudice as the mother's testimony established that the victim had no powers of reason, so the additional evidence could not be harmful. Page v. State, 271 Ga. App. 541, 610 S.E.2d 171 (2005).

Alleged failure to understand defendant incompetent.

- Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed as the defendant failed to proffer the necessary evidence to support the defendant's claims that counsel failed to interview witnesses, failed to obtain a9-1-1 tape, failed to attack the credibility of the arresting officer, and failed to understand that the defendant was incompetent. Spear v. State, 271 Ga. App. 845, 610 S.E.2d 642 (2005).

Testimony not hearsay.

- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony that defendant was told that the declarant "didn't want any guy to take off with [the declarant's] 16-year-old daughter"; the testimony was not hearsay as the statement was admitted to show that the defendant was told that the girls were only 16. Ford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (2005).

Counsel's failure to object to testimony of officer.

- Defense counsel's failure to object to an officer's testimony that the defendant said nothing after the defendant was arrested and that sometimes when the officer arrests people they protest, particularly when the officer has arrested the wrong person, was not ineffective assistance of counsel because it was harmless, given the other evidence of the defendant's guilt. Patterson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 341, 618 S.E.2d 81 (2005).

Failure to object to hearsay statement of detective.

- In a prosecution for kidnapping with bodily injury and aggravated assault, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for the defense counsel not to object to the hearsay testimony given by a detective about responses to questions asked of the victim's neighbors about the victim and the victim's husband because the counsel's decision to forego any objection was a matter of trial strategy. Nelson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 548, 629 S.E.2d 410 (2006).

Failure to call witnesses.

- Defendant failed to establish that defense counsel's failure to call two witnesses was ineffective assistance, since, even if one witness had testified as defendant claimed, the defendant did not establish prejudice, as the testimony did not exonerate the defendant, and since counsel's failure to call the second witness was based on a belief that the witness was not credible. Fortson v. State, 280 Ga. 435, 629 S.E.2d 798 (2006).

Questioning on polygraph examination.

- Denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial was affirmed as counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel elicited testimony that the defendant initially agreed to take a polygraph test and then refused to do so because a state's witness had referred to inadmissible evidence supporting the charges other than the victim's statements and counsel proceeded to ask the witness about these conversations as a conscious decision to take the "lesser of the evils" and "deal with it," rather than "make it appear that (counsel was) hiding something"; eliciting inadmissible testimony to address or explain a matter raised by the evidence was a reasonable trial strategy. Ellis v. State, 280 Ga. App. 660, 634 S.E.2d 833 (2006).

Failure to introduce written statements made by victim.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to introduce into evidence certain written statements made by the victim to law enforcement officers and a hospital nurse and statements made by the victim's friend to police that allegedly conflicted with the witnesses' trial testimony; each statement, in addition to contradicting the witnesses' testimony, also contained inculpatory information that stood to further strengthen the state's case, and the defendant called a sheriff's deputy to elicit direct testimony regarding the victim's post-incident statements. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 64, 635 S.E.2d 358 (2006).

Failure to adequately cross-examine forensic pediatrician.

- In a shaken baby case in which the injuries allegedly occurred during a time when the defendant was responsible for the victim, defense counsel was not ineffective in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for allegedly failing to adequately cross-examine a forensic pediatrician about the time frame during which the victim's injuries occurred; although the pediatrician stated in testimony in a hearing on a motion for a new trial that the pediatrician could not pinpoint when the injury occurred, the defendant failed to show prejudice, as the substance of the pediatrician's testimony was essentially the same in the new trial hearing and before the jury. Mahan v. State, 282 Ga. App. 201, 638 S.E.2d 366 (2006).

Questioning on deal with accomplice witness.

- Given the lack of evidence of a deal between an accomplice witness and the state, trial counsel was not deficient in failing to cross-examine the witness about whether a deal existed; furthermore, counsel's representation did not fall outside of the broad range of reasonable professional conduct because counsel did not ask the witness whether the witness had a hope of benefitting from the witness's testimony. Even assuming arguendo that trial counsel was deficient in failing to cross-examine the witness about whether the witness held any hope of benefit, the defendant did not show prejudice; the statement the witness initially gave to the police was consistent in material respects with the witness's trial testimony, and both statements were also corroborative of the victim's trial testimony. Varner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 799, 678 S.E.2d 515 (2009).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to ask about specific effects of a plea deal when counsel obtained testimony that an accomplice had motivation to testify against the defendant. Holder v. State, 319 Ga. App. 239, 736 S.E.2d 449 (2012).

Trial counsel's failure to cross-examine the codefendant about a plea deal was not patently unreasonable because trial counsel's decision not to question the codefendant due to the potential harm to the defendant was a tactical and strategic decision; even if trial counsel performed deficiently, the defendant could not show prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, and even in the absence of the defendant's testimony placing the defendant at the scene and acknowledging that the defendant hit the victim, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to establish the facts necessary to support the defendant's convictions. Bonner v. State, 308 Ga. App. 827, 709 S.E.2d 358 (2011).

Questioning on accomplice's drug involvement.

- Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object when the trial court stopped defense counsel's cross-examination regarding an accomplice's drug involvement because even if trial counsel could have properly objected to the trial court's action, the defendant failed to show any harm by defendant's trial counsel's failure to do so, and trial counsel effectively impeached the accomplice by getting the accomplice to admit to another crime, and any further questioning regarding drug involvement would merely have been cumulative; the defendant did not call the accomplice to testify at the hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, and speculation as to what the accomplice's testimony would have been did not satisfy the defendant's burden to show that the result of defendant's trial would have been different if trial counsel had objected to the trial court's action and had trial counsel continued to cross-examine the accomplice regarding the drug issue. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S.E.2d 867 (2010).

Questioning on defendant's prior bad acts.

- Trial court did not err in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a witness's unsolicited mention of the defendant's prior bad acts because any objection would have been fruitless; the defendant could not show that the defendant was harmed by the witness's answer because trial counsel followed up with a question regarding the defendant's criminal history, and the police chief acknowledged that the defendant had never been convicted of a felony. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S.E.2d 867 (2010).

Questioning on defendant's drug usage.

- Codefendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to testimony from one of the victims and a police officer regarding the codefendant's prior purchase of marijuana from one of the victims because drug use showed the codefendant's motive to rob a home where the codefendant believed illegal drugs and money would be found; an accomplice testified that the motive for the robbery was that the victims kept drugs and cash in the apartment and that the codefendant planned the robbery and knew that drugs and money were kept in the house. Wilson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 827, 703 S.E.2d 400 (2010).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to a question directed to an accomplice because counsel personally opened the line of questioning on cross-examination, and in the absence of councel's testimony, it was presumed to be a strategic decision; having made that decision, trial counsel could not object, and because trial counsel succeeded in obtaining acquittal on the three most serious charges against the defendant that strongly supported the conclusion that the assistance actually rendered by trial counsel fell within that broad range of reasonably effective assistance that members of the bar in good standing were presumed to render. Wilson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 827, 703 S.E.2d 400 (2010).

Questioning of phlebotomist.

- Defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel questioned the phlebotomist who drew the defendant's blood about the fact that the phlebotomist did not invert the blood tubes and introduced evidence regarding the impact of that omission on the blood test results because there was no evidence that the phlebotomist failed to invert the tubes; the phlebotomist did not testify that the phlebotomist failed to invert the tubes. Fletcher v. State, 307 Ga. App. 131, 704 S.E.2d 222 (2010).

Impact of misstatement by defense counsel.

- Defendant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by mistakenly referring to the night of the murder as August 30 rather than September 1, 2006, during the direct examination of the host of a barbecue because the transcript of defense counsel's complete questioning of the host and the host's responsive testimony made clear that both were operating under the premise that the event of the barbecue took place on the day of the murder, which was unquestionably September 1, 2006, and thus, the jury was aware that the host was testifying in an attempt to establish an alibi for the defendant; there was not a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's mistake, the outcome of the defendant's trial would have been different because it was plain that the host was testifying about the night of the murder, and the host's testimony fell well short of establishing an alibi for the defendant for other reasons. Smiley v. State, 288 Ga. 635, 706 S.E.2d 425 (2011).

Questioning of police detective.

- Trial counsel's performance was not deficient when counsel elicited testimony from a detective that another witness, besides the victim, had identified the defendant as being at the scene of the crimes because the discussion between the trial court and defense counsel indicated that defense counsel had done extensive discovery in the case and was surprised by the detective's answer; even if counsel was ineffective, the error did not so undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial court could not have reliably produced a just result. Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

Failure to object to drug agent's testimony.

- Defendant failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object to an agent's testimony regarding what the agent believed to be a marijuana stalk in a burn pile because expert testimony based on scientific tests was not necessarily required to establish that a substance was marijuana as the identifying witness had the requisite training in the narcotics field; additionally, defense counsel testified that counsel did not think it was all that helpful to focus on the stalk because it may have emphasized that the substance was marijuana before it got burned. Kania v. State, 280 Ga. App. 356, 634 S.E.2d 146 (2006).

Failure to impeach witness.

- Defendant failed to demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to impeach an eyewitness with prior inconsistent statements since counsel testified that the witness was very argumentative and that the counsel questioned the witness as well as possible, and since counsel did impeach the witness with the prior statement in several respects; that counsel may not have impeached the witness in every respect did not show that counsel's performance fell outside the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. In any event, the exploration of additional inconsistencies in the witness's testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Sims v. State, 280 Ga. 606, 631 S.E.2d 656 (2006).

Trial counsel's decision not to impeach a witness with a prior criminal history was not patently unreasonable in light of counsel's testimony that counsel impeached the witness by showing inconsistencies between the witness's testimony and a prior statement to police. Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 745 S.E.2d 637 (2013).

Because: (1) the defendant failed to show that counsel was deficient in failing to impeach a cohort in the crimes charged with a prior felony conviction; (2) counsel made the strategic decision to restrict the scope of the cohort's cross-examination; and (3) the defendant could not show any prejudice resulting from counsel's actions, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked merit. Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 219, 656 S.E.2d 556 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 381 (Ga. 2008).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's exclusion of a state witness's conviction without conducting the balancing test required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(1) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609) because the defendant made no showing that the prior conviction would have been admitted notwithstanding the stringent limitations in former § 24-9-84.1(b) on the use of a conviction more than ten years old. Chance v. State, 291 Ga. 241, 728 S.E.2d 635 (2012).

Because the defendant failed to show that any prejudice resulted from trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in failing to discover and introduce the criminal record of one of the witnesses for the prosecution for impeachment purposes, the defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal. Rivers v. State, 283 Ga. 108, 657 S.E.2d 210 (2008).

With regard to defendant's conviction for arson and other related crimes, defendant failed to establish that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach a witness with evidence that the witness previously had committed arson as instances of specific misconduct cannot be used to impeach a witness's character or veracity unless the misconduct resulted in the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the proper method of proving such a conviction was by the introduction of a certified copy of the conviction. Since no conviction existed, defense counsel could not be charged with deficient performance in failing to attempt to introduce inadmissible evidence. Shelnutt v. State, 289 Ga. App. 528, 657 S.E.2d 611 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0977, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 518 (Ga. 2008).

Because: (1) trial counsel could not be deemed ineffective in failing to move to strike two jurors who were allegedly convicted felons, as their felon status had not been proven; (2) defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately impeach a detective concerning a previous suspension; and (3) order denying suppression was supported by probable cause, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit. Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 767, 658 S.E.2d 386 (2008).

With regard to defendant's convictions for malice murder and other crimes, defendant failed to show that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach four witnesses' testimony by the witnesses' convictions as such impeachment would have caused defense counsel to lose the right to make the final closing argument under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-71. Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298, 658 S.E.2d 627 (2008).

Defendant's passenger testified that the defendant stole a purse from a vehicle in a parking lot; defense counsel was not deficient for not introducing evidence of the passenger's criminal conviction. Counsel questioned the passenger as to the fact that the passenger was arrested along with the defendant for a probation violation, and that the passenger was found in possession of other persons' credit cards; as the jury was made aware that the passenger had a criminal record, the defendant did not show that but for counsel's failure to formally introduce the passenger's conviction, the outcome of the trial would likely have been different. Dennis v. State, 294 Ga. App. 171, 669 S.E.2d 187 (2008).

There was no ineffectiveness by the defendant's counsel in failing to obtain a continuance in the defendant's criminal trial in order to more effectively impeach a witness for the state with certified copies of all of the witness's prior convictions, as counsel had impeached the witness with a number of convictions and there was no reasonable probability that the additional ones would have changed the outcome of the trial; further, the failure to cross-examine that witness regarding the initial denial of a criminal history was not ineffectiveness, as it would not have changed the outcome and it was not necessarily even admissible impeachment evidence. Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 823, 678 S.E.2d 531 (2009).

Trial court did not err in finding that ineffective assistance of counsel had not been proven when trial counsel failed to impeach a witness with evidence of charges pending against the witness because the defendant failed to establish that the outcome of the defendant's trial would have been different had the witness been impeached; there were eyewitness identifications of defendant as the shooter, evidence that the defendant had been looking for the victim and believed the victim had robbed the defendant, and evidence that the defendant had been shot. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 687 S.E.2d 799 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to focus the jury's attention on the fact that a passenger was not being prosecuted for any involvement in the theft of the defendant's automobile or for originally telling the investigating officers that the passenger did not know that a driver would steal the automobile because the jury had already been informed that the passenger had multiple felony convictions and was a close friend of the driver; the defendant failed to establish that had counsel additionally impeached the passenger, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Kendrick v. State, 287 Ga. 676, 699 S.E.2d 302 (2010).

Defendant failed to establish that the defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's failure to provide the state with written notice of the defendant's intent to use evidence of a witness's prior conviction for impeachment purposes pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609) because even if the conviction had been admitted and the jury had disregarded the witness's testimony, there remained evidence sufficient to convict the defendant; the witness's trial testimony conflicted with the witness's prior statements, and the witness admitted on the stand being a crack dealer. Lanier v. State, 288 Ga. 109, 702 S.E.2d 141 (2010).

Defendant did not show a reasonable probability that the trial would have ended differently if trial counsel had uncovered all the details about the victim's first offender plea and cross-examined the victim about the victim's possible bias toward the state because five witnesses separately testified that the defendant assaulted the victims with a gun; thus, even if the jury decided to completely disregard the victim's testimony based on successful cross-examination, the testimony of four other eyewitnesses remained. Strong v. State, 308 Ga. App. 558, 707 S.E.2d 914 (2011).

Trial court's conclusion that trial counsel's failure to obtain certified copies of the victim's prior felony convictions and first offender plea, which the defendant asserted would have been admissible to impeach the victim and show bias under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609), did not constitute ineffective assistance and was not clearly erroneous because counsel made a strategic decision not to expend the limited resources of the office to obtain the certified copies, choosing instead to focus on other avenues of defense. Strong v. State, 308 Ga. App. 558, 707 S.E.2d 914 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to highlight the inconsistencies between a prior victim's trial testimony and the victim's account of a shooting as reported to police immediately after the victim was shot because although trial counsel testified that counsel recalled that the account in the police report was inconsistent with the victim's trial testimony, appellate counsel never inquired as to why trial counsel chose not to use the police report to impeach the state's pretrial proffer or the victim's trial testimony; in the absence of any evidence on the issue, it was presumed that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to pursue that mode of impeachment. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 709 S.E.2d 217 (2011).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to discredit the veracity of an inmate witness who testified to the defendant's jailhouse confession because at trial the inmate witness appeared in prison clothes, and the state elicited testimony from the inmate that the inmate was a convicted felon; since the evidence was properly before the jury, it could not be shown that the omission was an unreasonable tactical move that no competent attorney in the same situation would have made. Brown v. State, 289 Ga. 259, 710 S.E.2d 751 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 524, 181 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2011).

Defendant failed to establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because although the defendant contended that trial counsel should have impeached a witness with testimony from a pre-trial hearing, and the defendant failed to establish that there was any reasonable probability that had counsel pursued the line of questioning, the outcome of the trial would have been different; at the pre-trial hearing, the witness was testifying regarding the behavior of prostitutes, not about what another person recounted to the witness. White v. State, 289 Ga. 511, 712 S.E.2d 834 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach a witness through the use of prior inconsistent statements because, on cross-examination, counsel did attempt to impeach the witness with comments in the witness's statement to the police, the video recording of the witness's statement was admitted at trial, and the defendant did not establish that trial counsel's tactics for laying a foundation for impeaching the witness in regard to the statement was unreasonable. Nations v. State, 290 Ga. 39, 717 S.E.2d 634 (2011).

Although trial counsel's performance was defective for failing to urge that counsel was entitled to cross-examine the defendant's cell mate about probation revocation charges that were pending at the time the cell mate went to the police with the defendant's jailhouse confession, the defendant failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if counsel's performance had not been deficient because the victim testified about the struggle with the defendant, DNA evidence placed the defendant in the apartment, and the defendant was hospitalized for a gunshot wound consistent with the victim's testimony. Davis v. State, 312 Ga. App. 328, 718 S.E.2d 559 (2011).

Trial counsel did not fail to adequately question and impeach the state's witness because counsel did not question the witness about potential deals, favorable treatment, or why the witness was handcuffed since the witness was arrested on a material witness warrant and had no pending cases about which to make a deal; the defendant could not show prejudice because the state had already elicited from the witness information about prior drug convictions and that the witness was jailed the preceding day for failing to appear to testify in the defendant's case. Johnson v. State, 290 Ga. 382, 721 S.E.2d 851 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to discover that a witness had four prior felony convictions that could have been used to impeach the witness because counsel discovered one conviction and used that conviction to impeach the witness and, thus, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Boothe v. State, 293 Ga. 285, 745 S.E.2d 594 (2013).

Failure to object to hearsay testimony of witness.

- As a parent's testimony about a child's claim of being molested by the defendant was not admissible under the former Georgia Child Hearsay Statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820), because the child was 15 when the accusation was made, defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object at trial. Cash v. State, 294 Ga. App. 741, 669 S.E.2d 731 (2008).

Because defendant's counsel had no reasonable strategic reason for not objecting to a detective's hearsay testimony regarding an accomplice's custodial statement identifying the defendant as a purse snatcher, the outcome of the trial might have been different; therefore, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial. Grindle v. State, 299 Ga. App. 412, 683 S.E.2d 72 (2009).

Trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not properly object to evidence that the defendant was a drug trafficker who always carried a gun, that the defendant was a dangerous man, that the defendant was the shooter in a similar transaction, and that the defendant's other girlfriend knew where the gun was located after the second crime; the statements, especially that the defendant's other girlfriend knew where the gun was located, were clearly objectionable hearsay, and failing to object to that statement alone was deficient because the statement linked the defendant to the principal crime. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the responding officer's testimony about what the victim said at the time of the incident because the testimony at issue was admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime. Mubarak v. State, 305 Ga. App. 419, 699 S.E.2d 788 (2010).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to the arresting detective's testimony about what a witness told the defendant just prior to a shooting because although the testimony was inadmissible hearsay since the state failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement by not asking the witness about the witness's statement, the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if counsel had objected to the testimony; four eyewitnesses other than the witness testified that those witnesses saw the defendant shoot the victim, and the witnesses independently picked the defendant out of a photographic lineup. Cannon v. State, 288 Ga. 225, 702 S.E.2d 845 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a lead investigator's references to a tip the investigator received from an unnamed source implicating the defendant in a shooting because counsel did object to at least one of the investigator's references to the tip and to two questions bearing the potential to elicit responses regarding the substance of the tip; because none of the investigator's references to the tip constituted reversible error, any failure of counsel to object in certain of those instances could not give rise to an ineffectiveness claim. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 709 S.E.2d 217 (2011).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object when a witness testified as to statements a man made because the testimony was hearsay but nevertheless admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime and, thus, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to admissible evidence; the defendant's right to confrontation was not compromised because the statements to the witness was not testimonial. Kitchens v. State, 289 Ga. 242, 710 S.E.2d 551 (2011).

Defendant could not establish that the trial court's admission of a witness's testimony would have constituted an abuse of discretion had trial counsel voiced an objection because the evidence was admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule, subject to the trial court's discretion. White v. State, 289 Ga. 511, 712 S.E.2d 834 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a hearsay objection to testimony about surveillance videotape because such an objection would have been unavailing; the surveillance footage and the testimony about what the witnesses personally observed on the videotape was not hearsay. Hammock v. State, 311 Ga. App. 344, 715 S.E.2d 709 (2011).

Defendants' trial counsel was not ineffective for having failed to object on hearsay grounds to an investigator's testimony regarding the reasons why the victim's sibling and the sibling's spouse could not come to court to testify because the defendant suffered no harm from the admission of the testimony as the testimony had nothing to do with either the charged offenses or with the defendant as the alleged perpetrator of the alleged crimes. Adel v. State, 290 Ga. 690, 723 S.E.2d 666 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on hearsay grounds to portions of a Secret Service agent's testimony about what the agent learned during the investigation since the agent did not repeat the testimony of an out-of-court declarant and was not hearsay. Bearden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 721, 728 S.E.2d 874 (2012).

Trial counsel's decision not to object to an officer's testimony, which was hearsay because the testimony was based on someone else's research about vehicle tag numbers, in an attempt to confuse the jury over the different vehicles used in the similar transaction was a legitimate strategic decision. Spinks v. State, 322 Ga. App. 387, 745 S.E.2d 653 (2013).

Failure to move for mistrial on basis of witness's testimony.

- Defendant failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to seek a mistrial after successfully objecting to a witness's testimony that the defendant told the witness that "he would have a shoot-out with police before he ever went back to jail" on the ground that the witness's response placed the defendant's character in evidence because even if counsel's failure to request a mistrial were deemed deficient, no mistrial would have been granted as a nonresponsive answer that impacted negatively on a defendant's character did not improperly place the defendant's character in issue. Billings v. State, 308 Ga. App. 248, 707 S.E.2d 177 (2011).

Failure to obtain investigator's written reports.

- A defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied as trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to obtain written reports from the court-appointed investigator since, while the trial counsel did not obtain any reports of witness interviews, the trial counsel discussed extensively the content of those interviews with the court-appointed investigator; assuming that the trial counsel's failure to obtain the content in written form constituted deficient conduct, the defendant failed to show how the defendant was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 870, 635 S.E.2d 259 (2006).

Failure to object to statement given to investigator.

- Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a new trial as defense counsel did not give ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a Jackson-Denno hearing as there was no basis to object to the introduction of defendant's statement to an investigator as: (1) defendant was not under arrest at the time of the statement, nor would a reasonable person have understood that the person was under arrest; (2) there was no evidence that the officer sent to insure that defendant did not leave the hospital before the investigator arrived had any contact with defendant; (3) that defendant was in pain or taking pain medication did not render defendant's statement involuntary; and (4) defendant failed to show that defendant was prejudiced by the failure to request the hearing. Alwin v. State, 267 Ga. App. 236, 599 S.E.2d 216 (2004).

Failure to obtain medical evidence.

- In a prosecution for felony obstruction of an officer, the defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena the defendant's medical records to show injuries received in the struggle with police failed as the defendant did not state what these medical records would have shown or how this would have changed the outcome of the trial. Steillman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (2009).

Defendant did not carry the defendant's burden of showing that trial counsel was deficient for failing to preserve a sample of the defendant's blood for later testing to determine whether the defendant's mind was impaired during the interrogation session because the defendant did not cite to anything in the record that showed that the state obtained a blood sample from the defendant; counsel testified that counsel investigated whether such a blood sample existed but found no evidence of the sample, and one could not fault counsel for failing to secure and to maintain a blood sample for testing if the sample did not exist. Hester v. State, 304 Ga. App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (2010).

Failure to object to testimony by undisclosed witness.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the victim's brother's testimony on the ground that the state failed to put the brother on the witness list as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-16-3 because the defendant failed to show that if counsel had objected the outcome of the trial would have been different; the defendant offered no evidence at the motion for new trial hearing to show how the defendant could have benefitted from a continuance before the brother was permitted to testify or that the state acted in bad faith in leaving the brother off the witness list. Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 743 S.E.2d 1 (2013).

Failure to object to testimony of GBI agent.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of a GBI Agent because counsel made a strategic decision not to object to the testimony, and that strategy was reasonable. Wheeler v. State, 290 Ga. 817, 725 S.E.2d 580 (2012).

Use of polygraphs.

- Mere fact that a jury was apprised that a lie detector test may have been taken was not prejudicial if no inference as to the result was raised, so even if testimony received from a police polygraph examiner implied that a polygraph exam was taken, it was not admitted in error, and defense counsel was not deficient in failing to object to it; further, in a molestation case, an expert was allowed to testify regarding the proper techniques for interviewing an alleged victim and whether the techniques actually used were proper, so admission of expert testimony regarding the tactile recollections of victims of child sexual abuse did not constitute reversible error since the witness was never asked whether the victim was telling the truth, and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this testimony, either. Norman v. State, 278 Ga. App. 497, 629 S.E.2d 489 (2006).

Defendant failed to establish a claim that defense counsel was ineffective based on the fact that defense counsel did not hire a defense polygraph examiner to rebut the state's examiner because, at the motion for new trial hearing, the defendant's trial defense counsel testified that this was a matter of trial strategy to preserve the right to closing argument; defense counsel was prepared to and did cross-examine the state's expert to bring out the points defense counsel wanted to raise and felt the value of putting on a defense expert was not outweighed by retaining the right to close. Johnson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 341, 634 S.E.2d 134 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Kimbrough v. State, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 48 (Ga. 2017).

A defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to an attorney's failure to obtain a stipulation from the state permitting the admission of the results of a polygraph test, when the attorney had not entered the attorney's appearance in the case, because the defendant did not show that the state was willing to enter into a stipulation to authorize the admission of the polygraph results and the defendant did not show that the attorney's performance was deficient or that the defendant suffered any prejudice from the inaction. McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 635 S.E.2d 153 (2006).

When the evidence shows that the defendant knew and understood the defendant's rights before waiving counsel and stipulated to the admissibility of polygraph results, the trial court's determination that the stipulation was valid was not clearly erroneous and was affirmed. Beaudoin v. State, 311 Ga. App. 91, 714 S.E.2d 624 (2011).

Use of photographs.

- Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel after counsel failed to photograph the crime scene as the counsel went to the crime scene several times, photographs of the scene already had been taken by the police, and counsel was unaware of any photos or any angles that would have been beneficial to defendant. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Because the second of two pre-autopsy photos of the clothed body of the victim was properly admitted as relevant in order to show the nature and extent of the victim's wounds, as well as to show that the body had been examined in preparation for autopsy, the defendant failed to show that counsel's performance as it related to the admission of the photo was deficient or that the result of the trial would have been different if counsel objected to the admission of the photograph. Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 653 S.E.2d 23 (2007).

Defendant could not establish that the defendant was prejudiced by defendant's trial counsel's failure to take and introduce into evidence photographs of the home where the defendant and the defendant's girlfriend resided in order to show the distance from the rear window, out of which the defendant's girlfriend escaped, to the ground below because the state introduced photographs of the back of the home, which included the rear windows; there is no ineffective assistance when trial counsel simply failed to introduce evidence cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial. Carmichael v. State, 305 Ga. App. 651, 700 S.E.2d 650 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial or request a curative instruction when the State of Georgia showed the jury two photographs of the murder victim's body at the crime scene, which the trial court had previously ordered the state not to show on the ground that the photographs were duplicative of other photographs. Given that the two photographs did not show the jury more than other crime scene photographs, and given the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the defendant failed to show that, even if trial counsel had moved for a mistrial or requested a curative instruction, there was a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted a mistrial or that the outcome of the trial otherwise would have been different. Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011).

Medical evidence.

- Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel when defendant provided counsel medical records showing that defendant suffered from "confusional migraines," which could render defendant unable to form requisite criminal intent, but counsel did not investigate the condition, nor was evidence of it, which was defendant's only defense, offered, and defendant was prejudiced because other evidence showed defendant was suffering from this condition at the time of defendant's alleged crime. Guzman v. State, 260 Ga. App. 689, 580 S.E.2d 654 (2003).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as the failure to introduce medical evidence to show that defendant's foot injury was consistent with defendant's claim that defendant was shot while running away from a robbery attempt was due to counsel's inability to locate the emergency room doctor; further, there was no evidence at the motion for a new trial hearing that the testimony would have been relevant or favorable. Sampson v. State, 279 Ga. 8, 608 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

Defense counsel was not ineffective as defense counsel tried without success to obtain medical evidence showing that defendant was impotent at the time defendant allegedly molested the victim, defendant did not investigate similar transaction witnesses' criminal backgrounds because defendant did not think that their juvenile records would yield any useful impeachment evidence, and ample evidence concerning the victim's behavioral problems was admitted at trial. Hogan v. State, 272 Ga. App. 19, 611 S.E.2d 689 (2005).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on the failure of counsel to present evidence of the defendant's medical condition, was rejected because the claim that the condition detrimentally affected the defendant's ability to understand the Miranda rights was pure speculation; further, counsel researched the condition and found that it was not legally recognized. Ward v. State, 274 Ga. App. 511, 618 S.E.2d 154 (2005).

Because evidence of the victim's disease was inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-412), trial counsel's performance could not be considered deficient based on a failure to contest the receipt of the medical information; thus, an order granting defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was reversed because even if counsel had requested a continuance for the purpose of testing the defendant, no reasonable likelihood existed that the outcome of the trial would have been different, and in fact, a negative result for defendant at the time of trial would not have established the medical condition at the time of the crimes, or rule out the possibility that the defendant had molested the victim. Murrell v. Ricks, 280 Ga. 427, 627 S.E.2d 546 (2006).

On retrial on one count of child molestation and two counts of aggravated child molestation, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial on grounds that trial counsel was ineffective in admitting notes generated by a forensic evaluator who interviewed the child victim, as the defendant had previously been found guilty in the first trial in which the notes were not introduced. Mewborn v. State, 285 Ga. App. 187, 645 S.E.2d 669 (2007).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present the victim's medical records because even assuming that trial counsel was remiss for failure to use the medical records in the attempt to block admission of the victim's statements as dying declarations, the defendant could not show any prejudice thereby; there was ample evidence to support the finding that the victim believed that the victim was in the article of death, and the statements were also admissible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. Sanford v. State, 287 Ga. 351, 695 S.E.2d 579 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1514, 179 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2011).

Trial court properly rejected the defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce into evidence two medical evaluation documents, which the defendant alleged would have contradicted statements witnesses gave to the police, because it was mere speculation that the witnesses' statements were inconsistent with the medical reports; it was impossible for the defendant to show there was a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's alleged error. McClarin v. State, 289 Ga. 180, 710 S.E.2d 120 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1004, 181 L. Ed. 2d 745 (2012).

Failure to object to DNA evidence.

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for statutory rape and two counts of child molestation involving a stepchild, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a result of failure to object to the state's DNA evidence was rejected because the defendant failed to show prejudice in that the outcome of the trial would have been no different had the DNA evidence not been admitted. The defendant's conclusory assertion that the conviction was largely based upon the DNA evidence was contradicted by the totality of the evidence in the record in that: (1) the jury heard direct evidence from the victim that the defendant forced the victim to engage in sex with the defendant over a period of years; (2) the victim testified that the defendant fathered the victim's twins; and (3) the victim's mother testified as to the victim's prior consistent outcry statements, which the mother initially did not believe. Haygood v. State, 289 Ga. App. 187, 656 S.E.2d 541 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an independent DNA analysis to challenge the state's findings because counsel's strategy in challenging the state's version of events was reasonable; the strategy was not rendered unreasonable just because another attorney could have approached the case under a different theory that would have required an independent DNA analysis. Wheeler v. State, 290 Ga. 817, 725 S.E.2d 580 (2012).

Failure to seek DNA evidence.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying a defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea because the defendant failed to prove the prejudice prong of the defendant's ineffectiveness claim since, at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, the defendant proffered no evidence that a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41 would have rebutted the state's evidence, regarding defendant's incest conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22, that the defendant and the victim were half-siblings; in addition, counsel's strategy to forego a DNA test was one of trial tactics and did not provide a basis on which to find that counsel's representation was deficient. Hunter v. State, 294 Ga. App. 583, 669 S.E.2d 533 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective because while the results of DNA testing of certain items recovered from the scene of armed robberies were favorable to the appellant, trial counsel used reasonable trial strategy in not requesting additional DNA testing based on a concern that such testing might implicate the appellant. Boykins-White v. State, 305 Ga. App. 827, 701 S.E.2d 221 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain either an independent test of the blood on the defendant's shoes or an independent review of the lab's practices and procedures because defense counsel did not produce a DNA expert who would testify that the state's DNA evidence was defective, and the defendant's unfounded speculation as to the potential for a test result different from that introduced at trial did not constitute a showing of professionally deficient performance by counsel. Lanier v. State, 288 Ga. 109, 702 S.E.2d 141 (2010).

Failure to object to search warrant affidavit from which DNA obtained.

- With regard to defendant's convictions for rape and other crimes, the trial court did not err by concluding that defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a search warrant affidavit that led to the police obtaining a DNA swab from defendant, despite defendant's voluntary statement to the detectives being elicited in violation of Miranda and case law, as the search warrant could be predicated on defendant's voluntary but unlawfully obtained statements. Brown v. State, 292 Ga. App. 269, 663 S.E.2d 749 (2008).

Mental health history as evidence.

- Trial counsel's failure to introduce evidence of defendant's mental health history was not ineffective assistance of counsel as a prior incident, in which defendant was shot, could not support a justification defense. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Failure to investigate mental state.

- Since the defendant did not prove that trial counsel failed to investigate the defendant's mental state or move for a directed verdict, the defendant did not prove that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's actions. Hightower v. State, 278 Ga. 39, 597 S.E.2d 362 (2004).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel due to a failure to investigate defendant's mental health history as: (1) defendant did not claim that defendant was insane at the time of the crimes, was incompetent to stand trial, or was otherwise suffering from delusional compulsion; (2) there was no evidence that defendant was guilty, but mentally ill; and (3) felony murder carried a mandatory life sentence, firearm possession required a consecutive five-year sentence, and the trial court was lenient in sentencing defendant to half of the time allowed by law for an aggravated assault, so there was no harm in the failure to introduce more detail about defendant's mental health history at sentencing. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Because defendant's trial and appellate counsel did not investigate after being notified of the defendant's history of mental problems, the habeas court properly concluded that they were ineffective and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Martin v. Barrett, 279 Ga. 593, 619 S.E.2d 656 (2005).

Trial court erred by refusing to conduct a hearing or to rule on defendant's motion for a new trial based upon its finding that defendant was, at that time, mentally incompetent and unable to assist the counsel in challenging a conviction, as defendant's current mental incompetence provided no logical basis to delay a post-conviction proceeding to address whether defendant was incompetent at trial, whether the trial court should have been on notice of the incompetency and conducted a hearing during trial, or whether the trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely raise the competency issue. Florescu v. State, 276 Ga. App. 264, 623 S.E.2d 147 (2005).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to obtain a mental evaluation of the defendant prior to trial to determine criminal responsibility, absent record evidence that counsel had advance notice of any mental health problems, and further discussions with the defendant's family would not have revealed a history of significant mental illness. Breland v. State, 285 Ga. App. 251, 648 S.E.2d 389 (2007).

Habeas court erred by reversing a defendant's death sentence imposed for a murder based on the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel's failure to present evidence of the defendant's mental health status and for failing to present other mitigation evidence as, considering the combined effect of trial counsel's various professional deficiencies, as a matter of law, there was no possibility that absent trial counsel's professional deficiencies a reasonable probability existed that a different outcome would have occurred. Schofield v. Cook, 284 Ga. 240, 663 S.E.2d 221 (2008).

Failure to have drugs retested.

- Defendant's argument, that counsel was ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to request independent analysis of cocaine allegedly found on the defendant's person, failed; trial counsel's decision not to retest the contraband, under the belief that the original test had been properly conducted and that an additional test might identify the presence of more cocaine, was strategic, thereby foreclosing an ineffective assistance claim. Copeland v. State, 281 Ga. App. 11, 635 S.E.2d 283 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 for failing to object when the state placed the defendant's character at issue by introducing evidence of the defendant's use of crack cocaine after the crime; the state had presented evidence that the defendant acted erratically after the crime, suggesting nervousness about the defendant's involvement in the crime, and the defendant and defense counsel strategically chose not to object to the crack cocaine evidence because the defense provided an alternative reason for the defendant's nervous behavior. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14, 635 S.E.2d 723 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1215, 127 S. Ct. 1266, 167 L. Ed. 2d 91 (2007).

Failure to object to bolstering.

- A defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object to testimony concerning the defendant's initial statement denying knowledge of a murder as counsel testified that counsel did not object because the testimony bolstered the defense theory that the initial statement was true and that the defendant had given a subsequent inculpatory statement only after being threatened by a co-indictee; the decision was a reasonable strategic decision and did not constitute deficient performance. McKinney v. State, 281 Ga. 92, 635 S.E.2d 153 (2006).

Defendant failed to establish that defense counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to object when the child victim's relative in a sexual abuse case impermissibly bolstered the victim's credibility; although the relative stated that the relative believed the victim's testimony, the defendant failed to establish prejudice, as the relative's response was only one answer in a day-long trial, the victim's description of the abuse remained consistent throughout the case and was corroborated, and the defendant had a full opportunity to test the victim's credibility during cross-examination. Anderson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 58, 637 S.E.2d 790 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

A defendant's conviction for child molestation and related charges was upheld on appeal, and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for remand, as the defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of defense counsel failing to object to the bolstering testimony of a child psychologist. The defendant failed to show how defense counsel's strategy, which resulted in leading the expert to qualify the prior bolstering testimony on cross-examination, was unreasonable, as well as failed to show a likelihood that an objection would have led to a different trial outcome necessitating remand. Al-Attawy v. State, 289 Ga. App. 570, 657 S.E.2d 552 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1039, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 503 (Ga. 2008).

As a child's alleged motive to fabricate arose after the child told the child's parent of being molested by the defendant, and after the child made a videotaped statement to an investigator, the parent's testimony about the child's accusation and the videotape were not admissible as prior consistent statements, but constituted impermissible bolstering. Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object at trial; this failure harmed the defendant, thereby satisfying the prejudice prong of Strickland. Cash v. State, 294 Ga. App. 741, 669 S.E.2d 731 (2008).

Defense counsel was not deficient for falling to object to expert witnesses' testimony as to the truthfulness of the child victims because the testimony was not objectionable; testimony by a witness that the witness did not see any evidence that the child victim had been coached does not constitute bolstering of the child's credibility and does not impermissibly address the ultimate issue. Vaughn v. State, 307 Ga. App. 754, 706 S.E.2d 137 (2011).

Trial counsel's failure to object to a detective's testimony did not amount to deficient performance because the testimony was not a statement of the victim's credibility or an invasion of the province of the jury since the testimony concerned the detective's reason for ending the interview with the victim and referring the victim to the Georgia Center of Child Advocacy; even if the detective's testimony that "a molestation incident occurred" did constitute improper bolstering, the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the testimony so prejudiced the defense as to affect the outcome of the trial because the victim's account of the incident remained consistent throughout. Strickland v. State, 311 Ga. App. 400, 715 S.E.2d 798 (2011).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to timely object when a testifying police officer provided an opinion as to what was depicted in a convenience store's video surveillance footage while the video was being played for the jury because the officer's testimony was not improper bolstering; the officer was testifying as to the officer's own observations regarding the video. Anderson v. State, 311 Ga. App. 732, 716 S.E.2d 813 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a police detective's testimony regarding a victim's truthfulness because the defendant could not demonstrate either that trial counsel's performance was deficient or that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense since, in an initial statement, the victim identified three perpetrators by name and omitted the defendant entirely; therefore, the testimony exculpated the defendant, and it was highly unlikely that the testimony changed the outcome of the trial. Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).

Trial counsel did not err in failing to raise an objection to a detective's testimony regarding a forensic interview with the victim as improperly bolstering because the prosecutor's question appeared to have been directed at determining whether the victim provided information that led to further investigation, not at determining whether the detective believed the victim was telling the truth. Twiggs v. State, 315 Ga. App. 191, 726 S.E.2d 680 (2012).

Failure to present evidence suggested by defendant.

- Defendant failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the counsel's decision to not put up evidence because trial counsel testified that, as agreed to by the defendant, it was defense counsel's strategy to not put up evidence in order to preserve the right to closing argument; with regards to the defendant's accusations that a county solicitor general had some motive to commit the murders at issue, defense counsel also testified that defense counsel believed that it would not be productive to attempt to blame an elected official on the basis of weak evidence and supposition. Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683, 631 S.E.2d 671 (2006).

Failure to object to admission of driving record.

- Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the defendant's driving record, which was not admissible at trial, that consisted of six pages, showing 22 separate traffic offenses. Kalb v. State, 276 Ga. App. 394, 623 S.E.2d 230 (2005).

Failure to object to admission of cocaine field test.

- With regard to defendant's appeal of a conviction for possessing cocaine, defendant's argument that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of a cocaine field test was meritless since significant evidence other than the field test supported the jury's verdict based on the officers finding a residue-laden scale commonly used to measure cocaine on defendant's person; following arrest, defendant displayed the same physical symptoms seen in persons who had swallowed cocaine when confronted by police; defendant had admitted to two people - an officer and a nurse - to swallowing the cocaine; and on two prior occasions leading to drug convictions, defendant attempted to discard cocaine to avoid detection by authorities. Moreover, defense counsel successfully undermined the field test, establishing through the state's own expert that the test was merely presumptive and lacked scientific certainty. Hinton v. State, 292 Ga. App. 40, 663 S.E.2d 401 (2008).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant a new trial as defense counsel's decision to present evidence of the defendant's two prior convictions for intent to distribute cocaine was in furtherance of defense counsel's reasonable trial strategy to portray the defendant as a drug dealer and to support the defense's theory that the defendant's fingerprint was found on the stolen car because the defendant sold drugs to someone driving the same car, not because the defendant was involved in the armed robbery of the two victims. State v. Reynolds, 332 Ga. App. 818, 775 S.E.2d 187 (2015).

Failure to introduce county records.

- Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel relating to charges arising from a fatal accident which occurred at an intersection controlled by a traffic light, based on the defense counsel's failure to introduce county department of transportation reports which showed, inter alia, that four days before the collision there had been a report that the traffic signals at this intersection were showing "green all 4 ways;" while witnesses testified that the victims had a green light when they entered the intersection, the defendant claimed the defendant, also, had a green light; the fact that there had been equipment malfunctions at this intersection, and reports of the signals holding green all four ways less than a week before this accident, was certainly relevant to the defense. Gibson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204 (2006).

Failure to introduce evidence.

- A defendant had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel, as counsel's failure to attempt to introduce into evidence additional photographs was not deficient performance when counsel testified that the state's photographs fairly illustrated the area in question and the defendant did not show anything to the contrary; counsel explained that a certain witness had not been called because the witness was clearly hostile toward the defendant, the defendant's claim that counsel should have introduced certain evidence rested on mere speculation, and the evidence showing the child victim walking through a store would have belied the defendant's assertion that the child had already been significantly injured before being left in the defendant's care. Banta v. State, 282 Ga. 392, 651 S.E.2d 21 (2007).

With respect to presenting chemical testing evidence and pursuing the state's undisclosed chemical test results, counsel's failure to present or pursue such evidence did not affect the outcome at trial, and counsel's performance was not ineffective. The chemical test was consistent with evidence that the state had already presented to the jury; accordingly, the undisclosed evidence was not outcome determinative. Morris v. State, 284 Ga. 1, 662 S.E.2d 110, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1074, 129 S. Ct. 731, 172 L. Ed. 2d 734 (2008).

In a prosecution for first degree forgery, the defendant claimed defense counsel was ineffective in not introducing certain exculpatory e-mails. As the trial court found that everything contained in the e-mails was covered by the defendant's testimony, the defendant was unable to show any prejudice. Taylor v. State, 293 Ga. App. 551, 667 S.E.2d 405 (2008).

Defense counsel's decision not to play child victims' videotaped interviews for the jury was not ineffective assistance as counsel chose to highlight the victims' alleged inconsistencies by way of cross-examination. This reasonable and calculated tactical decision presented no grounds for reversal, and the defendant failed to show prejudice. Scruggs v. State, 294 Ga. App. 501, 669 S.E.2d 485 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0450, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 191 (Ga. 2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain an electronic enhancement of a videotape depicting a drug sale, which allegedly would have shown that defendant was not the perpetrator of the offense, because the defendant failed to show that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of trial counsel's failure to obtain an electronic enhancement of the videotape prior to trial since the enhanced images failed to create a reasonable probability that the defendant was not the perpetrator depicted in the images; an undercover officer unequivocally identified the defendant as the perpetrator based upon the officer's personal observations and independent memory of the defendant at the time of the drug sale, and although the defendant attempted to prove that another individual was the perpetrator depicted in the videotape's images, the defendant failed to proffer sufficient evidence in support of the defendant's claim. Faulkner v. State, 304 Ga. App. 791, 697 S.E.2d 914 (2010).

Although the defendant claimed that the defense attorney failed to introduce evidence that would have allowed the jury to understand the reasonable nature of defendant's allegedly fearful state of mind with regard to the shooting victim, the defendant's attorney was able to elicit testimony from the defendant about the defendant's belief that the victim was dangerous. Therefore, the defendant did not prevail on the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the defendant could not show that a reasonable probability existed that, but for counsel's errors in allegedly failing to introduce the evidence, the outcome at trial would have been more favorable. Render v. State, 288 Ga. 420, 704 S.E.2d 767 (2011).

Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because counsel testified that counsel attempted to produce evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim against third persons but because of lack of time was not able to do so; counsel further testified that counsel did not strenuously pursue a continuance for more time to gather such evidence because of the age of the case and because counsel believed such motion for continuance would be unsuccessful. Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 715 S.E.2d 113 (2011).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce photographs because counsel testified that counsel decided not to introduce the photographs since the photographs would have shown that there were numerous surveillance cameras at the scene; a decision not to introduce certain evidence is a strategic and tactical matter that cannot be judged by hindsight to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hammock v. State, 311 Ga. App. 344, 715 S.E.2d 709 (2011).

Court of appeals could not review the defendant's claim that trial counsel erred by failing to follow proper procedures to introduce a psychologist's notes, which stated that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder because the defendant did not attach a copy of the psychologist's notes, proffer any testimony, or otherwise provide any information to support the claim that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to subpoena an insurance company because the defendant did not show that such evidence was available, that the evidence was relevant to the charges, or that the evidence would have aided the defense. Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333, cert. denied, No. S12C0968, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 2012).

Alleged failure of counsel to find all evidence.

- Counsel was not shown to be ineffective for mitigating evidence development and presentation in a malice murder trial because a defendant did not show (by actually presenting that evidence to the appellate court) how the defendant was prejudiced by evidence that the defendant alleged counsel should have, but did not, find and present on the defendant's behalf. Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1058, 125 S. Ct. 870, 160 L. Ed. 2d 784 (2005).

Failure to admit booking sheet.

- Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed as the defendant failed to show that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to admit a copy of the book-in sheet, which showed that the defendant was not wearing a white cap when the defendant was booked; although the victim testified that the victim's assailant was wearing a white cap at the time of the crime, the fact that the defendant was not wearing a white cap when the defendant was booked did not indicate that the defendant was not wearing a white cap at the time of the crime. Lawrence v. State, 267 Ga. App. 515, 600 S.E.2d 444 (2004).

Failure to secure second drug test.

- Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to lay a proper foundation for the admission of a second drug test on the defendant's urine sample by a private lab, because without a positive assertion that the independent drug test would have shown that controlled substances were not present in the defendant's system, the defendant could not meet the defendant's burden of affirmatively showing how counsel's failure affected the outcome of the defendant's case; further, a proper foundation was nearly impossible, as the defendant was unable to secure the presence of someone who saw the specimen given and could establish a chain of custody. Poston v. State, 274 Ga. App. 117, 617 S.E.2d 150 (2005).

Failure to question legality of traffic stop.

- Defendant was not entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel as there was no basis to argue that a traffic stop of defendant was illegal. Mayfield v. State, 276 Ga. App. 544, 623 S.E.2d 725 (2005).

Failure to show mental retardation.

- An inmate seeking habeas corpus had not shown prejudice by the alleged deficiencies of trial counsel, and even if trial counsel had failed to provide certain records to a psychologist, the psychologist, upon seeing the records, had reaffirmed the psychologist's original opinion that the inmate was not mentally retarded; the additional mitigation evidence cited by the inmate would not have made a significant contribution in light of the evidence trial counsel actually presented. Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1070, 128 S. Ct. 728, 169 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2007).

Failure of counsel to listen to 9-1-1 call.

- Even if trial counsel was ineffective for failing to listen to a9-1-1 tape prior to trial, given the overwhelming evidence supporting the defendant's convictions, particularly the eyewitness testimony, the defendant failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel's error. Thus, this ineffectiveness claim failed. Taylor v. State, 295 Ga. App. 689, 673 S.E.2d 7, aff'd, 286 Ga. 328, 687 S.E.2d 409 (2009).

Conceding to reliability of a child victim's hearsay testimony.

- Defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the defendant's trial and conviction for child molestation based on trial counsel's failure to object and conceding to the issue of reliability for the admission of the child victim's hearsay testimony as: (1) the defendant failed to point to any evidence indicating that the victim's statements were unreliable since the statements were videotaped at a neutral location in a room alone with a professional forensic interviewer; (2) the forensic interviewer testified that the victim was very bright and articulate and did not appear to be coached; (3) the victim's videotaped statements were spontaneous, voluntary, and not coerced; (4) the victim's videotaped statements were consistent with other out-of-court statements; and (5) significantly, the victim's statements were consistent with the defendant's statements to police. Williams v. State, 290 Ga. App. 841, 660 S.E.2d 740 (2008).

New trial unwarranted when counsel's failure to object to evidence of prior DUI conviction did not result in prejudice.

- Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not warrant a new trial because sufficient evidence of the defendant's intoxication was presented in the record, and the defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel's failure to object to the defendant's admission to having a prior DUI conviction, even though it was error for trial counsel not to object. Thomas v. State, 288 Ga. App. 827, 655 S.E.2d 701 (2007).

Alibi defense.

- Defendant could not show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel met the notice requirements in O.C.G.A. § 17-16-5(a) and presented defendant's alibi defense because of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant. Thus, defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to properly notify the prosecution of defendant's alibi defense, which resulted in the exclusion of alibi testimony at trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-16-6. Jones v. State, 266 Ga. App. 679, 598 S.E.2d 65 (2004).

Defendant did not show defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when defendant's trial counsel did not subpoena two alibi witnesses, because the testimony of these witnesses would have been cumulative of witnesses who testified, so defendant did not show that defendant was prejudiced by counsel's actions. Jefferies v. State, 267 Ga. App. 694, 600 S.E.2d 753 (2004).

Defendant did not show counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel elicited testimony from the defendant showing the defendant had an alibi without presenting alibi witnesses as this was presumed strategic, absent testimony to the contrary, which was not presented. Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 317, 609 S.E.2d 643 (2004).

Defendant failed to prove the prejudice prong of the defendant's ineffectiveness of counsel claim because the defendant did not show that any alibi witnesses existed or what their testimony would have been; moreover, the defendant did not show whether a DNA expert would have provided testimony at trial that would have rebutted the state's DNA evidence. Denny v. State, 280 Ga. 81, 623 S.E.2d 483 (2005).

In a prosecution for murder and related crimes, defendant's counsel was not ineffective for not interviewing or calling two alleged alibi witnesses because one of these witnesses intentionally did not return counsel's messages, neither witness could provide an alibi consistent with defendant's statements about where defendant was on the night of the crimes, and, at a hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, the witnesses gave inconsistent testimony about defendant's whereabouts on the night of the crimes and admitted they visited defendant in jail before trial but did not credibly explain their failure to come forward as alibi witnesses, so counsel's failure to call them was reasonable trial strategy. Styles v. State, 279 Ga. 134, 610 S.E.2d 23 (2005).

Defendant did not show counsel provided ineffective assistance for not contacting possible alibi witnesses as defendant instructed counsel not to contact these witnesses; it was not unreasonable for counsel to follow this instruction, and it was not shown that these witnesses would have testified or provided an alibi defense. Brown v. State, 273 Ga. App. 577, 615 S.E.2d 628 (2005).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel spoke with an alibi witness who refused to testify on the defendant's behalf; in addition, counsel found that the alibi strained credulity and might harm the defendant's case. Johnson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 641, 618 S.E.2d 716 (2005).

Defendant did not meet the defendant's burden of showing prejudice to support the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as the defendant did not proffer an alleged alibi witness's testimony at the hearing on the defendant's new trial motion. Boatwright v. State, 281 Ga. App. 560, 636 S.E.2d 719 (2006).

Because the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to withdraw an alibi notice and failed to show prejudice by the introduction of the notice, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked merit. Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 651 S.E.2d 538 (2007).

In a malice murder prosecution, as the defendant did not give defense counsel the correct phone number for an alleged alibi witness until trial was underway, and the witness was out of state and counsel was unable to convince the witness to appear voluntarily, counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. Marshall v. State, 285 Ga. 351, 676 S.E.2d 201 (2009).

Attorneys did not provide the defendant ineffective assistance when the attorneys failed to timely serve notice of the defendant's alibi evidence because the attorneys testified that the attorneys discovered a theoretical alibi defense when searching through phone records produced by the state in late November 2006, and the attorneys talked with potential alibi witnesses and then gave notice of the alibi on December 1, 2006; prior to that time, the attorneys had no independent evidence of an alibi. Huckabee v. State, 287 Ga. 728, 699 S.E.2d 531 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present an alibi defense because an appellant admitted that the appellant committed the armed robberies, and Ga. St. Bar R. 4-102(d):3.3(a)(4) prohibited trial counsel from knowingly offering false evidence. Boykins-White v. State, 305 Ga. App. 827, 701 S.E.2d 221 (2010).

Trial counsel's decision not to request the production of the duct tape that was used to bind the defendant when the defendant was allegedly kidnapped was not patently unreasonable because the duct tape itself was cumulative of evidence that was introduced through the defendant's recorded police interview and trial counsel's cross-examination of a detective; even if it was assumed that trial counsel performed deficiently, the defendant proffered no evidence at the hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial that an analysis of the duct tape would have bolstered the defendant's alibi defense, and because the defendant did not proffer an analysis of the duct tape, the defendant failed to prove the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness claim. Buis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 644, 710 S.E.2d 850 (2011).

Defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different had trial counsel presented an alibi defense through evidence that the victim was in another state during some of the dates alleged in the indictment because the defendant offered nothing more than mere speculation that the victim was not in the state during the dates listed in the indictment. Davenport v. State, 316 Ga. App. 234, 729 S.E.2d 442 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present an alibi defense showing that the defendant was incarcerated during some of the time listed in the indictment because there was no evidence supporting an alibi defense; thus, the defendant did not meet the burden of showing a reasonable probability that the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial. Davenport v. State, 316 Ga. App. 234, 729 S.E.2d 442 (2012).

Coercion defense.

- Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel by the counsel's failure to reserve an objection to the failure to charge on coercion regarding the armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault charges against defendant because the failure to make a meritless objection was not ineffective assistance of counsel; there was no evidence that the codefendant threatened defendant during the commission of the offenses or forced defendant to drive the getaway car. Maxey v. State, 272 Ga. App. 800, 613 S.E.2d 236 (2005).

Because the defendant was identified by the victim as the robber and none of the proffered testimony related to an immediate threat, it was highly unlikely that the defendant was misidentified; consequently, because the trial court properly excluded the defendant's coercion defense, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it. Treadwell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 508, 613 S.E.2d 3 (2005).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to a jury charge on coercion as the defendant was not entitled to a charge on coercion since the defendant did not admit to participating in the crimes; any error in the charge was harmless error and the defendant was not prejudiced by any error. Olarte v. State, 273 Ga. App. 96, 614 S.E.2d 213 (2005).

Misidentification defense.

- Pretermitting whether the identification procedure used, in which the defendant was identified as the perpetrator of an armed robbery by the victims at a one-on-one showup identification, was impermissibly suggestive, the evidence showed no likelihood of irreparable misidentification, so trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the identification evidence. Sorrells v. State, 279 Ga. App. 18, 630 S.E.2d 171 (2006).

Failure to pursue certain forensic evidence or to challenge the state's failure to disclose certain forensic evidence was not ineffective assistance because the defendant failed to show that such evidence either existed or would have tended to exculpate the defendant; the misidentification defense was unrelated to a food stamp card found on the victim, and the defendant failed to show that the misidentification defense was outside the ambit of reasonable trial strategy. Butts v. State, 279 Ga. App. 28, 630 S.E.2d 182 (2006).

Failure to present sleepwalking defense.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert a sleepwalking defense since the decision was based on counsel's belief that the jury was more likely to believe a defense based on the accidental discharge of a defective weapon. Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 740 S.E.2d 158 (2013).

Justification defense.

- In circumstances in which a trial court found that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence which supported the defendant's justification defense, it was illogical to grant a new trial for charges of murder and aggravated assault, but not for possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime; the jury could have acquitted the defendant of the possession charge on the basis of justification. Langlands v. State, 280 Ga. 799, 633 S.E.2d 537 (2006).

In a malice murder trial, trial counsel, who relied on a defense of lack of malicious intent, was not ineffective for withdrawing a request to charge on justification. Self-defense was supported by only slight evidence at best, and such a defense might have risked alienating the jury; moreover, defense counsel reasonably concluded that if the defendant sought a charge on self-defense, the state would request a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 663 S.E.2d 206 (2008).

Because there was no evidence to support a justification defense pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), including defense of habitation under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23, trial counsel's performance could not be considered deficient for failure to pursue those defenses. Reese v. State, 289 Ga. 446, 711 S.E.2d 717 (2011).

Failure to present evidence of victim's violent act.

- When the defendant presented a prima facie case of justification, counsel was ineffective in not introducing evidence of a prior act of violence by the victim based on counsel's mistaken belief that such an act had to have occurred prior to the act being tried in order to be admissible. The error was not harmless, as the assault, which like the charged crime involved an assault with a gun upon a man leaving the residence of the victim's ex-spouse, was highly relevant to the sole defense of justification. Bennett v. State, 298 Ga. App. 464, 680 S.E.2d 538 (2009).

Investigation of victim's prior bad acts impacting effectiveness.

- Defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on counsel's ineffectiveness because defendant gave counsel no information (in support of defendant's self-defense claim) to conduct an investigation of the victims' alleged prior violent acts. Moreno-Rivera v. State, 291 Ga. 336, 729 S.E.2d 366 (2012).

Affirmative misrepresentations about effects of plea.

- Evidence showing that a doctor asked counsel about the effect of a nolo plea to sexual battery on the doctor's future participation in federal health care programs, and that counsel responded with affirmative misrepresentations, which were caused by the counsel's failure to perform basic research, required the habeas court to allow the doctor to withdraw the plea. State v. Patel, 280 Ga. 181, 626 S.E.2d 121 (2006).

No affirmative misrepresentations about effects of plea.

- Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of first appointed counsel lacked merit as the defendant did not contend that counsel affirmatively misrepresented the defendant's eligibility or ineligibility for parole, but merely asserted that counsel failed to sufficiently explain Georgia's parole system to the defendant. Toro v. State, 319 Ga. App. 39, 735 S.E.2d 80 (2012).

Plea deals.

- When the defendant was convicted of selling cocaine and obstruction of an officer, the defendant failed to establish that counsel was ineffective because trial counsel insisted that counsel communicated a plea to the defendant and that the defendant was "adamant" on not accepting the plea, and the record revealed that trial counsel had several meetings with the defendant, conducted discovery, filed pretrial motions, and spoke with most of the state's witnesses. Trammell v. State, 262 Ga. App. 786, 586 S.E.2d 693 (2003).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea on grounds that the defendant's attorney failed to inform the defendant that the defendant's plea was open-ended as opposed to negotiated when the plea transcript showed that the defendant was well aware that the plea was open-ended; that the defendant understood the consequences of the plea; and that the defendant entered the plea freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, with a full understanding that the defendant was subject to the maximum sentence. Dudley v. State, 266 Ga. App. 336, 596 S.E.2d 772 (2004).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from the failure of trial counsel to communicate a plea offer to the defendant was rejected as the trial court's decision not to credit the defendant's testimony, that a plea offer was only communicated to the defendant's mother and that the defendant would have accepted the plea, was not clearly erroneous. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Defendant did not show deficient performance for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis that counsel failed to adequately advise the defendant regarding a possible plea to the fleeing and attempting to elude and obstruction charges, and that the defendant's failure to plead guilty to these charges would result in the trial court's admission of similar transaction evidence; nor did the defendant show that counsel's failure to advise the defendant as to the consequences of counsel's concession of guilt in opening statement and closing argument constituted deficient performance. Mills v. State, 273 Ga. App. 699, 615 S.E.2d 824 (2005).

Defendant did not show that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, despite the defendant's claims that the defendant's attorney did not accurately convey a plea offer to the defendant and that the defendant's attorney waived objections to the allegedly illegal search of the defendant's vehicle following an investigatory stop of the vehicle, as the evidence showed that the attorney adequately explained the plea agreement to the defendant and the defendant nevertheless chose to reject the agreement, and the search of the vehicle was not illegal; accordingly, the defendant could not show that the defendant's attorney performed in an unreasonable manner and that the defendant was prejudiced by the attorney's conduct. Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga. App. 151, 619 S.E.2d 821 (2005).

Claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to communicate a plea bargain offer made by the state lacked merit, as the record did not support a finding that such a plea bargain had even been made by the state; there was no notation of such an offer in the prosecution's file, and the prosecutor did not recall such an offer and would not have re-indicted the matter in order to seek an increase in time that defendant would serve in prison if there had been such an offer. Lindo v. State, 278 Ga. App. 228, 628 S.E.2d 665 (2006).

Because the defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise the defendant regarding a plea offer, and counsel was not required to make meritless objections to the admission of testimony and evidence, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed. Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 526, 640 S.E.2d 271 (2007).

Because the defendant failed to present the testimony of either trial counsel to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus, the record of the new trial hearing was silent as to what actions were taken by counsel to prepare for the plea or to investigate the ramifications of the previous plea, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's withdrawal of the plea. Jackson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 742, 655 S.E.2d 323 (2007).

An ineffective assistance claim based on a guilty plea failed. The defendant did not assert that the defendant would have rejected the plea deal if counsel had told the defendant that the defendant was ineligible for parole or corrected the trial court's alleged misstatement about sentence review. Leary v. State, 291 Ga. App. 754, 662 S.E.2d 733 (2008).

It was error to deny an inmate's habeas petition when the only evidence of record, the inmate's affidavit, indicated that counsel gave erroneous advice that adversely affected the decision of the inmate, who entered into a negotiated plea, not to go to trial. Without a finding that counsel gave proper advice or that the inmate lacked credibility, the evidence did not support the conclusion that counsel was not deficient. Garrett v. State, 284 Ga. 31, 663 S.E.2d 153 (2008).

Evidence authorized the trial court to find that trial counsel's representation of the defendant in connection with an offered plea bargain was not deficient because the evidence showed that the defendant met with counsel several times prior to trial, the defendant discussed the facts of defendant's case with counsel, counsel explained to the defendant the problems defendant's custodial statement posed for the defense, and counsel set forth the potential sentence the defendant could expect if found guilty; after receiving advice from counsel, the defendant told counsel that the defendant still wanted to proceed to trial, and nothing in the record showed that the defendant was amenable to the state's plea bargain offer, as required for the defendant to demonstrate that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's representation. Miller v. State, 305 Ga. App. 620, 700 S.E.2d 617 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to adequately explain to the defendant the possibility that the defendant faced a mandatory life sentence or a sentence of life because the defendant did not carry the defendant's burden of proving that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the defendant would have accepted the state's plea offer; counsel testified that counsel discussed the plea offer with the defendant, told the defendant that the defendant was facing a possible life sentence or life without parole, and tried to explain the recidivist statute, but the defendant did not want to talk about it, and the defendant further testified that when the counsel attempted to discuss the details of the plea, defendant repeatedly said that it was not good enough and that counsel needed to do better. Chatman v. State, 306 Ga. App. 218, 702 S.E.2d 51 (2010).

Plea counsel did not perform deficiently for failing to investigate a robbery charge in another county because the defendant's only available means to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea to the robbery charge was through habeas-corpus proceedings; the defendant's first mention of any challenge to the defendant's plea of guilty to the robbery charge was well beyond the term of court in which the defendant was sentenced. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).

Habeas corpus petitioner failed to prove that trial counsel's performance was professionally deficient because trial counsel did not fail in the duty to offer the petitioner informed advice regarding the state's plea agreement offer; the petitioner admitted that the petitioner never told trial counsel that the petitioner wished to plead guilty, and trial counsel did not act in an unreasonable or professionally deficient manner in concluding that the petitioner had decided to let the petitioner's father speak for the petitioner and wished to reject the state's offer. Cammer v. Walker, 290 Ga. 251, 719 S.E.2d 437 (2011).

Defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because the court credited trial counsel's testimony that trial counsel fully explained the evidence and the strength of the state's case to the defendant, conveyed all plea bargain offers from the state to the defendant, and the defendant rejected those offers. Butler v. State, 319 Ga. App. 350, 734 S.E.2d 567 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise the defendant that, as a recidivist, the defendant faced a mandatory life sentence because even after being informed that the defendant could face a life sentence, the defendant continued to assert the defendant's innocence and request a jury trial. Biggins v. State, 322 Ga. App. 286, 744 S.E.2d 811 (2013).

Failure to obtain a plea agreement.

- Failure to obtain plea agreement for a malice murder, death sentenced defendant was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the state did not want to agree to a reduced sentence - primarily because there was no evidence the state needed from the defendant to prosecute other persons for two other (or the instant) murders. Franks v. State, 278 Ga. 246, 599 S.E.2d 134 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1058, 125 S. Ct. 870, 160 L. Ed. 2d 784 (2005).

Defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied as the trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to engage in plea negotiations since there was no evidence that the state made a plea offer to the defendant and a failure to initiate plea bargaining did not constitute deficient professional conduct; further the defendant failed to show that the defendant would have accepted any plea offer and thus did not show that the defendant was prejudiced. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 870, 635 S.E.2d 259 (2006).

Defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective due to counsel's alleged failure to engage in plea negotiations with respect to the defendant's multiple pending armed robbery charges as the failure to initiate plea negotiations by counsel did not, without more, constitute deficient performance. Simmons v. State, 309 Ga. App. 369, 710 S.E.2d 193 (2011).

Miscommunication on plea deal.

- Although the defendant claimed that the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in forwarding to the defendant a plea offer that was meant for another client and in failing to ensure that the defendant understood the statutory range of the defendant's sentence, the record showed that trial counsel informed the defendant later that month that counsel had sent the letter in error and that the plea offer the letter contained was not available to the defendant; the defendant presented no evidence that trial counsel's mistake led the defendant to plead guilty some five months later. Even assuming that trial counsel failed to properly ensure that the defendant understood the statutory range, the defendant's alleged confusion was corrected by the trial court before the defendant entered the plea, and the defendant presented no evidence that the defendant otherwise would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Frye v. State, 298 Ga. App. 415, 680 S.E.2d 431 (2009).

Guilty pleas.

- Reasonably effective assistance is an easier standard to meet in the context of a guilty plea than in a trial, but counsel still must render competent service: it is the lawyer's duty to ascertain if the plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly; the lawyer must actually and substantially assist the client in deciding whether to plead guilty; it is the lawyer's job to provide the accused an understanding of the law in relation to the facts; the advice the lawyer gives need not be perfect, but it must be reasonably competent; the lawyer's advice should permit the accused to make an informed and conscious choice; in other words, if the quality of counsel's service falls below a certain minimum level, the client's guilty plea cannot be knowing and voluntary because it will not represent an informed choice. McBryar v. McElroy, 510 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

In a case in which the defendant sought to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea after sentencing based on, inter alia, defense counsel's ineffectiveness in allegedly giving the defendant confusing advice about the sentence and in allegedly failing to inform the defendant that the defendant had the opportunity to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea prior to sentencing, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel was insufficient to justify allowing the defendant to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea as the record clearly showed that the defendant was well aware of the trial court's intention to sentence the defendant to 20 years in prison and that defense counsel had informed the defendant that the defendant could withdraw the defendant's guilty plea prior to sentencing if the defendant did not want to accept the intended sentence. Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 897, 581 S.E.2d 407 (2003).

Trial court did not commit clear error in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea as the defendant did not show that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and caused the defendant's plea of guilty to first-degree homicide by vehicle to be entered unknowingly and involuntarily; indeed, the record showed that defense counsel properly prepared the defendant's case and advised the defendant even though the trial court entered a slightly longer sentence than the defendant had expected and, as a result, the defendant entered the defendant's plea knowing the nature of the charges and consequences of the plea. David v. State, 261 Ga. App. 468, 583 S.E.2d 135 (2003).

A defendant, who was sentenced as a recidivist to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, failed to show that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to inform defendant that defendant would likely receive a mandatory sentence of life without parole if defendant rejected a plea offer because defendant failed to show that, when defendant rejected the plea, defendant was amenable to the offer made by the state. Carson v. State, 264 Ga. App. 763, 592 S.E.2d 161 (2003).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea as the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the defendant did not show that the plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel since the record showed that defense counsel fully advised the defendant in all aspects of the plea and no evidence existed to show that defense counsel was unprepared, unresponsive, or otherwise incompetent to represent the defendant. Payne v. State, 271 Ga. App. 619, 610 S.E.2d 572 (2005).

Because a trial judge informed the defendant of the charges as well as the possible penalties for conviction on those charges, the defendant's guilty plea was freely and voluntarily entered; the defendant failed to show that counsel's trial strategies were ineffective, and consequently, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. Hart v. State, 272 Ga. App. 754, 613 S.E.2d 107 (2005).

When the defendant's motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea was denied, the defendant did not show the defendant's trial counsel ineffectively advised the defendant about entering the plea because: (1) the defendant did not show what advice counsel should have given the defendant in addition to the advice given; (2) the defendant had ample time to consider the plea and several chances to withdraw the plea, so the defendant was not prejudiced by being given a last minute opportunity to plead; (3) trial counsel was not unprepared for trial; and (4) it was not shown that counsel was ineffective for not requesting a presentence investigation. Zellmer v. State, 273 Ga. App. 609, 615 S.E.2d 654 (2005).

Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not advising the defendant of the option of an Alford plea because the defendant had no constitutional right to plead guilty, there was no indication that the trial court would have been willing to accept such a plea, and the defendant and the family had rejected any possibility of entering a plea from the counsel's first involvement in the case. Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga. App. 806, 616 S.E.2d 148 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Defendant was not entitled to relief from a guilty plea because the defendant did not show that the trial counsel breached the duty to ensure that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty nor did the defendant show that there was prejudice as a result of the trial counsel's failure to file a meritless motion to recuse. Trimble v. State, 274 Ga. App. 536, 618 S.E.2d 163 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009).

Record did not support a claim that the defendant rejected the state's plea offer due to the ineffectiveness of defense counsel as the defendant was aware of the state's final plea offer and was aware of the potential of being sentenced as a recidivist; the defendant's claims regarding missing discovery documents were not credible. Himes v. State, 274 Ga. App. 541, 618 S.E.2d 174 (2005).

Denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was proper because: (1) the record showed that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily withdrew the pre-sentencing motion to change the plea to not guilty; (2) the trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to obtain a psychiatric evaluation, as there was no showing that the evaluation would have shown the existence of a psychiatric defense; and (3) speculation was insufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Terrell v. State, 274 Ga. App. 539, 618 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

When the defendant did not even allege, let alone establish, a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's purported error in failing to advise the defendant of a possible appeal right, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, and when the defendant cited no evidence that the defendant would have proceeded to trial but for counsel's alleged error, the defendant failed to make the required showing and the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel provided no basis for setting aside the guilty plea. Lee v. State, 277 Ga. App. 887, 627 S.E.2d 901 (2006).

Defendant failed to establish that the defendant received ineffective assistance in defense counsel's advice to plead guilty because the defendant's trial counsel testified that after the conviction in a first trial, it was counsel's best professional recommendation that the defendant plead guilty in the second case, as the second case was a lot worse than the first and that, if the defendant went to trial in the second case, the defendant was potentially facing a much longer sentence, but as a consequence of the plea, the defendant's maximum aggregate sentence in both cases was 15 years, with 13 to serve; moreover, the defendant's testimony demonstrated that the defendant understood that by pleading guilty, the defendant would not have to serve a longer sentence. Hollman v. State, 280 Ga. App. 53, 633 S.E.2d 395 (2006).

Defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea was properly denied as the defendant failed to show that defense counsel's performance was deficient in advising the defendant to enter a non-negotiated plea without a recommendation from the state; the defendant also did not overcome the presumption that defense counsel's conduct was reasonable as the defendant's testimony that the defense counsel led the defendant to believe that the defendant's sentence would be no more than 10 years' was contradicted by the defendant's testimony that the defendant understood that the defendant could be sentenced to life imprisonment, entreaties from the defendant's mother and the defense counsel for the imposition of concurrent sentences, and the defendant's decision to throw the defendant upon the mercy of the sentencing court. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 767, 634 S.E.2d 875 (2006).

Trial court did not err by denying a defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of the counsel representing the defendant at the plea hearing as: (1) the counsel met with the defendant several times prior to the plea hearing, reviewed the district attorney's file, and discussed with the defendant the evidence the state intended to present against the defendant; (2) the counsel moved to suppress the defendant's statements to the police and discussed the options available with the defendant after the motion was denied, including the state's offer of a plea recommendation; and (3) the defendant failed to show how additional communication with the counsel would have changed the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea. Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 637 S.E.2d 20 (2006).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea because the defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of trial counsel in incorrectly assessing the strength of the state's case, and recognizing the existence of exculpatory evidence; moreover, the appeals court rejected the defendant's coercion claim, as any coercion the defendant experienced did not manifest itself from counsel's actions, but arose from the circumstances the defendant felt during the entire hearing process. Collier v. State, 281 Ga. App. 646, 637 S.E.2d 72 (2006).

Because the defendant's current counsel filed the motion to suppress the defendant claimed initial counsel failed to do, and because the defendant chose to enter a guilty plea while that motion was pending, withdrawal of that plea based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to the initial counsel's failure to file the motion to suppress was not allowed as the evidence did not show that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have insisted on going to trial but for counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress. Lamb v. State, 282 Ga. App. 756, 639 S.E.2d 641 (2006).

Because a defendant failed to argue or show actual prejudice by the trial court's requirement that the defendant's previously appointed attorney remain present at the defense table after retaining new counsel only one week prior to trial, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea entered to possessing cocaine and speeding. Cole v. State, 284 Ga. App. 246, 643 S.E.2d 733 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 514 (Ga. 2007).

Because the defendant failed to show sufficient evidence of a psychological impairment, due in part by ceasing to take needed medication, sleep deprivation, racing thoughts or other psychological turmoil, or that trial counsel was ineffective as to counsel's advice regarding sentencing as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, the appeals court agreed that a guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered; thus, the trial court properly denied a motion to withdraw it. Frost v. State, 286 Ga. App. 694, 649 S.E.2d 878 (2007).

The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to a charge of malice murder, because sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding that: (1) counsel did not render ineffective assistance in advising the defendant as to the guilty plea; (2) counsel attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to pursue a voluntary manslaughter defense and plea deal with the state; (3) the defendant was generally competent at the time of the murder; (4) a statement by a proposed expert witness in support of the defense would have been inadmissible as an opinion on the ultimate issue and could not, in any event, have helped the defendant's case; and (5) the viability of any type of voluntary manslaughter defense was highly unlikely. Trauth v. State, 283 Ga. 141, 657 S.E.2d 225 (2008).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea to possession of cocaine and possession of tools for the commission of a crime charges as the defendant failed to show that the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered as the colloquy of the trial court indicated that the defendant was properly questioned and that the defendant's responses established that the plea and circumstances were understood and that the defendant was satisfied with trial counsel. Further, the defendant failed to establish that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel purportedly not explaining that the state was incapable of meeting the state's burden on a trafficking charge, causing the defendant to believe that the reduced charges were a part of a negotiated plea agreement, as the defendant testified that the defendant informed trial counsel that the defendant would take a plea if the trafficking offense was reduced. Franklin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 267, 661 S.E.2d 870 (2008).

With regard to the defendant's conviction for pimping, the defendant failed to establish that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of defense counsel allegedly failing to advise the defendant as to the consequences of a guilty plea as the defendant failed to show how further consultation with defense counsel would have impacted the decision to enter a guilty plea and the defendant failed to show how, but for counsel's performance, the defendant would not have pled guilty and proceeded to trial. Burroughs v. State, 292 Ga. App. 580, 665 S.E.2d 4 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1930, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 930 (Ga. 2008).

Pursuant to the record of the defendant inmate's plea hearing, the trial court properly provided advice regarding the rights being waived by the inmate's entry of a plea as well as the maximum sentences that could be imposed; there was no ineffectiveness in counsel's failure to inform the inmate of the right to appeal, and the trial court had no duty to inform the inmate that there was possibly a right to appeal from convictions that resulted from the guilty plea. Powell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 833, 678 S.E.2d 524 (2009).

Defendant, who sought to withdraw an Alford plea, did not show that the defendant misunderstood the state's recommendation concerning credit for time served or that counsel failed to listen to the defendant, much less that the defendant would have insisted on going to trial had the defendant been counseled properly. Thus, the defendant failed to prove that plea counsel was ineffective on this ground. Skinner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 828, 678 S.E.2d 526 (2009).

Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter. Pretermitting whether counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that the defendant would have insisted on a trial if the defendant had always known the defendant could be sentenced to serve 15 years instead of 10; furthermore, the defendant would have been tried for felony murder had the defendant gone to trial. Johnson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 197, 679 S.E.2d 763 (2009).

Defendant, who pled guilty to theft by shoplifting, did not establish that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to interview and subpoena witnesses because the defendant did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have insisted on going to trial but for trial counsel's failure to interview any potential witness, and the defendant failed to produce any such witness at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the defendant's plea; evidence supported the trial court's finding that the defendant was motivated to plead guilty after viewing a video of the defendant committing the crime and not as a result of any purportedly deficient performance by counsel. Trapp v. State, 309 Ga. App. 436, 710 S.E.2d 637 (2011).

Trial court was authorized to find that trial counsel's alleged deficiency of misinforming the defendant about the eligibility for parole was not prejudicial and did not present a manifest injustice requiring withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea because at the hearing conducted on the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, trial counsel testified that counsel had explained to the defendant that it was within the parole board's discretion to decide the parole issue and that no promises or guarantees could be made as to the length of the defendant's incarceration; the trial court was authorized to find that the defendant was not primarily concerned about parole eligibility but rather was concerned about proceeding to trial on the more serious charges before a jury that the defendant did not deem as being favorable because the defendant testified that the defendant did not like the composition of the potential jurors and wanted to put off the trial, and when trial counsel expressed uncertainty regarding how the defendant's probation revocations would affect parole eligibility, the defendant did not inquire further. James v. State, 309 Ga. App. 721, 710 S.E.2d 905 (2011).

Trial counsel's advice to the defendant regarding the effect of a guilty plea did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel correctly advised the defendant that once the defendant entered the guilty plea, the defendant was subject to being deported to Mexico as did the state and the trial court during the plea hearing; the defendant admitted being in the United States illegally, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement already had a hold on the defendant, and in addition to the felony child endangerment plea, the defendant was entering a third DUI plea within the past year. Lopez v. State, 309 Ga. App. 756, 711 S.E.2d 345 (2011).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the defendant's claim that plea counsel failed to explain the consequences of the non-negotiated guilty plea because the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the defendant knowingly and intelligently entered the guilty plea; during the plea hearing, the defendant confirmed that counsel discussed the plea petition and waiver-of-rights form with the defendant and that the defendant understood the form; the defendant then responded affirmatively when the state's prosecutor asked if the defendant understood the rights the defendant was waiving by pleading guilty, and the defendant affirmatively stated that the defendant understood when the trial court reiterated the rights the defendant was waiving by pleading guilty. Earley v. State, 310 Ga. App. 110, 712 S.E.2d 565 (2011).

Because the defendant declined the opportunity at a plea hearing to discuss any concerns with counsel's representation, the defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective; therefore, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's plea on that basis. Norwood v. State, 311 Ga. App. 815, 717 S.E.2d 316 (2011).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel informed the defendant of the state's extended plea offer and fully advised the defendant about the process; counsel informed the defendant that the defendant faced a possible recidivist punishment, that the state would withdraw the state's plea offer if it revealed the identity of the confidential informant, and that if the defendant rejected the offer, the only options were to enter a blind plea or proceed to trial. Arnold v. State, 315 Ga. App. 831, 728 S.E.2d 342 (2012).

Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant failed to establish an ineffectiveness claim because the defendant was adequately advised regarding the plea offer, the options, and the risks, but the defendant rejected the state's plea offer; having received the full and careful advice of counsel, the ultimate decision of whether to plead guilty belonged to the defendant. Cruz v. State, 315 Ga. App. 843, 729 S.E.2d 9 (2012).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel because the record authorized the trial court to reject the defendant's claim that counsel's performance was deficient and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency, the defendant would not have pled guilty; counsel testified that prior to the plea hearing, counsel reviewed with the defendant all of the evidence obtained through discovery and that counsel and the defendant had agreed on the strategy. Davis v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (June 27, 2012).

Failure to object to reference to codefendant's guilty plea.

- Because the defendant did not show that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if counsel had objected to a reference to a codefendant's guilty plea during the state's opening, the court did not have to determine whether counsel was deficient; furthermore, the jury was charged that opening statements were not evidence. Wilcox v. State, 297 Ga. App. 201, 677 S.E.2d 142 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1285, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 342 (Ga. 2009).

Advice not to testify.

- In a malice murder trial, trial counsel was not ineffective in advising the defendant not to testify even though only the defendant could have supplied the details surrounding the shooting, given the weakness of the state's case, the trial court's permission to argue justification without using the word, the defendant's reluctance to testify, the belief that the state's rebuttal witnesses would be very hostile, and the desire to eliminate the possibility of a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 663 S.E.2d 206 (2008).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for interfering with the defendant's right to testify at trial as: (1) counsel informed the defendant that, although the defendant had an absolute right to testify, counsel believed that it was in the defendant's interest not to testify for strategic reasons; and (2) based on the reasonable advice of counsel, the defendant voluntarily chose not to testify. Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. 312, 677 S.E.2d 76 (2009), overruled on other grounds, 287 Ga. 242, 695 S.E.2d 255 (2010).

No misstatement on sentence.

- Defendant's ineffective assistance claims failed because the defendant could not show deficient performance on the ground that defendant's defense counsel failed to correct the trial court and prosecutor's misstatement regarding the defendant's eligibility to seek review of the defendant's sentence; neither the trial court nor the prosecutor informed the defendant that the defendant was entitled to seek sentence review. Belcher v. State, 304 Ga. App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (2010).

Advising on sentencing.

- When the defendant alleged that the defendant's counsel inadequately advised the defendant as to the defendant's guilty plea, the defendant had to move to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea, develop the record on the defendant's ineffectiveness claim, and appeal the denial of the defendant's motion, and, because the defendant did not move to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea, and the only evidence of record was a transcript of the guilty plea hearing, the defendant could not challenge counsel's effectiveness in a direct appeal, and the defendant's motion to file an out-of-time appeal was properly denied. Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 493, 604 S.E.2d 157 (2004).

Even if counsel gave incorrect advice as to sentencing, a defendant did not establish that this caused the defendant to plead guilty, and a claim of ineffective assistance failed because the defendant was warned by the trial court at the plea hearing that the sentence imposed could be up to 15 years without parole; even if counsel was deficient in filing the notice of appeal prematurely, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, defendant did not suggest what evidence might have been presented at a plea withdrawal hearing, and thus failed to show that the lack of a ruling on the motions changed the outcome of the case. Thomas v. State, 278 Ga. App. 661, 629 S.E.2d 553 (2006).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was rejected as trial counsel testified that counsel advised defendant that defendant could receive a sentence of 85 years without parole. Porter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 513, 621 S.E.2d 523 (2005).

Despite the defendant's claims that trial counsel failed to: (1) discuss the possibility of a plea or engage in plea negotiations with the state; (2) advise defendant of the consequences of being sentenced as a recidivist; and (3) advise defendant of the consequences of a speedy trial demand, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed because the record showed that the state never made a plea offer and the defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for trial counsel's alleged remaining errors. Cater v. State, 280 Ga. App. 891, 635 S.E.2d 246 (2006).

Defendant, who sought to withdraw a guilty plea on the ground that defense counsel was ineffective, did not show that defense counsel was deficient; the trial court found that defense counsel was more credible than the defendant on the question of whether counsel had advised the defendant that the defendant, who had pled guilty to armed robbery, would not be eligible for parole or sentence review. Carson v. State, 286 Ga. App. 167, 648 S.E.2d 493 (2007).

Defendant failed to show that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to being coerced or deceived by counsel as to the length of sentence that could be imposed, and the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea entered into, because the record did not support the defendant's claim that counsel deceived the defendant about the length of the sentence as the defendant was advised of the maximum possible sentence and was told that there was no guarantee as to the length of sentence that would be imposed. Brantley v. State, 290 Ga. App. 764, 660 S.E.2d 846 (2008).

In a prosecution for possession of methamphetamine, the defendant claimed defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the defendant of the possibility of receiving a prison sentence without the possibility of parole. This claim failed as the trial court was entitled to believe trial counsel's testimony that counsel advised the defendant of this possible sentence before the defendant elected to go to trial. Matthews v. State, 294 Ga. App. 836, 670 S.E.2d 520 (2008).

It was proper to deny a defendant's motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance. There were opposing arguments, each supported by the record, as to whether the defendant would have pled guilty had counsel correctly informed the defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence, which presented factual matters primarily for resolution by the trial court. Childrey v. State, 294 Ga. App. 896, 670 S.E.2d 536 (2008).

Defendant could not establish that defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise the defendant that entering a guilty plea to two counts of molestation would subject the defendant to the state probation office's sex offender treatment program because the transcript of the plea hearing plainly reflected that both the prosecutor and the trial court expressly advised the defendant that the defendant would be required to comply with any and all screening and treatment recommendations of the state probation office as a special condition of defendant's probation; therefore, even if trial counsel failed to advise the defendant on those matters, the defendant was made cognizant of them prior to entry of defendant's plea but nevertheless chose to plead guilty, and the defendant could not demonstrate that the defendant was prejudiced by any failure of defendant's trial counsel to advise the defendant that the defendant would have to comply with all treatment recommendations of the probation office. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010).

Trial counsel's failure to advise a client that pleading guilty will require the client to register as a sex offender is constitutionally deficient performance; even if registration as a sex offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the failure to advise a client that the client's guilty plea will require registration is constitutionally deficient performance because prevailing professional norms support the view that defense counsel should advise their clients concerning registration as a sex offender prior to entry of a guilty plea. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010).

Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea to two counts of child molestation because defendant's trial counsel failed to advise the defendant that entering a plea of guilty to child molestation would necessitate that the defendant comply with the requirements of the state's sex offender registry statute, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12; the defendant was subject to the sex offender registration requirements at the time that the defendant entered into defendant's plea, the terms of the sex offender registry statute were succinct, clear, and explicit in setting forth the consequences of defendant's guilty plea, and defendant's trial counsel could have readily determined that the defendant was required to register and conveyed that information to the defendant. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010).

Defendant juvenile did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel testified that counsel met with the defendant several times and conveyed the sentencing offer to the defendant; although the defendant testified that counsel visited the defendant only twice and never communicated any information about the evidence that would be presented at trial or that the state had presented any plea offers, the juvenile court was authorized to believe counsel's testimony over the defendant's testimony. In the Interest of K.F., 316 Ga. App. 437, 729 S.E.2d 575 (2012).

Defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process based on counsel's alleged promise regarding the sentence to be imposed because the trial court expressly found that the defendant's testimony regarding what counsel told the defendant about the sentence that would be imposed lacked credibility and was contradicted by the testimony of counsel and the evidence of record. Davis v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (June 27, 2012).

Performance of counsel during sentencing.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for remaining silent during sentencing when the prosecutor erroneously stated that the defendant did not have a right to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the record reflected that the defendant's trial counsel responded that the defendant had a right to file a habeas petition. Additionally, after announcing the court's sentence, the trial court advised the defendant that the defendant had the right to challenge the convictions in habeas proceedings. Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga. 364, 711 S.E.2d 660 (2011).

Failure to advise defendant of prosecution as recidivist.

- A trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the defendant's drug-related convictions based on defense counsel failing to advise the defendant that the state intended to prosecute the defendant as a recidivist since the defendant did not testify that the defendant would have accepted a plea offer if the defendant had known that the defendant was facing the prospect of being sentenced as a recidivist, thus, the defendant failed to show that counsel's alleged deficiency affected the end result of the case. Furthermore, the defendant did not show in the record that the state made or was amenable to any plea negotiations. Heard v. State, 291 Ga. App. 550, 662 S.E.2d 310 (2008).

Use of word "victim" in trial.

- Trial court's ruling that it was highly unlikely that a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the defendant's case would have been different but for defense counsel's failure to object to the use of the word "victim" when referring to the victim was not clearly erroneous; moreover, defense counsel testified that the defense theory was to show that the prosecution was on a witch hunt against the defendant and not objecting to the state's use of the word "victim" reinforced that strategy of showing that the state was "paranoid." This was a matter of tactics and strategy, and whether wise or unwise did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Johnson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 341, 634 S.E.2d 134 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Kimbrough v. State, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 48 (Ga. 2017).

Failure to request redaction of drug reference in 9-1-1 tape.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request redaction of drug references in a9-1-1 tape as the defendant could not demonstrate the prejudice necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel since the defendant subsequently injected the issue of drugs into the case by testifying that the victim's home was a crack house and that the victim set the defendant up in order to protect the victim's grandchild, an alleged drug dealer. Atwell v. State, 293 Ga. App. 586, 667 S.E.2d 442 (2008).

Reference to the 9-11 tragedy.

- Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's reference to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; there was no evidence in the record as to trial counsel's perspective because trial counsel did not testify at the hearing on the motion for new trial, and while the appellate court did not condone the analogy's use so soon after the 9-11 tragedy, it could not conclude that but for trial counsel's failure to object to its use, the jury would have acquitted defendant. Chalvatzis v. State, 265 Ga. App. 699, 595 S.E.2d 558 (2004).

Prosecutor's use of word "rape."

- In a rape prosecution, defendant did not show that defendant's counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the prosecutor's repeated use of the word "rape" in examining witnesses because, if counsel erred, defendant did not show that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different had counsel raised this objection, as the trial court's instructions explained to the jury the difference between consensual sexual relations and rape and the state's burden of proving that the victim did not consent to sexual relations with defendant. Machuca v. State, 279 Ga. App. 231, 630 S.E.2d 828 (2006).

Reference to defendant as "monster" without objections.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to the defendant as "a monster" in the prosecutor's opening statement; defense counsel explained that the trial court had ruled against the state's request to admit similar transaction evidence, to the prosecutor's surprise, and that defense counsel wanted the trial to go forward without giving the state time to "regroup." Phillips v. State, 284 Ga. App. 683, 644 S.E.2d 535 (2007).

Objections to prosecutor's argument.

- Evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant's trial counsel rendered effective assistance because: (1) counsel did not err in not moving for a directed verdict because the evidence sufficed to sustain defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge; (2) counsel's failure to object to the trial court's failure to recharge the jury in the second phase of the bifurcated trial was harmless error; (3) counsel's failure to object to detective's testimony regarding citizens' complaints about a drug dealer was appropriate trial strategy because counsel did not want to call more attention to the statement; and (4) counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing argument statements was not deficient performance as each of the prosecutor's statements was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. 55, 601 S.E.2d 434 (2004).

Defendant did not show counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not object when the prosecutor made comments concerning facts that were not in evidence, as this was presumed strategic, absent testimony to the contrary, which was not presented. Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 317, 609 S.E.2d 643 (2004).

Because the trial result would not have been different if counsel had objected to the prosecutor's argument, the defendant failed to show that counsel was ineffective. Hunter v. State, 273 Ga. App. 52, 614 S.E.2d 179 (2005).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel by the failure to object to a passing reference to defendant's incarceration as the reason for defendant not being arrested sooner and to the initial arrest as being part of a "roundup"; all of the circumstances connected with a defendant's arrest were admissible, even those that established the commission of another criminal offense, if they were relevant and the testimony was relevant to counter any accusation that defendant's arrest was delayed due to lack of identification. Butler v. State, 277 Ga. App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (2005).

Defendant failed to establish that defense counsel's failure to object to a prosecutor's questions about specific instances of misconduct was ineffective assistance since trial counsel testified that, knowing that the state had no evidence of prior crimes to introduce, defense counsel's trial strategy was to show that the type of acts for which the defendant stood accused were "totally out of character," and since counsel further testified that counsel did not object to the two questions at issue because defense counsel believed that the door to that line of questioning had been opened and because the state possessed no evidence that could be introduced to harm the defendant. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. App. 570, 631 S.E.2d 772 (2006).

Trial counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 for failing to join the objection tendered by the codefendant's counsel to the prosecutor's closing argument that allegedly improperly shifted the burden of proof to the three defendants; trial counsel's decision not to add an objection on top of the codefendant's objection was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial, as the trial counsel had already objected once, the codefendant's objection to the statement had already been overruled, and the trial counsel testified that the trial counsel was prepared to argue extensively about the burden of proof and the judge's instructions on the burden of proof during the trial counsel's closing argument. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14, 635 S.E.2d 723 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1215, 127 S. Ct. 1266, 167 L. Ed. 2d 91 (2007).

Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to move for a mistrial after the prosecutor, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(a)(1), failed to notify the trial counsel of the defendant's oral admission made in custody and then elicited testimony from the officer to whom the admission was made indicating that the officer had testified about the admission at a pretrial hearing when the officer, in fact, had not so testified; the state acted in bad faith as the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony about the admission and knew about the admission long before trial, the defense counsel was prejudiced by the misconduct as, had the misconduct not occurred, the defense counsel would have understood the importance of obtaining the officer's pretrial testimony, and the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure, as the admission was central to the state's case and was not cumulative of other evidence. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 455, 636 S.E.2d 178 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to object to a portion of the state's closing argument that the defendant characterized as an impermissible golden rule reference; there was a presumption that defense counsel's actions were strategic, as appellate counsel did not call defense counsel at the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial to examine defense counsel on the conduct of the trial, and the appellate court found that the state's closing argument did not refer to the golden rule. Parks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 679, 637 S.E.2d 46 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that the state was relying on the same facts to support burglary and theft by taking charges; the two charges were not based on the same facts, and even if one was included in the other as a matter of fact, the defendant was not entitled to dismissal of either charge or to a limiting instruction. Martin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 375, 646 S.E.2d 339 (2007).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments failed when, because the prosecutor's suggestion in closing argument that the victim was bending when the victim was shot was authorized by the physical evidence, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's argument; although the defendant alleged that trial counsel failed to subpoena trial witnesses, the defendant admitted that there was no failure to introduce critical testimony at trial. Winfrey v. State, 286 Ga. App. 718, 650 S.E.2d 262 (2007).

Because the defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in presenting a defense and requesting jury instructions on the defendant's claim of innocence, and was authorized to forego objection to a challenged portion of the state's closing argument, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit and did not warrant a new trial. King v. State, 282 Ga. 505, 651 S.E.2d 711 (2007).

While the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that portion of the state's closing argument in which the prosecutor referenced a slain officer's funeral a week prior, as that fact had no relevance to the charges the defendant was facing, based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant's admission, the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute were upheld on appeal; thus, a new trial was properly denied. Cantrell v. State, 290 Ga. App. 651, 660 S.E.2d 468 (2008).

At a trial for trafficking in cocaine and for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting when the prosecutor, in closing, described attending the funeral of a police officer killed in the line of duty, as this tragic and emotionally charged event had no relation to the evidence admitted or the case at hand. The defendant, however, had not shown prejudice from counsel's deficient performance, as the defendant admitted having cocaine before being chased by police officers, an officer saw the defendant throw down a large bag while the defendant was being chased, and a large amount of cocaine was recovered in this same location, less than 40 yards from where the defendant surrendered. Cantrell v. State, 290 Ga. App. 651, 660 S.E.2d 468 (2008).

In a rape case, as the prosecutor did not offer a personal belief about the veracity of an eyewitness and victim during closing argument, but instead argued that based on the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the jury should conclude that those witnesses were telling the truth, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the argument. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to statements made by the prosecutor in opening and closing arguments because the statements were but a small part of a summary of the evidence best understood as conceding the ambiguities therein and were unlikely to be interpreted as comments on the defendant's failure to testify. Odom v. State, 304 Ga. App. 615, 697 S.E.2d 289, cert. denied, No. S10C1801, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 927 (Ga. 2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on the ground that trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's closing argument that the incident took place in a residential area and that the incident could have endangered innocent women and children because the defendant did not show how the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel objected to the second reference made by the prosecutor, and the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence did not include opening and closing statements of the attorneys. Odom v. State, 304 Ga. App. 615, 697 S.E.2d 289, cert. denied, No. S10C1801, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 927 (Ga. 2010).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant's trial counsel failed to object to the state's opening argument because no reversible error occurred with respect to the prosecutor's opening statement; the prosecutor had a good faith belief at the time that the prosecutor made the prosecutor's opening statement that a witness would testify that the witness saw the defendant with a gun, and the jury was instructed that the prosecutor's opening statement was not evidence. Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 702 S.E.2d 151 (2010).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to statements the prosecutor made during closing argument because counsel did object, and counsel's objection was successful; while the defendant asserted that counsel should have further moved for a mistrial, such decisions generally fell within the ambit of strategy and tactics. Wilson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 827, 703 S.E.2d 400 (2010).

Counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor's victim impact argument during opening statement because negative characterizations of the victim were proper since the characterizations were relevant to evidence later offered to explain the context in which the drug-related crimes occurred, and the prosecutor's allusion to the fact that the victim was no longer alive was relevant to the murder charge; a witness's testimony and photographs of the witness's injuries were directly relevant and admissible to prove the charge against the defendant of committing aggravated assault on the witness. Lacey v. State, 288 Ga. 341, 703 S.E.2d 617 (2010).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to arguments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments because the defendant failed to show either that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object or that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel objected under the standard of Strickland. Fletcher v. State, 307 Ga. App. 131, 704 S.E.2d 222 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant a new trial on the ground that the defendant's trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's statement during closing argument amounted to ineffective assistance because the defendant could not demonstrate that the deficiency in trial court's performance prejudiced the defendant; the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming, and there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the defendant's trial would have been more favorable had trial counsel objected, even successfully, to the prosecutor's statement in argument. Jones v. State, 288 Ga. 431, 704 S.E.2d 776 (2011).

Defendant did not show that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the prosecutor's improper argument because the prosecutor's comments, when read as a whole, did not constitute a warning to the jury regarding the defendant's future actions if the defendant remained free, but instead constituted a comment on the evidence, including the defendant's molestation of the similar-transaction victim. Even if the argument did violate the prohibition against future-dangerousness arguments by the state of Georgia, it was highly unlikely that this single portion of the prosecutor's closing argument contributed to the guilty verdict, given the evidence presented against the defendant. Cobb v. State, 309 Ga. App. 70, 709 S.E.2d 9 (2011).

Counsel's failure to object to a municipal court judge's improper testimony about the defendant's future dangerousness was not ineffective assistance as a matter of law. Bass v. State, 288 Ga. App. 690, 655 S.E.2d 303 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Ga. 2009).

A defendant did not show that trial counsel was ineffective by moving for a directed verdict at the close of the state's evidence, thereby allowing the state to introduce additional evidence when the motion was denied. Trial counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that moving for a directed verdict was trial strategy and that counsel hoped the motion would be granted by the trial court. Zapata v. State, 291 Ga. App. 485, 662 S.E.2d 271 (2008).

Failure to object to comments from court.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 was not violated by the trial court's remarks when giving reasons for a ruling, any objection to that comment by defendant's trial counsel would have been without merit. Artis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 287, 682 S.E.2d 375 (2009).

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to object after the state elicited improper testimony and improperly commented on defendant's pre-arrest silence; defendant was entitled to a new trial because the evidence was not overwhelming and the error occurred in direct examination, cross-examination of defendant, and the state's closing argument. State v. Moore, 318 Ga. App. 118, 733 S.E.2d 418 (2012).

Erroneous legal argument.

- Counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for allegedly failing to know or research the elements of rape, as counsel erroneously argued that there had to be actual physical force without considering that force could be by intimidation; while trial counsel's argument as to the element of intimidation may have been legally inaccurate, no prejudice was shown, as the trial court's charge did not contradict the argument advanced by trial counsel. Hutchens v. State, 281 Ga. App. 610, 636 S.E.2d 773 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Futile objections.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e) based on the statute's allowance of a conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine if a defendant possessed 28 grams or more, regardless of the purity of the methamphetamine mixture, while O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) only allowed a conviction for trafficking in cocaine if the mixture of cocaine had a purity of at least 10 percent; the proposed challenge was not supported by the evidence as the state's expert testified that 56.2 grams of the 79.0 grams of the substance tested was positive for methamphetamine, and there was no proffer or evidence as to the purity of the mixture or any allegation by defendants that the substance was not methamphetamine. Christopher v. State, 262 Ga. App. 257, 585 S.E.2d 107 (2003).

Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel at a trial for aggravated child molestation because it would have been futile to object to the 10-year old victim's videotaped statement, which was admissible under the exception in O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 for a child's statement of sexual abuse since there was sufficient indicia of reliability and the child was available to testify at trial. Campos v. State, 263 Ga. App. 119, 587 S.E.2d 264 (2003).

When defendant's counsel did not object to a nurse's testimony summarizing what the victim had told the nurse about her rape by defendant, this was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the victim's veracity was at issue, she was present at trial, under oath, and subject to cross-examination, and the nurse's testimony amounted to a prior consistent out-of-court statement, which was admissible. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 1, 601 S.E.2d 392 (2004).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel did not object to the admission of statements defendant made to two police officers during defendant's custodial interrogation because the claim had been resolved adversely to defendant during a pretrial hearing; a different result was not required because defendant's statements involved a denial of culpability for the crimes, not a confession induced by trickery and deceit. Sampson v. State, 279 Ga. 8, 608 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to similar transaction evidence as trial counsel did not testify at the ineffective assistance hearing and the decision was presumed to be strategic; further, any objection would have been futile as the transactions were sufficiently similar in that: (1) defendant lived with the victims' mothers; (2) the victims were left in defendant's care; (3) defendant pushed aside the victims' clothing to assault them; (4) defendant was discovered when family members walked in on defendant during the assaults; and (5) one victim was a child, while the other had the mental capacity of a child. Page v. State, 271 Ga. App. 541, 610 S.E.2d 171 (2005).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object when the state asked defendant why the defendant did not stay at the victim's home following the robbery, report the incident to authorities, or tell anyone defendant's version of events prior to the trial; the state's cross-examination did not infringe upon defendant's right to remain silent and since defendant's direct examination brought out virtually the same testimony as the allegedly improper cross-examination, defendant was not prejudiced by the state's inquiry. Olarte v. State, 273 Ga. App. 96, 614 S.E.2d 213 (2005).

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the trial court's communication with the jury as the failure to raise a meritless objection could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Defendant failed to show that the trial counsel was ineffective in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV, as statements made by a co-conspirator were admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5, and the failure of counsel to raise a non-meritorious hearsay objection did not constitute ineffective legal representation. Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 622 S.E.2d 1 (2005).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel by the failure to object to the trial court complying with a juror's request that defendant briefly stand before the jury before they watched a video of a drug transaction a second time; the objection would have been meritless. Butler v. State, 277 Ga. App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (2005).

It was not ineffective assistance to fail to seek a mistrial after the prosecutor made certain statements during closing arguments regarding the horribleness of child molestation, for which the defendant was on trial, as the statements were a fair inference drawn from the evidence and within the latitude given to counsel during closing. Steverson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 876, 625 S.E.2d 476 (2005).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to object to the police detective's testimony that the victim exhibited symptoms that, in the detective's training and experience, were displayed by victims of sexual or physical abuse; although the state did not ask the trial court to qualify the detective as an expert in forensic interviewing, the detective's testimony established the detective's qualifications as such, and the detective's testimony, therefore, was within permissible bounds. Malone v. State, 277 Ga. App. 694, 627 S.E.2d 378 (2006).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as: (1) a hearsay objection to statements the defendant made during an argument and to testimony that the defendant stated that the defendant should have killed the other witnesses would have been futile as the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; (2) a hearsay objection to a witness's testimony as to the defendant's statements during a van ride would also have been futile as the statements were admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3; and (3) counsel's strategic decision to attack certain testimony through cross-examination was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. 229, 637 S.E.2d 393 (2006).

In a shaken baby case, defense counsel was not ineffective in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to object to testimony about two earlier incidents, one in which the defendant left the victim alone after agreeing to baby sit, and another in which the defendant cut up the victim's shoes with a knife after arguing with the victim's mother; any objection would have been futile, as the two incidents were admissible to show the defendant's motive, intent, and bent of mind in shaking the victim. Mahan v. State, 282 Ga. App. 201, 638 S.E.2d 366 (2006).

No ineffectiveness of counsel was shown in a defendant's malice murder trial by the failure of the defendant's trial counsel to object to the introduction of a prior consistent statement of a witness whose motivation for testifying against the defendant had been vigorously examined in cross-examination; such an objection would have been futile because the veracity of the witness was placed in issue by the cross-examination, rendering the prior consistent statement admissible, and therefore no ineffectiveness of counsel was shown. Green v. State, 281 Ga. 322, 638 S.E.2d 288 (2006).

A prosecutor's closing argument did not ask the jurors to put themselves in the victim's place or imply that the defendant was a future danger to society, but instead the prosecutor argued that it would be nonsensical to find that a mean look could justify a shooting; such an argument was not improper in light of the defendant's justification defense, and counsel thus was not ineffective for failing to object to it. Carpenter v. State, 285 Ga. App. 296, 645 S.E.2d 709 (2007).

Counsel was not ineffective because the record established that the defendant's statement that a multipurpose tool belonged to the defendant was voluntary, and as such the statement was admissible; a motion to suppress by counsel would have been futile under the circumstances. Donnell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 135, 645 S.E.2d 614 (2007).

Because the defendant's counsel was not ineffective in failing to make a meritless objection and could not be held to a duty to anticipate changes in the law regarding the use of a nolo plea to impeach a witness, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. 778, 642 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Because the trial judge did not err in admonishing the victim to tell the truth, outside the presence of the jury, or by propounding a single question to the victim in the presence of the jury in order to develop the truth of the case, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to either action, as the objection would have lacked merit. Morales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 698, 649 S.E.2d 873 (2007).

In a child molestation case, trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting when a child advocate and a grandmother of the victim testified that they had told the victim to tell the truth; the statements were not improper bolstering because they did not constitute an opinion as to whether the victim was in fact telling the truth. Slade v. State, 287 Ga. App. 34, 651 S.E.2d 352 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56, 172 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2008).

Defendant's trial counsel could not be found to have rendered ineffective assistance in not objecting to the court's admonishment of the victim to tell the truth or the court's subsequent questioning of the victim, as the appeals court found that both actions by the trial court were proper; hence, any objection would have lacked merit. Morales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 698, 649 S.E.2d 873 (2007).

Counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to evidence that a bloodhound had tracked a human scent, as the evidence was admissible without a showing that such tracking had reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty, or for not objecting to expert testimony, as the expert had not made an impermissible comment on the ultimate issue in the case but merely posited a connection between two crimes. Bass v. State, 288 Ga. App. 690, 655 S.E.2d 303 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Ga. 2009).

Defendant did not carry the burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection to the trial court's allegedly erroneous decisions regarding merger of offenses and prosecutorial misconduct; neither of those decisions were in error. Chandler v. State, 309 Ga. App. 611, 710 S.E.2d 826 (2011).

Defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel from the defendant's trial counsel having failed to object to the absence of a charge instructing jurors that to convict the defendant of felony murder the jurors were to specifically find the underlying felony had some connection with the homicide. Inasmuch as the jury found the defendant guilty of malice murder and no conviction was entered on the felony murder charge, this enumeration of error was moot. Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 715 S.E.2d 110 (2011).

Failure to object to closing argument.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the state's closing argument that a club was not lenient about letting people in who were under 21 years of age because that was a reasonable inference from defendant's testimony that one had to be 21 years old to get into the club. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

When, in a prosecutor's closing argument in defendant's murder trial, the prosecutor said the state did not have to prove the exact time of the murder, unless defendant claimed an alibi, which the defendant did not, the prosecutor did not improperly comment on defendant's failure to testify, so defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor's closing argument. Washington v. State, 279 Ga. 722, 620 S.E.2d 809 (2005).

In a case in which a jury convicted the defendant for trafficking in cocaine, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to that portion of the prosecutor's closing argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant as a party to the crime as the prosecutor's statement was correct; even if counsel's failure to object could be considered deficient, it did not prejudice the jury. Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 362, 629 S.E.2d 5 (2006).

In a prosecution for kidnapping with bodily injury and aggravated assault, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for the defense counsel not to object to part of the prosecutor's closing argument, claiming that the prosecutor was trying to bait the jury into believing that its only opportunity to prevent crime in general was to convict the defendant, because exhorting jurors to have an impact on crime in general was not impermissible. Nelson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 548, 629 S.E.2d 410 (2006).

Defendant failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object to the state's closing argument, in which the prosecutor incorrectly stated that the burden of proof was on the defendant because defense counsel testified that counsel did not object because counsel knew that the trial court would instruct the jury that the attorney's argument was not evidence, and then would tell the jury that the state had the burden of proof; additionally, the trial judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden of proof and that the burden never shifted to the defendant. Kania v. State, 280 Ga. App. 356, 634 S.E.2d 146 (2006).

Because an objection to the prosecutor's closing argument would have been meritless, as the prosecutor's description of aggravated assault was in accordance with the statute, consistent with the trial court's instruction to the jury, and, given the evidence, could not have misled the jury into convicting the defendant on an alternate basis of aggravated assault not specified by the indictment, trial counsel could not be deemed ineffective. Dudley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 86, 640 S.E.2d 677 (2006).

Trial counsel's decision not to object to a witness's statement about the defendant's silence was strategic and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance; moreover, the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming. McClain v. State, 284 Ga. App. 187, 643 S.E.2d 273 (2007).

In a prosecution for child molestation involving a 12-year-old victim, evidence was properly admitted that the defendant also had sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old child. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's comment during closing argument that the defendant liked to perform sex acts on children as this was a fair comment on the evidence, and any objection would have been overruled. Martin v. State, 294 Ga. App. 117, 668 S.E.2d 549 (2008).

As the interpretation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-36 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801) in Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839 (1991), had only prospective application, it did not apply to the defendant's case, which was tried before Mallory was decided. Therefore, defense counsel's strategic decision not to object to the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's request for counsel was not prejudicial as a matter of law; in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the defendant did not establish a violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Patterson v. State, 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1117, 130 S. Ct. 1051, 175 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2010).

Even assuming that the prosecutor's request that the jury not turn the defendant loose on the streets was an improper comment on the defendant's future dangerousness, and that defense counsel's failure to object constituted deficient performance, in light of evidence that the defendant confessed to a murder to an accomplice, a cellmate, and an officer, the assumed deficient performance created little, if any, actual prejudice. Patterson v. State, 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1117, 130 S. Ct. 1051, 175 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2010).

In a prosecution for possession of controlled substances, defense counsel did not object to statements by the codefendant's counsel in closing argument regarding the multiple drug-related investigations of the defendant. As the argument was based on evidence produced at trial, an objection would not have been meritorious; therefore, the defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective. Kessinger v. State, 298 Ga. App. 479, 680 S.E.2d 546 (2009).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to comments made during the state's closing argument in which the prosecutor conveyed the prosecutor's personal assessment of the evidence because the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, and in light of the evidence, the defendant did not show that had trial counsel objected to the state's closing argument, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would be different. Bridges v. State, 286 Ga. 535, 690 S.E.2d 136 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object and/or to move for a mistrial due to a statement the assistant district attorney made during closing argument because the defendant did not demonstrate that any statement by the prosecution was not a reasonable inference from the evidence; the defendant did not show that but for a lack of objection or moving for a mistrial, there was the reasonable probability that the outcome of the defendant's trial would have been different. Sanford v. State, 287 Ga. 351, 695 S.E.2d 579 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1514, 179 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2011).

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's characterization of the defendant as a "thug" during closing argument because the prosecution was afforded wide latitude in closing argument, and the characterization was based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Dockery v. State, 287 Ga. 275, 695 S.E.2d 599 (2010).

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel because even assuming that counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to the prosecutor's argument, despite counsel's explanation of the strategy, the defendant failed to carry the defendant's burden to show prejudice since the trial court instructed the jury that closing arguments were not evidence and that it was the jury's responsibility to decide the case based on the evidence introduced in court, which would exclude what the jury could have heard on television. Because the evidence against the defendant was strong, even if counsel had objected to the argument and the trial court had sustained the objection and instructed the jurors specifically not to rely on what the jurors had heard on television, there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 700 S.E.2d 399 (2010).

Trial counsel did not provide deficient performance in failing to object to the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument because the remarks did not constitute an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify since the state's manifest intention was not to comment on the defendant's silence to the police or failure to testify at trial but to comment on the defendant's failure to assert the defendant's innocence in response to a request by an acquaintance for the defendant to go to the police; taken in context, the prosecutor's closing argument did not directly or naturally implicate the defendant's decision not to testify, but the prosecutor was simply making a reasonable inference based on previous testimony. Cannon v. State, 288 Ga. 225, 702 S.E.2d 845 (2010).

Trial court's finding that the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel was not clearly erroneous because trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's permissible closing argument could not serve as the basis for an ineffective assistance claim; the prosecutor was not offering the prosecutor's personal belief about the veracity of a state witness, but instead was arguing that, based on the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the jury could conclude that the witness was telling the truth, and when read in context, the prosecutor's statements to the jury that the witness was telling you the truth were suggestions to the jury of inferences the jury could draw from the evidence presented and were made in response to trial counsel's attack on the witness's credibility during cross-examination. Herndon v. State, 309 Ga. App. 403, 710 S.E.2d 607 (2011).

Defendant's counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument because the prosecutor's argument that the victim could not have been lying due to the level of detail in the victim's testimony merely urged the jury to make a deduction about the victim's veracity based upon the evidence adduced at trial; the remarks did not constitute a statement of the prosecutor's personal belief as to the victim's veracity, and any objection thereto would have been meritless. Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 450, 710 S.E.2d 649 (2011).

Trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments during closing argument did not constitute deficient performance because the comments of which defendant complained were permissible; the comments were the conclusion the prosecutor wished the jury to draw from the evidence and not a statement of the prosecutor's personal belief as to the veracity of a witness. Strickland v. State, 311 Ga. App. 400, 715 S.E.2d 798 (2011).

Defendant failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's improper argument because even assuming that an objection to the offending argument would have had merit, the defendant did not show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel made the objection. Jeffers v. State, 290 Ga. 311, 721 S.E.2d 86 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object during closing arguments when the state commented on the defendant's right to remain silent and failure to come forward because the prosecutor did not act inappropriately; the defendant initially placed the evidence before the jury that the defendant fled and did not go to police after the shooting. Kendrick v. State, 290 Ga. 873, 725 S.E.2d 296 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the state's argument that no person in the circuit had ever been convicted and later proven innocent because the trial court would not have abused the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial had one been made and did not err when the court credited trial counsel's defense of counsel's decision not to object to the prosecutor's closing argument as strategic; even assuming that the prosecutor should not have compared the defendant to others, the subject of wrongful convictions in other cases was brought up by the defendant, and the jury was not impressed either way by the colloquy. Stubbs v. State, 315 Ga. App. 482, 727 S.E.2d 229 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's closing arguments because evidence supported the trial court's determination that no improper comments were made during the state's closing argument. Davenport v. State, 316 Ga. App. 234, 729 S.E.2d 442 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's closing argument which the defendant alleged shifted the burden of proof to the defense because trial counsel made the strategic decision not to object so as not to draw the jury's attention to the statements. Maurer v. State, 320 Ga. App. 585, 740 S.E.2d 318 (2013).

When it would have been meritless for defense counsel to object to portions of the state's closing argument and to reserve objections to the jury charge, the failure to make the objections did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Sampson v. State, 282 Ga. 82, 646 S.E.2d 60 (2007).

Time for closing argument.

- While the defendant met the burden of showing trial counsel's deficient performance based on a misimpression that counsel was entitled to only one hour to make a closing argument, instead of two as permitted by O.C.G.A. § 17-8-73, the defendant failed to show that but for that error, trial counsel could have convinced the jury that the defendant was innocent of the crimes charged. Hardeman v. State, 281 Ga. 220, 635 S.E.2d 698 (2006).

Although defense counsel did not object when counsel's closing argument was limited to one hour, even though the kidnapping charge permitted two hours, the defendant failed to show prejudice necessary for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because there was no reasonable possibility of an acquittal even if counsel had demanded two hours of closing argument due to the lack of complex issues, the fact that the defendant admitted to most of the charges, and counsel addressed all pertinent issues in counsel's closing argument. Hammond v. State, 303 Ga. App. 176, 692 S.E.2d 760 (2010), aff'd, 289 Ga. 142, 710 S.E.2d 124 (2011).

Timing of jury instructions.

- Trial counsel's failure to object when the court gave jury instructions before closing arguments did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel since the trial counsel explained the process to the defendant and the defendant agreed to the reversal of the usual process. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853, 596 S.E.2d 597 (2004).

Questioning of jurors.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to object to a prosecutor's questions to a jury panel relating to aiding and abetting in which the prosecutor used an armed robbery involving a getaway car as an example; because there was nothing in the circumstances of the defendant's case, which involved the defendant riding in a stolen vehicle and eluding police officers, that would have caused the prosecutor's reference to the extrinsic offense of armed robbery to have improperly influenced the jurors. Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (2006).

Assuming defense counsel's performance was deficient during the defendant's trial for aggravated assault and criminal trespass for failing to object to the trial court's failure to ask the qualifying voir dire questions that are required by O.C.G.A. § 15-12-164(a), the defendant failed to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the trial court asked the statutory questions as the prosecutor asked the potential jurors whether the jurors were acquainted with the defendant or the victim, and if so, whether they could remain impartial. Since the potential jurors indicated no bias and the defendant did not contend that any juror was, in fact, biased or prejudiced, the defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Burnette v. State, 291 Ga. App. 504, 662 S.E.2d 272 (2008).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because although the defendant argued that the defendant's trial counsel failed to ask prospective jurors certain questions during voir dire, the defendant made no assertion as to what answers any prospective juror would have given had the juror been asked any of those questions or as to what significance any such answer would have had; because the record also did not show that any other prospective jurors were erroneously qualified or disqualified due to any actions that the trial counsel took or failed to take, no prejudice could be assigned to the alleged error by trial counsel. Ware v. State, 307 Ga. App. 782, 706 S.E.2d 143 (2011).

Defendant's claim that the defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request that the trial court examine the remaining jurors whether the jurors had been affected by a juror after the juror had been removed was unsupported, and the defendant could not show prejudice or harm because there was no error on which to premise the claim of ineffective assistance; the defendant did not request that the trial court question the remaining jurors, and the juror's responses clearly indicated that the juror's statement to the other jurors about the juror's conflict was exceedingly minimal and that the others had no reaction to the statement. Sharpe v. State, 288 Ga. 565, 707 S.E.2d 338 (2011).

When the defendant was on trial for murdering a girlfriend, as defense counsel decided not to further question a prospective juror, who had strong feelings about domestic violence, in order to avoid tainting the remaining jurors, this was a reasonable strategic decision that did not constitute ineffective assistance. Cade v. State, 289 Ga. 805, 716 S.E.2d 196 (2011).

Failure to challenge jury array.

- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge or object to the racial composition of the jury panel because the panel appeared to mirror the demographics of the county as a whole. Goodall v. State, 277 Ga. App. 600, 627 S.E.2d 183 (2006).

As defense counsel testified that counsel believed the state's race-neutral reasons for striking African-Americans during voir dire, and as the jury panel comprised 10 white members and two African-American members, counsel was not ineffective for not raising a Batson challenge. Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (2008).

Because the defendant waived any objection regarding an unsummoned juror, and because evidence supported the trial court's finding that the state's reasons for striking the challenged jurors were race-neutral, the defendant did not show that counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance. Allen v. State, 299 Ga. App. 201, 683 S.E.2d 343 (2009).

Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise a Batson challenge because the defendant failed to show that a Batson challenge would have been successful since the defendant neither called the state's prosecutors to testify at the motion for new trial hearing nor sought out or attempted to introduce their notes regarding the striking of jurors prior to trial; only the state attempted to elicit that information during the state's cross-examination of trial counsel, and the resulting testimony indicated that the state did have race-neutral reasons for using the state's peremptory strikes. Stokes v. State, 289 Ga. 702, 715 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Failure to object to juror.

- Trial court determined under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(c) that a juror who had recently moved from the county was competent to serve, and the defendant presented no evidence to contradict this finding; even if the counsel's failure to object to the juror could be deemed ineffective representation, the defendant did not show that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Lawson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 852, 630 S.E.2d 131 (2006).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII for failing to properly pursue an equal protection objection under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. II based on the exclusion of African-Americans from the jury and from the pool of available jurors; the only evidence showed that the population of available African-American jurors in the trial court's county was very small, and the defendant did not show that the jury list failed to contain a fair cross section of the community or that there was purposeful discrimination in the selection of the panel. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 64, 635 S.E.2d 358 (2006).

Appeals court rejected the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on trial counsel's failure to move for mistrial or seek the removal of a juror who became nauseated during the state's cross-examination of the defendant and left the courtroom with the bailiff, but who thereafter indicated a willingness to continue and was allowed to remain on the jury, as: (1) nothing showed either that the juror was rendered unable by illness to continue or that anything improper occurred while the juror was separated from the others during the juror's temporary illness; (2) the defendant failed to show any prejudice by the lack of an inquiry; and (3) the defendant was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice due to an irregularity in the conduct of a juror. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 644 S.E.2d 853 (2007).

Defendant did not overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's failure to seek a juror's removal for cause constituted reasonable professional assistance because the defendant did not question trial counsel at the motion for new trial hearing about counsel's decision-making with regard to this issue, and the trial transcript showed that the juror did not meet the qualification for dismissal for cause. Higginbotham v. State, 287 Ga. 187, 695 S.E.2d 210 (2010).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to move to strike three prospective jurors for cause, all of whom said the jurors had strong feelings about individuals involved in the sale of illegal drugs, because the jurors all indicated the jurors could try to judge the case based upon the court's instructions and the evidence. Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013).

Failure to object to limitation on voir dire.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to limitations on voir dire because the defendant was nevertheless able to adequately explore any inclination or bias that might have derived from strong feelings that prospective jurors had about individuals involved in the sale of illegal drugs. Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013).

Failure to ensure defendant's presence at in-chamber hearing on juror removal.

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for malice murder, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial based on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a juror remaining on the panel after a brief encounter with one of the state's witnesses and the failure to insist that defendant be allowed to personally participate in the in-chambers hearing on the issue. The decision to allow the juror to remain on the panel was a reasonable tactical decision made after a hearing was held on the issue and no harm was established by the defendant not being present during the in-chambers hearing on the issue as a result of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Peterson v. State, 284 Ga. 275, 663 S.E.2d 164 (2008).

Failure to allow defendant's "participation" in voir dire.

- Defendant had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel based on the defendant's claim that the defendant was not allowed to participate in jury selection. Trial counsel testified that the defendant was present during voir dire and that counsel and the defendant did have some discussion about prospective jurors; moreover, the defendant did not suggest how jury selection would have been different if the defendant had participated. Daugherty v. State, 291 Ga. App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 792 (Ga. 2008).

Failure to poll jury.

- Because the failure to timely request a jury poll did not amount to deficient performance and trial counsel's preparation was not deficient or prejudicial, the appeals court rejected the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Hodge v. State, 287 Ga. App. 750, 652 S.E.2d 634 (2007).

A jury sent a question to the trial court, but before it could respond, the jury reached a verdict. The defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for not demanding that the jury be polled; moreover, the defendant failed to show it was reasonably probable that had the jury been polled, a problem with the verdict would have become apparent. Soloman v. State, 294 Ga. App. 520, 669 S.E.2d 430 (2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to conduct a poll of the jury because the defendant cited no authority to support the position that a poll of the jury was required under the circumstances to provide effective representation. Bonner v. State, 308 Ga. App. 827, 709 S.E.2d 358 (2011).

Counsel's use of peremptory strike after juror removed for cause.

- Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel after defendant's attorney used a peremptory strike to strike a juror who had already been stricken for cause; defendant was prejudiced by the unnecessary waste of a peremptory strike, and the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial was improper. Fortson v. State, 277 Ga. 164, 587 S.E.2d 39 (2003).

Failure to request voir dire transcription.

- Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failure to request that voir dire be transcribed; the defendant argued that a juror made a misrepresentation during voir dire that the juror did not know the defendant even though the defendant had served prison time with the juror's son, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in accepting the juror's testimony that the juror did not know the defendant or have any bias against the defendant. Robinson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 76, 635 S.E.2d 380 (2006).

Because convictions did not merge, trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the trial court's failure to merge them. Smashum v. State, 293 Ga. App. 41, 666 S.E.2d 549 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 952 (Ga. 2008).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to have voir dire taken down by a court reporter because the defendant did not show prejudice since the defendant failed to establish that a Batson violation, or any other irregularity, occurred and the record revealed no dispute at trial about the questioning and responses with respect to a juror; trial counsel testified that even though voir dire was not officially recorded, the co-counsel's primary duty was to take notes throughout trial, including voir dire, and that all the notes and other legal work by defense counsel on the case were turned over to the appellate counsel. Hunt v. State, 288 Ga. 794, 708 S.E.2d 357 (2011).

Failure to provide voir dire transcript.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the state's explanations for striking jurors, to move to suppress evidence obtained from a search after the armed robbery of a theater, to move to strike certain testimony, and by waiving the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict because the defendant failed to provide a transcript of the voir dire conference. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 625 S.E.2d 411 (2005).

Failure to ask that closing argument be recorded.

- Because the jury was informed of a stipulation and were read the contents of the victim's post-mortem toxicology reports, the trial court properly limited defense counsel's closing arguments; defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to ask that closing argument be reported or for failing to request a jury charge on manslaughter, since defendant claimed that the shooting was accidental. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 600, 619 S.E.2d 649 (2005).

In view of the trial court's curative instruction and the evidence against the defendant, no reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the defendant's case would have been different had trial counsel requested that the jury be excused before counsel moved for a mistrial. Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. App. 211, 645 S.E.2d 692 (2007).

Failure to challenge admission of testimony.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of testimony regarding the victim's dying declaration because the statement satisfied the requirements for admission of a dying declaration under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804); the defendant identified no valid basis for objection. Mathis v. State, 291 Ga. 268, 728 S.E.2d 661 (2012).

Failure to object to further jury deliberations.

- Defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV in failing to object to the trial court's ordering the jury back into deliberations when the jury could not come to a verdict on the charged offense or the lesser-included offense; an objection would have been meritless, as the jury had not yet come to a decision on the count at issue, thus there had been no acquittal. Giacini v. State, 281 Ga. App. 426, 636 S.E.2d 145 (2006).

Failure to object to communication with jury on unanimous decision issue.

- When a trial judge, upon learning of a jury's question during deliberations as to whether its verdict had to be unanimous, allowed the bailiff to communicate an answer to the question directly to the jury outside the presence of defendant, counsel, the prosecutor, the judge, or a court reporter, before telling the prosecutor or defense counsel of the court's intentions, and defense counsel did not raise an objection or request that the matter be placed on the record, it could not be found that defendant was not prejudiced. Lindsey v. State, 277 Ga. App. 18, 625 S.E.2d 431 (2005).

Jury instructions impacting ineffectiveness argument.

- Despite the various ineffective assistance of counsel claims involving a number of evidentiary issues and the jury instructions issued by the trial court, because the defendant failed to show that the objections made or not made by trial counsel prejudiced the defense, or that the instructions given were not in and of themselves deficient or correct statements of the law, the claims lacked merit. Goldey v. State, 289 Ga. App. 198, 656 S.E.2d 549 (2008).

In a prosecution against the defendant on two counts of child molestation, because trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to request specific jury charge addressing alleged improper bolstering testimony, present any expert testimony which was not helpful to the defense, and elicit available favorable evidence and impeach the victim's testimony, the defendant's convictions of related offenses were upheld on appeal; thus, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial on grounds that trial counsel was ineffective. Rouse v. State, 290 Ga. App. 740, 660 S.E.2d 476 (2008).

Defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an adverse inference instruction when the defendant failed to return to the courtroom after the first day of trial; appellate counsel declined to have trial counsel testify at the hearing on the motion for a new trial and without any other evidence to the contrary, trial counsel's decision regarding the instruction was presumed to be strategic. Spragg v. State, 292 Ga. App. 37, 663 S.E.2d 389 (2008).

Failure to obtain recusal of trial judge.

- Because the absence of a Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 25.1 affidavit in support of defendant's motion to recuse the trial judge did not affect the court's consideration of the motion, and although defense counsel was unable to cite any law indicating that the judge should be disqualified after presiding over defendant's prior probation revocation proceedings, defendant did not demonstrate either deficient performance by counsel or prejudice in failing to secure the trial judge's recusal. Paul v. State, 296 Ga. App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (2009).

Failure to request mistrial based on presence of SWAT team members.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a mistrial or curative instructions because the defendant did not show with reasonable probability that the presence of SWAT team members in the courtroom affected the outcome of the trial. Davis v. State, 309 Ga. App. 831, 711 S.E.2d 324 (2011).

Failure to request mistrial.

- Transcript revealed that the state's inquiry into defendant's silence was neither manifestly intended to comment on defendant's failure to testify nor was it of such character that it would have prejudiced the jury, and because the trial court sustained the defense's objection to the questioning and gave a curative instruction to the jury, defendant could not show either that counsel's tactical decision not to move for a mistrial fell outside the wide range of reasonably effective assistance, or that defendant would have been granted a mistrial but for counsel's decision not to move for one. Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 502, 591 S.E.2d 784 (2004).

Defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied as the trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to move for a mistrial when the trial counsel learned of an improper jury-bailiff communication since the improper communication was placed on the record and remedial instructions were given before the jury's deliberations. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 870, 635 S.E.2d 259 (2006).

Defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV due to defense counsel's failure to request a mistrial when a police officer testified that the officer believed that the victim in the child molestation case was telling the truth; while the witness was prohibited under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 from bolstering the victim's testimony, it was not clear that the trial court would have granted a mistrial had the defendant requested one, as the defense counsel had objected to the statement and the trial court had issued a curative instruction. Goldstein v. State, 283 Ga. App. 1, 640 S.E.2d 599 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0623, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 338 (Ga. 2007).

Because trial counsel's failure to move for a mistrial could have been a strategic decision, and because the defendant did not question trial counsel concerning this decision, the defendant failed to show that this failure amounted to deficient performance. Vonhagel v. State, 287 Ga. App. 507, 651 S.E.2d 793 (2007).

As there was no showing that a juror heard anything improper during a bench conference, the trial court did not err in not sua sponte declaring a mistrial. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving for a mistrial or removal of the juror as such motion would have been denied. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 304, 667 S.E.2d 65 (2008).

Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial or object to the state proceeding against the defendant on a different indictment in the midst of trial because any error in failing to try the defendant upon a "perfect" indictment was manifestly harmless when after the trial court severed an armed robbery charge from one of the indictments, the charges were identical in the two indictments, and the defendant did not show that the defendant suffered any prejudice from the state's mistake or by proceeding under the older indictment; the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding the mistake dealt with trial counsel's concern that the jury would think the defendant had two pending indictments, and the instruction was sufficient to cure any error. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 222, 690 S.E.2d 867 (2010).

Because defendant's failure to renew motions for a mistrial after declining a curative instruction waived the issue on appeal, and because the outcome of the trial would not have been different if trial counsel had renewed the motions, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to do so. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 853, 700 S.E.2d 735 (2010).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to seek a mistrial when the prosecutor elicited certain testimony from the police detective who investigated the case and procured the photographic lineup because the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that an objection or motion for mistrial related to the detective's testimony would have changed the outcome of the defendant's trial; the robbed teller made an in-court identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, and the jurors were shown video footage of the robber committing the crime as well as still photographs of the robber's face. Ware v. State, 307 Ga. App. 782, 706 S.E.2d 143 (2011).

Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to renew a motion for mistrial after the trial court gave a curative instruction because the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice; trial counsel had twice moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied, and the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in giving the curative instruction, which preserved the defendant's right to a fair trial. Sanders v. State, 290 Ga. 445, 721 S.E.2d 834 (2012).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a mistrial after learning of improper conduct between two jurors and a spectator at the trial because the communication at issue did not involve extrajudicial information, a discussion of the facts or legal issues in the case, or improper conduct by the jurors themselves and, thus, the defendant suffered no prejudice. Causey v. State, 319 Ga. App. 841, 738 S.E.2d 672 (2013).

Trial counsel's decision not to move for a mistrial when the trial court mentioned the redacted count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon did not amount to ineffective assistance because the decision was based on counsel's belief that the single mention would not have any influence on the jury and the fact that the trial court gave an adequate curative instruction. Vanstavern v. State, 293 Ga. 123, 744 S.E.2d 42 (2013).

Failure to file motion for directed verdict.

- Defendant's contention that the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel because counsel made no motion for a directed verdict of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence is without merit. Galloway v. State, 165 Ga. App. 536, 301 S.E.2d 894 (1983).

Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV for failing to file a motion for directed verdict based upon the alleged fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial; such a motion would have been meritless, as the variance was found to be immaterial because the indictment still gave the defendant adequate notice of the charge alleged. Fields v. State, 281 Ga. App. 733, 637 S.E.2d 136 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).