exclusionary rule in Georgia

2024We disagree. 8 We note that, in the trial court, the State argued that a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply to preclude suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, though the State also acknowledged that “Georgia has historically not recognized the good-faith exception.” See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 (422 SE2d 426) (1992) (construing OCGA § 17-5-30 to hold that Georgia does not recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (104 SCt 3405, 82 LE2d 677) (1984)).

2024We disagree. 8 We note that, in the trial court, the State argued that a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply to preclude suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, though the State also acknowledged that “Georgia has historically not recognized the good-faith exception.” See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 (422 SE2d 426) (1992) (construing OCGA § 17-5-30 to hold that Georgia does not recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (104 SCt 3405, 82 LE2d 677) (1984)).

2024We disagree. 8 We note that, in the trial court, the State argued that a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply to preclude suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, though the State also acknowledged that “Georgia has historically not recognized the good-faith exception.” See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 (422 SE2d 426) (1992) (construing OCGA § 17-5-30 to hold that Georgia does not recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (104 SCt 3405, 82 LE2d 677) (1984)).

2024We disagree. 8 We note that, in the trial court, the State argued that a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply to preclude suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, though the State also acknowledged that “Georgia has historically not recognized the good-faith exception.” See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573 (422 SE2d 426) (1992) (construing OCGA § 17-5-30 to hold that Georgia does not recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (104 SCt 3405, 82 LE2d 677) (1984)).

2019Compare with Teal , 282 Ga. at 326-327 (2), 647 S.E.2d 15 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to a warrantless search of a hotel room because an application for a warrant had been prepared based on evidence gathered prior to the illegal entry and inevitably would have been discovered). 36 Compare with Henderson , 305 F.3d at 1057-1058 (1) (A). 37 See Riley , 573 U.S. at 401-402 (IV), 134 S.Ct. 2473 . 38 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 39 (Punctuation omitted.) Harvey v. State , 266 Ga. 671 , 672, 469 S.E.2d 176 (1996), citing Gary v. State , 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2

2019Compare with Teal , 282 Ga. at 326-327 (2), 647 S.E.2d 15 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to a warrantless search of a hotel room because an application for a warrant had been prepared based on evidence gathered prior to the illegal entry and inevitably would have been discovered). 36 Compare with Henderson , 305 F.3d at 1057-1058 (1) (A). 37 See Riley , 573 U.S. at 401-402 (IV), 134 S.Ct. 2473 . 38 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 39 (Punctuation omitted.) Harvey v. State , 266 Ga. 671 , 672, 469 S.E.2d 176 (1996), citing Gary v. State , 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2

2019“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim,” however, but instead “to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (III) ( 94 SCt 613 , 38 LE2d 561) (1974).

2019“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim,” however, but instead “to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (III) ( 94 SCt 613 , 38 LE2d 561) (1974).

2010In State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488 ( 216 SE2d 586 ) (1975), our Supreme Court noted that in applying Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, and the associated exclusionary rule, in a public school setting, three groups of actors exist: private individuals; governmental agents whose conduct constitutes state action covered by the Fourth Amendment; and law enforcement personnel who are governed by both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.

2010In State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488 ( 216 SE2d 586 ) (1975), our Supreme Court noted that in applying Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, and the associated exclusionary rule, in a public school setting, three groups of actors exist: private individuals; governmental agents whose conduct constitutes state action covered by the Fourth Amendment; and law enforcement personnel who are governed by both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.

1993However, even assuming these prior statements had been tainted due to an inadequate Miranda warning or inadequate waiver of Miranda rights, “in Georgia the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence derived from a voluntary statement obtained without the benefit of Miranda warnings.” Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115 (4) ( 428 SE2d 333 ), citing Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 378 ( 290 SE2d 442 ).

1993However, even assuming these prior statements had been tainted due to an inadequate Miranda warning or inadequate waiver of Miranda rights, “in Georgia the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence derived from a voluntary statement obtained without the benefit of Miranda warnings.” Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115 (4) ( 428 SE2d 333 ), citing Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 378 ( 290 SE2d 442 ).

2022See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 (83 SCt 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963) (discussing the “fruits” extension of the exclusionary rule).

2022See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 (83 SCt 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963) (discussing the “fruits” extension of the exclusionary rule).

2025Many of us still doubt that Gary can remain good law given our later decision in Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59 ( 834 SE2d 785 ) (2019), which rejected the reasoning of Gary and adopted a different exception to the exclusionary rule.

2025Many of us still doubt that Gary can remain good law given our later decision in Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59 (834 SE2d 785) (2019), which rejected the reasoning of Gary and adopted a different exception to the exclusionary rule.

2023We agree with the trial court that, based on the circumstances of this case, the 2022 warrant was obtained by the State “solely as an attempt to overcome the Constitutional violation which occurred in 2020,” and “the State’s course of action [is] unreasonable . . . [and] worthy of deterrence.” See State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 606 ( 372 SE2d 426 ) (1988) (“The primary reason for the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, whether it be negligent or intentional.”).

2023We agree with the trial court that, based on the circumstances of this case, the 2022 warrant was obtained by the State “solely as an attempt to overcome the Constitutional violation which occurred in 2020,” and “the State’s course of action [is] unreasonable . . . [and] worthy of deterrence.” See State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 606 ( 372 SE2d 426 ) (1988) (“The primary reason for the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, whether it be negligent or intentional.”).

2013We have held unequivocally that “the ‘fruit’ of a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 276 (4) ( 553 SE2d 598 ) (2001).

2013We have held unequivocally that “the ‘fruit’ of a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 276 (4) ( 553 SE2d 598 ) (2001).

2024“To supplement the bare text, [the United States Supreme] Court 6 The Court of Appeals did not address whether Deputy Townsend’s initial viewing of the thumbnail image on Appellant’s phone was an unlawful search. 10 created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 231-232 .

2021Bearing in mind the stated intention of the exclusionary rule to deter improper conduct on the part of police officers, see Davis v. United States, 564 U. S. 229, 236-237 (II) (131 SCt 2419, 180 LE2d 285) (2011), this Court held in Lofton that there would be no deterrent value in excluding evidence obtained by the police acting with an objectively “reasonable good-faith belief” that their conduct was lawful based on a reasonable reliance on an 17 applicable federal statute and binding appellate precedent.

2018Inevitable discovery is an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies in circumstances in which "exclusion of the evidence puts the police in a worse position than they would have been absent any error or misconduct because the evidence ... would have been discovered as a matter of course if independent investigations were allowed to proceed." Teal v. State , 282 Ga. 319 , 323-324 (2), 647 S.E.2d 15 (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

2018Inevitable discovery is an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies in circumstances in which "exclusion of the evidence puts the police in a worse position than they would have been absent any error or misconduct because the evidence ... would have been discovered as a matter of course if independent investigations were allowed to proceed." Teal v. State , 282 Ga. 319 , 323-324 (2), 647 S.E.2d 15 (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

2021See Lofton, 854 SE2d at 696-699. 3 Noting that Carpenter was decided four years after Lofton’s trial, we held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on “‘a statute that appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless . . . search’” applied, because at the time, 18 USC § 2702 (c) (4) authorized the detective to obtain the cell phone records without a search warrant.

2021See Lofton, 310 Ga. at 775-778 .3 Noting that Carpenter was decided four years after Lofton’s trial, we held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on “‘a statute that appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless . . . search’” applied, because at the time, 18 USC § 2702 (c) (4) authorized the detective to obtain the cell phone records without a search warrant.

2013Cf. id. at 415-16 (1) (applying the balancing test to hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation hearings); see also Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 363-69 (II) ( 118 SCt 2014 , 141 LE2d 344) (1998) (exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings); I.

2013Cf. id. at 415-16 (1) (applying the balancing test to hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation hearings); see also Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 363-69 (II) ( 118 SCt 2014 , 141 LE2d 344) (1998) (exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings); I.

1991The exclusionary rule “has been ‘ “modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance (by an officer) on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.” ’ United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 905 (I) (104 SC 3405, 82 LE2d 677).” Debey v. State, 192 Ga. App. 512, 513 ( 385 SE2d 694 ). “ ‘ “(A) warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish” that a law enforcement officer has “acted in good faith in conducting the search.” (Cit.)’ United States v. Leon, supra at 922.” Adams v. *445 State, 191 Ga. App. 916, 917 ( 383 SE2d 378

1991The exclusionary rule “has been ‘ “modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance (by an officer) on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.” ’ United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 905 (I) (104 SC 3405, 82 LE2d 677).” Debey v. State, 192 Ga. App. 512, 513 ( 385 SE2d 694 ). “ ‘ “(A) warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish” that a law enforcement officer has “acted in good faith in conducting the search.” (Cit.)’ United States v. Leon, supra at 922.” Adams v. *445 State, 191 Ga. App. 916, 917 ( 383 SE2d 378

2024See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (III) (81 SCt 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961) (applying the federal exclusionary rule to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution); Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 75 (4) (a) (834 SE2d 785) (2019) (holding that OCGA § 17-5-30 “establishes a procedure for applying the exclusionary rule” developed by the United States Supreme Court in state criminal proceedings).

2024See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (III) (81 SCt 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961) (applying the federal exclusionary rule to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution); Mobley v. State, 307 Ga. 59, 75 (4) (a) (834 SE2d 785) (2019) (holding that OCGA § 17-5-30 “establishes a procedure for applying the exclusionary rule” developed by the United States Supreme Court in state criminal proceedings).

2020Mitchell argues that under the exclusionary rule announced by this Court in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862, 867 (302 19 SE2d 347 ) (1983),4 the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the photograph into evidence.

2020The appellant relies solely on the exclusionary rule established by this Court in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862, 867 (5) ( 302 SE2d 347 ) (1983), that “[a] photograph which depicts the victim after autopsy incisions are made or after the state of the body is changed by authorities or the pathologist will not be admissible unless necessary to show some material fact which becomes apparent only because of the autopsy.” The rule in Brown, however, was abrogated by Georgia’s current Evidence Code and is inapplicable to this case.

1991The exclusionary rule “has been ‘ “modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance (by an officer) on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.” ’ United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 905 (I) (104 SC 3405, 82 LE2d 677).” Debey v. State, 192 Ga. App. 512, 513 ( 385 SE2d 694 ). “ ‘ “(A) warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish” that a law enforcement officer has “acted in good faith in conducting the search.” (Cit.)’ United States v. Leon, supra at 922.” Adams v. *445 State, 191 Ga. App. 916, 917 ( 383 SE2d 378

1991The exclusionary rule “has been ‘ “modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance (by an officer) on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.” ’ United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 905 (I) (104 SC 3405, 82 LE2d 677).” Debey v. State, 192 Ga. App. 512, 513 ( 385 SE2d 694 ). “ ‘ “(A) warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish” that a law enforcement officer has “acted in good faith in conducting the search.” (Cit.)’ United States v. Leon, supra at 922.” Adams v. *445 State, 191 Ga. App. 916, 917 ( 383 SE2d 378

2021Two “good faith” exceptions to the exclusionary rule are pertinent here. 17 In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340 (107 SCt 1160, 94 17 The first good faith exception to the exclusionary rule recognized by 26 LE2d 364) (1987), the United States Supreme Court examined the admissibility of “evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute” that is later declared unconstitutional.

2021Two “good faith” exceptions to the exclusionary rule are pertinent here. 17 In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340 (107 SCt 1160, 94 17 The first good faith exception to the exclusionary rule recognized by 26 LE2d 364) (1987), the United States Supreme Court examined the admissibility of “evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute” that is later declared unconstitutional.

2019And that version of Rule 41 (e) was understood to be “no broader than the constitutional [exclusionary] rule” and not to amount to “a statutory expansion of the exclusionary rule.”14 Calandra, 414 U. S. at 348 (III) n.6 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 ( 89 SCt 961 , 22 LE2d 176) (1969), and Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 ( 80 SCt 725 , 4 LE2d 697) (1960)).

2019And that version of Rule 41 (e) was understood to be “no broader than the constitutional [exclusionary] rule” and not to amount to “a statutory expansion of the exclusionary rule.”14 Calandra, 414 U. S. at 348 (III) n.6 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 ( 89 SCt 961 , 22 LE2d 176) (1969), and Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 ( 80 SCt 725 , 4 LE2d 697) (1960)).

1994Without more, it is clear that suppression of the evidence found would be proper. “[I]n Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 (94 SC 2357, 41 LE2d 182) (1974), the United States Supreme Court stated: ‘The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in wilful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.

1994Without more, it is clear that suppression of the evidence found would be proper. "[I]n Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 (94 SC 2357, 41 LE2d 182) (1974), the United States Supreme Court stated: `The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in wilful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.

2012Although Murray v. United States, 487 U. S. 533, 536-537 (II) (108 SC 2529, 101 LE2d 472) (1988), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 485-486 (II) (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963), both cited by the Court of Appeals, each note that the exclusionary rule applies to both tangible evidence seized during an unlawful search, and testimony regarding knowledge acquired during that search, that does not mean that “testimony” is the opposite of “tangible evidence,” and that any evidence other than testimony is therefore “tangible evidence”; neither case was attempting to define the terms or par

2012See Murray, supra at 536 (“The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search, [cit.], and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search. [Cit.] Beyond that, the exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial. . . .”); Wong Sun, supra at 485 (“The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment may protect against the ove

2019In the nearly 30 years since that decision, this Court has relied on it in only three cases to reject an exception to the exclusionary rule, all involving claims that evidence obtained by officers relying in good faith on the validity of a search warrant should be admitted, notwithstanding the unlawfulness of the search and seizure.19 See Beck v. State, 283 Ga. 352, 353 (1) ( 658 SE2d 577 ) (2008) (officers relied on search warrant issued by person not authorized to issue warrants); Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 107 (2) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (officers relied 19 In a handful of other cases, w

2019In the nearly 30 years since that decision, this Court has relied on it in only three cases to reject an exception to the exclusionary rule, all involving claims that evidence obtained by officers relying in good faith on the validity of a search warrant should be admitted, notwithstanding the unlawfulness of the search and seizure.19 See Beck v. State, 283 Ga. 352, 353 (1) ( 658 SE2d 577 ) (2008) (officers relied on search warrant issued by person not authorized to issue warrants); Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 107 (2) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008) (officers relied 19 In a handful of other cases, w

2017See generally Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (acknowledging that prior decisions "treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule" but that, in time, the Court "came to acknowledge the exclusionary rule for what it undoubtedly is-a 'judicially created remedy' of this Court's own making" (punctuation omitted)). 60 Leon , 468 U.S. at 907-08 (II) (A), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; see id . at 918-19 (II) (B), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ("[E]ven assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively deters some

2017See generally Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (acknowledging that prior decisions "treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule" but that, in time, the Court "came to acknowledge the exclusionary rule for what it undoubtedly is-a 'judicially created remedy' of this Court's own making" (punctuation omitted)). 60 Leon , 468 U.S. at 907-08 (II) (A), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; see id . at 918-19 (II) (B), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ("[E]ven assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively deters some

2017See generally Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (acknowledging that prior decisions "treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule" but that, in time, the Court "came to acknowledge the exclusionary rule for what it undoubtedly is-a 'judicially created remedy' of this Court's own making" (punctuation omitted)). 60 Leon , 468 U.S. at 907-08 (II) (A), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; see id . at 918-19 (II) (B), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ("[E]ven assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively deters some

2017See generally Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 238, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (acknowledging that prior decisions "treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule" but that, in time, the Court "came to acknowledge the exclusionary rule for what it undoubtedly is-a 'judicially created remedy' of this Court's own making" (punctuation omitted)). 60 Leon , 468 U.S. at 907-08 (II) (A), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; see id . at 918-19 (II) (B), 104 S.Ct. 3405 ("[E]ven assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively deters some

2019Compare with Teal , 282 Ga. at 326-327 (2), 647 S.E.2d 15 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to a warrantless search of a hotel room because an application for a warrant had been prepared based on evidence gathered prior to the illegal entry and inevitably would have been discovered). 36 Compare with Henderson , 305 F.3d at 1057-1058 (1) (A). 37 See Riley , 573 U.S. at 401-402 (IV), 134 S.Ct. 2473 . 38 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 39 (Punctuation omitted.) Harvey v. State , 266 Ga. 671 , 672, 469 S.E.2d 176 (1996), citing Gary v. State , 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2

2019Compare with Teal , 282 Ga. at 326-327 (2), 647 S.E.2d 15 (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to a warrantless search of a hotel room because an application for a warrant had been prepared based on evidence gathered prior to the illegal entry and inevitably would have been discovered). 36 Compare with Henderson , 305 F.3d at 1057-1058 (1) (A). 37 See Riley , 573 U.S. at 401-402 (IV), 134 S.Ct. 2473 . 38 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). 39 (Punctuation omitted.) Harvey v. State , 266 Ga. 671 , 672, 469 S.E.2d 176 (1996), citing Gary v. State , 262 Ga. 573 , 422 S.E.2