exclusionary rule in Maryland

2025The court expressly 7 As an alternate ground for affirmance, the State invokes the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule (see generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)), to argue that the officers proceeded in good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant and, thus, that a court should not suppress the evidence that they seized.

2024Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 712 (1994) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 ) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 26 25 Maryland does not have an independent exclusionary rule for physical evidence.

2021The exclusionary rule is “designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect [on future unlawful police conduct], rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974) (footnote omitted).

2021The exclusionary rule is “designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect [on future unlawful police conduct], rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974) (footnote omitted).

2007The Supreme Court subsequently limited the application of the exclusionary rule in a series of cases, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Fourth Amendment claims could not be raised in habeas corpus petition); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 , 100 S.Ct. 2439 , 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980) (ev

2007The Supreme Court subsequently limited the application of the exclusionary rule in a series of cases, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Fourth Amendment claims could not be raised in habeas corpus petition); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 , 100 S.Ct. 2439 , 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980) (ev

2023Since Krull, the Supreme Court has clarified that the “extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct” and that “police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143-44 (2009).

2020“The exclusionary rule is not itself an individual right; therefore, suppression of evidence ‘is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.’” Copes, 454 Md. at 605 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009)). “[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct[.]” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).

2022See also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 368 , 739 A.3d 58 , 65 (1999) (We explained that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is “a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures[,]” and “does not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons, but applies only in contexts where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served[.]” (Cleaned up)). - 20 - one “to revisit whether Article 26 contains an exclusionary rule, because even were we to adopt [the defendant]’s position, we would uphold th

2019"As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 447 , 96 S.Ct. at 3028 (citations omitted); see Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards , 356 Md. 356 , 373, 739 A.2d 58 , 68 (1999) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to administrative license suspension proceedings, which serve "to protect the public from unscrupulous or unskilled operators who would otherwise engage in the licensed activity.").

2017Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule in federal courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (extending exclusionary rule to state courts).

2017Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule in federal courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (extending exclusionary rule to state courts).

2022As another example, in Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 507 , 864 A.2d 1006, 1019 (2004), we observed that, although the defendant “acknowledge[d] our precedent declining to recognize an exclusionary rule under [the Maryland] Declaration of Rights[,]” the defendant nonetheless urged this Court “to adopt an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of Article 26.” (Citation omitted).

2022As another example, in Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 507 , 864 A.2d 1006, 1019 (2004), we observed that, although the defendant “acknowledge[d] our precedent declining to recognize an exclusionary rule under [the Maryland] Declaration of Rights[,]” the defendant nonetheless urged this Court “to adopt an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of Article 26.” (Citation omitted).

2013See also Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 507 , 864 A.2d 1006 (2004) (“Fitzgerald acknowledges our precedent declining to recognize an exclusionary rule under our Declaration of Rights.”); Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 676-86 , 537 A.2d 250 (1988) (The Court thoroughly reviewed the history of federal exclusionary principles and their rejection in Maryland, pointing out particularly how the Maryland General Assembly, in enacting Chapter 74 of the Acts of 1958, rejected a proposed exclusionary rule for violations of Maryland’s search warrant statute.).

2013See also Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 507 , 864 A.2d 1006 (2004) (“Fitzgerald acknowledges our precedent declining to recognize an exclusionary rule under our Declaration of Rights.”); Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 676-86 , 537 A.2d 250 (1988) (The Court thoroughly reviewed the history of federal exclusionary principles and their rejection in Maryland, pointing out particularly how the Maryland General Assembly, in enacting Chapter 74 of the Acts of 1958, rejected a proposed exclusionary rule for violations of Maryland’s search warrant statute.).

2026Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (“If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge . . . that the search was unconstitutional . . . .”).

2026We hold that the conduct of Detective Sergeant Wojdan and Detective Altshuler in this case was not the type of willful, knowing, or even negligent misconduct that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter, see Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 ; Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542 ; that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies; and that the trial court did not err in denying Ms. Gambino’s motion to suppress the September 2019 video.

2019“The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the 16 Some notable exceptions to the exclusionary rule include: 1) independent source doctrine (Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 108 S. Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)), 2) inevitable discovery doctrine (Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)); (continued . . .) - 25 - government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence[.]” Id.

2019“The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the 16 Some notable exceptions to the exclusionary rule include: 1) independent source doctrine (Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 108 S. Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)), 2) inevitable discovery doctrine (Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)); (continued . . .) - 25 - government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence[.]” Id.

2022The exclusionary rule, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914), and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is “ordinarily ... the appropriate remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 76 (2010) (quoting Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 278 (2006)).

2018The three-factor attenuation analysis " 'attempts to mark the point at which ... the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.' " Myers v. State , 395 Md. at 286 , 909 A.2d 1048 (quoting Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. at 609 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (Powell, J., concurring) ); see also Gibson v. State , 138 Md.

2019"As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 447 , 96 S.Ct. at 3028 (citations omitted); see Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards , 356 Md. 356 , 373, 739 A.2d 58 , 68 (1999) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to administrative license suspension proceedings, which serve "to protect the public from unscrupulous or unskilled operators who would otherwise engage in the licensed activity.").

2019"As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 447 , 96 S.Ct. at 3028 (citations omitted); see Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards , 356 Md. 356 , 373, 739 A.2d 58 , 68 (1999) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to administrative license suspension proceedings, which serve "to protect the public from unscrupulous or unskilled operators who would otherwise engage in the licensed activity.").

2019See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 , 95 S. Ct. at 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter police misconduct and that the “‘dissipation of the taint’ attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer jusitifies its cost.”).

2019See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604 , 95 S. Ct. at 2262 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter police misconduct and that the “‘dissipation of the taint’ attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer jusitifies its cost.”).

2019The doctrine provides an exception to the exclusionary rule when “the connection between [the] unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2019The doctrine provides an exception to the exclusionary rule when “the connection between [the] unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

2019The Court of Appeals "has not recognized an exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights," Agurs v. State , 415 Md. 62 , 102, 998 A.2d 868 (2010) (Barbera, J., dissenting), and has followed Leon , permitting "evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid [to] be admissible if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant." McDonald v. State , 347 Md. 452 , 467, 701 A.2d 675 (1997) ; and see Fitzgerald v. State , 384 Md. 484 , 520, 864 A.2d 1006 (2004) (Greene, J., di

2019The Court of Appeals "has not recognized an exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights," Agurs v. State , 415 Md. 62 , 102, 998 A.2d 868 (2010) (Barbera, J., dissenting), and has followed Leon , permitting "evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid [to] be admissible if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant." McDonald v. State , 347 Md. 452 , 467, 701 A.2d 675 (1997) ; and see Fitzgerald v. State , 384 Md. 484 , 520, 864 A.2d 1006 (2004) (Greene, J., di

2016The exclusionary rule provides that “evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Kelly v. State, 436 Md. 406, 421 , 82 A.3d 205, 213 (2013) (“The remedy for an unlawful search is the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of that search....

2016The exclusionary rule provides that “evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Kelly v. State, 436 Md. 406, 421 , 82 A.3d 205, 213 (2013) (“The remedy for an unlawful search is the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of that search....

2023In Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 728 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991), Chief Judge Murphy explained that the purpose of the Exclusionary Rule is to deter unreasonable police conduct: The Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.

2023In Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 728 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991), Chief Judge Murphy explained that the purpose of the Exclusionary Rule is to deter unreasonable police conduct: The Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.

2025Invoking the exclusionary rule would put the police (and society) not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation occurred, but in a worse one. 12 Id. at 541 (emphasis in original).4 In this case, the State argues that the contraband found during the initial search of Harley’s home was admissible under the independent source doctrine.

2019“The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the 16 Some notable exceptions to the exclusionary rule include: 1) independent source doctrine (Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 108 S. Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)), 2) inevitable discovery doctrine (Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)); (continued . . .) - 25 - government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence[.]” Id.

2022However, the “significant costs” of the exclusionary rule have led the Supreme Court to deem it “applicable only ... where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” Carter, 472 Md. at 55 -56 (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016)).

2021However, the “significant costs” of the exclusionary rule “have led [the Supreme Court] to deem it applicable only ... where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (cleaned up).

2021The State, however, points to Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), in which the Supreme Court relied on Leon in holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply where officers conduct a warrantless search in conformance with a then-binding court decision that is subsequently overruled.

2019Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (citing Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–26, 131 S. Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011)) (The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct that is “purposeful or flagrant.”).

1999Plymouth Sedan Central to this case is One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 , 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1251 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture proceedings “such as the one involved” in that case.

1999Plymouth Sedan Central to this case is One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 , 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1251 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture proceedings “such as the one involved” in that case.

2026See Michigan v. Tucker, 49 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct . . . .

2026We hold that the conduct of Detective Sergeant Wojdan and Detective Altshuler in this case was not the type of willful, knowing, or even negligent misconduct that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter, see Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 ; Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542 ; that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies; and that the trial court did not err in denying Ms. Gambino’s motion to suppress the September 2019 video.

2013Following the lead of Judge Cardozo in People v. Defore[, 242 N.Y. 13 , 150 N.E. 585 ] (1926), Maryland is one of the approximately thirty jurisdictions that affirmatively rejected the exclusionary rule.

2013Following the lead of Judge Cardozo in People v. Defore[, 242 N.Y. 13 , 150 N.E. 585 ] (1926), Maryland is one of the approximately thirty jurisdictions that affirmatively rejected the exclusionary rule.

2022The exclusionary rule, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914), and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is “ordinarily ... the appropriate remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 76 (2010) (quoting Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 278 (2006)).

2021Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 , 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2681 (1978) (discussing the exclusionary rule and its creation in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914)).

2025Harley insisted that the contraband would be admissible only if the State proved that it was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine, an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies “‘where evidence is not actually discovered by lawful means, but inevitably would have been.’” Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 410 (2002) (quoting State v. Winkler, 552 N.W.2d 347 , 354 n.4 (N.D. 1996)) (further internal citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Kamara v. State, 205 Md.

2020The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies “where evidence is not actually discovered by lawful means, but inevitably would have been.” Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 410 (2002) (quoting State v. Winkler, 552 N.W.2d 347 , 354 n.4 (N.D. 1996)).

2013The opinion traced the history of Maryland’s rejection of the exclusionary principle to the Court of Appeals’s decision in Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195 , 141 A. 536 (1928).

2013The opinion traced the history of Maryland’s rejection of the exclusionary principle to the Court of Appeals’s decision in Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195 , 141 A. 536 (1928).