exclusionary rule in Maine

2021The exclusionary rule “is a prudential doctrine created by th[e] [United States Supreme] Court to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2021“For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.” Id. at 237 . [¶41] In Brown v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court discussed at length the application of the exclusionary rule. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

2020Thus, some jurisdictions have recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, by which the results of an illegal search are nonetheless admissible at trial because the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by the exclusion of that evidence—i.e., when the evidence was obtained “in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 (quotation marks omitted). [¶34] In Maine, we have not previously adopted the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, but we have acknowledged the Supreme Court’s

2003As such, the Supreme Court’s holding in Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 , relieves the prosecution in this case from the effect of the exclusionary rule ordinarily imposed upon law enforcement when probable cause is not established.

2025See Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 36 , 302 A.3d 1 (“With respect to a claim that evidence should have been suppressed pursuant to the Maine Constitution, it is particularly important to develop an independent analysis of article I, section 5 because we have yet to rule definitively whether that provision even incorporates an exclusionary rule.”). 12 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) and incorporated it to apply to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

2018The long-established remedy for unreasonable searches is set out in the exclusionary rule: the evidence obtained as a result of that unreasonable search was therefore inadmissible at trial. 15 See Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655-60, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) ; State v. McNaughton , 2017 ME 173 , ¶ 42, 168 A.3d 807 ; State v. Hawkins , 261 A.2d 255 , 257-58 (Me. 1970).

2025As we have previously stated, “[t]he inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule derives from the independent source doctrine, ‘but it differs in that the question is not whether the police did in fact acquire certain evidence by reliance upon an untainted source but instead whether evidence found because of a Fourth Amendment violation would inevitably have been discovered lawfully.’” State v. Storer, 583 A.2d 1016 , 1019–20 (Me. 1990) (quoting 4 Wayne R.

2007The Independent Source Exception [¶ 16] The independent source exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence "was gained through an independent source as well as the tainted source." State v. Storer, 583 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me.1990) (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 740 (1st Cir.1986)).

2021See Stale v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65 , 67 (Me. 1979) ("It has been the consistent position of this court not to adopt an exclusionary rule pmsuant to our Constitution when the United States upreme Court has not applied such a rule to the states .... "); State v. Foisy 384 A.2d 42 , 44 n.2 (Me.

2020The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is adequately served by the exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal prosecution. 334 A.2d at 499 n.5 (alterations and quotation marks omitted); see Johansen, 2014 ME 132, ¶ 17 , 105 A.3d 433 ; State v. Foisy, 384 A.2d 42, 44 (Me. 1978) (“We find nothing to justify changing, or departing from, our conclusion in Caron that application of an evidence-exclusionary rule in all criminal prosecutions is a sufficient police deterrent . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶11] Hourdeh correctly notes that there is a difference between t

2021United States v. Godfrey, 427 FedAppx. 409,413 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)("The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.").

2020Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (alteration, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see also Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (“[W]e have repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials.”), 368 (“We have never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.”). 9 [¶14] Relevant here, “the deterrence benefits of exclusion vary with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137

2017We held that, even if the officer had violated the fresh pursuit statute—which we assumed but did not decide—the exclusionary rule did not apply because the officer had probable cause to detain the driver, and he “acted reasonably and did not intentionally disregard the territorial limits to which he was subject in order to ferret out crime.” Id. at 147 . [¶19] Similarly, in Rideout, we affirmed a defendant’s conviction when a Fort Fairfield officer traveling in Presque Isle observed a vehicle he believed was being driven by a driver whose license had been suspended, requested that a Presque I

2017Although we have not decided “the point at which a violation of the fresh pursuit statute might trigger an exclusionary rule,” Pike, 642 A.2d at 147 , and we do not do so here, we have indicated that an intentional disregard of territorial limits to ferret out crime could require the suppression of evidence, see Rideout, 2000 ME 194, ¶ 9 , 761 A.2d 288 ; Jolin, 639 A.2d at 1064 ; Pike, 642 A.2d at 147 . [¶21] In the matter before us, the officer did not intentionally make an excursion into Waterville to ferret out crime; rather, he happened to observe a crime being committed while engaged in a

2007The Independent Source Exception [¶ 16] The independent source exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence “was gained through an independent source as well as the tainted source.” State v. Storer, 583 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me.1990) (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 740 (1st Cir.1986)).

2007The Independent Source Exception [¶ 16] The independent source exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence "was gained through an independent source as well as the tainted source." State v. Storer, 583 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me.1990) (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 740 (1st Cir.1986)).

2017On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the majority approach, including the existing law in Maine, that the exclusionary rule does not apply to "civil administrative license suspension proceedings." Beylund v. Levi, 2017 N.D. 30 , ~ 24, 889 N.W.2d 907 citing Powell v. Secretary ofState, 614 A.2d 1303 , 1306­ 07 (Me. 1992). 4 Maine's "implied-consent" statute,2 is not the same as the North Dakota law addressed in Birchfield. 29-A M.R.S. §2521.

2012The State in its rebuttal relies on Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A. 2d 1303 (Me. 1992), for the well-established principle that the exclusionary rule does not apply to administrative license suspensions.

2012See State v. Boyington, 1998 ME 163, ¶¶ 10-11 , 714 A.2d 141 ; cf. State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d at 368 (applying the Brown factors to the defendant's confession and to the results of a breath test). [¶ 16] The purpose of the Brown test is to deter "lawless conduct by ... officers, and [to] clos[e] the doors of the... courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained." 422 U.S. at 599 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (quotation marks omitted). *540 However, the Brown Court emphasized that, "despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illeg

1994We have previously stated that a detention of a motorist by a police officer, who is investigating a car stopped at the side of the road, is “a governmental seizure of the person, subject to the exclusionary rule unless shown to be reasonable.” LeGassey, 456 A.2d at 367 .

2018The long-established remedy for unreasonable searches is set out in the exclusionary rule: the evidence obtained as a result of that unreasonable search was therefore inadmissible at trial. 15 See Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655-60, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) ; State v. McNaughton , 2017 ME 173 , ¶ 42, 168 A.3d 807 ; State v. Hawkins , 261 A.2d 255 , 257-58 (Me. 1970).

1979As quoted in State v. Hawkins, supra, from Mapp v. Ohio, supra: “Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws.” In the instant case, however, there is no occasion to apply the exclusionary rule.

2012A defendant’s challenge to an alleged involuntary statement “will frequently be predicated upon police elicitation or conduct,” however, “that element is not a sine qua non for exclusion under the exclusionary rule inherent in the guarantee against self-incrimination.” Id. at 1123 . [¶ 21] In making a determination on voluntariness, we consider the totality of the circumstances.

2010See State v. Caouette, 446 A. 2d 1120 (Me. 1982) ("While a claim of compulsion will frequently be predicated upon police elicitation or conduct, that element is not a sine qua non for exclusion under the exclusionary rule inherent in the guarantee against self-incrimination. ").

1975The essence of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, effectively implemented by the exclusionary rule, is not merely that “evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all.” Wong Sun v. United States, 1963, 371 U.S. 471, 485 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 .

1975The essence of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, effectively implemented by the exclusionary rule, is not merely that “evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all.” Wong Sun v. United States, 1963, 371 U.S. 471, 485 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 .

2018Inevitable Discovery Doctrine [¶ 18] “The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 19 , 930 A.2d 268 .

2018Inevitable Discovery Doctrine [¶ 18] “The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 19 , 930 A.2d 268 .

2023See State v. Veglia, 620 A.2d 276 , 278 n.3 (Me. 1993); State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Me. 1991); State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1979).6 A party seeking to exclude evidence under article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution must present a developed argument based on an examination of the factors enumerated above.

2021See Stale v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65 , 67 (Me. 1979) ("It has been the consistent position of this court not to adopt an exclusionary rule pmsuant to our Constitution when the United States upreme Court has not applied such a rule to the states .... "); State v. Foisy 384 A.2d 42 , 44 n.2 (Me.

2021See Rees, 2000 ME 55 , ~ 44, 748 A.2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (stating that the exclusionary rule was created to "deter improper conduct by the State and to prevent the state from using its ill-gotten gains against a citizen"); c.f United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 33 8, 357 ( 1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people - all potential victims of unlawful government conduct - that the government would not profit from its

2021See Rees, 2000 ME 55 , ~ 44, 748 A.2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (stating that the exclusionary rule was created to "deter improper conduct by the State and to prevent the state from using its ill-gotten gains against a citizen"); c.f United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 33 8, 357 ( 1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people - all potential victims of unlawful government conduct - that the government would not profit from its

2020The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is adequately served by the exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal prosecution. 334 A.2d at 499 n.5 (alterations and quotation marks omitted); see Johansen, 2014 ME 132, ¶ 17 , 105 A.3d 433 ; State v. Foisy, 384 A.2d 42, 44 (Me. 1978) (“We find nothing to justify changing, or departing from, our conclusion in Caron that application of an evidence-exclusionary rule in all criminal prosecutions is a sufficient police deterrent . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶11] Hourdeh correctly notes that there is a difference between t

2020See 17-A M.R.S. § 1903(1)-(2). [¶7] The operative question in this appeal is not whether the criminal rules apply, but rather whether the exclusionary rule barred the State’s use of evidence that had been suppressed in a separate case to meet its burden in this case of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Hourdeh “inexcusably failed to comply with a court-imposed deferment requirement.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1903(3); see State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 499 (Me. 1975) (stating that after the Law Court determines whether the criminal rules apply to a proceeding, “[t]he further question remains”

2023See State v. Veglia, 620 A.2d 276 , 278 n.3 (Me. 1993); State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Me. 1991); State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1979).6 A party seeking to exclude evidence under article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution must present a developed argument based on an examination of the factors enumerated above.

1993See State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Me.1991).

2007The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence "inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Storer, 583 A.2d at 1020 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).

2007The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution when that evidence "inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Storer, 583 A.2d at 1020 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).

2020Generally, “[w]hen evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). [¶32] The purpose of the exclusionary rule is “to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).

2000In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Supreme Court noted that the exclusionary rule was a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” Id. at 348 .

1979See, e. g., State v. Foisy, Me., 384 A.2d 42 , 44 n.2 (1978); State v. Stone, Me., 294 A.2d 683 , 693 n.15 (1972); State v. Hawkins, Me., 261 A.2d 255 , 258 n.3 (1970).

1974It should be pointed out as we said in State v. Stone, Me., 294 A.2d 683, 693 , fn. 15: “Prior to being constitutionally obliged by Mapp [Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ] and Ker [Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 ], supra, to follow an exclusionary rule for evidence acquired by Fourth Amendment violations, Maine had declined to provide such sanction”.

2025See Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 36 , 302 A.3d 1 (“With respect to a claim that evidence should have been suppressed pursuant to the Maine Constitution, it is particularly important to develop an independent analysis of article I, section 5 because we have yet to rule definitively whether that provision even incorporates an exclusionary rule.”). 12 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) and incorporated it to apply to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

2025See Norris, 2023 ME 60, ¶ 36 , 302 A.3d 1 (“With respect to a claim that evidence should have been suppressed pursuant to the Maine Constitution, it is particularly important to develop an independent analysis of article I, section 5 because we have yet to rule definitively whether that provision even incorporates an exclusionary rule.”). 12 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) and incorporated it to apply to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

2021Typically, if evidence is illegally obtained, the exclusionary rule "precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." Id.

2021In Weddle, the Law Court determined that when an officer acts "in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment" the exclusionary rule does not apply because suppression "can in no way affect [the officer's] future conduct[.]" Weddle, 2020 ME 12 , j 33, 224 A.3d 1035 ; quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49 .