exclusionary rule in Rhode Island

2026Michael shared 1 While I agree with the majority’s decision not to address the state’s arguments on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, I submit that the facts in the record suggest an absence of good faith when, as here, the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause [to search the 7836 number] as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). - 38 - this information in the affidavit, I believe it would have b

2024See State v. McGuire, 273 A.3d 146 , 161-62 (R.I. 2022) (“The Supreme Court * * * recognized that ‘the Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands,’ and the exclusionary rule ‘thus operates as a judicially created remedy.’”) (brackets omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 906 - 68 - (1984)).

2024C The Attenuation Doctrine “The exclusionary rule bars from introduction at trial evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of searches and seizures in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Jennings, 461 A.2d at 368 .

2016Consequently, under the exclusionary rule, “the fruits of such an arrest (evidence seized in the dwelling) should have been suppressed.” Werner, 831 A.2d at 195 ; see also State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I.1983) (“The exclusionary rule bars from introduction at trial evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of searches and seizures in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.”).

2015However, “the law is well settled that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation- violation hearings.” State v. Campbell, 833 A.2d 1228, 1232 (R.I. 2003) (citing State v. Spratt, 120 R.I. 192, 194 , 386 A.2d 1094, 1095-96 (1978)).

2015However, “the law is well settled that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation- violation hearings.” State v. Campbell, 833 A.2d 1228, 1232 (R.I. 2003) (citing State v. Spratt, 120 R.I. 192, 194 , 386 A.2d 1094, 1095-96 (1978)).

2022The Supreme Court, however, recognized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands,” and the exclusionary rule “thus operates as ‘a judicially created remedy[.]’” Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). - 28 - We are hard-pressed to conceive that a judicially-created exception to a judicially-created exclusionary rule, such as the Leon good-faith rule, is applicable to the strict statutory mandates under review in these cases.

2014The exclusionary rule operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). “[Wjhether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context * * * [is] an *928 issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 , 103 S.Ct. 2317

2018But, even assuming there were a single permissible Rule 404(b) exception, I believe that the trial justice’s instruction did not specify the particular, limited purpose for which the jury could use Beth’s testimony. 8 See Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627-28 , 382 A.2d at 533 (“In its charge the trial court should not take a scatter-shot approach and list all of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.

2018But, even assuming there were a single permissible Rule 404(b) exception, I believe that the trial justice’s instruction did not specify the particular, limited purpose for which the jury could use Beth’s testimony. 8 See Jalette, 119 R.I. at 627-28 , 382 A.2d at 533 (“In its charge the trial court should not take a scatter-shot approach and list all of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.

1995In State v. Burns, 431 A.2d 1199, 1205 (R.I.1981), this court held that “statements obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest are fruits of the poisonous tree and are to be excluded at trial.” We also stated that the exclusionary rule “also forbids the use of indirect as well as direct products of an illegal arrest or search.” Id.

1995In State v. Burns, 431 A.2d 1199, 1205 (R.I.1981), this court held that “statements obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest are fruits of the poisonous tree and are to be excluded at trial.” We also stated that the exclusionary rule “also forbids the use of indirect as well as direct products of an illegal arrest or search.” Id.

2001In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 655 (1961), it was determined that the exclusionary rule should also be applied by state courts to suppress evidence obtained from illegal search and seizures.

1996This law was enacted six years before the exclusionary rule was made mandatory upon the states through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed. 2nd 1081 (1961), and reflects our legislature's clear intention to provide independent vitality to Article I § 6 [of the Rhode Island Constitution] in guarding the privacy of the citizens of this state.

2021“The exclusionary rule, which includes within its scope certain evidence derived from illegal police activity, does not apply when the government learns of evidence from a source independent of the original violation.” State v. Ducharme, 601 A.2d 937, 942 (R.I. 1991) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). -6- Here, there is no question that defendant’s arrest was illegal, as this Court decided in Gonzalez.

2013Further, the exclusionary rule applies to more than just physical evidence; the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that “verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry * * * is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380, 386 , 333 A.2d 676, 679 (1975) (“[Ojral evidence as well as physical evidence could be the subject of a search and seizure which, in turn, had to satisfy

2024“Where suppression fails to yield ‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly * * * unwarranted.’” Id. at 237 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)); see also Strieff, 579 U.S. at 241 (“The exclusionary rule exists to deter police misconduct.”).

1983The petitioners further suggest that United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), provides support to a jurisdiction hesitant about expanding the scope of the exclusionary rule.

2010See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228 , 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) (“It should at all times be remembered * * * that Rule 404(b) is fundamentally a rule of exclusion.”); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to “the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)”); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing exceptions “to this exclusionary rule”); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993); see generally Edward J.

2010See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228 , 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) ("It should at all times be remembered * * * that Rule 404(b) is fundamentally a rule of exclusion."); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)"); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing exceptions "to this exclusionary rule"); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993); see generally Edward J.

2010See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228 , 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) (“It should at all times be remembered * * * that Rule 404(b) is fundamentally a rule of exclusion.”); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to “the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)”); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing exceptions “to this exclusionary rule”); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993); see generally Edward J.

2010See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228 , 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) ("It should at all times be remembered * * * that Rule 404(b) is fundamentally a rule of exclusion."); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)"); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing exceptions "to this exclusionary rule"); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993); see generally Edward J.

2010See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228 , 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) (“It should at all times be remembered * * * that Rule 404(b) is fundamentally a rule of exclusion.”); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to “the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)”); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing exceptions “to this exclusionary rule”); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993); see generally Edward J.

2010See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228 , 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) ("It should at all times be remembered * * * that Rule 404(b) is fundamentally a rule of exclusion."); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)"); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing exceptions "to this exclusionary rule"); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993); see generally Edward J.

2005See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)"); see State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing the exceptions "to this exclusionary rule”); see also State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I.1993); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 721 (R.I.1985); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 623-28 , 382 A.2d 526, 531-33 (1978); see generally Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 , 87 S.Ct. 648 , 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (stating that evidence of prior offenses is "generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice”

2005See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)"); see State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing the exceptions "to this exclusionary rule”); see also State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I.1993); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 721 (R.I.1985); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 623-28 , 382 A.2d 526, 531-33 (1978); see generally Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 , 87 S.Ct. 648 , 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (stating that evidence of prior offenses is "generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice”

2013State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 239 (R.I.2002); see also Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 579 (“By its own terms the [.Miranda ] rule applies only when interrogation occurs within the coercive atmosphere of police custody.”).

2003See State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 579 (R.I. 1987).

2026And we have also recognized that the “approach to the probable cause question should be pragmatic and flexible” with the judicial officer “permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the affidavit presented to him or her.” Id.; see Byrne, 972 A.2d at 638 (“In making this determination, the issuing magistrate must review the affidavit and, based on the facts contained therein, together with the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts, 3 The state also argued that, if this Court were to conclude that the affidavit lacked probable cause, the evidence obtained pursuant to the sea

2010See State v. Byrne, 972 A.2d 633 , 642 n. 15 (R.I.2009). 6 .

2024See McGuire, 273 A.3d at 162; see also State v. Huy, 960 A.2d 550, 556 (R.I. 2008) (recognizing the “prophylactic purposes that underlie the exclusionary rule—to deter law enforcement officers from violating a defendant’s rights”) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 998 (R.I. 2008)).

2012In such a case, the deterrent function served by the exclusionary rule has no place.” Id.

2022See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 239 (R.I. 2002).

2013State v. Edwards, 810 A.2d 226, 239 (R.I.2002); see also Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 579 (“By its own terms the [.Miranda ] rule applies only when interrogation occurs within the coercive atmosphere of police custody.”).

2008See, e.g., State v. Reis, 815 A.2d 57, 62 (R.I.2003) ("Rule 404(b) represents an exception to the above-stated general rule.”); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)”); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing the exceptions "to the exclusionary rule”); State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 971 (R.I.1994) (referring to “one of the exceptions to the general prohibition”); see also State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I.1993); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 721 (R.I.1985); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 623-

2005See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)"); see State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing the exceptions "to this exclusionary rule”); see also State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I.1993); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 721 (R.I.1985); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 623-28 , 382 A.2d 526, 531-33 (1978); see generally Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 , 87 S.Ct. 648 , 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (stating that evidence of prior offenses is "generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice”

2008See, e.g., State v. Reis, 815 A.2d 57, 62 (R.I.2003) ("Rule 404(b) represents an exception to the above-stated general rule.”); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)”); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing the exceptions "to the exclusionary rule”); State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 971 (R.I.1994) (referring to “one of the exceptions to the general prohibition”); see also State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I.1993); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 721 (R.I.1985); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 623-

2005See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to "the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)"); see State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing the exceptions "to this exclusionary rule"); see also State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I.1993); State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 721 (R.I.1985); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 623-28 , 382 A.2d 526, 531-33 (1978); see generally Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 , 87 S.Ct. 648 , 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (stating that evidence of prior offenses is "generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice"

1991While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of this exclusionary clause is twofold: “(1) to prevent an insured from receiving coverage on all household cars or another uninsured car of the insured by merely purchasing a single policy, and (2) to provide coverage to the insured when engaged in the infrequent use of non-owned vehicles.” Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Ward, 83 Wash.2d 353, 359 , 517 P.2d 966, 969-70 (1974).

1991While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of this exclusionary clause is twofold: “(1) to prevent an insured from receiving coverage on all household cars or another uninsured car of the insured by merely purchasing a single policy, and (2) to provide coverage to the insured when engaged in the infrequent use of non-owned vehicles.” Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Ward, 83 Wash.2d 353, 359 , 517 P.2d 966, 969-70 (1974).

2014This Court has stated that the exercise of our supervisory power to interpret and apply the exclusionary rule “should be exercised with great restraint after balancing carefully the societal interests involved.” State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I.1990).

2014As this Court has stated before, “[w]e believe that an exclusionary rule is strong medicine indeed since it deprives the trier of fact in many instances of highly relevant and reliable evidence.” Jackson, 570 A.2d at 1117 .

1998Justice Cardozo's famous quote in Defore was made in conjunction with the decision from the State of New York to reject the application of the exclusionary rule promulgated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

1998Justice Cardozo's famous quote in Defore was made in conjunction with the decision from the State of New York to reject the application of the exclusionary rule promulgated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).

2006Further, the codification of an exclusionary rule in this state, G.L.1956 § 9-19-25, that prohibits the introduction of illegally seized evidence, came as a legislative response to this Court's split decision in State v. Olynik, 83 R.I. 31, 39 , 113 A.2d 123, 127 (1955), in which a majority of the Court declined to adopt an exclusionary rule as a matter of state constitutional law under article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution.

2006Further, the codification of an exclusionary rule in this state, G.L.1956 § 9-19-25, that prohibits the introduction of illegally seized evidence, came as a legislative response to this Court's split decision in State v. Olynik, 83 R.I. 31, 39 , 113 A.2d 123, 127 (1955), in which a majority of the Court declined to adopt an exclusionary rule as a matter of state constitutional law under article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution.

2026Michael shared 1 While I agree with the majority’s decision not to address the state’s arguments on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, I submit that the facts in the record suggest an absence of good faith when, as here, the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause [to search the 7836 number] as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). - 38 - this information in the affidavit, I believe it would have b

1993This exclusionary rule was adopted because illegal “[ajrrests made without a warrant or without probable cause * * * would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be admissible at trial * * * .” State v. Burns, 431 A.2d 1199, 1205 (R.I.1981) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261 , 45 L.Ed.2d. 416, 426 (1975)).

2024The Supreme Court has recognized that the exclusionary rule is designed not to “‘redress the injury’ - 73 - occasioned by an unconstitutional search,” but rather “[t]he rule’s sole purpose * * * is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 236-37 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).

2024“Where suppression fails to yield ‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly * * * unwarranted.’” Id. at 237 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)); see also Strieff, 579 U.S. at 241 (“The exclusionary rule exists to deter police misconduct.”).