exclusionary rule in Arizona

2023See Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (“deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs” when police exhibit reckless 5Leon limited application of the exclusionary rule to reject suppression of evidence “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant,” but expressly withheld from this exception warrants invalidated under Franks. 468 U.S. at 922-23 . 8 STATE v. SCOTT Opinion of the Court disregard for Fourth Amendment rights).

2023“The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 230–31 (2011). ¶38 “The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations.” Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 308–09, ¶ 31.

2021To that end, we have held that the exclusionary rule, for example, as a matter of state law is “no broader than the federal rule.” State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 269 (1984) (“It is poor judicial policy for rules 12 STATE V.

2021To that end, we have held that the exclusionary rule, for example, as a matter of state law is “no broader than the federal rule.” State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 269 (1984) (“It is poor judicial policy for rules 12 STATE V.

2023See Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (“deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs” when police exhibit reckless 5Leon limited application of the exclusionary rule to reject suppression of evidence “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant,” but expressly withheld from this exception warrants invalidated under Franks. 468 U.S. at 922-23 . 8 STATE v. SCOTT Opinion of the Court disregard for Fourth Amendment rights).

2019It is the exclusionary rule, not the good-faith exception to it, that we turn to as a "last resort." See, e.g. , Leon , 468 U.S. at 918 -19 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (reasoning that "even assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity").

2020"The exclusionary rule requires the suppression at trial of evidence gained directly or indirectly as a result of a government violation of the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendments." State v. Hackman, 189 Ariz. 505, 508 (App. 1997) (citation omitted). ¶6 "The necessity of giving Miranda warnings to a suspect relates not to the voluntariness of a confession but to its admissibility." State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 29 (1980).

2018P. 1.9(e) (“[T]he court may set a motion for argument or hearing.”) (emphasis added); State v. Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405, 407, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). ¶20 The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making unreasonable searches and seizures, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and the exclusionary rule generally prevents the introduction of evidence seized in violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, State v. Hackman, 189 Ariz. 505, 508 (App. 1997).

2024In Herring v. United States, the United States Supreme Court clarified that not all police errors justify the exclusionary rule’s application. 555 U.S. 135 , 139–40 (2009).

2023In applying the Brown test, Chief Justice Roberts expressly clarified the level of underlying police misconduct compelling suppression of evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree: “As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct . . . .” Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (emphasis added).

2015State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 151, ¶ 51 , 42 P.3d 564, 582 (2002). 5 STATE v. KRAUCH Decision of the Court ¶18 The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable governmental searches, and evidence derived from a warrantless search or seizure is subject to the exclusionary rule requiring suppression, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), unless the search comes within one of the few “established and well- delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

2010However, evidence need not be suppressed when “the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has „become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.‟” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963), quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); State v. Rosengren, 199 Ariz. 112, ¶ 22 , 14 P.3d 303, 310 (App. 2000) (suppression required only when “causal connection exists between a constitutional violation and the government‟s obtaining of [the] evidence”); see also State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, n.6 , 94 P.3d 1119 , 1141 n

2019Id . at 391-99, 34 S.Ct. 341 ; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385 , 392, 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). ¶17 Later, in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment by state actors through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2019Id . at 391-99, 34 S.Ct. 341 ; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385 , 392, 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). ¶17 Later, in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment by state actors through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2024“We review de novo the applicability of the good -faith exception.” State v. Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67 , 69 ¶ 5 (2019). ¶8 “The exclusionary rule ‘is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.’” State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

2017“Rather, the exclusionary rule has been applied only to the circumstances in which its deterrent purpose is ‘most efficaciously served.’” Id. at 505 , ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), and citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995)).

2006See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (disapproving of "indiscriminate" application); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (disapproving of "rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule").

2006See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (disapproving of "indiscriminate" application); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (disapproving of "rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule").

2004Because the parties effectively agree that Corella’s actions in stopping and detaining Chavez must be viewed not as the actions of a law enforcement officer or state agent but as *610 those of a private citizen, see generally Gustke, the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause simply was not implicated here. ¶ 15 As a corollary of that general principle, and given the exclusionary rule’s primary purpose, which is to discourage unconstitutional conduct by police, see State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 667 , 832 P.2d 593, 684 (1992) (Corcoran, J., specially concurring); State v. Windus, 20

2004Because the parties effectively agree that Corella’s actions in stopping and detaining Chavez must be viewed not as the actions of a law enforcement officer or state agent but as *610 those of a private citizen, see generally Gustke, the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause simply was not implicated here. ¶ 15 As a corollary of that general principle, and given the exclusionary rule’s primary purpose, which is to discourage unconstitutional conduct by police, see State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 667 , 832 P.2d 593, 684 (1992) (Corcoran, J., specially concurring); State v. Windus, 20

2023“The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 230–31 (2011). ¶38 “The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations.” Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 308–09, ¶ 31.

2019JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court: ¶1 We here consider whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, in a prosecution for driving under the influence ("DUI"), to admit blood evidence unconstitutionally obtained after State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013), but before State v. Valenzuela ( Valenzuela II ), 239 Ariz. 299 , 371 P.3d 627 (2016).

2023If we are to take seriously the Supreme Court’s direction that the exclusionary rule prohibits “exploitation of the illegality” of a search, Brown, 422 U.S. at 599-600 , then the facts of this case compel suppression not only of the DNA evidence itself, but also of Scott’s inculpatory statements, acquired through the unattenuated use of that illegally acquired evidence.

2016Thus, we will review the state’s attenuation claim. ¶ 20 “In [Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)] the [United States] Supreme Court applied three factors to determine whether the taint of illegal conduct is sufficiently attenuated from a subsequent search to avoid the exclusionary rule.” State v. Hummons, 227 Ariz. 78, ¶ 9 , 253 P.3d 275, 277 (2011).

2019Id. ¶20 Arizona recognizes the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when law enforcement “objectively, reasonably relie[s] on ‘binding appellate precedent.’” State v. Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67, ¶ 8 (2019).

2017The state has not asserted, either at trial or on appeal, that we may read category B as informing or limiting category A. See State v. Crowley, 202 Ariz. 80, ¶ 32 , 41 P.3d 618, 629 (App. 2002) (state has burden "to prove that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies”).

2019E.g., Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 , ¶ 31 , 371 P.3d at 636-37 ("the exclusionary *975 rule ... is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations."); Mitchell , 234 Ariz. at 419 , ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 ("the exclusionary rule ... incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior."); Booker , 212 Ariz. at 504 , ¶ 11 , 135 P.3d at 59 ("when there is no cognitive nexus between the police misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is ultimately tried, the exclusionary rule's primary deterrent purpose is not served.").

2019E.g., Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 , ¶ 31 , 371 P.3d at 636-37 ("the exclusionary *975 rule ... is a prudential doctrine invoked to deter future violations."); Mitchell , 234 Ariz. at 419 , ¶ 31 , 323 P.3d at 78 ("the exclusionary rule ... incentivizes law enforcement to err on the side of constitutional behavior."); Booker , 212 Ariz. at 504 , ¶ 11 , 135 P.3d at 59 ("when there is no cognitive nexus between the police misconduct and the crime for which the defendant is ultimately tried, the exclusionary rule's primary deterrent purpose is not served.").

2024We only apply the exclusionary rule “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)); Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (accepting that 12 STATE V.

2015See Pope, 686 F.3d at 1084 . ¶20 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence that the State can show by a preponderance of the evidence “would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984); see State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 387 (1986) (recognizing the inevitable discovery doctrine in Arizona).

2024“We review de novo the applicability of the good -faith exception.” State v. Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67 , 69 ¶ 5 (2019). ¶8 “The exclusionary rule ‘is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.’” State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

2015As Arizona courts have recognized, this is because the officers are entering a premises to preserve human life, which is “paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure laws and constitutional [guarantees].” Id. at 237 , 686 P.2d at 760 . ¶ 14 Bennett further counters that the exclusionary rule’s deterrent purpose is served by suppressing the evidence.

2019Id . at 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684 ; see also Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ("The rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations."). ¶18 Although the primary aim of the exclusionary rule is clearly deterrence, our courts have indicated that exclusion is also a "recognition that the judiciary ought not be involved in exploiting violations of the basic law." State v. Coats , 165 Ariz. 154 , 157-58, 797 P.2d 693 , 696-97 (App. 1990).

2019Id . at 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684 ; see also Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ("The rule's sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations."). ¶18 Although the primary aim of the exclusionary rule is clearly deterrence, our courts have indicated that exclusion is also a "recognition that the judiciary ought not be involved in exploiting violations of the basic law." State v. Coats , 165 Ariz. 154 , 157-58, 797 P.2d 693 , 696-97 (App. 1990).

2025Heien, 574 U.S. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring); cf. State v. Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67 , 73 ¶ 20 (2019) (applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because “[i]t is unreasonable to require the police to predict a shift in the law when our trial and appellate courts failed to do so”). ¶26 The statutory phrase “normal speed of traffic” may be ambiguous and perhaps provides fodder for a spirited defense against a § 28-721(B) citation in traffic court.

2025Heien, 574 U.S. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring); cf. State v. Weakland, 246 Ariz. 67 , 73 ¶ 20 (2019) (applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because “[i]t is unreasonable to require the police to predict a shift in the law when our trial and appellate courts failed to do so”). ¶26 The statutory phrase “normal speed of traffic” may be ambiguous and perhaps provides fodder for a spirited defense against a § 28-721(B) citation in traffic court.

2024See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 542 . ¶35 The “inevitable discovery” exception applies “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,” making the reason for applying the exclusionary rule meaningless.

2014The exclusionary rule, however, does not apply “to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality,” or to evidence “that would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 539, 540-44 (1988); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984).

2019State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506 , 509 ¶ 11, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1254 (2017). ¶6 "The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked [solely] to deter future violations." Valenzuela II , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 ¶ 31, 371 P.3d at 636-37 (citing Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ).

2019State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506 , 509 ¶ 11, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1254 (2017). ¶6 "The exclusionary rule, which allows suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is a prudential doctrine invoked [solely] to deter future violations." Valenzuela II , 239 Ariz. at 308-09 ¶ 31, 371 P.3d at 636-37 (citing Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ).

2024We only apply the exclusionary rule “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)); Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (accepting that 12 STATE V.

2018A few decades later, however, the United States Supreme Court retreated from Mapp , recognizing the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created" doctrine that is "prudential rather than constitutionally mandated," Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott , 524 U.S. 357 , 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998), and that any "reflexive" application of the doctrine was "expansive dicta," not required by the Constitution, Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236-37, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (suppression not "a personal constitutional right," and the Fourth Amendment "says noth

2017Similarly, Justice O’Connor warned in Krull that “the failure to apply the exclusionary rule in the very case in which a state statute is held to have violated the Fourth Amendment destroys all incentive on the part of individual criminal defendants to litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.” 480 U.S. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). ¶30 Arizona case law in effect at the time of Havatone’s blood test did not “specifically authorize[] a particular police practice,” see Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 (emphasis omitted), of directing warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws from unconsci

2017HAVATONE VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, joined by JUSTICE BRUTINEL, Dissented in part and Concurred in part U.S. 897, 906 (1984). ¶46 The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permits law enforcement to reasonably rely on legislative enactments, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 358-60 (1987), and binding appellate precedent, Davis, 564 U.S. at 240-41 .

2017“Rather, the exclusionary rule has been applied only to the circumstances in which its deterrent purpose is ‘most efficaciously served.’” Id. at 505 , ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), and citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995)).

2006Rather, the rule has been applied only to circumstances in which its deterrent purpose is "most efficaciously served." Id.; Evans, 514 U.S. at 11 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 . [5] ¶ 14 The proper application of the exclusionary rule is determined by weighing the potential costs and benefits of excluding the evidence in a particular case.

1997When the insured lacks rational capacity, “[application of the exclusionary clause would be ‘inconsistent with a primary purpose for incorporating intentional injury exclusions ..., i.e. to preclude individuals from benefiting financially when they deliberately cause injury.’ ” Feidler, 178 Ariz. at 532 , 875 P.2d at 191 (quoting Meere, 143 Ariz. at 359 , 694 P.2d at 189 ).

1997When the insured lacks rational capacity, “[application of the exclusionary clause would be ‘inconsistent with a primary purpose for incorporating intentional injury exclusions ..., i.e. to preclude individuals from benefiting financially when they deliberately cause injury.’ ” Feidler, 178 Ariz. at 532 , 875 P.2d at 191 (quoting Meere, 143 Ariz. at 359 , 694 P.2d at 189 ).

2024We only apply the exclusionary rule “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)); Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (accepting that 12 STATE V.

2019Therefore, "when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence," the good-faith exception applies because "the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way." Davis , 564 U.S. at 238 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also A.R.S. § 13-3925 (codifying good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule). ¶7 "Real deterrent value is a 'necessary condition for exclusion,' but it is not 'a sufficient' one." Davis , 564 U.S. a

2019Id . at 391-99, 34 S.Ct. 341 ; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385 , 392, 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). ¶17 Later, in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment by state actors through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1992The exclusionary rule, originally applied only in federal prosecutions for fourth amendment violations, Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , has been expanded to apply to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), and to fifth amendment, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and sixth amendment, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1203 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), violations.

2019The exclusionary rule also serves to promote "judicial integrity." Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206 , 222-24, 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).

2019The exclusionary rule also serves to promote "judicial integrity." Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206 , 222-24, 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).

2019Id . at 391-99, 34 S.Ct. 341 ; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385 , 392, 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). ¶17 Later, in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment by state actors through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2019Id . at 391-99, 34 S.Ct. 341 ; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385 , 392, 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). ¶17 Later, in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment by state actors through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.