exclusionary rule in Iowa

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2021In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court discovered a “good- faith” exception to the exclusionary rule for search and seizure cases. 468 U.S. at 920–21, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 (majority opinion).

2021In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court discovered a “good- faith” exception to the exclusionary rule for search and seizure cases. 468 U.S. at 920–21, 104 S. Ct. at 3419 (majority opinion).

2019And in Mapp , 367 U.S. at 649 , 81 S. Ct. at 1688 , the Supreme Court emphasized the constitutional nature of the exclusionary rule.

2019And in Mapp , 367 U.S. at 649 , 81 S. Ct. at 1688 , the Supreme Court emphasized the constitutional nature of the exclusionary rule.

2024To apply the exclusionary rule in the absence of a causal connection between the government’s illegal activity and the challenged evidence “would ‘put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.’ ” Id. at 112 (quoting State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 1997)).

2024See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 537–38, 542 (1988) (stating “[t]he ultimate question . . . is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the . . . evidence at issue” and so suppression is not required for “evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity”); Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 111–12; Seager, 571 N.W.2d at 214 (holding “the exclusionary rule does not apply and the district court erred in sustaining the defendant’s motion to suppress” where evidence was obtained pursuant to a search warrant untainted by

2023Instead, the exclusionary rule is a “judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 237 (2016); see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation”); Scott, 524 U.S. at 363 (“The 40 exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment righ

2019By declaring the exclusionary rule as part of the substance of article I, section 8, we have squarely and firmly rejected the unfortunate innovations of search and seizure doctrine introduced to the Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338 , 348, 94 S. Ct. 613 , 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

2015Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 634 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1740 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 611 (1965) (“We also affirmatively found that the exclusionary rule was ... the only effective remedy for the protection of rights under the Fourth Amendment....''), abrogated on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320-22 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-13 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 656-57 (1987); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455 (1963) (holding evidence obtained at the exploitation of an illegal search and seizure cannot be used against the person searched); see

2015Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 634 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1740 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 611 (1965) (“We also affirmatively found that the exclusionary rule was ... the only effective remedy for the protection of rights under the Fourth Amendment....''), abrogated on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320-22 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 712-13 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 656-57 (1987); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455 (1963) (holding evidence obtained at the exploitation of an illegal search and seizure cannot be used against the person searched); see

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2024State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2021The exclusionary rule advances important goals by deterring “lawless police conduct” and protecting “the integrity of the judicial system.” Id. at 681 .

2018See State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Iowa 2007) (explaining evidence must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule if the evidence was “discovered as a result of illegal government activity”).

2019See id. at 291 (declining to follow the Supreme Court by rejecting notion that parolees may be subject to broad, warrantless searches by law enforcement); State v. Cline , 617 N.W.2d 277 , 278 (Iowa 2000) (declining to follow the Supreme Court by rejecting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases under article I, section 8 ), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner , 630 N.W.2d 601 , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 -74 & n. 7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without paróle); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 170-72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802-03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspi-cio

2016The Marquart court noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court had rejected a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1067 . 945 P.2d at 1031 .

2016It further noted that in doing so, the New Mexico Supreme Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is not a “mere ‘judicial remedy’ ” but instead was a rule “to effectuate . . . the constitutional right of the accused.” Id. (quoting Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1067 ).

2024See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 537–38, 542 (1988) (stating “[t]he ultimate question . . . is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the . . . evidence at issue” and so suppression is not required for “evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity”); Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 111–12; Seager, 571 N.W.2d at 214 (holding “the exclusionary rule does not apply and the district court erred in sustaining the defendant’s motion to suppress” where evidence was obtained pursuant to a search warrant untainted by

2024See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 537–38, 542 (1988) (stating “[t]he ultimate question . . . is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the . . . evidence at issue” and so suppression is not required for “evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity”); Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 111–12; Seager, 571 N.W.2d at 214 (holding “the exclusionary rule does not apply and the district court erred in sustaining the defendant’s motion to suppress” where evidence was obtained pursuant to a search warrant untainted by

2016We noted that in our early search and seizure cases we emphasized the exclusionary rule “provided a remedy for a constitutional violation and protected judicial integrity.” Id.; see also State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 168 , 96 N.W. 730, 731 (1903) (stating that to admit illegally obtained evidence is to “emasculate the constitutional guarantee”).

2016We noted that in our early search and seizure cases we emphasized the exclusionary rule “provided a remedy for a constitutional violation and protected judicial integrity.” Id.; see also State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 168 , 96 N.W. 730, 731 (1903) (stating that to admit illegally obtained evidence is to “emasculate the constitutional guarantee”).

2021Id. at 444 , 104 S. Ct. at 2509 ; see also State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 1997) (“Similarly, if the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,’ the exclusionary rule serves no purpose and does not apply.” (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 , 104 S. Ct. at 2509 )); J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d at 591 (applying inevitable discovery doctrine to allow evidence of weapon disclosed by juvenile to support his delinquency adjudication).

2021Id. at 444 , 104 S. Ct. at 2509 ; see also State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 1997) (“Similarly, if the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,’ the exclusionary rule serves no purpose and does not apply.” (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 , 104 S. Ct. at 2509 )); J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d at 591 (applying inevitable discovery doctrine to allow evidence of weapon disclosed by juvenile to support his delinquency adjudication).

2020He asserts that the plain- view exception is inapplicable because Hofbauer “lacked reasonable suspicion that Bean was committing or had committed a crime,” citing State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 23 (Iowa 2005), in which our supreme court said, “evidence discovered indirectly through the use of evidence or information gained in [an] unlawful detention” is barred under the exclusionary rule.

2015See State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 23 (Iowa 2005) (“The exclusionary rule bars the use of both evidence directly seized in an unlawful detention and evidence discovered indirectly through the use of evidence or information gained in the 7 Because the State’s reliance on the community-caretaker exception fails at the second step of the analysis, we need not consider the third step—whether the public need and interest outweighed the intrusion upon Sellers’s privacy.

2024The exclusionary rule was intended to deter “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct.” Id.

2024“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be . . . sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).

2019See, e.g. , Dorsey v. State , 761 A.2d 807 , 818 (Del. 2000) ("[T]he efficient prosecution of criminals cannot justify a deliberate invasion of the right of the citizen to be made secure against the violation of specific constitutional guarantee's ....") (quoting Rickards v. State , 77 A.2d 199 , 205 (Del. 1950) ); State v. Guzman , 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 , 672 (1992) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures); State v. Eserjose , 171 Wash.2d 907 , 259 P.3d 172 , 178 (2011) (en banc) (noting that state exclusionary rule

2019See, e.g. , Dorsey v. State , 761 A.2d 807 , 818 (Del. 2000) ("[T]he efficient prosecution of criminals cannot justify a deliberate invasion of the right of the citizen to be made secure against the violation of specific constitutional guarantee's ....") (quoting Rickards v. State , 77 A.2d 199 , 205 (Del. 1950) ); State v. Guzman , 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 , 672 (1992) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures); State v. Eserjose , 171 Wash.2d 907 , 259 P.3d 172 , 178 (2011) (en banc) (noting that state exclusionary rule

2007State v. Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1992); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 437 (Iowa 1982).

1994See generally State v. Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1992) ("We have indicated that application of the exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy and not a personal constitutional right, usually is required only where there has been a violation of a constitutional right or when a statute specifically requires exclusion.”).

2024See State v. Garrity, 765 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Iowa 2009) (“We apply the exclusionary rule to violations of Iowa Code section 804.20 . . . .

2024Davis, 922 N.W.2d at 331 (“When section 804.20 is violated, exclusion of evidence is the appropriate remedy.”); Hicks, 791 N.W.2d at 97 (“The remedy associated with a section 804.20 violation is the exclusion of evidence . . . .”); Garrity, 765 N.W.2d at 597 (“We apply the exclusionary rule to violations of Iowa Code section 804.20, whether it is a violation of the right to communicate with family or with an attorney.

2024To apply the exclusionary rule in the absence of a causal connection between the government’s illegal activity and the challenged evidence “would ‘put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.’ ” Id. at 112 (quoting State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 1997)).

2024See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 537–38, 542 (1988) (stating “[t]he ultimate question . . . is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the . . . evidence at issue” and so suppression is not required for “evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity”); Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 111–12; Seager, 571 N.W.2d at 214 (holding “the exclusionary rule does not apply and the district court erred in sustaining the defendant’s motion to suppress” where evidence was obtained pursuant to a search warrant untainted by

1997As we stated in State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 882 (Iowa 1978), this statutory right is limited for persons arrested for OWL If this right is violated, the exclusionary rule applies, and any evidence of chemical testing must be suppressed.

1980In State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978), we adopted an exclusionary rule in considering the effect of the violation of the companion right under what is now section 804.20.

2024The district court held that the State’s violation of section 804.20 required the suppression of “any statements and non-verbal assertions of an incriminating nature [McMickle] made at the Boone County [law enforcement center]” as well as “the blood test results.” The State concedes that McMickle’s incriminating statements should be suppressed, see State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89, 97 (Iowa 2010) (“The remedy associated with a section 804.20 violation is the exclusion of evidence . . . .”), but it argues that suppression of the blood test results was an improper application of the exclusionary ru

2024Davis, 922 N.W.2d at 331 (“When section 804.20 is violated, exclusion of evidence is the appropriate remedy.”); Hicks, 791 N.W.2d at 97 (“The remedy associated with a section 804.20 violation is the exclusion of evidence . . . .”); Garrity, 765 N.W.2d at 597 (“We apply the exclusionary rule to violations of Iowa Code section 804.20, whether it is a violation of the right to communicate with family or with an attorney.

2023See State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa 2011) (“The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence discovered as a result of illegal government activity.” (citation omitted)). 12 A search done without a warrant or an applicable exception is per se unreasonable.

2016“The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence discovered as a result of illegal government activity.” Watts, 801 N.W.2d at 853 (citation omitted).

2014See 36 121 Iowa at 165–69, 96 N.W. at 731–32; see also State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000) (“An example of this court’s attempts to preserve the spirit of Iowa’s constitutional guarantee is reflected in the fact that Iowa was one of the first states to embrace the exclusionary rule as an integral part of its state constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, in fact, did so several years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks [v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L.

2014See 36 121 Iowa at 165–69, 96 N.W. at 731–32; see also State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000) (“An example of this court’s attempts to preserve the spirit of Iowa’s constitutional guarantee is reflected in the fact that Iowa was one of the first states to embrace the exclusionary rule as an integral part of its state constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, in fact, did so several years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Weeks [v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L.

2016As noted by the parties, in State v. Swartz, 278 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 1979), and State v. Kain, 378 N.W.2d 900, 903 (1985), we held the exclusionary rule did not apply in probation determinations.

2016As is apparent, the notion that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct was the centerpiece in Swartz, 278 N.W.2d at 26 , and its follower Kain, 378 N.W.2d at 903 .

2007See State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 673-75 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the statutory right to contact family upon arrest); State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 45-46 (Iowa 2003) (holding that violation of the Vienna convention’s notification requirements did not warrant exclusion because the defendant’s fundamental rights were not implicated); see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2681 , 165 L.Ed.2d 557, 577 (2006) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has suppressed evidence for statutory violations that implic

2007See State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667 , 673–75 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the statutory right to contact family upon arrest); State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38 , 45–46 (Iowa 2003) (holding that violation of the Vienna convention’s notification requirements did not warrant exclusion because the defendant’s fundamental rights were not implicated); see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681 , 165 L.

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70–74 & n.7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without parole); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149 , 170–72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802–03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspicionl

2014See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 -74 & n. 7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to sentences that are equivalent to life without paróle); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 170-72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802-03 (holding a parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspi-cio

2025See State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551 , 555–56 (Iowa 1995) (“Even though an initial arrest is unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest.

2023See State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1995) (“Even though an initial arrest is unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest.