exclusionary rule in Kentucky

2022Copley v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Ky. 2012) (“Suppression of evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule applies only to searches that were carried out in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights.”).

2021In Copley v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Ky. 2012), we stated: “Suppression of evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule applies only to searches that were carried out in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights.”3 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and its application “depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations omitted)

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2012Even if probable cause did not support the issuance of the warrant, the evidence found at Elders’s residence would be admissible pursuant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and adopted in Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky.1992).

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2018In United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule does not apply when police officers act in good faith in executing what is later ruled to be a legally deficient search warrant.

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2018We reject the • . 9 of "[T]he h~sh sanction exclusion 'spould not be applied. to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.' Evidence obtained during a search conducted in ·reasonable reliance.on binding precedent is not subject to' the exclusionary rule." 564 U.S. at 241 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984)).· 9 Commonwealth's argument that Eaton avoided the Rodriguez problem siinply by deploying the ·dog at the beginning of the stop, before addressing the traffic violation, .instead of at the end of the stop after addressing the trarfi~ violation.

2025Fourth Amendment law clearly establishes an exclusionary rule designed to protect that right which states “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” Warick v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 276 , 280 (Ky. 2019) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974)).

2024“Despite its broad deterrent purpose [against police misconduct], the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613 .

2024The trial court provided a thorough discussion of the exclusionary rule and its exceptions to the warrant requirement -- including the independent source doctrine, citing Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 , 195 L.

2024Recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule “involve the causal relationship between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of evidence.” Utah v. Strieff, [579] U.S. [232, 238], 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 , 195 L.

2025This exclusionary rule 30 excludes both evidence obtained directly during an illegal search and evidence later found derivative of an illegal search, or “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (quoting Nardoni v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).

2024Unquestionably, “the exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence -13- obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , 104 S. Ct. 3380 , 82 L.

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2002See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 438 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 383 (1984) ("The trial court concluded that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, ... if Williams had not led the police to the victim, her body would have been discovered 'within a short time' in essentially the same condition as it was actually found.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir.2001) ("The district court found [the inevitable discovery exception] to apply to Scott’s case, and we agree.”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1583 , 152 L.Ed.2d 501 (20

2016“The dual purpose of the exclusionary rule has historically been to deter police misconduct by excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as to encourage compliance with the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." Hensley v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Ky.App.2007). .

2015Hensley v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 572 (Ky. App. 2007) citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

2015Copley v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Ky.2012) (citing Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1997)).

2012Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky.1997).

2026In a submitted response, the Commonwealth primarily argued that, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Johnson, 245 S.W.3d 821 (Ky. App. 2008), even if an unconstitutional entry had occurred, no application of the exclusionary rule was available for the subsequent crime of assaulting a police officer.

2026We held that, furthermore, it was “beyond question that the exclusionary rule does not extend to suppress evidence of independent crimes taking place as a reaction to an unlawful arrest or search.” Id. at 824 .

2025Parker, 440 S.W.3d at 386-87 .

2025Moreover, we agree with the circuit court that Trooper Davis acted in good faith, and we further agree with the Commonwealth that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule serves as an independent basis for denying suppression.3 The exclusionary rule holds that “unlawfully obtained evidence and the fruits resulting therefrom are inadmissible in criminal proceedings.” Parker v. Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 386 (Ky. 2014).

2021“Without a constitutional right underpinning his motion to suppress, Appellant has no basis for application of the exclusionary rule.” Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Ky. 2014).

2015Similarly, in Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Ky. 2014), the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that evidence seized in violation of a Department of Corrections’ policy would not be subject to suppression by application of the exclusionary rule.

2020Rather, we believe that an investigatory report may sometimes provide relevant and reliable evidence about the incident in question, but in other cases, the report may prove to be “very poor proof of negligence or defectiveness.” See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 529 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that, in addition to encouraging safety upgrades, another purpose of this exclusionary rule is to “bar[] a class of evidence that is very poor proof of negligence or defectiveness.” (citing 2 Weinstein’s Evidence § 407, 13-14)).

2020Rather, we believe that an investigatory report may sometimes provide relevant and reliable evidence about the incident in question, but in other cases, the report may prove to be “very poor proof of negligence or defectiveness.” See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 529 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that, in addition to encouraging safety upgrades, another purpose of this exclusionary rule is to “bar[] a class of evidence that is very poor proof of negligence or defectiveness.” (citing 2 Weinstein’s Evidence § 407, 13–14)).

2009Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.") (internal footnote omitted). 36 .See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (“When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.”); LaFave,

2009Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.") (internal footnote omitted). 36 .See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (“When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.”); LaFave,

2009See, e.g., Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 335 (Ky.2006) ("The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct.”). 35 .

2008See, e.g., Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 335 (Ky.2006) ("The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct.”). 29 .

2026This is a significant oversight, as this Court has held that “[w]hether or not an officer’s actions constitute an illegal search, arrest or detention, our courts reject applying the exclusionary rule to prohibit evidence of a crime that takes place after such a prior illegality.” Constant v. Commonwealth, 603 S.W.3d 654 , 661 (Ky. App. 2020) (quoting Pulley v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 520, 528 (Ky. App. 2016)).

2026In Pulley, this Court reaffirmed Johnson and determined that the exclusionary rule would likewise not apply to suppress evidence of independent crimes committed while a defendant was unlawfully detained. 481 S.W.3d at 528 - 29.

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2022The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against the accused.78 The rule extends not only to the evidence immediately discovered in the illegal search (Reed’s real-time CSLI, in this case) but also to the “indirect products of official misconduct” (the weapon discovered in Reed’s vehicle during the traffic stop, in this case).79 This rule is a court-created remedy rather than an independent constitutional right.80 There are several established exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the independent-source doctrine,81 the inevitabl

2026As before the trial court, the Commonwealth continues to assert that, “even if entry into the home was illegal (which it was not), it is beyond question that the exclusionary rule does not extend to suppress evidence of independent crimes taking place as a reaction to an unlawful arrest or search.” Appellee brief, p. 9 (citing Johnson at 824 ; State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380, 1386-87 (Me. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2008While we are in agreement with the various legal theories advanced for rejecting the application of the exclusionary rule to assaults on police officers who entered a residence illegally, we are most persuaded by the common-sense reasoning expressed by the Maine Supreme Court in State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380 (Me.1985).

2024Likewise, in Hudson v. Michigan, the Court, in holding that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to a knock-and-announce violation, discussed the interests protected by the knock-and- announce requirement. 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006).

2013For example, when the Court rejected the application of the exclusionary rule to “knock-and announce” violations by police in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006), it said: Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.

2004Ky.App., 119 S.W.3d 532 , 541 n. 37 (2003)(citing United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.1997)). 9 .

2003See, e. g., United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.1997). 38 . 534 U.S. 266 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). 39 .

2026The rule includes evidence stemming directly from official misconduct as well as derivative evidence that is tainted or fruit of the poisonous tree.” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Ky. App. 2011) (citations omitted).