exclusionary rule in South Dakota

1995Whether the implied consent statutes prohibit the admission of a BAT obtained for medical purposes? “[B]odily substance samples [are] not subject to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment if they are taken [under certain prescribed circumstances].” State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131, 134 (S.D.1977) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

1990In State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 1977), we adopted the Schmerber holding that bodily substance samples are not subject to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment if they are taken (1) incident to a lawful arrest, (2) by a reliable and accepted method of obtaining such sample, (3) in a reasonable, medically approved manner, and (4) where there is probable cause to believe that the evidence sought exists.

1999However, the basis for the arrest was the illegally seized “bullet.” Therefore, the arrest and subsequent seizure of the methamphetamine and snort tube were in violation of Sleep’s state and federal constitutional rights. [¶25.] “Under the exclusionary rule, illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed.” Shearer, 1996 SD 52 at ¶ 21 , 548 N.W.2d at 796 (citing State v. McCreary, 82 S.D. 111, 125 , 142 N.W.2d 240, 247 (1966) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961))).

1999However, the basis for the arrest was the illegally seized “bullet.” Therefore, the arrest and subsequent seizure of the methamphetamine and snort tube were in violation of Sleep’s state and federal constitutional rights. [¶25.] “Under the exclusionary rule, illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed.” Shearer, 1996 SD 52 at ¶ 21 , 548 N.W.2d at 796 (citing State v. McCreary, 82 S.D. 111, 125 , 142 N.W.2d 240, 247 (1966) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961))).

2014See Davis v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (in discussing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court stated “[e]videnee obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule”); State v. Sorensen, 2004 S.D. 108 , ¶¶ 8-9, 688 N.W.2d 193, 196-97 (stating that “[u]nder the ‘good faith’ exception [to the exclusionary rule], ‘evidence is admissible when police officers reasonably rely on a warrant that is subsequently invalidated because a judge finds t

2004Because the goal of deterrence will not always be advanced by excluding relevant, though illegally seized, evidence, the Supreme Court has identified several exceptions to the exclusionary rule. [¶ 9.] Under the “good faith” exception, “evidence is admissible when police officers reasonably rely on a warrant that is subsequently invalidated because a judge finds there was an insufficient basis for the issuing magistrate to find probable cause.” State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825, 828 (S.D.1988).

2014“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Id. [¶ 18.] Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Schmerber , this Court adopted the following rule: [B]odily substance samples [are] not subject to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment if they are taken (1) incident to a lawful arrest, (2) by a reliable and accepted method of obtaining such sample, (3) in a reasonable, .medically approved manner, and (4) where there is probable cause to believe that the evidence sought exists. [Schmer

2014“Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Id. -9- #26847, #26849 [¶18.] Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Schmerber, this Court adopted the following rule: [B]odily substance samples [are] not subject to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment if they are taken (1) incident to a lawful arrest, (2) by a reliable and accepted method of obtaining such sample, (3) in a reasonable, medically approved manner, and (4) where there is probable cause to believe that the evidence sought

2009It noted that at the time of the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968, the United States Supreme Court had previously held in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655-56 , 81 S.Ct. at 1692 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , that “the exclusionary rule was ‘part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitation upon governmental encroachment of individual privacy’ and ‘an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.’ ” Id. at 1473, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 631 (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, 658 , 81 S.Ct. at 1689, 1693 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ). 3 The enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act against the

2009It noted that at the time of the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968, the United States Supreme Court had previously held in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655-56 , 81 S.Ct. at 1692 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , that “the exclusionary rule was ‘part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitation upon governmental encroachment of individual privacy’ and ‘an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.’ ” Id. at 1473, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 631 (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, 658 , 81 S.Ct. at 1689, 1693 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ). 3 The enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act against the

2017The exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy to deter constitutional violations by government officials.” Sorensen, 2004 S.D. 108 , ¶ 8, 688 N.W.2d at 196 . [¶46.] Jones claims it would be unjust to apply the rule here.

2017The exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy to deter constitutional violations by government officials.” Sorensen, 2004 S.D. 108 , ¶ 8, 688 N.W.2d at 196 . 2.

2024“Evidence obtained because of an unlawful seizure ordinarily must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” Tenold, 2019 S.D. 66, ¶ 23 , 937 N.W.2d at 13 (citation omitted). -11- #30023 “[T]he exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality of ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Heney, 2013 S.D. 77 , ¶ 9, 839 N.W.2d 558, 562 ).

2024See e.g., Heney, 2013 S.D. 77 , ¶ 15, 839 N.W.2d at 563 (independent source doctrine); State v. Smith, 2014 S.D. 50 , ¶ 25, 851 N.W.2d 719, 726 (inevitable discovery doctrine); State v. Mousseaux, 2020 S.D. 35, ¶ 14 , 945 N.W.2d 548, 552 (attenuation doctrine). -12- #30023 [¶24.] The circuit court acknowledged all three exceptions to the exclusionary rule and noted the State’s argument that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies under the circumstances.

2014Inevitable Discovery Doctrine [¶ 25.] “Under the exclusionary rule, illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed.” State v. Shearer, 1996 S.D. 52 , ¶ 21, 548 N.W.2d 792, 796 , rejected on other grounds by State v. Jucht, 2012 S.D. 66 , ¶ 27 n. 1, 821 N.W.2d 629 , 636 n. 1.

2001Shearer, 1996 SD 52, ¶20 , 548 N.W.2d at 796 . [¶ 32.] Under the exclusionary rule, illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed.

2016“The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search, and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search.” State v. Heney, 2013 S.D. 77 , ¶ 9, 839 N.W.2d 558, 562 (quoting State v. Boll, 2002 S.D. 114 , ¶ 19, 651 N.W.2d 710, 716 ).

2016“The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Id. (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , 104 S.Ct 3380, 3385 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)).

2015The United States Supreme Court has described the exclusionary rule as a “last resort” appropriate when “the deterrence benefits of suppression ... outweigh its heavy costs.” Davis v. United States, 664 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2427 , 180 L.Ed.2d 286 (2011) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009)) (citation omitted).

2014See Davis v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (in discussing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court stated “[e]videnee obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule”); State v. Sorensen, 2004 S.D. 108 , ¶¶ 8-9, 688 N.W.2d 193, 196-97 (stating that “[u]nder the ‘good faith’ exception [to the exclusionary rule], ‘evidence is admissible when police officers reasonably rely on a warrant that is subsequently invalidated because a judge finds t

2024“However, ‘the progenitor of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine’—Wong Sun— ‘recognized that original lawless conduct would not taint all evidence forever.’” Id. (quoting Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 768 (S.D. 1990)).

1996See, e.g., Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 767 (S.D.1990).

2012“Under the doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the exclusionary rule generally makes inadmissible, evidence that is the product of an unconstitutional arrest.” State v. Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d 463, 469 (S.D.1990); see also State v. Ludemann, 2010 S.D. 9 , ¶ 18, 778 N.W.2d 618, 623 .

2012“Once the exclusionary rule is triggered, ‘indirect as well as direct evidence; physical tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion, come at by exploitation of the illegal search; and testimony of matters observed during an unlawful invasion’ are excluded.” Ludemann, 2010 S.D. 9 , ¶ 18, 778 N.W.2d at 623 (quoting Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d at 469 ).

2020Id. [¶17.] In resolving the parties’ competing views of the exclusionary rule, the Court held that when an officer’s initial stop is the product of a good faith error, the defendant’s preexisting arrest warrant is “sufficiently attenuated” from the unlawful stop, saving the evidence from exclusion.

2013Application of the exclusionary rule should strike a balance between “the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime[.]” See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). [¶ 10.] On appeal, the parties do not dispute the illegality of the initial search in room 212, or the trial court’s suppression of evidence found in room 212 during that initial search.

2024This was part of a larger discussion regarding the general policies weighing against the application of the exclusionary rule, namely, that “while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied.” Id.

2013The Silverthome Court held that although the exclusionary rule forbids any use of illegally seized evidence, “[i]f knowledge of [the evidence] is gained from an independent source [it] may be proved like any [other].... ” 2002 S.D. 114 , ¶ 23, 651 N.W.2d at 717 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). “[Wjhere an unlawful entry has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has been learned by other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because derived from an ‘independent *564 source.’ ” Murray, 487 U.S. at 538 , 108 S.Ct. at 2533 . [¶ 16.] In this case, the

2018State v. Jackson, 2000 S.D. 113 , ¶ 12 n.1, 616 N.W.2d 412 , 417 n.1. -11- #27951 catheterize the suspect when the warrant does not specify the method of urine collection?

2018State v. Jackson , 2000 S.D. 113 , ¶ 12 n.1, 616 N.W.2d 412 , 417 n.1.

2024As noted in Utah v. Strieff, there are “significant costs” in applying the exclusionary rule; therefore, it is “applicable only . . . where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” 579 U.S. 232 , 237, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 , 195 L.

2024As noted in Utah v. Strieff, there are “significant costs” in applying the exclusionary rule; therefore, it is “applicable only . . . where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” 579 U.S. 232 , 237, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 , 195 L.

2024See e.g., Heney, 2013 S.D. 77 , ¶ 15, 839 N.W.2d at 563 (independent source doctrine); State v. Smith, 2014 S.D. 50 , ¶ 25, 851 N.W.2d 719, 726 (inevitable discovery doctrine); State v. Mousseaux, 2020 S.D. 35, ¶ 14 , 945 N.W.2d 548, 552 (attenuation doctrine). -12- #30023 [¶24.] The circuit court acknowledged all three exceptions to the exclusionary rule and noted the State’s argument that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies under the circumstances.

2014STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶ 12.] ‘We review the [ ] court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress involving an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right under the de novo standard of review.” State v. Smith, 2014 S.D. 50 , ¶ 14, 851 N.W.2d 719, 723 .

2000Wfiiether the “good faith” exception applies when the error is made by the affiant officer, rather than the issuing judge, is a question of first impression for this Court. [¶ 14.] The United States Supreme Court noted in Leon that, “If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” 468 U.S. at 919 , 104 S.Ct. at 3419 , 82 L.Ed.2d at

2000Wfiiether the “good faith” exception applies when the error is made by the affiant officer, rather than the issuing judge, is a question of first impression for this Court. [¶ 14.] The United States Supreme Court noted in Leon that, “If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” 468 U.S. at 919 , 104 S.Ct. at 3419 , 82 L.Ed.2d at

1988The balancing approach “forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in a reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 , 104 S.Ct. at 3413 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 689 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 255 , 103 S.Ct. at 2341 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 559 (White, J., concurring in judgment)).

1988The balancing approach “forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in a reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 909 , 104 S.Ct. at 3413 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 689 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 255 , 103 S.Ct. at 2341 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 559 (White, J., concurring in judgment)).