exclusionary rule in Utah

2008Finally, we noted that enforeement of the Act was "inextricably connected with proof of criminal activity." Id. at 14 . ¶ 17 We also reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule furthered the rule's purpose of "ensuring restraint by law enforcement officials in connection with the Act." Id.

2008Finally, we noted that enforeement of the Act was "inextricably connected with proof of criminal activity." Id. at 14 . ¶ 17 We also reasoned that application of the exclusionary rule furthered the rule's purpose of "ensuring restraint by law enforcement officials in connection with the Act." Id.

2026Finally, the court concluded that even if the information in the affidavit did not provide probable cause, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), would apply and preclude suppression of the evidence obtained during the search. ¶10 After the court denied Revuelta’s motion to suppress, she entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in the presence of a child.

2017The district court rejected the availability of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

2025See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 655– 58 (1961) (declaring that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require courts to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained via unconstitutional searches and seizures, even in state court); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 223–24 (1960) (declaring that the Fourth Amendment requires exclusion in federal court of (continued . . .) 14 Cite as: 2025 UT 15 Opinion of the Court requests that a federal officer obtain subscriber records from a service provider and then share those records with the state officer, the state officer ha

2015ANALYSIS ¶ 8 Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth: Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures should be excluded, Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426-28 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); State v. Strieff, 2015 UT 2, ¶¶ 15-19 , 357 P.3d 532 , Mr. Anderson argues that the sheriff's deputies violated, his Fourth Amendment rights when they seized his vehicle without sufficient justification. | He further contends that the warrant and

2025But “the harsh consequences of this rule—excluding relevant evidence of illegal activity at trial—are tempered somewhat by the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.” Id. ¶10 One such exception is the inevitable discovery exception adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).

2025Id. at 449–50. 20241002-CA 5 2025 UT App 101 State v. Abonza ¶11 In discussing its application of the inevitable discovery exception, the Supreme Court recognized that its own rationale “for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections.” Id. at 442–43.

2000The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials." See id. (citation omitted) (holding exclusionary rule is inapplicable to adult parole proceedings); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448 , 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-346 , 94 S.Ct. at 620-21 (declining to apply exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings). {15 Like the United States Supreme Court, Utah's appellate courts, when determining wh

2000The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials." See id. (citation omitted) (holding exclusionary rule is inapplicable to adult parole proceedings); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448 , 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-346 , 94 S.Ct. at 620-21 (declining to apply exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings). {15 Like the United States Supreme Court, Utah's appellate courts, when determining wh

2020But in the context of parental-rights-termination proceedings, there is no similar avenue, and if we did not have a mechanism to remand to develop the record on direct appeal, parents would have no meaningful remedy by which to vindicate their right to the effective assistance of counsel. 20190808-CA 22 2020 UT App 114 In re C.M.R. the sound exercise of our inherent power. 11 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect”).

2003We disagree. ¶ 11 Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 619 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

2018Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over [the child], and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence." (citation omitted) ); In re A.R. , 1999 UT 43 , ¶¶ 18-20, 982 P.2d 73 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that a child protection proceeding was "quasi-criminal in nature," observing that "[t]he primary focus of and sole statutory justification for child protection proceedings is to protect the interests of children who are neglected or abused," and concluding that "th

2018Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over [the child], and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence." (citation omitted) ); In re A.R. , 1999 UT 43 , ¶¶ 18-20, 982 P.2d 73 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that a child protection proceeding was "quasi-criminal in nature," observing that "[t]he primary focus of and sole statutory justification for child protection proceedings is to protect the interests of children who are neglected or abused," and concluding that "th

2010BELTON AND ITS PROGENY WHEN THEY IMPROPERLY EXTENDED THE DURATION OF THE STOP 135 The United States Supreme Court has adopted a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in some situations when application of the rule would not serve a *663 deterrent effect. 2 Herring v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

2010BELTON AND ITS PROGENY WHEN THEY IMPROPERLY EXTENDED THE DURATION OF THE STOP 135 The United States Supreme Court has adopted a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in some situations when application of the rule would not serve a *663 deterrent effect. 2 Herring v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

2011For several decades, however, this court "never separately articulated an exclusionary rule as a necessary part of article I, section 14," but instead simply handed down "a series of cases ... approv[ing] the federal rule and affordfing] its protections to Utah citizens." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 471 . 1[ 42 That all changed in Lorocco.

2008Based on the general rule and this analogy, the supreme court concluded that "[all bank records obtained as a result of illegal subpoenas must ... be suppressed unless a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is appropriate." Id.

2015The court of appeals affirmed under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

2015The court of appeals affirmed under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

1994In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), a four-member majority of the court cited Larocco with approval and specifically endorsed the exclusionary rule recognized in Larocco.

1994In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), a four-member majority of the court cited Larocco with approval and specifically endorsed the exclusionary rule recognized in Larocco.

2000Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the exclusionary rule, see State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah Ct.App.1988), and "Itlhe appropriate standard governing the inevitable discovery exception is whether 'the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have been discovered by lawful means." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 16 , 405 Utah Adv.

1990This court recognized inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary rule in State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah Ct.App.1988).

2000Relying on Pennsylvamia Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 367 , 118 S.Ct. 2014, 2022 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to parole violation proceedings), and In re A.R., 1999 UT 43 at ¶ 20 , 982 P.2d 73 (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to child protection proceedings), we held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to adult probation proceedings because "the social costs outweigh the benefit of deterrence." Jarman, 1999 UT App 269 at ¶ 7 , 987 P.2d 1284 .

2000Relying on Pennsylvamia Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 367 , 118 S.Ct. 2014, 2022 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to parole violation proceedings), and In re A.R., 1999 UT 43 at ¶ 20 , 982 P.2d 73 (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to child protection proceedings), we held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to adult probation proceedings because "the social costs outweigh the benefit of deterrence." Jarman, 1999 UT App 269 at ¶ 7 , 987 P.2d 1284 .

1999Similarly, In re Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354 , 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1985), held "the State's overwhelming interest in protecting and promoting the best interests and safety of minors in a child protective proceeding far outweighs the rule's deterrent value." We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the juvenile court's ruling that the exclusionary rule does not apply to child protection proceedings. ¶ 23 Because we have held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in child protective proceedings, it is unnecessary to consider in this case whether the searches by police officers w

1999Similarly, In re Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354 , 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1985), held "the State's overwhelming interest in protecting and promoting the best interests and safety of minors in a child protective proceeding far outweighs the rule's deterrent value." We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the juvenile court's ruling that the exclusionary rule does not apply to child protection proceedings. ¶ 23 Because we have held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in child protective proceedings, it is unnecessary to consider in this case whether the searches by police officers w

2025In other words, “the exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the ‘fruit of unlawful police conduct’), obtained in violation of an individual’s constitutional and statutory rights.” State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 13 , 76 P.3d 1159 (quotation simplified).

2025In other words, “the exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the ‘fruit of unlawful police conduct’), obtained in violation of an individual’s constitutional and statutory rights.” State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 13 , 76 P.3d 1159 (quotation simplified).

2025See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 655– 58 (1961) (declaring that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require courts to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained via unconstitutional searches and seizures, even in state court); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 223–24 (1960) (declaring that the Fourth Amendment requires exclusion in federal court of (continued . . .) 14 Cite as: 2025 UT 15 Opinion of the Court requests that a federal officer obtain subscriber records from a service provider and then share those records with the state officer, the state officer ha

1997In rendering its decision, the Mapp Court noted that the purpose of the exclusionary rule “ ‘is to deter [police misconduct] — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’” Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 , 81 S.Ct. at 1692 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 , 80 S.Ct. at 1444 ); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 , 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3417 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct.”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 , 88 S.Ct. at 1875 (stating “major thrust” of exclusio

2017See State v. Strieff , 2015 UT 2 , ¶¶ 41-56, 357 P.3d 532 (pointing out that the attenuation exception and inevitable discovery exception dictated different outcomes in that case and concluding that the attenuation doctrine did not apply, while observing that "[t]he terms and conditions of the exclusionary rule have been meted out by the Supreme Court in a piecemeal ... fashion," and that "[t]his case implicates a gap of substantial significance"), rev'd , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (applying the attenuation doctrine); Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the La

2017See State v. Strieff , 2015 UT 2 , ¶¶ 41-56, 357 P.3d 532 (pointing out that the attenuation exception and inevitable discovery exception dictated different outcomes in that case and concluding that the attenuation doctrine did not apply, while observing that "[t]he terms and conditions of the exclusionary rule have been meted out by the Supreme Court in a piecemeal ... fashion," and that "[t]his case implicates a gap of substantial significance"), rev'd , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (applying the attenuation doctrine); Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the La

1999We therefore limit our discussion to the exclusionary rule mandated by the United States Constitution. ¶ 15 In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to a state criminal proceeding by holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Nevertheless, the rule is a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights," Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 , 115 S.C

1999We therefore limit our discussion to the exclusionary rule mandated by the United States Constitution. ¶ 15 In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to a state criminal proceeding by holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Nevertheless, the rule is a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights," Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 , 115 S.C

2012The United States Supreme Court, however, has “never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.” Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Rather, “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” See id. at 702 .

2021See generally United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Infirmity due to overbreadth does not doom the entire warrant; rather, it requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant, but does not require the suppression of anything described in the valid portions of the warrant.” (cleaned up)); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 717 (Utah 1983) (“The exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of otherwise legally seized evidence merely because it was obtained in the same search as evidence illegally seized.

1983See State v. Romero, supra (admitting legal evidence though seized together with illegally obtained evidence).

2017Thus, “to show that a trial court abused its discretion in allowing a witness to testify despite a. violation of the exclusionary rule, the [objecting party] carries ‘the onus of showing’ prejudice,” Gibson, 2016 UT App 16, ¶ 13 , 366 P.3d 876 (quoting Carlson, 636 P.2d at 74), “and, in particular, must demonstrate that the witness ‘changed [his or her] testimony' in some material way because of what [he or she] heard,” id. (quoting State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 634 (Utah 1988)).

2016Thus, in order to show that a trial court abused its discretion in allowing a witness 'to testify despite a violation of the exclusionary rule, the defendant carries "the onus of showing" prejudice, Carlson, 635 P.2d at 74 , and, in particular, must demonstrate that the witness "changed [her] testimony" in some material way because of what she heard, State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 634 (Utah 1988).

2021It notes that the exclusionary rule is ―a ‗prudential‘ doctrine, created by‖ the Supreme Court ―to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.‖ Id. at 236–37 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2021And it makes clear that the exclusionary rule has been limited ―to situations in which‖ the purpose of deterrence ―is thought most efficaciously served.‖ Id. at 237 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ―For exclusion to be appropriate‖ under the Davis line of cases, ―the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.‖ Id. ¶30 Davis notes that ―the deterrence benefits of exclusion ‗var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct‘ at issue.‖ Id. at 238 (citation omitted). ―When the police exhibit ‗deliberate,‘ ‗reckless,‘ or ‗grossly negligent‘ disregard

1999Relying on Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the court observed that the primary function of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct in the context of criminal investigations.

1999Relying on Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the court observed that the primary function of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct in the context of criminal investigations.

2013The State adds that even with the tainted evidence removed from the warrant affidavit, "the remaining untainted evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause." Therefore, the State argues, the tainted evidence did not affect the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant. 2 134 "The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search...." Murray, 487 U.S. at 536 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 . "[Tlhe exelusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence ... that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acqu

2013The State adds that even with the tainted evidence removed from the warrant affidavit, "the remaining untainted evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause." Therefore, the State argues, the tainted evidence did not affect the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant. 2 134 "The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search...." Murray, 487 U.S. at 536 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 . "[Tlhe exelusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence ... that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acqu

1993As Justice Powell explained in Brown , “The notion of the ‘dissipation of the taint’ attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” 422 U.S. at 609 , 95 S.Ct. at 2264 (Powell, J., concurring), quoted in part in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 .

1991The exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence obtained directly as a result of the illegal seizure, but also to evidence obtained by exploitation of the illegality, unless the evidence was obtained by means “ ‘sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 417-18 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1956)); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 , 83 S.Ct. at 417-18 ).

2017See State v. Strieff , 2015 UT 2 , ¶¶ 41-56, 357 P.3d 532 (pointing out that the attenuation exception and inevitable discovery exception dictated different outcomes in that case and concluding that the attenuation doctrine did not apply, while observing that "[t]he terms and conditions of the exclusionary rule have been meted out by the Supreme Court in a piecemeal ... fashion," and that "[t]his case implicates a gap of substantial significance"), rev'd , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (applying the attenuation doctrine); Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the La

2017See State v. Strieff , 2015 UT 2 , ¶¶ 41-56, 357 P.3d 532 (pointing out that the attenuation exception and inevitable discovery exception dictated different outcomes in that case and concluding that the attenuation doctrine did not apply, while observing that "[t]he terms and conditions of the exclusionary rule have been meted out by the Supreme Court in a piecemeal ... fashion," and that "[t]his case implicates a gap of substantial significance"), rev'd , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (applying the attenuation doctrine); Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the La