exclusionary rule in Minnesota

2025And the supreme court has emphasized that the Minnesota Constitution compels application of the exclusionary rule to remedy the acquisition of unlawfully obtained evidence to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.” Id. at 572, 575 (quotation omitted); cf. State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 871 (Minn. 2015) (declining to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence where exclusion “deters no police misconduct and imposes substantial social costs”).

2025Assuming without deciding that this conduct may also be unlawful, the “cost” of excluding evidence of this nature of flight from police “must be balanced against the deterrence of improper police action that the exclusionary rule promotes.” Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 871 (quotations omitted).

2023The exclusionary rule bars evidence “obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).

2017And because the dog’s positive alert was essential to the district court’s probable cause determination for the warrant to search the apartment, we conclude that the district court erred by denying • Edstrom’s suppression motion. 4 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (explaining that the exclusionary rule extends to indirect and direct products of unlawful searches).

2024The Supreme Court has stated that “the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement” and has “repeatedly rejected efforts to expand the focus of the exclusionary rule beyond deterrence of culpable police conduct.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 246 .

2024But there is another consideration—the imperative of judicial integrity.”), with Davis, 564 U.S. at 246 (“[W]e have said time and again that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement.”).

2025See, e.g., Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 577-78 (applying exclusionary rule to “deter[] unlawful government conduct” and “promote[] the public perception of fairness in the judicial process” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1998) (excluding evidence obtained through illegal search “to eliminate the incentive for police officers who have detained a person on a Terry stop to overstep the limits of the stop”); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178-80 (Minn. 2007) (excluding illegally obtained evidence because “the police conduct involved is capable of repetition and . . . ap

2015Minnesota has not adopted a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.4 State v. Martinez, 579 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998); see State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007) (commenting that Minnesota has “consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the . . . ‘good faith’ exception”). “[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.” Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).

2025The “primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.” State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1998).

2025See, e.g., Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 577-78 (applying exclusionary rule to “deter[] unlawful government conduct” and “promote[] the public perception of fairness in the judicial process” (emphasis omitted)); State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1998) (excluding evidence obtained through illegal search “to eliminate the incentive for police officers who have detained a person on a Terry stop to overstep the limits of the stop”); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178-80 (Minn. 2007) (excluding illegally obtained evidence because “the police conduct involved is capable of repetition and . . . ap

2024The Supreme Court concluded that if police act “in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor,” the “substantial social costs” of excluding relevant evidence outweigh the exclusionary rule’s benefits, id. at 907–08, and observed that “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” Id. at 916 .

2024The Supreme Court concluded that if police act “in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor,” the “substantial social costs” of excluding relevant evidence outweigh the exclusionary rule’s benefits, id. at 907–08, and observed that “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” Id. at 916 .

2025United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (applying the exclusionary rule to the states).

2015Although Mapp proclaims that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible in a state court,”' 367 U.S. at 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , the Supreme Court has consistently restricted application of the exclusionary rule to “those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence ... has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”). 3 In particular, the Suprem

2024But the United States Supreme Court “has consistently restricted application of the exclusionary rule to ‘those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’” State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 , and citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).

2016See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-92 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (discussing the exclusion of evidence as “a last resort,” and stating that some evidence is too “attenuated” from the constitutional violation to justify exclusion); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 907 n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (describing the exclusionary rule as “a rule of evidence ” (emphasis added)).

2024See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224, 227 (1960) (appending a 50-state survey indicating that illegally obtained evidence remained admissible in Minnesota courts, despite the exclusionary rule’s adoption in other states); State v. Pluth, 195 N.W. 789 , 792–93 (Minn. 1923) (discussing state precedent on admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to unlawful search or seizure); State v. Strait, 102 N.W. 913, 914 (Minn. 1905) (declining to entertain an objection to the admission of evidence illegally obtained when the evidence is “pertinent to the issue”).

2018The exclusionary rule's "purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206 , 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).

2024But unlike the United States Supreme Court, which “has declined to consider any reason justifying exclusion beyond deterrence,” the Minnesota Supreme Court “has never used such absolute language, instead emphasizing that deterrence is a purpose, but not the only purpose, of exclusion.” Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 577 n.4; see, e.g., State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Minn. 1985) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule where suppression of the evidence would “not serve to deter misconduct by police officers” and admission of the evidence would “not compromise judicial integrity”).

2024See State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Minn. 1985) (applying an exclusionary rule analysis to determine the admissibility, in a Minnesota prosecution, of evidence obtained in another state, “[t]aking into account the several policy reasons underlying the exclusionary rule,” and concluding that the trial court correctly refused to exclude evidence because there was no police misconduct to deter, nor would admitting the evidence “compromise judicial integrity”); State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 , 371–72 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., concurring specially) (acknowledging the exclusionary rule’s

1991As to the application of the exclusionary rule to a violation of a rule or statute, as opposed to a violation of constitution, see State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Minn.1987) (police violation of statute governing right of non-English-speaking suspect to interpreter does not require suppression); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 840-41 (Minn.1978) (nighttime execution of search warrant was a statutory violation not mandating exclusion of the evidence seized). 3 .

1990See State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833 , 840 n. 1 (Minn.1978) (questioning how far the exclusionary rule should apply where there is no police misconduct because police obtained a warrant).

2025United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (applying the exclusionary rule to the states).

2024But the United States Supreme Court “has consistently restricted application of the exclusionary rule to ‘those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’” State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 , and citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).

1999In finding coverage under the insured's policy, which specifically excluded coverage for intentional bodily injuries caused by the insured, the supreme court held that "where no bodily injury is intended, an [act] does not come within the exclusionary clause." Id. at 97-98 , 213 N.W.2d at 330 .

1999In finding coverage under the insured's policy, which specifically excluded coverage for intentional bodily injuries caused by the insured, the supreme court held that "where no bodily injury is intended, an [act] does not come within the exclusionary clause." Id. at 97-98 , 213 N.W.2d at 330 .

2024See, e.g., Zanter, 535 N.W.2d at 634 (excluding evidence obtained in violation of Article I, Section 10, because “the good faith of the police . . . cannot cure the clear insufficiency of the . . . warrant application”); Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633 , 639–40 (Minn. 2001) (applying the exclusionary rule despite law enforcement’s good-faith reliance on an issued warrant because it lacked the “sufficiently particularized circumstances” required to justify an unannounced entry).

2015See Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639-40 (Minn.2001); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (explaining that evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant must still be suppressed under the exclusionary rule if the affidavit in support of the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable” or if the warrant was "facially deficient” (citation omitted)). .

2024State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004).

2016State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004).

1988See, e.g., State v. Kittleson, 305 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Minn.1981) (“contrary to defendant’s argument, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the evidence of this assault on the officer even if the entry was in violation of Payton [ 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 ] ”); State v. Bale, 267 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Minn.1978) (even if defendant’s violent response to arrest would not have occurred “but for” the illegal arrest, the evidence of the violent response would not be suppressed); see also State v. Combs, 394 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn.App.1986) (“It is well settled that ev

1988See, e.g., State v. Kittleson, 305 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Minn.1981) ("contrary to defendant's argument, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the evidence of this assault on the officer even if the entry was in violation of *90 Payton [ 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 ]"); State v. Bale, 267 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Minn.1978) (even if defendant's violent response to arrest would not have occurred "but for" the illegal arrest, the evidence of the violent response would not be suppressed); see also State v. Combs, 394 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn.App. 1986) ("It is well settled tha

2016See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186 n.9 (stating that if the court on remand finds that consent was not voluntary, it must determine whether the evidence obtained in the search must be suppressed when the search was done pursuant to a state statute and is offered in an administrative rather than criminal proceeding); see also State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876-77 (Minn. 2015) (describing good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule). 5 violated).

2016See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186 n.9 (stating that if the court on remand finds that consent was not voluntary, it must determine whether the evidence obtained in the search must be suppressed when the search was done pursuant to a state statute and is offered in an administrative rather than criminal proceeding); see also State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876 (Minn. 2015) (describing good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule). 6

2013Distinguishing Lucas , we also decided that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable because the conduct was not “illegal under the statutes or constitution of either the forum or search jurisdictions, nor any statute or constitutional principle in the search jurisdiction that would make the evidence inadmissible.” Id. at 172.

2005Appellant relies on the court’s discussion in Heaney stating that “[wjhere the police have engaged in illegal conduct in obtaining evidence or where, as in Lucas , police conduct was lawful but a statute concerning privacy interests renders the evidence inadmissible, an exclusionary rule analysis is appropriate.” Id. at 172.

2016See id.

2015See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254 .

2013Safety, 527 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Minn.App.1995) (noting that “the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained from an unconstitutional checkpoint” (citing Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub.

1999Safety, 527 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Minn.App.1995) (in an implied consent proceeding, the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained from an unconstitutional checkpoint), review denied (Minn. Mar. 21, 1995).

2015The exclusionary rule does not apply here because the exclusionary rule prohibits only the “introduction of evidence seized during an unlawful 11 search.” State v. Lozar, 458 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn. App. 1990) (emphasis added), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990).

2012James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 , 110 S.Ct. 648, 651 , 107 L.Ed.2d 676 (1990); State v. Lozar, 458 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn.App.1990), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990).

1998As the Court made clear in that case, the rationale of the exclusionary rule is that “the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been if no illegality had transpired.” Id. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 .

1998As the Court made clear in that case, the rationale of the exclusionary rule is that “the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been if no illegality had transpired.” Id. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 .

2024See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (declining to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a mistake of court administration, as “the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct”); see also Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 871 (declining to exclude evidence when suppression would not serve the rule’s central purpose of deterring police misconduct).

2024In sum, the Supreme Court has specifically applied the good-faith exception to evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a quashed arrest warrant that appears active to law enforcement because of a clerical court error, Evans, 514 U.S. at 15 , and more generally limited the exclusionary rule’s application to circumstances that deter unlawful police conduct.

2024Similarly, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to an officer’s good-faith reliance on a statute that later is determined to be unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-55 (1987), or an arrest-warrant database that later is determined to be inaccurate, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-48 (2009).

2015Because culpability is not at issue here, we see no reason to address whether the exclusionary rule should apply to police “conduct [that] involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence.” Id. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2427-28 (majority opinion) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 , 129 S.Ct. 695 ). 11 For these reasons, we disagree with Justice Page’s view that the Davis good-faith exception is “inseparable from ...

2015See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) (mandating the exclusionary rule in federal court).

2015See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) (mandating the exclusionary rule in federal court).

2015See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (habeas proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (ordinary civil suits and civil tax proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (grand-jury proceedings); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (evidence used to impeach a criminal defendant’s direct testimony). 9 and maintaining judicial integrity), with Davis, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2432 (“[W]e have said time and again that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement.”), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,

1995Tucker v. Pahkala, 268 N.W.2d 728 (Minn.1978) refused to exclude a blood sample taken from an unconscious victim on the grounds that by extending the application of the exclusionary rule, “concededly relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered unavailable.” Id. at 730 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 , 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976)).

2025See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (1984) (objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant later held invalid); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 350–52 (1987) (objectively reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statute); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 14–15 (1995) (objectively reasonable reliance on erroneous information concerning an arrest warrant); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 (1984) (objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant later held invalid because of a clerical error).

2024Similarly, the Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to an officer’s good-faith reliance on a statute that later is determined to be unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-55 (1987), or an arrest-warrant database that later is determined to be inaccurate, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-48 (2009).

1990In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 , 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3427 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 , 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21 ), the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objective reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that is subsequently determined to lack probable cause.

1990In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 , 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3427 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 , 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21 ), the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objective reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that is subsequently determined to lack probable cause.