exclusionary rule in California

2026(United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 .) However, the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by the police when they acted in objective reasonable reliance on a valid search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, even if the warrant was later found to be unsupported by probable cause.

2025The exclusionary rule is “ ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ ” (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] (Leon), quoting United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 348 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 561 ].) In Leon, the United States Supreme Court established the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2021To say that no warrant is required is merely to acknowledge that ‘rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement- related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.’ This application of ‘traditional standards of reasonableness’ requires a court to weigh ‘the promotion of 19 legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’ ” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 448 .) Regarding the exclusionary rule remedy for a search and seizure violation, California Constitutio

2021To say that no warrant is required is merely to acknowledge that ‘rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement- related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.’ This application of ‘traditional standards of reasonableness’ requires a court to weigh ‘the promotion of 19 legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’ ” (King, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 448 .) Regarding the exclusionary rule remedy for a search and seizure violation, California Constitutio

2018In People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 , 282 P.2d 905 , we adopted the exclusionary rule for violations of the state constitutional prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, declining to follow the high court's refusal to adopt a federal exclusionary rule in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 .

2018In People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 , 282 P.2d 905 , we adopted the exclusionary rule for violations of the state constitutional prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, declining to follow the high court's refusal to adopt a federal exclusionary rule in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 .

2025The exclusionary rule is “ ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ ” (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] (Leon), quoting United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 348 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 561 ].) In Leon, the United States Supreme Court established the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2025The exclusionary rule is “ ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ ” (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] (Leon), quoting United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 348 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 561 ].) In Leon, the United States Supreme Court established the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2026In any event, “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144 .) Here, as discussed above, the officer was, at a minimum, reckless in omitting information about the limitations on the probation search terms in his statement of probable cause.

2026In any event, “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144 .) Here, as discussed above, the officer was, at a minimum, reckless in omitting information about the limitations on the probation search terms in his statement of probable cause.

2026(Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471 , 486–487 [defendant’s statements after unlawful arrest excluded].) And although the Attorney General suggests that Perez’s in-field identification by the reporting party should not be excluded, the exclusionary rule applies to that kind of evidence as well.

2025(See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 485 [“The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result” of a Fourth Amendment violation]; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655–656.) without explanation—what extrinsic evidence C.T. hoped to introduce that would be relevant enough for admission, even in a relaxed evidentiary setting such as this. 13.

2026Under the exclusionary rule, the evidence seized due to 6 Perez’s illegal seizure must be suppressed.4 (Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 232 .) The parties agree that if Perez’s detention was unconstitutional, all evidence seized on his person must be suppressed.

2025(Herring, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 141 .) As the Court explained: “ ‘[T]o the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social costs.’ [Citation.] The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free—something that ‘offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.’ ” (Ibid.)

2023Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” (Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 217 (Elkins).) In our view, the substantial lack of justification for the pat search, the close connection between the illegal pat search and the discovery of the drug evidence, and the lack of any exigency or emergency, warrants 22 application of the exclusionary rule.

2023The lives and safety of police officers weigh heavily in the balance of competing Fourth Amendment considerations.” (Dickey, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 957 .) However, we are equally mindful that the exclusionary rule serves the vital purpose of “compel[ling] respect for the constitutional guaranty [of the Fourth Amendment] in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” (Elkins, supra, 364 U.S. at p. 217 ; see People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334 .) Thus, in implementing the rule in this case, we do so to reemphasize that a pat search “is a serious i

2024The Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception “[T]he exclusionary rule generally bars admission of the evidence seized that was beyond the scope of the warrant.” (United States v. Sedaghaty (9th Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 885, 915 (Sedaghaty).) It is a “judicially created rule [that] is ‘designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect’ ” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135 , 139–140 (Herring)) by “forbid[ding] the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” 14 (Id. at p. 139; People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 30 (Willis).) The United States Supr

2024(Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 347 .) “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.

2025(See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 485 [“The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result” of a Fourth Amendment violation]; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 655–656.) without explanation—what extrinsic evidence C.T. hoped to introduce that would be relevant enough for admission, even in a relaxed evidentiary setting such as this. 13.

2024(Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 655 ; see also Bay, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025 .) 12 An unconstitutionally unreasonable search does not necessarily trigger the application of the exclusionary rule.

2022(Tully, at p. 979.)” (People v. Mathews (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 130, 137 (Mathews).) 3 Overruled on another ground as stated in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610 , 637-643 and People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912 , 919–920. 4 We need not, and do not, decide whether the warrantless search of the vehicle immediately following defendant’s arrest was lawful, as we agree with the Attorney General that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.4 “[E]vidence that has been illegally obtained need not always be suppressed.” (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 441 (Nix).) “ ‘The inevitable disco

2020The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence “if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.” (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 447 , (Nix ).) The purpose of the exception is “to prevent the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800 .) It is the prosecution's burden to “establish by a prepo

2023The trial court, relying on Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1 , 15 and its statement that “[a]pplication of the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees,” denied the renewed motion.

2023The trial court, relying on Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1 , 15 and its statement that “[a]pplication of the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees,” denied the renewed motion.

2016To be sure, Mullen held that “injuries resulting from acts committed by an insured in self-defense”—“even if [the insured] exceeded the reasonable bounds of self- defense”—“are not ‘intended’ or ‘expected’ within the meaning of those terms as 8 customarily used in an exclusionary clause.” (Id. at pp. 170-171; see also Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 277 [same].) But Mullen and Gray—the decision on which Mullen relies—were interpreting an exclusion to an insurance policy, not the policy’s coverage in the first place.

2007(Id. at pp. 514-516.) Our statement with regard to such a choice-of-law decision by a California court concerned the enforceability of an express contractual promise, rather than contract interpretation. 19 Moreover, the pollution liability endorsement here expressly states that it “forms a part of the policy to which attached.” 20 Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at page 274 , stated: “Since we must resolve uncertainties in favor of the insured and interpret the policy provisions according to the layman’s reasonable expectations, [fn. omitted] and since the effect of the exclusionary clause is neither

2024(See Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 924 ; People v. Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 596 .) Because Detective Armando’s belief that the affidavit presented probable cause to search Lopez’s cell phone records was not objectively unreasonable, the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and the motion to quash was properly denied.7 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 7 By reason of this holding, there is no need to address Lopez’s argument that all of the evidence obtained from the subsequent July 2014 search warrant should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. 25 ________________

2023“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 140 (Herring); see United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 922 (Leon).) “When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” (Herring, at p. 142; Leon, at p. 922.) As pertinent here, the governing test “is whether a reas

1994I, § 28, subd. (d).) [8] At the time of the crimes at issue, a defendant could invoke the exclusionary rule to challenge Fourth Amendment breaches when the Fourth Amendment rights of a person other than defendant were violated. ( People v. Martin (1955) 45 Cal.2d 755, 761 [ 290 P.2d 855 ].) The law today is otherwise. ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) [9] Because we conclude that Officer Paerels had probable cause to arrest Austin for receipt of stolen property, we need not address defendant's alternative argument that Austin's arrest was invali

1994I, § 28, subd. (d).) [8] At the time of the crimes at issue, a defendant could invoke the exclusionary rule to challenge Fourth Amendment breaches when the Fourth Amendment rights of a person other than defendant were violated. ( People v. Martin (1955) 45 Cal.2d 755, 761 [ 290 P.2d 855 ].) The law today is otherwise. ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) [9] Because we conclude that Officer Paerels had probable cause to arrest Austin for receipt of stolen property, we need not address defendant's alternative argument that Austin's arrest was invali

2026(Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590 , 7 603-604 (Brown).)” (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 448 .) “The third Brown factor, the flagrancy and purposefulness of the police misconduct, is generally regarded as the most important because ‘it is directly tied to the purpose of the exclusionary rule—deterring police misconduct.’ ” (People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 271 .) The first two factors, as the People concede, do not support finding attenuation: Seto’s consent to search the residence immediately followed the pat search, with no temporal separation and no intervening circumstance.

2023I, § 28, subd. (f)(2).) We accordingly focus on federal constitutional standards in our analysis in this case. 6 PEOPLE v. MCWILLIAMS Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. guided by three factors first set out in Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590 , 603–604 (Brown): (1) the “temporal proximity” between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence; (2) the “presence of intervening circumstances”; and (3) the “purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” (See Strieff, at p. 239.) Once the defendant establishes a Fourth Amendment violation, the prosecution bears the burden of establis

2009(Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 8 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ].) The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police from violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures “in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” (Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 217 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) “The exclusionary rules of the criminal law are based upon the principle that the state should not profit by its own wrong in using in criminal proceedings evidence obt

2009(Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 8 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ].) The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police from violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures “in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” (Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 217 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 ].) “The exclusionary rules of the criminal law are based upon the principle that the state should not profit by its own wrong in using in criminal proceedings evidence obt

2025(See Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591 [describing the exclusionary rule— not dismissal of a proceeding—as the “last resort,”]; id. at pp. 596–598 [describing availability of civil damages for Fourth Amendment violations]; United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 366 [“[W]e have not suggested that searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth Amendment warrant dismissal of the indictment.

2025(See Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 591 [describing the exclusionary rule— not dismissal of a proceeding—as the “last resort,”]; id. at pp. 596–598 [describing availability of civil damages for Fourth Amendment violations]; United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 366 [“[W]e have not suggested that searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth Amendment warrant dismissal of the indictment.

2020The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence “if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.” (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 447 , (Nix ).) The purpose of the exception is “to prevent the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800 .) It is the prosecution's burden to “establish by a prepo

2017“The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule, and permits the admission of otherwise excluded evidence ‘if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police.’ ” (People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1071 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 890 ]; see Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 800 .) “The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct.” (Robles, at p. 8

1994Like the United States Supreme Court, we too have never extended the rule to exclude evidence from civil proceedings, but "only to proceedings so closely identified with the aims of criminal prosecution as to be deemed `quasi criminal.'" ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 892 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) Thus, as we noted above, we had little hesitation in applying the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings, finding in those proceedings "a close identity to the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement." ( People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, supra, 62 Cal.2d 92 a

1994Like the United States Supreme Court, we too have never extended the rule to exclude evidence from civil proceedings, but "only to proceedings so closely identified with the aims of criminal prosecution as to be deemed `quasi criminal.'" ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 892 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) Thus, as we noted above, we had little hesitation in applying the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings, finding in those proceedings "a close identity to the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement." ( People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, supra, 62 Cal.2d 92 a

2024The Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception “[T]he exclusionary rule generally bars admission of the evidence seized that was beyond the scope of the warrant.” (United States v. Sedaghaty (9th Cir. 2013) 728 F.3d 885, 915 (Sedaghaty).) It is a “judicially created rule [that] is ‘designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect’ ” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135 , 139–140 (Herring)) by “forbid[ding] the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” 14 (Id. at p. 139; People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 30 (Willis).) The United States Supr

2024As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring, at p. 144; People v. Leal (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1065 .) The test is an objective one and “does not turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers” (Krull, at p. 355) or “ ‘the actual motivations of individual officers.’ ” (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334 (Sanders).) Rather, the question is “ ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal’ in

2009Even in an administrative setting, “egregious violations” of the Fourth Amendment “might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.” (INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 1050-1051.) We also consider whether the circumstances surrounding an unlawfully obtained confession show it was “involuntary” or “coerced.” (In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 650 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 382 , 463 P.2d 734 ].) Applying a balancing test to the case at bench, we find insufficient grounds for extending the exclusionary rule to this disciplinary proceed

2009Even in an administrative setting, “egregious violations” of the Fourth Amendment “might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.” (INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 1050-1051.) We also consider whether the circumstances surrounding an unlawfully obtained confession show it was “involuntary” or “coerced.” (In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 650 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 382 , 463 P.2d 734 ].) Applying a balancing test to the case at bench, we find insufficient grounds for extending the exclusionary rule to this disciplinary proceed

2026(Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590 , 7 603-604 (Brown).)” (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 448 .) “The third Brown factor, the flagrancy and purposefulness of the police misconduct, is generally regarded as the most important because ‘it is directly tied to the purpose of the exclusionary rule—deterring police misconduct.’ ” (People v. Brendlin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 271 .) The first two factors, as the People concede, do not support finding attenuation: Seto’s consent to search the residence immediately followed the pat search, with no temporal separation and no intervening circumstance.

2024(Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 269 .) Finally, the third Brown factor—generally regarded as “the most important” because of its direct tie to the exclusionary rule’s 10 purpose of deterring police misconduct (Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 271 )—also counsels against suppression. “[T]here is no indication” that Kay’s detention “was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.” (Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. 232, 242 .) To the contrary, officers detained Kay to permit them to investigate “what was happening inside a house whose occupant[ ] [was] legitimately suspected” of wrong

2017Though there is little, if any, concern that expert witnesses would commit perjury, 8 the admission of this evidence prevents the defendant from turning the exclusionary rule into a “ ‘a shield against contradiction of his untruths.’ ” (Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 224 , quoting Walder, supra, 347 U.S. at p. 65 .) Nor would the admission of the suppressed statements have a chilling effect on a defendant’s ability to present a defense.

2015The passage of Proposition 9 by the voters in 2008 amended section 28, resulting in some renumbering of previously existing subdivisions. 35 York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 [statement taken without advising the defendant of his right to appointed counsel may be admitted for impeachment].) The court explained that the benefit to the jury of evaluating the defendant’s credibility in light of prior inconsistent statements should not be lost, and that, assuming the exclusionary rule has the effect of deterring police misconduct, there was sufficient deterrence when the prosecution is barred fro

1969Domingo’s contention his commitment and conviction were invalid is based upon the following grounds, asserted on appeal and set forth in his petition and an amendment thereto, each of which he claims constitute a denial of due process of law: (1) Admission in evidence at his trial of allegedly incriminating statements made by him which are .within the exclusionary rule adopted by the state Supreme Court on January 29, 1965 in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 *645 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ] ; (2) failure to try him separately as allegedly required by the rule adopted by the state Suprem

1969Domingo’s contention his commitment and conviction were invalid is based upon the following grounds, asserted on appeal and set forth in his petition and an amendment thereto, each of which he claims constitute a denial of due process of law: (1) Admission in evidence at his trial of allegedly incriminating statements made by him which are .within the exclusionary rule adopted by the state Supreme Court on January 29, 1965 in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 *645 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ] ; (2) failure to try him separately as allegedly required by the rule adopted by the state Suprem

2014The Trial Court Did Not Err By Denying the Motion to Suppress The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution “‘proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures’” (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1224 ) “‘to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials’” (People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 934 ). “‘Under the Fourth Amendment, a[] [judicial] officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor[e] from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath o

2001(See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 [whether probable cause to arrest exists is a practical, commonsense issue based on totality of the circumstances, not on application of rigid rules]; but see Judge Harold Rothwax, Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice (1997).) In the aftermath of this still-continuing *146 judicial return to reason, peace officers and their agencies would be mistaken to assume they may seek haven in the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, for example, and there find a license to be casual or, worse, careless.

2024(Id. at pp. 995–996.) The court held that “the search warrants were written with sufficient particularity because the items listed on the warrants were qualified by phrases that emphasized that the items sought were those related to child pornography,” and thus, “[p]olice officers executing the warrants were not unguided and free to rummage through Hall’s property.” (Id. at pp. 996–997, fn. omitted.) 33 “Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic.” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1219 (Macabeo).) “The exclusionary rule applies only ‘where its deterrenc

2023“Exclusion of evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation is not automatic.” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1219 .) While the exclusionary rule “ ‘bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation,’ ” “the deterrent purpose of the rule is not served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith.” (Id. at p. 1220.) “ ‘If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer h