exclusionary rule in Massachusetts

2025"The suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is a 'judicially created remedy,' whose 'prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 438 (2008), quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 348 (1974).

2016“The suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is a ‘judicially created remedy,’ whose ‘prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 438 (2008), quoting from United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 348 (1974).

2025To serve its function, the exclusionary rule provides that "evidence seized during an unlawful search [cannot] constitute proof against the victim of the search." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).

2025In articulating that judgment, we have also provided for application of the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule as and when appropriate: "if a defendant can establish that a traffic stop is the product of selective enforcement predicated on race, evidence seized in the course of the stop should be suppressed unless the connection between the unconstitutional stop by the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Id. at 440 , quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-488 .

2009The exclusionary rule also is supported by the “imperative of judicial integrity.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960), quoted in Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. at 438 n.25.

2008Under the exclusionary rule, “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . .. inadmissible in a state court.” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

2008It is elementary that “all relevant evidence is admissible unless within an exclusionary rule.” Vigorito v. Ciulla Bldrs., Inc., 57 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 454 (2003), quoting Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 210 (1978).

2003Authy., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 654, 657 (1992). 8 The rule speaks of a party who, aware that a piece of evidence in his hands is relevant to the case, destroys or otherwise dispatches it: where the party does this deliberately or even negligently to the potential prejudice of the adversary, he will be barred from offering related testimony at trial. 9 The party moving the exclusion has to demonstrate the justification, for “[t]he general rule to be followed ... is that all relevant evidence is admissible unless within an exclusionary rule.” Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 210 (1978).

2025Finally, because the second buccal swab was obtained pursuant to a court order supported entirely by evidence untainted by the initial illegality, the exclusionary rule does not apply.[7] That rule -- designed to deter constitutional violations by suppressing illegally obtained evidence -- bars the admission not only of the unlawfully obtained item itself, see Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 78 (2019), but also of its derivatives, see Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 .

2025Just as "[w]e do not recognize a 'good faith' exception to either the exclusionary rule or the attenuation [exception]," Fredericq, 482 Mass. at 84 , lack of credibility on Shlosser's part supports a finding of purpose and flagrancy.

2015The mere presence of another person’s DNA on a defendant’s clothing does not reveal a significant amount of information or detail about the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the source of the DNA. 10 The Fourth Amendment violation, however, did not result in the suppression of the DNA evidence because the court concluded that the exclusionary rule should not apply in these circumstances under the “good faith” exception established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-920 (1984).

2014In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-921 (1984), the United States Supreme Court adopted the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule where the officer conducting a search objectively reasonably relied on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate that was subsequently determined to be invalid and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2011“Under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the Commonwealth satisfies the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘discovery by lawful means was certain as a practical matter.’ ” Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 558 (2010), quoting from Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117 (1989). 3.

2005Notable exceptions to the exclusionary rule are the “inevitable discovery rule,” see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 115-116 (1989); the “independent source rule,” see Wong Sung, supra and lastly the “attenuation rule,” which will be discussed in the next section.

2018Compare id . at 503, 287 N.E.2d 599 (suppressing evidence of identification made at police station after defendant was intentionally denied his statutory right to use telephone); Commonwealth v. Alicea , 428 Mass. 711 , 716, 705 N.E.2d 233 (1999) ("To make the statute an effective piece of legislation in the absence of [a prescribed penalty for a violation], we have grafted an exclusionary rule to it" [quotation omitted] ).

2018Compare id . at 503, 287 N.E.2d 599 (suppressing evidence of identification made at police station after defendant was intentionally denied his statutory right to use telephone); Commonwealth v. Alicea , 428 Mass. 711 , 716, 705 N.E.2d 233 (1999) ("To make the statute an effective piece of legislation in the absence of [a prescribed penalty for a violation], we have grafted an exclusionary rule to it" [quotation omitted] ).

2019See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602-603, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ("If Miranda **81 warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, ... the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted").

2019See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602-603, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ("If Miranda **81 warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, ... the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted").

2023Souza, 428 Mass. at 494 , quoting Egerton, 396 Mass. at 504 . 5 depict, and they are not otherwise barred by an exclusionary rule." Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 400 Mass. 524, 527 (1987).

2006Our courts have held that videotapes are “on balance, a reliable evidentiary resource,” Commonwealth v. Harvey, 397 Mass. 351, 359 (1986), and that they “should be admissible as evidence if they are relevant, they provide a fair representation of that which they purport to depict, and they are not otherwise barred by an exclusionary rule.” Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 400 Mass. 524, 527 (1987).

2019"The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions." Commonwealth v. Santiago , 470 Mass. 574 , 578, 24 N.E.3d 560 (2015). "[W]here 'the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.' " Commonwealth v. Wilkerson , 436 Mass. 137 , 142, 763 N.E.2d 508 (2002), quoting United States v. Janis , 428 U.S. 433 , 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (

2019"The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions." Commonwealth v. Santiago , 470 Mass. 574 , 578, 24 N.E.3d 560 (2015). "[W]here 'the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.' " Commonwealth v. Wilkerson , 436 Mass. 137 , 142, 763 N.E.2d 508 (2002), quoting United States v. Janis , 428 U.S. 433 , 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (

2025"The suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is a 'judicially created remedy,' whose 'prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425, 438 (2008), quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 348 (1974).

2025In articulating that judgment, we have also provided for application of the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule as and when appropriate: "if a defendant can establish that a traffic stop is the product of selective enforcement predicated on race, evidence seized in the course of the stop should be suppressed unless the connection between the unconstitutional stop by the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Id. at 440 , quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-488 .

2025Although our courts have not adopted the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, we have instead focused on whether the alleged violations are "substantial and prejudicial." Hernandez, 456 Mass. at 532-533 .

2023I am mindful that Massachusetts has not adopted the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule for purposes of art. 14; instead, we focus on whether violations are "substantial and prejudicial." Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 456 Mass. 528, 533 (2010).

2026The legality of the patfrisk turned on the existence of reasonable safety concerns, and it is therefore not clear to us that exclusion of Sanchez's testimony about the juvenile's prior possession of a firearm would have served the purpose of the exclusionary rule -- "to deter police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity by dissociating courts from unlawful conduct." Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 570-571 (2011).

2025Whatever its constitutional grounds, the fundamental policy underlying the exclusionary rule is the same: "to deter police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity by dissociating courts from unlawful conduct." Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 570-571 (2011).

2019"The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions." Commonwealth v. Santiago , 470 Mass. 574 , 578, 24 N.E.3d 560 (2015). "[W]here 'the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.' " Commonwealth v. Wilkerson , 436 Mass. 137 , 142, 763 N.E.2d 508 (2002), quoting United States v. Janis , 428 U.S. 433 , 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (

2019"The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions." Commonwealth v. Santiago , 470 Mass. 574 , 578, 24 N.E.3d 560 (2015). "[W]here 'the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.' " Commonwealth v. Wilkerson , 436 Mass. 137 , 142, 763 N.E.2d 508 (2002), quoting United States v. Janis , 428 U.S. 433 , 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (

2014The “exception[s] [to the strict application of the exclusionary rule are] justified when the deterrence rationale is outweighed by the competing societal interest in convicting the guiliy.” Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 216 (1981) (Liacos, C.J.).

2014The “exception[s] [to the strict application of the exclusionary rule are] justified when the deterrence rationale is outweighed by the competing societal interest in convicting the guilty.” Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 216 (1981) (Liacos, C.J.).

2016Besides the “ ‘primary justification for the exclusionary rule’ [of] deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct,” Lora, supra, quoting from Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976), “its purpose is to . . . preserve judicial integrity by dissociating courts from unlawful conduct.” Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 570-571 (2011).

2005While we have rejected the “clean hands” exception to § 2515, the complete lack of police involvement in the underlying illegal interception is not an insignificant fact in assessing the necessary reach of the exclusionary rule and the adequacy of the attenuating circumstances in the context of a criminal investigation and prosecution. 18 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976).

2018L. c. 119, § 51F, 15 and therefore there is no need to graft an exclusionary rule to it "to make the statute an effective piece of legislation." Commonwealth v. Jones , 362 Mass. 497 , 502, 287 N.E.2d 599 (1972).

2018L. c. 119, § 51F, 15 and therefore there is no need to graft an exclusionary rule to it "to make the statute an effective piece of legislation." Commonwealth v. Jones , 362 Mass. 497 , 502, 287 N.E.2d 599 (1972).

2008Coo lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (stating that the exclusionary rule’s “target is official misconduct”).

2005Absent an explicit statement from the Legislature to the contrary, we will not read the “use” provisions of the wiretap statute as forcing police and prosecutors to avert their eyes from information procured by private individuals, without any encouragement from the State. 7 Id. at 632-633 , quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (“the ‘target’ of the exclusionary rule ‘is official misconduct,’ and the rule is not intended ‘to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability the apprehension of criminals’ ”). 8 We reject the defendant’s contention that, by “u

2011The exclusionary rule serves the twin purposes of deterring unlawful conduct by law enforcement officials, and “the protection of judicial integrity through the dissociation of the courts from unlawful conduct.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708, 715 (2010); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).

2007See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (“Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unreasonable risks in the performance of their duties”). 5 Finally, it bears mentioning why an exclusionary rule has been judicially engrafted onto art. 14.

2024In denying the probationer's motion for a new revocation hearing, the motion judge relied on Commonwealth v. Olsen, 405 Mass. 491, 491 (1989), to conclude the exclusionary rule does not apply as a matter of course to probation revocation proceedings.

2024In Olsen, 405 Mass. at 493 , we held the exclusionary rule does not generally apply to probation revocation proceedings.

2019We do not recognize a "good faith" exception to either the exclusionary rule or the attenuation doctrine. 9 See Commonwealth v. Hernandez , 456 Mass. 528 , 533, 924 N.E.2d 709 (2010) ("We have not adopted the 'good faith' exception [to exclusionary rule] **85 for purposes of art. 14 ..."); Commonwealth v. Upton , 394 Mass. 363 , 370 & n.5, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985) ( G.

2019We do not recognize a "good faith" exception to either the exclusionary rule or the attenuation doctrine. 9 See Commonwealth v. Hernandez , 456 Mass. 528 , 533, 924 N.E.2d 709 (2010) ("We have not adopted the 'good faith' exception [to exclusionary rule] **85 for purposes of art. 14 ..."); Commonwealth v. Upton , 394 Mass. 363 , 370 & n.5, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985) ( G.

2016“Rigid adherence to a rule of exclusion is unnecessary in situations where these purposes are not furthered.” Nelson, supra, citing Brown, supra. We therefore turn to the question whether the “stated goal of *107 the exclusionary rule ... to encourage police officers to conform their conduct to the dictates of the Constitution,” Crawford , 410 Mass, at 80, militates in favor of prohibiting consideration of previously suppressed evidence when assessing an informant’s veracity under the Aguilar-Spinelli test in an unrelated case. 6 We conclude that it does not, at least not in a case such as thi

2011The exclusionary rule serves the twin purposes of deterring unlawful conduct by law enforcement officials, and “the protection of judicial integrity through the dissociation of the courts from unlawful conduct.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708, 715 (2010); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).

2023The court recognized that "[t]he officers here undoubtedly proceeded upon an honest belief that they were acting within the law." Id. at 387 . 35 of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions." Commonwealth v. Santiago, 470 Mass. 574, 578 (2015).

2022To be sure, given that “[t]he primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by barring, in a current prosecution, the admission of evidence that the police have obtained in violation of rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions,” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 470 Mass. 574, 578 (2015) (citations omitted), it would be nonsensical to ignore the exclusionary rule in an asset forfeiture proceeding in which the police will directly benefit from the forfeiture.[8] S ee G.L. c. 94C, § 47(d) (“The final order of the court shall provide that said moneys and the

2019Although "the exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the claim [as here] is based on a causal relationship between a constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object," Commonwealth v. Caso , 377 Mass. 236 , 244, 385 N.E.2d 979 (1979), quoting United States v. Ceccolini , 435 U.S. 268 , 280, 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), the defendant contends that his mother was "coerced into [providing a statement] by police exploitation of illegal acts." Caso , supra at 242

2019Although "the exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the claim [as here] is based on a causal relationship between a constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object," Commonwealth v. Caso , 377 Mass. 236 , 244, 385 N.E.2d 979 (1979), quoting United States v. Ceccolini , 435 U.S. 268 , 280, 98 S.Ct. 1054 , 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), the defendant contends that his mother was "coerced into [providing a statement] by police exploitation of illegal acts." Caso , supra at 242

2007Moreover, because an improper application of the exclusionary rule exacts an unwarranted and costly toll on the truth-finding function in criminal trials, see Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 503 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), quoting from United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980), the suppression order must be reversed. 4.

1996In the companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), the court stated “the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid.”

2023"If free from ambiguity, an exclusionary clause, like all other provisions of an insurance contract, must be given its usual and ordinary meaning." Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers' 8 Insolvency Fund, 424 Mass. 275, 281 (1997).

2014“If free from ambiguity, an exclusionary clause, like all other provisions of an insurance contract, must be given its usual and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 281 .