exclusionary rule in New York

2026Accordingly, I conclude that the court properly granted those branches of the defendants' separate omnibus motions which were to suppress the physical evidence contained in the fanny pack and the defendants' pockets.</p> <p>"The exclusionary rule generally bars from trial all 'physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion'" (<i>People v Millan</i>, 69 NY2d 514, 521 , quoting <i>Wong Sun v United States</i>, 371 US 471, 485 ). "'The exclusionary rule is not aimed at safeguarding the truth-seeking process nor is its underlying purpose to redres

2024Turning to the merits, the exclusionary rule provides that “when the police have acted illegally, evidence which has been come at by exploitation of that illegality should be suppressed” (People v Gethers, 86 NY2d 159, 161-162 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 488 [1963]).

2012In any event, both Statement No. 4 and the two items of physical evidence were admissible into evidence pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, which permits a court to deny the suppression of evidence if it can be shown by “a very high degree of probability that the evidence sought to be suppressed would inevitably have been discovered irrespective of the initial wrong” (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]).

2012In any event, both Statement No. 4 and the two items of physical evidence were admissible into evidence pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, which permits a court to deny the suppression of evidence if it can be shown by “a very high degree of probability that the evidence sought to be suppressed would inevitably have been discovered irrespective of the initial wrong” (People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318 [1987] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]).

1996(See, United States v Calandra, 414 US 338 [1974]; People v Young, 55 NY2d 419 [1982]; People v McGrath, 46 NY2d 12 [1978].) As the Court of Appeals stated in People v Young (supra, at 425 ) the exclusionary rule is not to be applied automatically whenever there has been a Fourth Amendment violation.

1993The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful police misconduct (People v Young, 55 NY2d 419, 425 , cert denied 459 US 848 ). " 'In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generated through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved’ ” (supra, at 425, quoting United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 348 ).

2026Applying the exclusionary rule in this manner is directly contrary to binding Supreme Court precedent, and any such argument under the New York State Constitution is both unpreserved and meritless. 1. "[A]ttenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity' " ( New York v Harris , 495 US 14, 19 [1990], quoting United States v Crews , 445 US 463, 471 [1980]; see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 32, 34 [1982] ["the defendant . . . has the burden of showing that the seizure o

2026Applying the exclusionary rule in this manner is directly contrary to binding Supreme Court precedent, and any such argument under the New York State Constitution is both unpreserved and meritless. 1. "[A]ttenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity' " ( New York v Harris , 495 US 14, 19 [1990], quoting United States v Crews , 445 US 463, 471 [1980]; see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 32, 34 [1982] ["the defendant . . . has the burden of showing that the seizure o

2019Indeed, the exclusionary rule—"a judicially created tool for the effectuation of constitutionally guaranteed rights . . . [f]ormulated as a pragmatic response to law enforcement procedures violative of individual liberties[—] . . . has never enjoyed the stature of an end in itself, but, rather, has served solely as a means to an end: a remedial device operating essentially upon a principle of deterrence" ( People v McGrath , 46 NY2d 12, 20-21 [1978], cert denied 440 US 972 [1979]; see Jones , 2 NY3d at 241 ; Young , 55 NY2d at 425 ).

2019Nonetheless, "the application of the rule must be restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously served' and not merely tenuously demonstrable' " ( Young , 55 NY2d at 425 ). "[I]t has always been incumbent upon the courts to balance the societal cost of losing reliable and competent evidence against the probable effectuation and enhancement of Fourth Amendment principles" and, consequently, "the application of the exclusionary rule is dependent upon a balancing of its probable deterrent effect against its detrimental impact upon the truth-finding process' " ( id

2026Applying the exclusionary rule in this manner is directly contrary to binding Supreme Court precedent, and any such argument under the New York State Constitution is both unpreserved and meritless. 1. "[A]ttenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity' " ( New York v Harris , 495 US 14, 19 [1990], quoting United States v Crews , 445 US 463, 471 [1980]; see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 32, 34 [1982] ["the defendant . . . has the burden of showing that the seizure o

2026Applying the exclusionary rule in this manner is directly contrary to binding Supreme Court precedent, and any such argument under the New York State Constitution is both unpreserved and meritless. 1. "[A]ttenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity' " ( New York v Harris , 495 US 14, 19 [1990], quoting United States v Crews , 445 US 463, 471 [1980]; see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 32, 34 [1982] ["the defendant . . . has the burden of showing that the seizure o

2020The exclusionary rule is meant to “‘deter[] lawless conduct’” by police and to preclude the use in court of evidence that was “‘unconstitutionally obtained’” (Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 599 [1975], quoting Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 486 [1963]; People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 404-405 [1979]).

2004We have recognized “that the application and scope of the exclusionary rule is ascertained by balancing the foreseeable deterrent effect against the adverse impact of suppression upon the truth-finding process” (People v Drain, 73 NY2d 107, 110 [1989], citing People v Harris, 72 NY2d 614, 621-622 [1988]; People v McGrath, 46 NY2d 12, 21 [1978]; People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 404 [1979]).

2024This reasoning misunderstands the concept of deterrence lying at the core of the exclusionary rule, which is inherently forward-looking: application of the exclusionary rule in one case aims to quell the temptation for overreach and subterfuge in other, future ones ( see Jones , 2 NY3d at 241 ).

2022With respect to the consequences of an unreasonable search or seizure, "[u]nder well-established exclusionary rule principles, where police have engaged in unlawful activity[,] . . . evidence which is a result of the exploitation of that illegality is subject to suppression as the fruit of the poisonous tree unless one of the recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule is applicable" ( People v Small , 110 AD3d 1138, 1140 [3d Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Jones , 2 NY3d 235, 242 [2004]; People v Gethers , 86 NY2d 159, 161-162 [1995]).

2020The exclusionary rule is meant to “‘deter[] lawless conduct’” by police and to preclude the use in court of evidence that was “‘unconstitutionally obtained’” (Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 599 [1975], quoting Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 486 [1963]; People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 404-405 [1979]).

1996Therefore, any time an intrusion on the security and privacy of the individual is undertaken with intent to harass or is based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, the spirit of the Constitution has been violated and the aggrieved party may invoke the exclusionary rule or appropriate forms of civil redress.” Whatever may have been the motivation, the unauthorized search was clearly undertaken to obtain physical evidence and, thus, has "the 'quality of purposefulness’ to uncover incriminating evidence” (People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 404 [quoting Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 605 ], cert d

2023Co. v Rapid-American Corp. , 80 NY2d 640, 648 [1993] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and any "ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be construed against the insurer, particularly when found in an exclusionary clause" ( Breed v Insurance Co. of N. Am. , 46 NY2d 351, 353 [1978], rearg denied 46 NY2d 940 [1979]; see 140 Grist , Inc. v Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exch. , 185 AD3d 636, 638 [2d Dept 2020]).

2022"To the extent that there is any ambiguity in an exclusionary clause, [courts] construe the provision in favor of the insured" ( Cragg , 17 NY3d at 122 ; see Breed v Insurance Co. of N. Am. , 46 NY2d 351, 353 [1978], rearg denied 46 NY2d 940 [1979]).

2018"The application of the exclusionary rule requires a commonsense appraisal of whether the suppression of the challenged evidence will remove in the future the motive for similar improper police conduct" ( People v Rogers , 52 NY2d 527, 535 [1981], cert denied 454 US 898 [1981]; see People v John BB. , 81 AD2d 188, 192 [1981], affd 56 NY2d 482 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1010 [1982]).

2018We see no reason to disturb County Court's determination inasmuch as "sufficient evidence that the required nexus between the detention and the statements is absent, there would be no deterrence and therefore no reason to invoke the exclusionary rule" ( People v Rogers , 52 NY2d at 535 ).

2024The exclusionary rule "prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of an accused's Fourth Amendment rights in a criminal proceeding" ( People v Young , 55 NY2d 419, 424 [1982]; see also People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 32 [1982] ["(E)vidence which is obtained as a result of illegal police activity may not be used against a defendant at (a) criminal trial"]).

2019Indeed, the exclusionary rule—"a judicially created tool for the effectuation of constitutionally guaranteed rights . . . [f]ormulated as a pragmatic response to law enforcement procedures violative of individual liberties[—] . . . has never enjoyed the stature of an end in itself, but, rather, has served solely as a means to an end: a remedial device operating essentially upon a principle of deterrence" ( People v McGrath , 46 NY2d 12, 20-21 [1978], cert denied 440 US 972 [1979]; see Jones , 2 NY3d at 241 ; Young , 55 NY2d at 425 ).

2023Rather, in assessing whether suppression of the cell phone data was warranted during the administrative proceeding, we must "[b]alanc[e] the probable deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule against the detrimental impact upon the truth-finding process" ( id. at 195 ; Matter of Charles Q. v Constantine , 204 AD2d 904, 905-906 [3d Dept 1994], affd 85 NY2d 571 [1995]).

2014Further, on the facts of this case, the exclusionary rule applies to bar use of the evidence at the administrative proceeding, based on a “ ‘balancing [of] the foreseeable deterrent effect against the adverse impact of suppression upon the truth-finding process’ ” (Matter of Boyd v Constantine, 81 NY2d 189, 195 [1993], quoting People v Drain, 73 NY2d 107, 110 [1989]).

2026Following these tenets, we held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was "not adequate to protect New York citizens from Payton violations because of our right to counsel rule" ( id. at 439).

2026As we explained on remand from the Supreme Court in Harris , the Supreme Court's ruling regarding the scope of the exclusionary rule under federal law "is not adequate to protect New York citizens from Payton violations because of our right to counsel rule" (77 NY2d at 439).

2023To permit the People to use the evidence seized pursuant to an illegal detention where an officer did not have sufficient information at the time to determine if there was reasonable suspicion to detain a suspect would frustrate the exclusionary rule ( see People v Bigelow , 66 NY2d 417, 427 ).

2019In other words, the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be frustrated in this case because allowing the People to use the seized evidence would not place "a premium . . . on the illegal police action" or create "a positive incentive . . . to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future" ( People v Bigelow , 66 NY2d 417, 427 [1985]).

2014However, as the People correctly contend, the hearing court erred in suppressing disputed identification evidence and the defendant’s statement to law enforcement officials as fruit of the poisonous tree because this evidence fell under the inevit *1255 able discovery exception to the exclusionary rule (see People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499, 506 [1973]).

1995Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the court properly concluded that certain fingerprint evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule (see, e.g., People v Stith, 69 NY2d 313 ; People v Fitzpatrick, 32 NY2d 499, 508-509 , cert denied 414 US 1033 , 1050; People v Watson, 188 AD2d 501, 502 ).

2024The exclusionary rule "is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" and "[t]o hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment" ( Mapp v Ohio , 367 US 643, 656-657 [1961]).

2017The defendant has filed a motion alleging that three Inspectors from the Village’s Building Department conducted an illegal search of his premises without a warrant and he avers that this was in violation of the exclusionary rule pursuant to Mapp v Ohio ( 367 US 643 [1961]).

2017Co., 60 NY2d 390, 398 [1983]; see Cleary v Automobile Ins.

1998Co., 60 NY2d 390, 398 ): “The tests to be applied in construing an insurance policy are common speech * * * and the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary businessman * * * The ambiguities in an insurance policy are, moreover, to be construed against the insurer, particularly when found in an exclusionary clause” (60 NY2d, supra, at 398).

2014Further, on the facts of this case, the exclusionary rule applies to bar use of the evidence at the administrative proceeding, based on a “ ‘balancing [of] the foreseeable deterrent effect against the adverse impact of suppression upon the truth-finding process’ ” (Matter of Boyd v Constantine, 81 NY2d 189, 195 [1993], quoting People v Drain, 73 NY2d 107, 110 [1989]).

2014Further, on the facts of this case, the exclusionary rule applies to bar use of the evidence at the administrative proceeding, based on a “ ‘balancing [of] the foreseeable deterrent effect against the adverse impact of suppression upon the truth-finding process’ ” (Matter of Boyd v Constantine, 81 NY2d 189, 195 [1993], quoting People v Drain, 73 NY2d 107, 110 [1989]).

2024In De Bour , the Court of Appeals recognized that "any time an intrusion of the security and privacy of the individual is undertaken with intent to harass or is based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, the spirit of the Constitution has been violated and the aggrieved party may invoke the exclusionary rule or appropriate forms of civil redress" ( id. at 217).The Court developed a graduated four-tiered test to evaluate the nature and extent of police conduct toward private citizens during street encounters, which considers whether or not the police action was: "justified in its inceptio

2024In De Bour , the Court of Appeals recognized that "any time an intrusion of the security and privacy of the individual is undertaken with intent to harass or is based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, the spirit of the Constitution has been violated and the aggrieved party may invoke the exclusionary rule or appropriate forms of civil redress" ( id. at 217 ).The Court developed a graduated four-tiered test to evaluate the nature and extent of police conduct toward private citizens during street encounters, which considers whether or not the police action was: "justified in its incepti

2026Rather than address third party consent head-on, the dissent contends that New York v Harris (495 US 14 [1990]) bars application of the exclusionary rule here, relying on a passage which holds that attenuation analysis should not be employed where evidence is obtained "outside of [a defendant's] home . . . after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton " (dissenting op at 8, citing Harris , 495 US at 21).

2026Rather than address third party consent head-on, the dissent contends that New York v Harris (495 US 14 [1990]) bars application of the exclusionary rule here, relying on a passage which holds that attenuation analysis should not be employed where evidence is obtained "outside of [a defendant's] home . . . after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton " (dissenting op at 8, citing Harris , 495 US at 21).