exclusionary rule in Nevada

2018See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08, 919-20 (1984) (recognizing policy of limiting the extent of the exclusionary rule when police act in "objective good faith"). 2 Such efforts could justify the application of the apparent authority doctrine if actual authority did not in fact exist.

2018See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 907-08, 919-20, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (recognizing policy of limiting the extent of the exclusionary rule when police act in "objective good faith"). 2 Such efforts could justify the application of the apparent authority doctrine if actual authority did not in fact exist.

2019Proc. § 9.6(b) (4th ed. Nov. 2018 Update) (On rare occasion, defense tactics which likewise seek to gain extraordinary advantage from the fact of suppression of certain evidence may also be deemed to have 'opened the door to at least limited receipt of that evidence."); see also State v. Allen, 119 Nev. 166, 172 , 69 P.3d 232, 236 (2003) (Exclusion is only appropriate where the remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule are served.").

2019Proc. § 9.6(b) (4th ed. Nov. 2018 Update) (On rare occasion, defense tactics which likewise seek to gain extraordinary advantage from the fact of suppression of certain evidence may also be deemed to have 'opened the door to at least limited receipt of that evidence."); see also State v. Allen, 119 Nev. 166, 172 , 69 P.3d 232, 236 (2003) (Exclusion is only appropriate where the remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule are served.").

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Finally, Dail v. State, 96 Nev. 435 , 610 P.2d 1193 (1980), rejected the exclusionary rule the majority today adopts.

2018Finally, Dail v. State, 96 Nev. 435 , 610 P.2d 1193 (1980), rejected the exclusionary rule the majority today adopts.

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2015See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986); COURT OF APPEALS OF 10 NEVADA (0) 1947B see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

2015See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986); COURT OF APPEALS OF 10 NEVADA (0) 1947B see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

2015Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 896-99 (Pa. 1991) ("The history of Article I, Section 8 [of the Pennsylvania Constitution] thus indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment . . . .").

2015Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 896-99 (Pa. 1991) ("The history of Article I, Section 8 [of the Pennsylvania Constitution] thus indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment . . . .").

2015See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986); COURT OF APPEALS OF 10 NEVADA (0) 1947B see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

2015See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986); COURT OF APPEALS OF 10 NEVADA (0) 1947B see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

2017While the exclusionary rule generally prohibits the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule." Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 232 (2011); see United States v. Gary, 790 F.3d 704, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to reverse and order suppression of cellphone evidence based on Riley where the search pre-dated Riley and was authorized by pre-Riley caselaw, reliance on which was objectively reasonable).

2015Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24, 2427 (2011).

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2015See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).

2001See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“[The exclusionary rule’s] purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states for purposes of Fourth Amendment violations); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (applying exclusionary rule to states for purposes of Fifth Amendment violations); see also NRS 48.025 (providing that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible).

2024The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to declare a mistrial based on a violation of the exclusionary rule “The decision to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Romo v. Keplinger, 115 Nev. 94, 96, 978 P.2d 964, 966 (1999) Gnternal quotation marks omitted).

2024The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to declare a mistrial based on a violation of the exclusionary rule “The decision to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Romo v. Keplinger, 115 Nev. 94, 96, 978 P.2d 964, 966 (1999) Gnternal quotation marks omitted).

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2017Similarly, in the related child abuse/neglect context, courts routinely hold that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (4t5)44 9 is admissible because "the substantial social cost of ignoring children's safety" exceeds "the minimal additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule." In re W.L.P., 202 P.3d 167, 173 (Or. 2009); accord In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 , 728 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[The potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result fro

2017Similarly, in the related child abuse/neglect context, courts routinely hold that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (4t5)44 9 is admissible because "the substantial social cost of ignoring children's safety" exceeds "the minimal additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule." In re W.L.P., 202 P.3d 167, 173 (Or. 2009); accord In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 728 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[The potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from

2017A per se rule of inadmissibility would sweep broader than the exclusionary rule in the criminal context, 5 and it would be particularly inappropriate here because 4 This statement does not affect our holding in Sims v. Sims "that a court may not use changes of custody as a sword to punish parental misconduct." 109 Nev. 1146, 1149, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993).

2017A per se rule of inadmissibility would sweep broader than the exclusionary rule in the criminal context, 5 and it would be particularly inappropriate here because 4 This statement does not affect our holding in Sims v. Sims "that a court may not use changes of custody as a sword to punish parental misconduct." 109 Nev. 1146, 1149, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993).

2017A.R. v. CR., 982 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah 1999) ("Whatever deterrent effect there might be is far outweighed by the need to provide for the safety and health of children in peril.").

2017A.R. v. CR., 982 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah 1999) ("Whatever deterrent effect there might be is far outweighed by the need to provide for the safety and health of children in peril.").

2017SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 194M e 8 a district court "needs to consider as much relevant evidence as possible when deciding child custody." Rogers, 633 A.2d at 749 (admitting allegedly illegally obtained evidence in a child custody proceeding); accord Munson, 166 P.2d at 271 ("[T]he controlling rights are those of the minor child and of the state in the child's welfare."); Lee v. Lee, 967 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("Even evidence obtained fraudulently, wrongfully, or illegally is admissible.").

2017SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 194M e 8 a district court "needs to consider as much relevant evidence as possible when deciding child custody." Rogers, 633 A.2d at 749 (admitting allegedly illegally obtained evidence in a child custody proceeding); accord Munson, 166 P.2d at 271 ("[T]he controlling rights are those of the minor child and of the state in the child's welfare."); Lee v. Lee, 967 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("Even evidence obtained fraudulently, wrongfully, or illegally is admissible.").

2017SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 194M e 8 a district court "needs to consider as much relevant evidence as possible when deciding child custody." Rogers, 633 A.2d at 749 (admitting allegedly illegally obtained evidence in a child custody proceeding); accord Munson, 166 P.2d at 271 ("[T]he controlling rights are those of the minor child and of the state in the child's welfare."); Lee v. Lee, 967 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("Even evidence obtained fraudulently, wrongfully, or illegally is admissible.").

2017SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 194M e 8 a district court "needs to consider as much relevant evidence as possible when deciding child custody." Rogers, 633 A.2d at 749 (admitting allegedly illegally obtained evidence in a child custody proceeding); accord Munson, 166 P.2d at 271 ("[T]he controlling rights are those of the minor child and of the state in the child's welfare."); Lee v. Lee, 967 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("Even evidence obtained fraudulently, wrongfully, or illegally is admissible.").

2017Similarly, in the related child abuse/neglect context, courts routinely hold that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (4t5)44 9 is admissible because "the substantial social cost of ignoring children's safety" exceeds "the minimal additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule." In re W.L.P., 202 P.3d 167, 173 (Or. 2009); accord In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 , 728 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[The potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result fro

2017Similarly, in the related child abuse/neglect context, courts routinely hold that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (4t5)44 9 is admissible because "the substantial social cost of ignoring children's safety" exceeds "the minimal additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule." In re W.L.P., 202 P.3d 167, 173 (Or. 2009); accord In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 728 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[The potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from

2017Similarly, in the related child abuse/neglect context, courts routinely hold that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (4t5)44 9 is admissible because "the substantial social cost of ignoring children's safety" exceeds "the minimal additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule." In re W.L.P., 202 P.3d 167, 173 (Or. 2009); accord In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 , 728 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[The potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result fro

2017Similarly, in the related child abuse/neglect context, courts routinely hold that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A (4t5)44 9 is admissible because "the substantial social cost of ignoring children's safety" exceeds "the minimal additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule." In re W.L.P., 202 P.3d 167, 173 (Or. 2009); accord In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. 726, 728 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[The potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from

2017SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 194M e 8 a district court "needs to consider as much relevant evidence as possible when deciding child custody." Rogers, 633 A.2d at 749 (admitting allegedly illegally obtained evidence in a child custody proceeding); accord Munson, 166 P.2d at 271 ("[T]he controlling rights are those of the minor child and of the state in the child's welfare."); Lee v. Lee, 967 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("Even evidence obtained fraudulently, wrongfully, or illegally is admissible.").

2017SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 194M e 8 a district court "needs to consider as much relevant evidence as possible when deciding child custody." Rogers, 633 A.2d at 749 (admitting allegedly illegally obtained evidence in a child custody proceeding); accord Munson, 166 P.2d at 271 ("[T]he controlling rights are those of the minor child and of the state in the child's welfare."); Lee v. Lee, 967 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("Even evidence obtained fraudulently, wrongfully, or illegally is admissible.").

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2017CI Utah v. Strieff, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (creating the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to physical evidence obtained as a result of questioning that violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (same for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2014Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) Instead, the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to deter law enforcement from future Fourth Amendment violations.

2014Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) Instead, the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy designed to deter law enforcement from future Fourth Amendment violations.

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2018Therefore, we join our sister courts in adopting a rule to limit the use of a probationer's testimony given at a probation revocation hearing 5 See id. at 438, 610 P.2d at 1194-95 (listing jurisdictions that had adopted use and derivative use immunity for a probationer's testimony or the option of proceeding with the criminal trial before the revocation hearing); see also McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 997-98 (Alaska 1980) (providing for an exclusionary rule of evidence or testimony presented at a probation revocation hearing and any "fruits of the . . . revocation hearing"); State v. Boyd,

2015In this, he makes several arguments that we have previously rejected, including that the district court should have granted his request to exclude witnesses from the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses, Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 917 , 921 P.2d 886, 892 (1996) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to the penalty phase of a capital trial), abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev., Adv.

2015In this, he makes several arguments that we have previously rejected, including that the district court should have granted his request to exclude witnesses from the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses, Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 917 , 921 P.2d 886, 892 (1996) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to the penalty phase of a capital trial), abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev., Adv.