exclusionary rule in South Carolina

2025As the Davis Court explained, "the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement." 564 U.S. at 246 , 131 S. Ct. at 2432 , 180 L.

2025As the Davis Court explained, "the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement." 564 U.S. at 246 , 131 S. Ct. at 2432 , 180 L.

2025See State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 566 , 216 S.E.2d 501, 514 (1975) ("The exclusionary rule is harsh medicine.").

2025See State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 566 , 216 S.E.2d 501, 514 (1975) ("The exclusionary rule is harsh medicine.").

2026See e.g., State v. Carter, 445 S.C. 157 , 163–64, 912 S.E.2d 264 , 268 (2025) (holding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule "forecloses suppression" when officers acted pursuant to the federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (c)(4), in obtaining real time cell site location information); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 918–21 (1984) (finding the good faith exception permits admission of evidence where an officer reasonably relies upon a warrant later determined to lack probable cause); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizi

2023The exclusionary rule operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). "[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement." Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011).

2023We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (holding a reviewing court "will uphold [the factual findings of the PCR court] if there is any evidence of probative value to support them"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (stating that to prove prejudice, a PCR applicant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"); State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641, 647 , 763 S.E.2d 341, 345

2017See State v. Spears , 393 S.C. 466 , 482, 713 S.E.2d 324 , 332 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The inevitable discovery doctrine, one exception to the exclusionary rule, states that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, the information is admissible despite the fact it was illegally obtained." (citing Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) )).

2026See e.g., State v. Carter, 445 S.C. 157 , 163–64, 912 S.E.2d 264 , 268 (2025) (holding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule "forecloses suppression" when officers acted pursuant to the federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (c)(4), in obtaining real time cell site location information); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 918–21 (1984) (finding the good faith exception permits admission of evidence where an officer reasonably relies upon a warrant later determined to lack probable cause); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizi

2022See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (considering a pre-Carpenter warrantless gathering of historical CSLI and finding "when investigators 'act with an objectively "reasonable good-faith belief" that their conduct is lawful,' the exclusionary rule will not apply").

2014In Leon , the Supreme Court established a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, holding “that when an officer acting in objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope, a reviewing court should not order a suppression of the evidence based on a lack of probable cause.” State v. Weston, 329 S.C. 287, 292 , 494 S.E.2d 801, 803-04 (1997) (summarizing Leon).

2014In Leon , the Supreme Court established a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, holding “that when an officer acting in objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope, a reviewing court should not order a suppression of the evidence based on a lack of probable cause.” State v. Weston, 329 S.C. 287, 292 , 494 S.E.2d 801, 803-04 (1997) (summarizing Leon).

2005The court held “that for the purpose of construing an exclusionary clause in a general liability policy, ‘arising out of’ should be narrowly construed as ‘ caused by .’ However, we find that even under a narrow construction of the exclusion, the injuries . . . are not covered under the policy.” Id. at 320, 426 S.E.2d at 771-72 (emphasis added).

2004Co., 310 S.C. 316, 320 , 426 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1993) (“[H]old[ing] that for the purpose of construing an exclusionary clause in a general liability policy, ‘arising out of should be narrowly *175 construed as ‘caused by.’ ”); MGC Mgmt.

2023The exclusionary rule operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). "[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement." Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011).

2023The exclusionary rule operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). "[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct by law enforcement." Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 246 (2011).

2025In Sachs and subsequent cases, this Court has permitted exclusion "only where deterrence is clearly subserved." Sachs, 264 S.C. at 566 , 216 S.E.2d at 514 ; see also State v. Harvin, 345 S.C. 190, 194 , 547 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2001) (stating "the question" as to applying the exclusionary rule "is whether suppressing appellant's statement would deter police misconduct"), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490 , 504 n.3, 832 S.E.2d 575 , 583 n.3 (2019).

2025In Sachs and subsequent cases, this Court has permitted exclusion "only where deterrence is clearly subserved." Sachs, 264 S.C. at 566 , 216 S.E.2d at 514 ; see also State v. Harvin, 345 S.C. 190, 194 , 547 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2001) (stating "the question" as to applying the exclusionary rule "is whether suppressing appellant's statement would deter police misconduct"), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490 , 504 n.3, 832 S.E.2d 575 , 583 n.3 (2019).

2019Code Ann. § 17-13-141 (A) (2014) (providing every judiciary official authorized to issue search warrants must keep records reflecting, among others, the reason for issuing the warrant); State v. Wise, 272 S.C. 384, 386 , 252 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979) (holding the failure to fulfill a statutory ministerial requirement does not void a warrant unless a defendant can show prejudice); State v. Sheldon, 344 S.C. 340, 343 , 543 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In the context of the application of the exclusionary rule, our supreme court held the 'exclusion of evidence should be limited to violations of

2019Code Ann. § 17-13-141 (A) (2014) (providing every judiciary official authorized to issue search warrants must keep records reflecting, among others, the reason for issuing the warrant); State v. Wise, 272 S.C. 384, 386 , 252 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979) (holding the failure to fulfill a statutory ministerial requirement does not void a warrant unless a defendant can show prejudice); State v. Sheldon, 344 S.C. 340, 343 , 543 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In the context of the application of the exclusionary rule, our supreme court held the 'exclusion of evidence should be limited to violations of

2002See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (holding the exclusionary rule barring admission of evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states).

2002See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (holding the exclusionary rule barring admission of evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states).

2026Still, "'courts have recognized several exceptions to the exclusionary rule,' including, among others, the independent source doctrine, inevitable discovery, and good-faith reliance." Id. (quoting State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641 , 647 & n.3, 763 S.E.2d 341 , 345 & n.3 (2014)). "[T]he independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source." Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016).

2023We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (holding a reviewing court "will uphold [the factual findings of the PCR court] if there is any evidence of probative value to support them"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (stating that to prove prejudice, a PCR applicant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"); State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641, 647 , 763 S.E.2d 341, 345

2020Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) (noting the "substantial social costs" of the exclusionary rule).

2011See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-94 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 , 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (holding violation of the “knock and announce” rule did not warrant the exclusion of all evidence obtained in a search, and noting that the exclusionary rule generates “substantial societal costs”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2019See State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 92 , 736 S.E.2d 263, 268 (2012) ("[T]he exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter future [constitutional] violations [by law enforcement] and []where suppression fails to yield 'appreciable deterrence,' exclusion is 'clearly . . . unwarranted.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011)).

2019See State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 92 , 736 S.E.2d 263, 268 (2012) ("[T]he exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter future [constitutional] violations [by law enforcement] and []where suppression fails to yield 'appreciable deterrence,' exclusion is 'clearly . . . unwarranted.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011)).

2017See State v. Spears , 393 S.C. 466 , 482, 713 S.E.2d 324 , 332 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The inevitable discovery doctrine, one exception to the exclusionary rule, states that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, the information is admissible despite the fact it was illegally obtained." (citing Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) )).

2017See State v. Spears , 393 S.C. 466 , 482, 713 S.E.2d 324 , 332 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The inevitable discovery doctrine, one exception to the exclusionary rule, states that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, the information is admissible despite the fact it was illegally obtained." (citing Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) )).

2011See State v. Brown, 389 S.C. 473, 483 , 698 S.E.2d 811, 816 (Ct.App.2010) (“The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search must be excluded.”).

2011See State v. Brown, 389 S.C. 473, 483 , 698 S.E.2d 811, 816 (Ct.App.2010) (“The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search must be excluded.”).

2026The independent source doctrine rests "upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). "[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained information may nevertheless be admissible if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information would have ultimately been discovered by lawful means." Moore, 429 S.C. at 481, 839 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting State v. Cardwell, 425 S.

2023We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (holding a reviewing court "will uphold [the factual findings of the PCR court] if there is any evidence of probative value to support them"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (stating that to prove prejudice, a PCR applicant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"); State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641, 647 , 763 S.E.2d 341, 345

2023See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address petitioner's remaining issues when the first issue was dispositive). confident law enforcement will take care to use section 56-5-2946 in accordance with what the South Carolina Constitution and the Fourth Amendment require.16 IV.

2023See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address petitioner's remaining issues when the first issue was dispositive). confident law enforcement will take care to use section 56-5-2946 in accordance with what the South Carolina Constitution and the Fourth Amendment require.16 IV.

2019Code Ann. § 17-13-141 (A) (2014) (providing every judiciary official authorized to issue search warrants must keep records reflecting, among others, the reason for issuing the warrant); State v. Wise, 272 S.C. 384, 386 , 252 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979) (holding the failure to fulfill a statutory ministerial requirement does not void a warrant unless a defendant can show prejudice); State v. Sheldon, 344 S.C. 340, 343 , 543 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In the context of the application of the exclusionary rule, our supreme court held the 'exclusion of evidence should be limited to violations of

2019Code Ann. § 17-13-141 (A) (2014) (providing every judiciary official authorized to issue search warrants must keep records reflecting, among others, the reason for issuing the warrant); State v. Wise, 272 S.C. 384, 386 , 252 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1979) (holding the failure to fulfill a statutory ministerial requirement does not void a warrant unless a defendant can show prejudice); State v. Sheldon, 344 S.C. 340, 343 , 543 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In the context of the application of the exclusionary rule, our supreme court held the 'exclusion of evidence should be limited to violations of

2012See Weston, 329 S.C. at 293 , 494 S.E.2d at 804 (“Suppression is appropriate in only a few situations----”); State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 113 , 352 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1987) (“Exclusion of evidence is not the only means available to insure that warrants are properly issued.” (citing Sachs, 264 S.C. at 556 , 216 S.E.2d at 509 )).

2012See Weston, 329 S.C. at 293 , 494 S.E.2d at 804 (“Suppression is appropriate in only a few situations----”); State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 113 , 352 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1987) (“Exclusion of evidence is not the only means available to insure that warrants are properly issued.” (citing Sachs, 264 S.C. at 556 , 216 S.E.2d at 509 )).

2026Still, "'courts have recognized several exceptions to the exclusionary rule,' including, among others, the independent source doctrine, inevitable discovery, and good-faith reliance." Id. (quoting State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641 , 647 & n.3, 763 S.E.2d 341 , 345 & n.3 (2014)). "[T]he independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source." Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016).

2023We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (holding a reviewing court "will uphold [the factual findings of the PCR court] if there is any evidence of probative value to support them"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (stating that to prove prejudice, a PCR applicant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"); State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641, 647 , 763 S.E.2d 341, 345

2022Id at 236 and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (holding the exclusionary rule is "calculated to prevent, not to repair").

2012However, because the trial court ruled the search was legal, the State never had an opportunity to present evidence to prove its contention. 7 The purpose of the exclusionary rule “ ‘is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ ” State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 560-61 , 216 S.E.2d 501, 511 (1975) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)).

2026The independent source doctrine rests "upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). "[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine provides that illegally obtained information may nevertheless be admissible if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information would have ultimately been discovered by lawful means." Moore, 429 S.C. at 481, 839 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting State v. Cardwell, 425 S.

2012Specifically, it prohibits the admission of evidence (1) directly acquired during an unlawful search and (2) later discovered and derivative of the unlawful search. 9 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 538 , 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988); see also *490 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2020See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) ("The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.").

2014However, “[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred ... does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).

2017See State v. Tindall , 388 S.C. 518 , 521, 698 S.E.2d 203 , 205 (2010) ("On appeals from a motion to suppress based on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse if there is clear error."); State v. Spears , 393 S.C. 466 , 482, 713 S.E.2d 324 , 332 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) ) (stating that the inevitable discovery doctrine-an exception to the exclusionary rule-allows for the admission of illegally obtained evidence if the prosecution can establish by a prepo

2013See United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir.2007) (stating “the expectation [of privacy] must be one which the law recognizes as legitimate,” meaning it “must be objectively reasonable ... by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 17, 19 , 409 S.E.2d 811, 816, 817 (Ct.App.1991) (stating whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists “depends on a factual determination” and “is a question of fact”); State v. Tindall, 388 S.C.

2017See State v. Tindall , 388 S.C. 518 , 521, 698 S.E.2d 203 , 205 (2010) ("On appeals from a motion to suppress based on Fourth Amendment grounds, [the appellate court] applies a deferential standard of review and will reverse if there is clear error."); State v. Spears , 393 S.C. 466 , 482, 713 S.E.2d 324 , 332 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) ) (stating that the inevitable discovery doctrine-an exception to the exclusionary rule-allows for the admission of illegally obtained evidence if the prosecution can establish by a prepo

2013See United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir.2007) (stating “the expectation [of privacy] must be one which the law recognizes as legitimate,” meaning it “must be objectively reasonable ... by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 17, 19 , 409 S.E.2d 811, 816, 817 (Ct.App.1991) (stating whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists “depends on a factual determination” and “is a question of fact”); State v. Tindall, 388 S.C.

2014We turn first to the court of appeals’ holding that suppression was not warranted because Adams’ traffic violations were intervening criminal acts. *648 “Generally, evidence derived from an illegal search or arrest is deemed fruit of the poisonous tree and is inadmissible.” United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 477 (4th Cir.2002) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).

2014We turn first to the court of appeals’ holding that suppression was not warranted because Adams’ traffic violations were intervening criminal acts. *648 “Generally, evidence derived from an illegal search or arrest is deemed fruit of the poisonous tree and is inadmissible.” United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 477 (4th Cir.2002) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).

2026Still, "'courts have recognized several exceptions to the exclusionary rule,' including, among others, the independent source doctrine, inevitable discovery, and good-faith reliance." Id. (quoting State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641 , 647 & n.3, 763 S.E.2d 341 , 345 & n.3 (2014)). "[T]he independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source." Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016).

2026Still, "'courts have recognized several exceptions to the exclusionary rule,' including, among others, the independent source doctrine, inevitable discovery, and good-faith reliance." Id. (quoting State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641 , 647 & n.3, 763 S.E.2d 341 , 345 & n.3 (2014)). "[T]he independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source." Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, 5 F.4th 706, 712 (7th Cir. 2021) ("In our view, the record demonstrates that the officers relied on § 2702(c)(4) of the Stored Communications Act in good faith."); United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 392-93 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding evidence collected based on law enforcement officers' good-faith reliance on subsection 2702(c)(4) should not be suppressed); United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1324 (D.