exclusionary rule in Indiana

2025However, we note that the State cites a line of United States Supreme Court opinions, starting with United States v. Leon, which stand for the proposition that “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984), reh’g denied.

2025Under this principle, the exclusionary rule does not require the “suppressi[on of] evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant[.]” Id. at 922 . [40] The Court expanded the application of this “good-faith exception” in Davis v. United States, which held that “[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” 564 U.S. 229 , 241 (2011).

2020Therefore, even if the protective sweep was improper, reversal is not warranted. “[T]he inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the introduction of evidence that eventually would have been located had there been no error.” Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

2018Under the Fourth Amendment, “the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits the introduction of evidence that eventually would have been located had there been no error.” Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

2026Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 314 (Ind. 2018); see also Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 277 (Ind. 2008) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (noting the exclusionary rule also “protect[s] the integrity of the judicial process and . . . the rights of criminal defendants”).

2018And so we've cautioned that "[b]ecause there is this cost to enforcing the exclusionary rule, it should be done only where appropriate to advance its [deterrent] purpose." Id. at 274 (emphasis added).

2020See Dolliver, 598 N.E.2d at 529 (recognizing that the good-faith exception “cannot be so broadly construed as to obliterate the exclusionary rule”); Lloyd v. State, 677 N.E.2d 71, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (Najam, J., dissenting) (“If a mere hunch were sufficient to support an official belief in the validity of a warrant, the good faith exception would swallow the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search or seizure . . . .”), trans. denied.

2015Our Supreme Court has counselled against allowing the good faith exception to “obliterate the exclusionary rule.” Dolliver v. State, 598 N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ind.1992).

2017We conclude that the search violated Watkins’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence discovered as a result of the search. 4 [34] To the extent the State suggests that we adopt the inevitable discovery exception as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, we observe that under the Fourth Amendment, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule “permits the introduction of evidence that eventually would have been located had there been no error, for [in] that instance ‘there is no nexus sufficient to

2017We conclude that the search violated Watkins’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence discovered as a result of the search. 4 To the extent the State suggests that we adopt the inevitable discovery exception as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, we observe that under the Fourth Amendment, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule “permits the introduction of evidence that eventually would have been located had there been no error, for [in] that instance ‘there is no nexus sufficient to provi

2016Ind.Code § 35-37-4-5(b). [17] “The good faith exception cannot be so broadly construed as to obliterate the exclusionary rule.” Newby v. State, 701 N.E.2d 593, 602 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

2005"However, care should be taken when applying this exception to ensure that the good faith exception does not swallow the exclusionary rule." Caudle v. State, 749 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.; Newby v. State, 701 N.E.2d 593, 602 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (quoting Dolliver v. State, 598 N.E.2d 525, 529 (Ind.1992)).

2015See Hanna v. State, 726 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine is one facet of the exclusionary rule of evidence which bars the admissibility in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in the course of unlawful searches and seizures.”).

2014“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine is one facet of the exclusionary rule of evidence which bars the admissibility in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in the course of unlawful searches and seizures.” Hanna v. State, 726 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

2010We noted that our supreme *582 court has declared that the "[floeus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution is the reasonableness of the police conduct." Id. (quoting Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind.2006)).

2009Indiana, too, applies the exclusionary rule, founded upon Article 1, sections 11 and 14 of the Indiana Constitution: "If the property was secured by search and seizure under the pretext of a search warrant, which was invalid for any reason, then the property so seized could not be used as evidence against the appellant, and its admission over his objection was prejudicial error." Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 96 , 138 N.E. 817, 818 (1922).

2009In Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180 (Ind. 1997), our supreme court addressed the "interplay between the 'good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule and the warrant statute, Indiana Code [Section] 35-33-5-2," Id. at 181 .

2009In Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180 (Ind. 1997), our supreme court addressed the "interplay between the 'good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule and the warrant statute, Indiana Code [Section] 35-33-5-2," Id. at 181 .

2018Id. (quoting Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind.1992)). [13] Given the distinction between formal criminal proceedings and probation revocation hearings, “courts have found it unnecessary to fully apply the exclusionary rule when dealing with probation revocation.” Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211, 219 , 346 N.E.2d 746, 751 (1976).

2018Id. (quoting Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind.1992)). [13] Given the distinction between formal criminal proceedings and probation revocation hearings, “courts have found it unnecessary to fully apply the exclusionary rule when dealing with probation revocation.” Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211, 219 , 346 N.E.2d 746, 751 (1976).

2025Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2785| August 29, 2025 Page 18 of 22 burden to prove that one of these well-delineated exceptions is satisfied.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). [39] The State argues that application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate in this case but does not specifically identify which exception we should apply to reach that conclusion.

2020Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260 ; see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (noting the exclusionary rule encompasses both “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure” and any “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality”); Hill v. State, 956 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that evidence obtained from an illegal search was “fruit of the poisonous tree” and therefore inadmissible), trans. denied.

2018Membres , 889 N.E.2d at 273 (citing Spillers , 847 N.E.2d at 957 ) ("Indiana search and seizure jurisprudence, like federal Fourth Amendment doctrine, identifies deterrence as the primary objective of the exclusionary rule.").

2015See State v. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949, 957 (Ind. 2006) (holding that if officers rely on a defective search warrant in objective good faith, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence).

2020“The focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution is the reasonableness of police conduct.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind. 2006).

2018"The focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution is the reasonableness of police *654 conduct." Hardister v. State , 849 N.E.2d 563 , 573 (Ind. 2006).

2016“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 , 129 S.Ct. 695, 702 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Id.

2016“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 , 129 S.Ct. 695, 702 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Id.

2017“The focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution is the reasonableness of police conduct.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind. 2006). ‘We consider three factors when evaluating reasonableness: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.’ ” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 368 (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)).

2011The court specifically addressed the exclusionary rule as used to remedy violations of the Indiana Constitution in the seizure of evidence and its decision in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), which limited the ability of police to conduct trash searches.

2026Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 314 (Ind. 2018); see also Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 277 (Ind. 2008) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (noting the exclusionary rule also “protect[s] the integrity of the judicial process and . . . the rights of criminal defendants”).

2025The Court observed, “As we see it, by examining the causal chain between the illegality and the discovered evidence or looking at the totality of the circumstances, attenuation is the natural, reasonable limit to the exclusionary rule’s fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Id. at 317 (citing in part Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444 , 828 N.E.2d 510, 518 (2005) (citation omitted) (explaining that since the attenuation doctrine asks whether the police exploited the illegality to gain evidence, “the attenuation rule is ‘not an exception to the exclusionary rule but a test of its limits’”)

2015See, e.g., State v. Owens, 992 N.E.2d 939, 943 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. denied; Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 888 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), abrogated on other grounds by Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind.2014); Ronco v. State, 840 N.E.2d 368, 376 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), issue summarily aff’d by Ronco v. State, 862 N.E.2d 257 , 259 n. 1 (Ind.2007); Dennis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh’g denied. 4 .

2014Specifically, “[i]n some situations, the causal chain is sufficiently attenuated to dissipate any taint of [the illegal police activity], allowing the evidence seized during a search to be admitted.” Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 887 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).

2018See Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). *714 [19] Because the gun would have been admissible at trial under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Winborn's motion to suppress.

2018See Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). *714 [19] Because the gun would have been admissible at trial under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Winborn's motion to suppress.

2014Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has recognized an exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where the connection between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent discovery of evidence “become[s] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

2014Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has recognized an exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where the connection between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent discovery of evidence “become[s] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

2025Under this principle, the exclusionary rule does not require the “suppressi[on of] evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant[.]” Id. at 922 . [40] The Court expanded the application of this “good-faith exception” in Davis v. United States, which held that “[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” 564 U.S. 229 , 241 (2011).

2016The exclusionary rule is “a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231-32 (2011). [8] The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” The State concedes that Officer Faulk violated this provision when she handcuffed Turner, since she had no “objective justification” for doing so.

2020“Indeed ‘the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of evidence in reliance on a defective search warrant if the police relied on the warrant in objective good faith.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2009)).

2020“Indeed ‘the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of evidence in reliance on a defective search warrant if the police relied on the warrant in objective good faith.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2009)).

2019I.C. § 35-37-4-5(b)(1)(A). [18] “The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct, and in many cases there is no police illegality to deter.” Hensley, 778 N.E.2d at 489 (citing U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984)).

2013As we have said before, "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct.” Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 957 (quoting Hensley v. State, 778 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002)).

2007“The United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, but is ‘a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.’ ” Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998)).

2007“The United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, but is ‘a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.’ ” Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 , 118 S.Ct. 2014 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998)).

2010The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for violations of the Indiana Constitution well before the United States Supreme Court mandated use of the rule in the states for violations of the federal constitution in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

2010The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for violations of the Indiana Constitution well before the United States Supreme Court mandated use of the rule in the states for violations of the federal constitution in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

2025The exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” C.P. v. State, 39 N.E.3d 1174, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

2020However, even if C.D. was illegally seized in violation of Article 1, Section 11, he is not entitled to any relief. [6] In C.P. v. State, this Court held that if a suspect commits a “new and distinct” crime in response to an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement, evidence of that new crime is admissible under the new-crime exception to the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution. 39 N.E.3d 1174, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; see also Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 314 (Ind. 2018) (acknowledging this Court’s adoption of the new-crime exception in C.P.); K.C. v. Sta