exclusionary rule in Colorado

2025In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984), however, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should not be suppressed in circumstances where the evidence was obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, even if that warrant was later determined to be invalid.

2019We recognize that the federal courts have created several exceptions to the exclusionary rule, see, e.g. , United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and that we have our own statutory good-faith exception, see § 16-3-308, C.R.S. (2018), but we need not address the applicability of those exceptions.

2025Id. (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). ¶ 32 However, the independent source doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule.

2024Our state supreme court has also “acknowledged the special protections applicable to cell phone searches.” People v. 7 The exclusionary rule “applies both to illegally obtained evidence and to derivative evidence — often called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Schoondermark, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988)). 20 Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 19 ; see also Coke, ¶ 38 (warrant to search a cell phone that “permitted the officers to search all texts, videos, pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any data that showed ownership or possession”

2022But “the exclusionary rule should not automatically apply every time a [constitutional] violation is found.” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo. 2009)) (discussing federal, Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). ¶ 24 “Because ‘the exclusionary rule is intended to deter improper police conduct[,]’ it ‘should not be applied in cases where the deterrence purpose is not served, or where the benefits associated with the rule are minimal in comparison to the costs associated with the exclusion of probative evidence.’” Id. (quoting People v. Altm

2022But “the exclusionary rule should not automatically apply every time a [constitutional] violation is found.” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo. 2009)) (discussing federal, Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). ¶ 24 “Because ‘the exclusionary rule is intended to deter improper police conduct[,]’ it ‘should not be applied in cases where the deterrence purpose is not served, or where the benefits associated with the rule are minimal in comparison to the costs associated with the exclusion of probative evidence.’” Id. (quoting People v. Altm

2024Id. ¶ 24 “Exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not a constitutional right, and the exclusionary rule is not designed to redress the injury of an unconstitutional search.” People v. Barry, 2015 COA 4, ¶ 32 , 349 P.3d 1139, 1149-50 ; see Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011).

2024Id. (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 ). ¶ 26 In light of this case law, although we conclude that the warrantless draw of Tarr’s blood was an unreasonable search, we must determine whether evidence of the blood draws was nonetheless admissible at Tarr’s trial under an exception to the exclusionary rule.

2022But “the exclusionary rule should not automatically apply every time a [constitutional] violation is found.” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 941 (Colo. 2009)) (discussing federal, Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). ¶ 24 “Because ‘the exclusionary rule is intended to deter improper police conduct[,]’ it ‘should not be applied in cases where the deterrence purpose is not served, or where the benefits associated with the rule are minimal in comparison to the costs associated with the exclusion of probative evidence.’” Id. (quoting People v. Altm

2021The rule is “intended to deter improper police conduct,” and thus “should not be applied in cases where the ‘deterrence purpose is not served, or where the benefits associated with the rule are minimal in comparison to the costs associated with the exclusion of probative evidence.’” People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Colo. 1998) (citation omitted). ¶ 53 The attenuation doctrine is one exception to the exclusionary rule.

2025Apparently, not closing the defendant's door amounts to unlawful conduct, as the "'prime purpose' of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (quoting United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). ¶40 In this case, however, I do not perceive that any unlawful police conduct occurred.

2019The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy under which the "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." Id. at 347-48 , 94 S.Ct. 613 .

2026Id.; People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27 , ¶ 27. ¶ 19 When exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a home, “[t]he scope of the permissible intrusion is determined by the exigency justifying the initiation of the warrantless entry.” Gillespie, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)). ¶ 20 As a safeguard for an individual’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule “‘forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence 7 at trial,’ as well as ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.’” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 19 (f

2024See Barry, ¶ 33, 349 P.3d at 1149-50 ; see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) (“[E]vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer 12 had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987))). ¶ 28 As the United States Supreme Court noted, The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effec

2019See Wolf v. People , 117 Colo. 279 , 187 P.2d 926 , 927-28 (1947), aff'd , Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (concerning the applicability in state criminal proceedings of the exclusionary rule adopted in Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), for evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2019See Wolf v. People , 117 Colo. 279 , 187 P.2d 926 , 927-28 (1947), aff'd , Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U.S. 25 , 69 S.Ct. 1359 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (concerning the applicability in state criminal proceedings of the exclusionary rule adopted in Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), for evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment).

2018See People v. McKinstry, 843 P.2d 18, 20 (Colo. 1993) (“[W]here an officer has obtained evidence in violation of a statute or regulation, the exclusionary rule is not triggered unless the unauthorized conduct also amounts to a constitutional violation.”).

2018See People v. McKinstry , 843 P.2d 18 , 20 (Colo. 1993) ("[W]here an officer has obtained evidence in violation of a statute or regulation, the exclusionary rule is not triggered unless the unauthorized conduct also amounts to a constitutional violation.").

2018See People v. Morley , 4 P.3d 1078 , 1080 (Colo. 2000) (defining "the exclusionary rule" as a "judicially created remedy ... [that] operates to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. constitution] and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution") (citing People v. Burola , 848 P.2d 958 , 960-61 (Colo. 1993) ). ¶ 7 If an individual voluntarily consents to a search, that search is reasonable, and suppression of any evidence obtained is not warranted.

2002People v. Burola, 848 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo.1993); see People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 889 (Colo.1994).

2008See People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380, 384 (Colo.1997); People v. Schrader, 898 P.2d 33, 36-37 (Colo.1995); Martinez, 898 P.2d at 31-82 ; McKinstry, 843 P.2d at 21-22 ; People v. Fournier, 793 P.2d 1176, 1179-80 (Colo.1990); People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471, 475 (Colo.1986); Peo *1030 ple v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 156-57 (Colo.1983).

1995“The sanction of the exclusionary rule is designed to effectuate guarantees against deprivation of constitutional rights.” McKinstry, 843 P.2d at 20 (quoting Hamilton, 666 P.2d at 156 ); see also Fournier, 793 P.2d at 1179 (Where “a law enforcement officer obtains evidence in violation of a statute or regulation, the exclusionary rule is not trig *32 gered unless the unauthorized conduct also amounts to a constitutional violation.”); People v. Hamer, 689 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Colo.App.1984), cert. denied, No. 84SC1999 (Nov. 5, 1984).

2025Apparently, not closing the defendant's door amounts to unlawful conduct, as the "'prime purpose' of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" Illinois v. Krull , 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (quoting United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). ¶40 In this case, however, I do not perceive that any unlawful police conduct occurred.

2024See Barry, ¶ 33, 349 P.3d at 1149-50 ; see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) (“[E]vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer 12 had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987))). ¶ 28 As the United States Supreme Court noted, The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effec

2026Id.; People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27 , ¶ 27. ¶ 19 When exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a home, “[t]he scope of the permissible intrusion is determined by the exigency justifying the initiation of the warrantless entry.” Gillespie, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)). ¶ 20 As a safeguard for an individual’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule “‘forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence 7 at trial,’ as well as ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.’” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 19 (f

2024See Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43 ; see also Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶¶ 21-22, 36 . ¶ 67 We recognize that the exclusionary rule’s deterrence rationale is not served when the challenged evidence would “ultimately or inevitably” be discovered by lawful means.

2025Specifically, a person whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated by an officer may not respond by committing a new crime “and then rely on the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence pertaining to that criminal act.” Id. at 239 ; see also People v. Smith, 870 P.2d 617, 619 (Colo. App. 1994) (“[I]f, following an illegal stop or attempted stop, the detained person's response is itself a new, distinct crime, then the police constitutionally may arrest the person for that crime and the evidentiary fruit of that arrest will not be suppressed.”).

2020The court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply because the defendant’s “decision to resist ‘br[oke] the causal connection between the police illegality and the evidence of the new crime.’” Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Doke, 171 P.3d 237, 240 (Colo. 2007)). ¶ 32 Here, the district court found that K.D.W. trespassed and obstructed a peace officer after he fled from police.

2022See McKnight II , ¶ 61; People v. Morley , 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000). ¶ 23 The exclusionary rule, however, should not be automatically applied every time a constitutional violation is found.

2020It applies both to illegally obtained evidence and to derivative evidence — often called “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939)). ¶ 20 One exception to the exclusionary rule is the independent source doctrine, under which “unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be admitted if the prosecution can establish that it was also discovered by means independent of the illegality.” People v. Arapu, 2012 CO 42, ¶ 32 (quoting People v. Morley, 4 P.3d 1078, 180 (Colo. 8 2000)).

2021Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206 , 217 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 ( 1960 ) . ¶20 Because the exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation , there is tension between the Fourth Amendment rights the exclusionary rule protects and the future search and seizure violations it seeks to deter, on the one hand, and the courts ' truth-seeking function, on the other.

2021Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). ¶20 Because the exclusionary rule bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation, there is tension between the Fourth Amendment rights the exclusionary rule protects and the future search and seizure violations it seeks to deter, on the one hand, and the courts’ truth-seeking function, on the other.

2026Id.; People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27 , ¶ 27. ¶ 19 When exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a home, “[t]he scope of the permissible intrusion is determined by the exigency justifying the initiation of the warrantless entry.” Gillespie, ¶ 41 (quoting People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)). ¶ 20 As a safeguard for an individual’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule “‘forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence 7 at trial,’ as well as ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.’” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 19 (f

2019The exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure, as well as "evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality," otherwise known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Utah v. Strieff , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2056 , 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (quoting Segura v. United States , 468 U.S. 796 , 804, 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) ).

2025Id. (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). ¶ 32 However, the independent source doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule.

2021The exclusionary rule applies both to illegally obtained evidence and to derivative evidence — often called “fruit of the poisonous tree.” People v. Schoondermark, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939)).

2014The United States Supreme Court held in Jamis that the exclusionary rule should not apply in civil proceed ings if it "has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion." Id. at 454 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 ; Penn.

2014The United States Supreme Court held in Jamis that the exclusionary rule should not apply in civil proceed ings if it "has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion." Id. at 454 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 ; Penn.

2021Instead, the "sole purpose" of the exclusionary rule "is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations ." Id. at 236-37 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 . ¶44 As the majority correctly recognizes, the U.S. Supreme Court has "carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule ... where the introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truthseeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that admissibility of such evidence would encourage police misconduct is but a ‘speculative possibility.’ " Maj. op. at ¶ 20 ( quoting James , 493 U.S. at 311 , 110 S.Ct. 648 ) . ¶45 One such

2021Instead, the “sole purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at 236–37. 3 ¶44 As the majority correctly recognizes, the U.S. Supreme Court has “carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule . . . where the introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truthseeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that admissibility of such evidence would encourage police misconduct is but a ‘speculative possibility.’” Maj. op. at ¶ 20 (quoting James, 493 U.S. at 311 ). ¶45 One such exception to the rule—recognized i

2014Id. at 521 . {21 In Abart, we examined whether the exclusionary rule should apply during employee termination proceedings.

2014In Ahart, we concluded that the conduct was intra-sovereign, but we still went on to hold that the exclusionary rule should not apply because the proceeding was not quasi-criminal and the deterrent benefits of the exclusionary rule in that case did not outweigh the societal costs. 964 P.2d at 523 . 126 As we did in Ahart, we conclude that the proceeding here is not quasi-criminal in nature.

1998A. The exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its ■ deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)); see also People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1160 (Colo.1985) (Dubofsky, J., concurring).

1998Thus, the exclusionary rule is intended to deter improper police conduct and should not be applied in eases where the “deterrence purpose is not served, or where the benefits associated with the rule are minimal in comparison to the costs associated with the exclusion of probative evidence.” Deitchman, 695 P.2d at 1160 (Dubofsky, J., concurring); United States v. Chaar, 137 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir.1998) (noting that the exclusionary rule is intended to deter police misconduct not to punish mistakes of judges and magistrates); United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting

2017When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation. 26 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)). ¶ 63 Still, some may see following the independent source doctrine as at odds with the deterrence that results from applying the exclusionary rule.

2012Under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule, "unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be admitted if the prosecution can establish that it was also discovered by means independent of the illegality." People v. Morley, 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo.2000); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 542 & n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) ("what counts is whether the actual illegal search had any effect in producing the warrant").

2020Id. at 1363-64 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 ). ¶ 18 “If a trial court erroneously admits evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, we must reverse unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 17 .

2019Rodriguez, 945 P.2d at 1363 -64 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). ¶ 17 If a trial court erroneously admits evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, we must reverse unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1983Conceding that a statutory violation by a governmental officer need not rise per se to the level of constitutional significance for purposes of the exclusionary rule, our prior case law indicates that the unjustified exercise of extraterritorial arrest powers by a police officer does implicate constitutional interests. 635 P.2d at 218-219 .

1983Conceding that a statutory violation by a governmental officer need not rise per se to the level of constitutional significance for purposes of the exclusionary rule, our prior case law indicates that the unjustified exercise of extraterritorial arrest powers by a police officer does implicate constitutional interests. 635 P.2d at 218-219 .