exclusionary rule in New Jersey

2026Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." [Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)).] A-3765-23 21 "The exclusionary rule, however, is not absolute" and evidence obtained as fruit of the poisonous tree "is not automatically inadmissible." Holland, 176 N.J. at 354 -55 (quoting State v. H

2022See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484–88 (holding the exclusionary rule extends to direct and indirect products of unlawful police conduct).

2025Rather, "[c]ase law has developed certain exceptions to the exclusionary rule, in recognition of the fact that if exclusion in a particular instance will not further purposes of the exclusionary rule, there is no reason for the courts to apply it." Ibid. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 ).

2021"If the State can show that 'the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means . . . the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the evidence should be received.'" Id. at 551-52 (alterations in original) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).

2023State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58 (1987) (declining to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in our State because doing so would "undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed" protections that inhere in Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution).

2022See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987) (rejecting a "good faith" exception for A-3417-18 26 violations of the exclusionary rule); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (1983) (rejecting suppression of a police entry onto premises where the police had a valid warrant, regardless of the officers' subjective motives).

2026"Under the exclusionary rule, 'the State is barred from introducing into evidence the "fruits" of an unlawful search or seizure by the police.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311 (2005)).

2026"The exclusionary rule 'is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard' the right of the people to be free from 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 14 (2007) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

2026"The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to act as a 'deterrent safeguard to ensure that the Fourth Amendment is not reduced to a form of words.'" State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 376 (2003) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021In later holding that the exclusionary rule is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court noted the exclusionary rule is "a clear, specific, and constitutionally required—even if judicially implied—deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to a form of words." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 A-0580-20 The Court recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in

2024This doctrine arose from the recognition that "the exclusionary rule's purpose of preventing the use of evidence unlawfully A-0729-23 15 obtained by law enforcement is not served – especially in light of the heavy societal cost – where the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence." Id. at 620-21 (citing State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 237 (1985)).

2022As explained in State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 238 (1985), the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule allows the admission of illegally-obtained evidence if the State can prove that the evidence would have been discovered had the illegality not occurred by showing: (1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evi

2021See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (explaining where an officer obtains "physical, tangible materials . . . during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion," the exclusionary rule applies and bars such materials from trial); State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 412-13 (2012) (same).

2020In its sole response, the State, relying upon In re J.A., 233 N.J. 432 (2018), maintains that even if Gilmore did enter the vehicle prior to obtaining Rosario's consent, "the alleged entrance had nothing to do with the police obtaining consent." In J.A., the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply where seizure of evidence was not the result of "exploitation" of unconstitutional police action or was "of a 'means sufficiently distinguishable' A-1072-19T3 26 from the constitutional violation such that the 'taint' of the violation was 'purged.'" Id. at 447 (quoting State v. S

2026"Under the exclusionary rule, 'the State is barred from introducing into evidence the "fruits" of an unlawful search or seizure by the police.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311 (2005)).

2025"The attenuation doctrine is an example of an exception to the exclusionary rule" and "examines whether the connection between the constitutional violation and the evidence is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint from the unlawful conduct.'" State v. Herrerra, 211 N.J. 308, 331 (2012) (quoting State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2026"The exclusionary rule 'is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard' the right of the people to be free from 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 14 (2007) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

2022The judge found there was "no significant break in the causative chain between Pereira's attempt to conduct an unlawful Terry stop and defendant allegedly dropping a gun . . . . [T]he State has not shown that defendant was aware that he was fleeing from a police officer, or that defendant even heard the officer's command to stop." The judge found the situation lacked an "intervening act that marked 'the point at which the detrimental consequences' of the illegal police action became so 'attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.'" (quoting State

2021In State v. Novembrino, for example, the Court declined to adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established under federal law in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

2021In State v. Novembrino, for example, the Court declined to adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established under federal law in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

2026"The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to act as a 'deterrent safeguard to ensure that the Fourth Amendment is not reduced to a form of words.'" State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 376 (2003) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025"Ordinarily, this state's exclusionary rule will not be invoked to bar otherwise reliable and relevant evidence gathered by law enforcement officers of another jurisdiction over which our state has no control or authority, when those officers act in conformity with the Federal Constitution." State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 376 (2003).

2021In later holding that the exclusionary rule is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court noted the exclusionary rule is "a clear, specific, and constitutionally required—even if judicially implied—deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to a form of words." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 A-0580-20 The Court recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in

2015The Mapp Court further noted its recent “recogni[tion] that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way— by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ ” Id. at 656 , 81 S.Ct. at 1692 , 6 L.Ed.2d at 1090 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1677 (1960) (further stating “[t]he [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair,” constitutional violations)).

2018To determine whether seized evidence is sufficiently attenuated from police misconduct to justify not invoking the exclusionary rule, we look to three factors: "(1) 'the temporal proximity' between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) 'the presence of intervening circumstances'; and (3) 'particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' " Shaw , 213 N.J. at 415 , 64 A.3d 499 (quoting Brown , 422 U.S. at 602 -04 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ).

2018To determine whether seized evidence is sufficiently attenuated from police misconduct to justify not invoking the exclusionary rule, we look to three factors: "(1) 'the temporal proximity' between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) 'the presence of intervening circumstances'; and (3) 'particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' " Shaw , 213 N.J. at 415 , 64 A.3d 499 (quoting Brown , 422 U.S. at 602 -04 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ).

2021See, e.g., State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525 , 551-52 (2015) (remanding for the trial court to determine whether evidence "discovered directly" from the defendant's illegally obtained confession should be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule); State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 291 (1990) (addressing the inevitable discovery doctrine).

2021Super. at 369; see, e.g., State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 551-52 (2015) (remanding for the trial court to determine whether evidence "discovered directly" from the defendant's illegally obtained confession should be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule); O'Neill, 193 N.J. at 171 n.13 ("The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine denies the prosecution the use of derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth or Fifth Amendment violation."); State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 238 (1985) (allowing an exception to the exclusionary rule where "proper, normal and specific investigatory proced

1987For recent cases reaffirming this principle, see Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Comm., 100 N.J. 79, 85 (1985) ("Deterrence of future unlawful police conduct is the 'prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule, if not the sole one,’ ” quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984); State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 406 (1981) (the exclusionary rule is "meant solely to deter illegal police conduct").

1987Under such circumstances there is no reason to think that a good faith exception will encourage judges to ignore the law. [3] For recent cases reaffirming this principle, see Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Comm., 100 N.J. 79, 85 (1985) ("Deterrence of future unlawful police conduct is the `prime purpose' of the exclusionary rule, `if not the sole one,'" quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed. 2d 778 (1984); State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 406 (1981) (the exclusionary rule is "meant solely to deter illegal police conduct"). [4] T

2019Plaintiff asserts the failure to define "motor vehicle" results in an ambiguity as to the difference between "autos" and "motor vehicles," despite the fact that the exclusion only uses the term "motor vehicle." While GEICO could have included a definition of "motor vehicle" in its policy, if the words used in an exclusionary clause are clear and unambiguous, "a court should not engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability." Longobardi , 121 N.J. at 537 , 582 A.2d 1257 .

2019Plaintiff asserts the failure to define "motor vehicle" results in an ambiguity as to the difference between "autos" and "motor vehicles," despite the fact that the exclusion only uses the term "motor vehicle." While GEICO could have included a definition of "motor vehicle" in its policy, if the words used in an exclusionary clause are clear and unambiguous, "a court should not engage in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability." Longobardi , 121 N.J. at 537 , 582 A.2d 1257 .

2025Unless the totality of the circumstances satisfies the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard, the investigatory stop "is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule." Elders, 192 N.J. at 247 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 132-33 (2002)).

2021"An investigative detention that is premised on less than reasonable and articulable suspicion is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule." Elders, 192 N.J. at 247 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 132-33 (2002)).

2025Unless the totality of the circumstances satisfies the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard, the investigatory stop "is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule." Elders, 192 N.J. at 247 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 132-33 (2002)).

2024See Elders, 192 N.J. at 247 ("An investigative detention that is premised on less than reasonable and articulable suspicion is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary rule.").

2025Rather, "[c]ase law has developed certain exceptions to the exclusionary rule, in recognition of the fact that if exclusion in a particular instance will not further purposes of the exclusionary rule, there is no reason for the courts to apply it." Ibid. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 ).

2024This doctrine arose from the recognition that "the exclusionary rule's purpose of preventing the use of evidence unlawfully A-0729-23 15 obtained by law enforcement is not served – especially in light of the heavy societal cost – where the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence." Id. at 620-21 (citing State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 237 (1985)).

2026Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." [Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)).] A-3765-23 21 "The exclusionary rule, however, is not absolute" and evidence obtained as fruit of the poisonous tree "is not automatically inadmissible." Holland, 176 N.J. at 354 -55 (quoting State v. H

2022The attenuation doctrine precludes application of the exclusionary rule to an improper warrantless search if "the causal connection between the illegal conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence was 'so attenuated' that the taint was dissipated." State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 349 (1982).

1987In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 , 95 S.Ct. 2313 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 374 (1975), the Court found the exclusionary rule to be unavailable to the defendant in a narcotics prosecution by declining to give retroactive effect to an earlier decision holding warrantless automobile searches by the border patrol to be violative of the fourth amendment: "If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge * * * that the search was unconstitutional un

1987In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 , 95 S.Ct. 2313 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 374 (1975), the Court found the exclusionary rule to be unavailable to the defendant in a narcotics prosecution by declining to give retroactive effect to an earlier decision holding warrantless automobile searches by the border patrol to be violative of the fourth amendment: "If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge * * * that the search was unconstitutional un

2025"The attenuation doctrine is an example of an exception to the exclusionary rule" and "examines whether the connection between the constitutional violation and the evidence is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint from the unlawful conduct.'" State v. Herrerra, 211 N.J. 308, 331 (2012) (quoting State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025"The attenuation doctrine is an example of an exception to the exclusionary rule " and "examines whether the connection between the constitutional violation and the evidence is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint from the unlawful conduct.'" State v. Herrerra, 211 N.J. 308, 331 (2012) (first citing State v. Ball, 381 N.J.

2015In doing so, the Court noted that it had consistently held the exclusionary rule is “a clear, specific, and constitutionally required' — even if judicially implied — deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to ‘a form of words.’ ” Id. at 648 , 81 S.Ct. at 1688 , 6 L.Ed.2d at 1086 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 , 40 S.Ct. 182, 183 , 64 L.Ed. 319, 321 (1920)).

2015In doing so, the Court noted that it had consistently held the exclusionary rule is “a clear, specific, and constitutionally required' — even if judicially implied — deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to ‘a form of words.’ ” Id. at 648 , 81 S.Ct. at 1688 , 6 L.Ed.2d at 1086 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 , 40 S.Ct. 182, 183 , 64 L.Ed. 319, 321 (1920)).

2015"The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and to preserve the integrity of the courts." State 7 A-2458-14T2 v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639, 651 (1990) (citations omitted).

2009"The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and to preserve the integrity of the courts." Johnson, supra, 118 N.J. at 651 , 573 A. 2d 909 .

2015In doing so, the Court observed: The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. [Id. at 392, 34 S.Ct. at 344 , 58 L.Ed. at 655 .

2015In doing so, the Court observed: The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. [Id. at 392, 34 S.Ct. at 344 , 58 L.Ed. at 655 .

2019Considered a narrow exception to the exclusionary rule, our standard for allowing evidence on the basis of inevitable discovery requires the State to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, id. at 240 , that (1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly

2018In Sugar II, the Court held that for purposes of the New Jersey Constitution, evidence that would otherwise be subject to the exclusionary rule may be admitted if the State establishes by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) proper, normal, and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to A-4606-15T4 6 complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures wo

2026Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." [Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)).] A-3765-23 21 "The exclusionary rule, however, is not absolute" and evidence obtained as fruit of the poisonous tree "is not automatically inadmissible." Holland, 176 N.J. at 354 -55 (quoting State v. H

2021With respect to the trial court's conclusion that the search warrant can be sustained based on information from sources independent of the canine sniff, the State acknowledges the court did not consider and make findings with respect to two of the three elements that must be established by clear and convincing evidence to invoke the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule under State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344 (2002).

2026“If the terms used in an exclusionary clause are ambiguous, ‘courts apply the meaning that supports coverage rather than the one that limits it.’” Mem’l Props., 210 N.J. at 528 (quoting Flomerfelt, 202 N.J. at 442 ).

2026There is an important distinction between an exclusionary clause that applies only if the evidence supports a causal link between the excluded act and the loss alleged -- as in Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432 (2010) -- and an exclusionary clause that does not expressly require such a causal nexus in order to apply -- as in Norman Int’l, Inc. v. Admiral Ins.

2015See Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 100 , 519 A.2d 820 (“ ‘The debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one.’ ” (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 , 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 1056 (1976)); see also Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at 907 , 104 S.Ct. at 3412 , 82 L.Ed. 2d at 688 (“The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern.”)).

2015See Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 100 , 519 A.2d 820 (“ ‘The debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one.’ ” (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 , 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3028 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 1056 (1976)); see also Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at 907 , 104 S.Ct. at 3412 , 82 L.Ed. 2d at 688 (“The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern.”)).

2021The United States Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).

2017The exclusionary rule, as set forth in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L.