exclusionary rule in District of Columbia

2025Put another way, the government seeks to lump CSOSA in with neutral decisionmakers that do not feel the exclusionary rule’s bite because they are not part of “the law enforcement team engaged in . . . ferreting out crime.” See Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15 (“[T]he exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees.”); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 350 (“Penalizing the officer for the le

2025Put another way, the government seeks to lump CSOSA in with neutral decisionmakers that do not feel the exclusionary rule’s bite because they are not part of “the law enforcement team engaged in . . . ferreting out crime.” See Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15 (“[T]he exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees.”); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 350 (“Penalizing the officer for the le

2025In Herring, the Court said, for example that “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,” not officers who acted in an “objectively reasonable” way. 555 U.S. at 144, 146 .

2025Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1995) (brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 ); see also, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”); Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6 (“Any rule of evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative and reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be carefully limited to the circumstances in 46 which

2025See United States v. Asgari, 918 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2019) (A Fourth Amendment “violation usually comes with a remedy: suppression of the evidence.”); United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57, 80 (2d Cir. 2018) (“When a Fourth Amendment violation leads the government to evidence of a crime, the ‘exclusionary rule’ usually precludes the government from introducing that evidence at trial.”); United States v. Mendez, 885 F.3d 899, 909 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The exclusionary rule provides the typical remedy for Fourth Amendment violations: suppression of the evidence at trial.”); United States v

2025In the many years since the statement in Krull that the 50 opinion for the court relies upon, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is not usual but rather is “a last resort.” Strieff, 579 U.S. at 237-38 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025The 10 government opposed, arguing that Wells’s CSO imposed GPS monitoring “in objectively reasonable reliance on existing CSOSA regulations and policy,” so that “application of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted.” The government furthered, quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 349 , that suppression under these circumstances “would have as little deterrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.” Wells countered in reply that “[n]either the Supreme Court, the D.C.

2025Put another way, the government seeks to lump CSOSA in with neutral decisionmakers that do not feel the exclusionary rule’s bite because they are not part of “the law enforcement team engaged in . . . ferreting out crime.” See Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15 (“[T]he exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees.”); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 350 (“Penalizing the officer for the le

2024As the trial court put it, “[i]t was not until officers went into the defendant’s pocket for his ID that Officer Jones felt the slide of the gun,” and “[t]he second pat-down was directly in the location where the gun had been felt.” So Brown has at least made a “prima facie showing” that the pocket search had a “causal connection to the alleged fruit,” i.e., the gun, and if Brown indeed did not consent to that search then it was unconstitutional and “the burden of producing evidence that will bring the case within [an] exception[] to the exclusionary rule . . . rests squarely upon the prosecut

2024As the trial court put it, “[i]t was not until officers went into the defendant’s pocket for his ID that Officer Jones felt the slide of the gun,” and “[t]he second pat-down was directly in the location where the gun had been felt.” So Brown has at least made a “prima facie showing” that the pocket search had a “causal connection to the alleged fruit,” i.e., the gun, and if Brown indeed did not consent to that search then it was unconstitutional and “the burden of producing evidence that will bring the case within [an] exception[] to the exclusionary rule . . . rests squarely upon the prosecut

2025Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges § 1.3 (2d ed. 2009) (defining a privilege as a “[s]tatutory or common law . . . [p]rocedural rule . . . inspired primarily by extrinsic social policy 1 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (discussing the protection against self-incrimination); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (discussing the confrontation clause); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 484- 85 (1963) (discussing the exclusionary rule). 67 (as opposed to institutional concerns about the quality of judicial evidence or the functioning of the adve

2019Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 484, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (explaining the exclusionary rule deters avoidable police misconduct and "make[s] effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of [the] sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person"); ( Prince ) Jones v. United States , 168 A.3d 703 , 717 (D.C. 2017) ("[T]he exclusionary rule forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial ... [and] is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect." (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted)

1993"If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted.” Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 602 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261 .

1993"If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted.” Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 602 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261 .

2024That clarification echoed a statement in its brief: “the inevitable-discovery doctrine ‘shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that’ the challenged evidence ‘would have been discovered by lawful means.’ Here, however, the rifle was not ‘illegally obtained’; it was instead actually ‘discovered by lawful means.’” Br. for the United States at 34-35 n.34 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jones, 168 A.3d at 717 ).

2022The inevitable discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’” Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 717 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016)).

2006See Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 . [11] The use of similar terms, for example, whether the suspect reasonably considers himself to be "under arrest" or "feels free to leave," to determine whether there is seizure and custody, has contributed to the blurring of the separate analyses and purposes of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

2006See Harris, 401 U.S. at 226 , 91 S.Ct. 643 . [11] The use of similar terms, for example, whether the suspect reasonably considers himself to be "under arrest" or "feels free to leave," to determine whether there is seizure and custody, has contributed to the blurring of the separate analyses and purposes of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

2025The exclusionary rule is instead a “‘prudential’ doctrine,” (W.G.) Davis, 564 U.S. at 236 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)), subject to various exceptions that the government might invoke to avoid suppression.

2025See (W.G.) Davis, 564 U.S. at 237-38 (The exclusionary rule applies only where it “yields[s] appreciable deterrence” that outweighs “the resulting costs.”).

2022The exclusionary rule is “recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. . . . [W]ithout it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere ‘form of words.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).

2010Compare Mapp, supra note 14, 367 U.S. at 649, 657 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 with Herring, supra note 27 , 129 S.Ct. at 700 ("the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only when it result[s] in appreciable deterrence”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 29 .

2025In each of these cases, (1) the police themselves were “blameless,” (W.G.) Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , (2) the culpable decisionmaker was roughly “neutral,” which is to say, they were neither law enforcement agents nor adjuncts to them, Evans, 514 U.S. at 11, 15 , and (3) the exclusionary rule thus would not yield appreciable deterrent benefits sufficient to outweigh its social costs.

2025Put another way, the government seeks to lump CSOSA in with neutral decisionmakers that do not feel the exclusionary rule’s bite because they are not part of “the law enforcement team engaged in . . . ferreting out crime.” See Evans, 514 U.S. at 14-15 (“[T]he exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees.”); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 350 (“Penalizing the officer for the le

2022Evans v. United States, 122 A.3d 876, 885 (D.C. 2015); see also Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (“[T]he burden is on the government to go forward with evidence that will bring the case within one or more exceptions to the exclusionary rule.”).

2022Evans v. United States, 122 A.3d 876, 885 (D.C. 2015); see also Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (“[T]he burden is on the government to go forward with evidence that will bring the case within one or more exceptions to the exclusionary rule.”).

2015Finally, the court explained that, under our eases, suppression was required under the exclusionary rule even if the initial traffic stop “was close enough to the line of validity” to constitute a “good faith attempt to comply with the” law.- Id. at 8 n. 9 (internal quotation marks omitted; citing In re T.L., 996 A.2d 805 (D.C.2010)).

2014This is because an officer’s mistake of law “no matter how reasonable or understandable,” id., cannot provide the objective basis necessary for either probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion. 12 See In re T.L., 996 A.2d 805, 816 (D.C.2010). 13 *656 Moreover, in such instances, there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2022Evans v. United States, 122 A.3d 876, 885 (D.C. 2015); see also Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (“[T]he burden is on the government to go forward with evidence that will bring the case within one or more exceptions to the exclusionary rule.”).

2022Evans v. United States, 122 A.3d 876, 885 (D.C. 2015); see also Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (“[T]he burden is on the government to go forward with evidence that will bring the case within one or more exceptions to the exclusionary rule.”).

2022The inevitable discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’” Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 717 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016)).

2022The inevitable discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’” Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 717 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016)).

2017Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine The inevitable-discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ ” Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1999)); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

2017Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine The inevitable-discovery doctrine “shields illegally obtained evidence from the exclusionary rule if the government can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence ‘ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ ” Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540, 548 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1999)); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

2015Citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988), he argues that even in light of the statutory mandate for CSOSA to collect DNA from appellant in 2011, if a “decision to exercise that statutory authority was . . . motivated by knowledge gained solely from the illegal 2005 search,” the search would not be independent of the illegality, and the exclusionary rule would still apply. 18 Accordingly, appellant argues, because Judge Motley was obligated to disregard the CODIS match, and because the government had no other basis to suspect appellant of the charged offenses, Judge Motley erred

2014See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988).

2014In such cases, applying the good faith exception "would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.” Id. at 817 (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2000)); accord United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir.2003).

2012A stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable.”); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir.2005) ("Failure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable.”); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2000) ("[Tjhere is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do not act in accordance with governing law.

2024As the trial court put it, “[i]t was not until officers went into the defendant’s pocket for his ID that Officer Jones felt the slide of the gun,” and “[t]he second pat-down was directly in the location where the gun had been felt.” So Brown has at least made a “prima facie showing” that the pocket search had a “causal connection to the alleged fruit,” i.e., the gun, and if Brown indeed did not consent to that search then it was unconstitutional and “the burden of producing evidence that will bring the case within [an] exception[] to the exclusionary rule . . . rests squarely upon the prosecut

2024As the trial court put it, “[i]t was not until officers went into the defendant’s pocket for his ID that Officer Jones felt the slide of the gun,” and “[t]he second pat-down was directly in the location where the gun had been felt.” So Brown has at least made a “prima facie showing” that the pocket search had a “causal connection to the alleged fruit,” i.e., the gun, and if Brown indeed did not consent to that search then it was unconstitutional and “the burden of producing evidence that will bring the case within [an] exception[] to the exclusionary rule . . . rests squarely upon the prosecut

2010I do so based on a straightforward application of New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 , 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990), where the Supreme Court held that: where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton.

2010I do so based on a straightforward application of New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 , 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990), where the Supreme Court held that: where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton.

2013Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

2013Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).

2015In other words, we discern no error in Judge Motley’s ruling that he would “not exclude the CODIS hit” or “suppress the use of the DNA obtained in this case.” The exclusionary rule is a “prudential rather than constitutionally mandated” rule, which is “applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’” Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (explaining that “the rule does not ‘proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons,’ . . . but applies only in contexts ‘where its remedi

1978Although we therefore follow the Supreme Court view that deterrence is the “primary justification for the exclusionary rule,” Stone v. Powell, supra, 428 U.S. at 486 , 96 S.Ct. at 3048 , we wish to stress that the “imperative of judicial integrity,” Elkins v. United States, supra, 364 U.S. at 222 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , is an important factor in direct review of official constitutional violations.

2017The government concedes that the police lacked the reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity on appellant’s part necessary to make his seizure lawful.19 Under the exclusionary rule, the cocaine recovered from appellant during the seizure therefore should have been suppressed as the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation; appellant’s purported voluntary consent to Officer Blier’s 19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also, e.g., Green, 662 A.2d at 1391 (“Green’s pocketing of a ‘small, dark object’” and walking away from police “insufficient to establish grounds for a Ter

2010See (Chauncy) Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d 1170, 1173 (D.C.1993) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (discussing the imprudence of a “rigid, unthinking application of the exclusionary rule”).

2015Citing United States v. Edelen, 529 A.2d 774, 783 (D.C. 1987) (rejecting “the government's argument that the violation of a statutory rule does not permit suppression of evidence”), appellant also argues that even if the taking of 2005 sample did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, the exclusionary rule applies because of the (alleged) statutory violation.

2014See Leon, supra, at 920-22 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; United States v. Edelen, 529 A.2d 774, 785-86 (D.C.1987) (explaining that the "good faith exception” prevents exclusion where an officer's conduct is “objectively reasonable,” such as conducting a search in reasonable reliance on a properly issued search warrant later found to be unsupported by probable cause or otherwise defective).

2015But see, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in . . . conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.”) (emphasis added). 12 Appellant relies on James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (D.C.

2015But see, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in . . . conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.”) (emphasis added). 12 Appellant relies on James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (D.C.

2014This is because an officer’s mistake of law “no matter how reasonable or understandable,” id., cannot provide the objective basis necessary for either probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion. 12 See In re T.L., 996 A.2d 805, 816 (D.C.2010). 13 *656 Moreover, in such instances, there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2014Such mistakes of law, even when reasonable, “cannot provide the objective basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause needed to justify a search or seizure [and] the exclusionary rule is well-tailored to hold [law enforcement] accountable for their mistakes.” In re T.L., 996 A.2d at 816-17 (citations omitted); see also McDonald, swpra, 453 F.3d at 961 .