exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania

2026But see supra n.12. [J-62-2025] - 27 Supreme Court in Leon made clear that, in its view, the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment was to deter police misconduct.” Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)) (emphasis in original).

2025The Court further -5- explained that “[t]o adopt a ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule, we believe, would virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have been carefully developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200 years.” Id. at 899 .

2023“To effectuate the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, in the early part of the last century, the United States Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule, which bars the use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure.” Commonwealth v. Arter, 637 Pa. 541, 547-48 , 151 A.3d 149, 153 (2016).

2023I, § 8 (emphasis added). 7 The exclusionary rule, which was first recognized under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “bars the use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure.” Com. v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 153 (Pa. 2016).

2026However, “Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not incorporate a ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 905-06 .

2026But see supra n.12. [J-62-2025] - 27 Supreme Court in Leon made clear that, in its view, the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment was to deter police misconduct.” Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)) (emphasis in original).

2023Instead, Hicks and Malloy address, solely, the issue of suppression, i.e., the determination of whether a defendant may “escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand . . . as a sanction to compel enforcement officers to respect the constitutional security of all of us under[, - 25 - inter alia,] the Fourth Amendment.” McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-350 (1974) (explaining that a motion to suppress is a procedural vehicle utilized to enforce the exclusionary rule by “suppress[ing] [] the use of illegal seized evidence agai

2021The motion to suppress is a procedural vehicle effectuating the purpose of the exclusionary rule which is to deter police misconduct, by allowing the “[s]uppression of the use of illegally seized evidence against the search victim[.]” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 350 (1974).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2026“This Court’s consideration and rejection of the Leon good faith exception as a matter of state constitutional law in Edmunds did not turn upon the nature of the intrusion—i.e., whether a search was at issue or a seizure was at issue—but rather upon the perceived values furthered by the exclusionary rule applied under Article I, Section 8 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 188 (Pa. 2014). 31 Whiteley was the first time the principle was expressed by the United States Supreme Court.

2025Id. at 184-85 . - 31 - immaterial to the constitutional analysis because Edmunds “turned on a determination that, under Article I, Section 8, the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania serves other values besides deterrence; it also vindicates an individual’s right to privacy.” Id. at 188 .

2025Instead, “[t]he notion of the ‘dissipation of the taint’ attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Id. at 609 [] (Powell, J., concurring in part).

2024The Wong Sun Court stated that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence that is “gained from an independent source,” but rather applies only to “knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong.” Id.

2024“Where…a consensual search has been preceded by an unlawful seizure, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of evidence, thus assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of voluntariness.” Id. at 57 , 757 A.2d at 889 .

2024“Where…a consensual search has been preceded by an unlawful seizure, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of evidence, thus assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of voluntariness.” Id. at 57 , 757 A.2d at 889 .

2026If an interaction constitutes a seizure but is not justified by the requisite level of suspicion, it “immediately violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect, taints the evidence recovered thereby, and subjects that evidence to the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 927-28 . ____________________________________________ 8 First recognized in the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a Terry stop is practical crime investigation and prevention tool that balances the “constitutionally protected privacy interests of the individual” with “the needs and safety of law enforcement personne

2026If an interaction constitutes a seizure but is not justified by the requisite level of suspicion, it “immediately violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect, taints the evidence recovered thereby, and subjects that evidence to the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 927-28 . ____________________________________________ 8 First recognized in the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a Terry stop is practical crime investigation and prevention tool that balances the “constitutionally protected privacy interests of the individual” with “the needs and safety of law enforcement personne

2017We hold that blood draw evidence collected prior to June 23, 2016 is not admissible under Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), 1 as no goodrfaith exception to the exclusionary' rule' exists under Article I, Section'8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2017We hold that blood draw evidence collected prior to June 23, 2016 is not admissible under Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), 1 as no goodrfaith exception to the exclusionary' rule' exists under Article I, Section'8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2020L.J. 265, 300 (2007) (explaining that Edmunds failed to supply “a coherent theory to explain how the exclusionary rule should be understood and applied” for purposes of state constitutional law)).1 Additionally -- as pertains to the imposition of a state-level exclusionary rule more exacting than the federal analogue -- I find continuing resonance in the position of some commentators that the new judicial federalism has generated, and is generating, a 1 In 1914, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the exclusionary rule applicable to all federal courts, see Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 38

2020L.J. 265, 300 (2007) (explaining that Edmunds failed to supply “a coherent theory to explain how the exclusionary rule should be understood and applied” for purposes of state constitutional law)).1 Additionally -- as pertains to the imposition of a state-level exclusionary rule more exacting than the federal analogue -- I find continuing resonance in the position of some commentators that the new judicial federalism has generated, and is generating, a 1 In 1914, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the exclusionary rule applicable to all federal courts, see Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 38

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution, a good[-]faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888 ; Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007).7 Here, as the Commonwealth points out, Wolfel sought suppression 7 Although a concurring opinion authored by a member of this Court suggests that the good-

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution, a good[-]faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888 ; Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007).7 Here, as the Commonwealth points out, Wolfel sought suppression 7 Although a concurring opinion authored by a member of this Court suggests that the good-

2020Id. at 1110 . “[S]ince Frye is an exclusionary rule of evidence, it must be construed narrowly so as not to impede admissibility of evidence that will aid the trier of fact in the search for truth.” Walsh v. BASF Corporation, 191 A.3d 838, 848 (Pa. Super. 2018).

2020Id. at 1110 . “[S]ince Frye is an exclusionary rule of evidence, it must be construed narrowly so as not to impede admissibility of evidence that will aid the trier of fact in the search for truth.” Walsh v. BASF Corporation, 191 A.3d 838, 848 (Pa. Super. 2018).

2021See also Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421, 423 (Pa. 1985) (“[W]e reject the automatic application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search which in some way violates the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the issuance and execution of search warrants.”). - 26 - J-E03006-20 A rule of exclusion is properly employed where the objection goes to the question of the reliability of the challenged evidence or reflects intolerable government conduct which is widespread and cannot otherwise be controlled. . . .

2017We have, in fact, specifically “reject[ed] the automatic application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search which in some way violates the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the issuance and execution of search warrants.” Commonwealth v. Gerald Mason, [ ] 490 A.2d 421, 423 ([Pa.] 1985).

2019In addition to citing the federal authority discussed supra , we relied upon this Court's previous decision in Commonwealth v. Corley , 507 Pa. 540 , 491 A.2d 829 (1985), which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to a citizen's arrest because there was no state action.

2019In addition to citing the federal authority discussed supra , we relied upon this Court's previous decision in Commonwealth v. Corley , 507 Pa. 540 , 491 A.2d 829 (1985), which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to a citizen's arrest because there was no state action.

2021See Brief for the Commonwealth at 10-11 (citing to exceptions recognized in U.S. v. Leon, 468 -4- U.S. 897 (1984),4 and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)).5 The Commonwealth conceded that, in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 905-06 (Pa. 1991), our Supreme Court held that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not incorporate a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule.

2017We hold that blood draw evidence collected prior to June 23, 2016 is not admissible under Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), 1 as no goodrfaith exception to the exclusionary' rule' exists under Article I, Section'8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2026More importantly, Chief Justice Cappy explained that Article I, Section 8 has always been interpreted “to embody a strong notion of privacy that has been carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centuries, whereas the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment is to deter police misconduct.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

2025The Edmunds Court also discusses the strength of the right of privacy to which citizens in this Commonwealth are entitled, stating that a ‘“good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule . . . would virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have been carefully developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200 years.” Edmunds, 526 A.2d 887 at 899; see also Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979).

2016Thus, the high Court has stated that the exclusionary rule applies only “where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (“If ... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.”); Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (evidence seized in good faith by police pursuant to warrant duly issued by a magistrate, but which is later deemed unsupported by probable cause, need not be supp

2016Thus, the high Court has stated that the exclusionary rule applies only “where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (“If ... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted.”); Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (evidence seized in good faith by police pursuant to warrant duly issued by a magistrate, but which is later deemed unsupported by probable cause, need not be supp

2006“Where the evidence obtained as the result of illegal police activity would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no purpose is served in applying the exclusionary rule.” Brown, 368 A.2d at 631 .

2006"Where the evidence obtained as the result of illegal police activity would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no purpose is served in applying the exclusionary rule." Brown, 368 A.2d at 631 .

2025The exclusionary rule applies not only to illegally obtained evidence, but also the “‘fruit’ of unlawful government conduct,” that was “derived from the primary evidence.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).

2024This timely appeal followed.2 Woodard raises the following issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in denying suppression of a firearm, holding that although police unlawfully seized a firearm from [Woodard’s] car in the absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances and without a search warrant, that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the inevitable discovery rule as held by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) and by this Court in Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. 2009)?

2020Id. at 656 ; but see id. at 650 (calling the exclusionary rule “part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitations upon federal encroachment of individual privacy”); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222 (writing that “another consideration” was “the imperative of judicial integrity”). 2 Thus, even as the Supreme Court began to adopt a deterrence (rather than privacy) rationale for the exclusionary rule, it still found that a bright-line decree— forbidding all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, no matter the sovereign identity of the law enforcement officer—was the appropriate way to

2020Id. at 656 ; but see id. at 650 (calling the exclusionary rule “part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitations upon federal encroachment of individual privacy”); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222 (writing that “another consideration” was “the imperative of judicial integrity”). 2 Thus, even as the Supreme Court began to adopt a deterrence (rather than privacy) rationale for the exclusionary rule, it still found that a bright-line decree— forbidding all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, no matter the sovereign identity of the law enforcement officer—was the appropriate way to

2025The exclusionary rule applies not only to illegally obtained evidence, but also the “‘fruit’ of unlawful government conduct,” that was “derived from the primary evidence.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).

2025The Wong Sun Court continued that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence that is “gained from an independent source,” but rather applies only to “knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong.” Id. at 485 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392 ).