exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania

2025The Commonwealth argued that Pennsylvania should adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court held “the Fourth Amendment does not mandate suppression of illegally seized evidence obtained pursuant to a constitutionally defective warrant, so long as the police officer acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888, 892 .

2025Our High Court explained that “the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the [Fourth] Amendment [is] to deter police misconduct” and that the federal exclusionary rule operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” Id. (emphasis in original; quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Alexander, 243 A.3d at 203 (“[P]romoting effective law enforcement is the driving force explaining the United States Supreme Court’s applications of the

2023I, § 8 (emphasis added). 7 The exclusionary rule, which was first recognized under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “bars the use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure.” Com. v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 153 (Pa. 2016).

2023“To effectuate the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, in the early part of the last century, the United States Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule, which bars the use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure.” Commonwealth v. Arter, 637 Pa. 541, 547-48 , 151 A.3d 149, 153 (2016).

2025The Commonwealth argued that Pennsylvania should adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court held “the Fourth Amendment does not mandate suppression of illegally seized evidence obtained pursuant to a constitutionally defective warrant, so long as the police officer acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888, 892 .

2025In Edmunds, our Supreme Court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

2023Instead, Hicks and Malloy address, solely, the issue of suppression, i.e., the determination of whether a defendant may “escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand . . . as a sanction to compel enforcement officers to respect the constitutional security of all of us under[, - 25 - J-S42021-22 inter alia,] the Fourth Amendment.” McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-350 (1974) (explaining that a motion to suppress is a procedural vehicle utilized to enforce the exclusionary rule by “suppress[ing] [] the use of illegal seized e

2021The motion to suppress is a procedural vehicle effectuating the purpose of the exclusionary rule which is to deter police misconduct, by allowing the “[s]uppression of the use of illegally seized evidence against the search victim[.]” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 350 (1974).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2025Instead, “[t]he notion of the ‘dissipation of the taint’ attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Id. at 609 [] (Powell, J., concurring in part).

2024The Wong Sun Court stated that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence that is “gained from an independent source,” but rather applies only to “knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong.” Id.

2025Id. at 184-85 . - 31 - J-S47041-24 immaterial to the constitutional analysis because Edmunds “turned on a determination that, under Article I, Section 8, the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania serves other values besides deterrence; it also vindicates an individual’s right to privacy.” Id. at 188 .

2025Id. at 184-85 . - 31 - J-S47041-24 immaterial to the constitutional analysis because Edmunds “turned on a determination that, under Article I, Section 8, the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania serves other values besides deterrence; it also vindicates an individual’s right to privacy.” Id. at 188 .

2024“Where…a consensual search has been preceded by an unlawful seizure, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of evidence, thus assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of voluntariness.” Id. at 57 , 757 A.2d at 889 .

2024“Where…a consensual search has been preceded by an unlawful seizure, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of evidence, thus assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of voluntariness.” Id. at 57 , 757 A.2d at 889 .

2017We hold that blood draw evidence collected prior to June 23, 2016 is not admissible under Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), 1 as no goodrfaith exception to the exclusionary' rule' exists under Article I, Section'8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2017We hold that blood draw evidence collected prior to June 23, 2016 is not admissible under Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), 1 as no goodrfaith exception to the exclusionary' rule' exists under Article I, Section'8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2025If the seizure is not justified by the requisite level of suspicion, however, the seizure “immediately violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect, taints the evidence recovered thereby, and subjects that evidence to the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 927-28 .

2024An unlawful investigative -5- J-S35003-24 detention “immediately violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the suspect, taints the evidence recovered thereby, and subjects that evidence to the exclusionary rule.” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 927 (citation omitted).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution, a good[-]faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888 ; Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007).7 Here, as the Commonwealth points out, Wolfel sought suppression 7 Although a concurring opinion authored by a member of this Court suggests that the good-

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution, a good[-]faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888 ; Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007).7 Here, as the Commonwealth points out, Wolfel sought suppression 7 Although a concurring opinion authored by a member of this Court suggests that the good-

2020L.J. 265, 300 (2007) (explaining that Edmunds failed to supply “a coherent theory to explain how the exclusionary rule should be understood and applied” for purposes of state constitutional law)).1 Additionally -- as pertains to the imposition of a state-level exclusionary rule more exacting than the federal analogue -- I find continuing resonance in the position of some commentators that the new judicial federalism has generated, and is generating, a 1 In 1914, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the exclusionary rule applicable to all federal courts, see Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 38

2020The Federal Silver Platter Doctrine Although the United States Supreme Court hinted at the existence of an exclusionary remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment as early as the nineteenth century, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the High Court definitively adopted the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914): If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,

2020Id. at 1110 . “[S]ince Frye is an exclusionary rule of evidence, it must be construed narrowly so as not to impede admissibility of evidence that will aid the trier of fact in the search for truth.” Walsh v. BASF Corporation, 191 A.3d 838, 848 (Pa. Super. 2018).

2020Id. at 1110 . “[S]ince Frye is an exclusionary rule of evidence, it must be construed narrowly so as not to impede admissibility of evidence that will aid the trier of fact in the search for truth.” Walsh v. BASF Corporation, 191 A.3d 838, 848 (Pa. Super. 2018).

2021See also Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421, 423 (Pa. 1985) (“[W]e reject the automatic application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search which in some way violates the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the issuance and execution of search warrants.”). - 26 - J-E03006-20 A rule of exclusion is properly employed where the objection goes to the question of the reliability of the challenged evidence or reflects intolerable government conduct which is widespread and cannot otherwise be controlled. . . .

2017We have, in fact, specifically “reject[ed] the automatic application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search which in some way violates the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the issuance and execution of search warrants.” Commonwealth v. Gerald Mason, [ ] 490 A.2d 421, 423 ([Pa.] 1985).

2019In addition to citing the federal authority discussed supra , we relied upon this Court's previous decision in Commonwealth v. Corley , 507 Pa. 540 , 491 A.2d 829 (1985), which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to a citizen's arrest because there was no state action.

2019In addition to citing the federal authority discussed supra , we relied upon this Court's previous decision in Commonwealth v. Corley , 507 Pa. 540 , 491 A.2d 829 (1985), which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to a citizen's arrest because there was no state action.

2021See Brief for the Commonwealth at 10-11 (citing to exceptions recognized in U.S. v. Leon, 468 -4- J-A24031- 20 U.S. 897 (1984),4 and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)).5 The Commonwealth conceded that, in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 905-06 (Pa. 1991), our Supreme Court held that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not incorporate a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule.

2017We hold that blood draw evidence collected prior to June 23, 2016 is not admissible under Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), 1 as no goodrfaith exception to the exclusionary' rule' exists under Article I, Section'8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2016Thus, the high Court has stated that the exclusionary rule applies only “where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 ; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (“If . . . the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use . . . is unwarranted.”); Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (evidence seized in good faith by police pursuant to warrant duly issued by a magistrate, but which is later deemed unsupported by probable cause, need not be suppressed pursuant to Fourth Amendment because the deterrence goa

2016In Janis, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not preclude the introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a federal civil tax proceeding because the cost of excluding the relevant and reliable evidence would outweigh the marginal deterrence benefits. 428 U.S. at 448, 454 .

2025The Edmunds Court also discusses the strength of the right of privacy to which citizens in this Commonwealth are entitled, stating that a ‘“good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule . . . would virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have been carefully developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution over the past 200 years.” Edmunds, 526 A.2d 887 at 899; see also Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979).

2024See, e.g., Alexander, 243 A.3d at 177 (holding that warrantless search of vehicle required both probable cause and exigent circumstances pursuant to Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996) (holding that pursuit by a police officer without probable cause or reasonable suspicion constitutes a seizure and there required suppression of contraband discarded during the chase); Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 887 (rejecting federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979) (holding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of

2006“Where the evidence obtained as the result of illegal police activity would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no purpose is served in applying the exclusionary rule.” Brown, 368 A.2d at 631 .

2006"Where the evidence obtained as the result of illegal police activity would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no purpose is served in applying the exclusionary rule." Brown, 368 A.2d at 631 .

2025The exclusionary rule applies not only to illegally obtained evidence, but also the “‘fruit’ of unlawful government conduct,” that was “derived from the primary evidence.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).

2024This timely appeal followed.2 Woodard raises the following issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in denying suppression of a firearm, holding that although police unlawfully seized a firearm from [Woodard’s] car in the absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances and without a search warrant, that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the inevitable discovery rule as held by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) and by this Court in Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. 2009)?

2020And the High Court’s seminal decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applying the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions, recognized the same.

2020Id. at 656 ; but see id. at 650 (calling the exclusionary rule “part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitations upon federal encroachment of individual privacy”); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222 (writing that “another consideration” was “the imperative of judicial integrity”). 2 Thus, even as the Supreme Court began to adopt a deterrence (rather than privacy) rationale for the exclusionary rule, it still found that a bright-line decree— forbidding all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, no matter the sovereign identity of the law enforcement officer—was the appropriate way to

2025The Wong Sun Court continued that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence that is “gained from an independent source,” but rather applies only to “knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong.” Id. at 485 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392 ).

2025The exclusionary rule applies not only to illegally obtained evidence, but also the “‘fruit’ of unlawful government conduct,” that was “derived from the primary evidence.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).