exclusionary rule in Missouri

2018"It is well-established that the exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of an illegal search and seizure." Riche v. Dir. of Revenue , 987 S.W.2d 331 , 333 (Mo. banc 1999) (citing United States v. Calandra , 414 U.S. 338 , 347, 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) ).

2017However, the Supreme Court also held in Riche that “the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative proceedings to suspend or revoke a driver’s license.” Id. at 334, 336 ; see also Gordon v. Dir. of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Sullins v. Dir. of Revenue, 893 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995); Green v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988).

2025See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable— does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.

2023"The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies." Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009).

2012The exclusionary rule also requires excluding the “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ that is, ‘evidence discovered and later found to be derivative of a Fourth Amendment violation.’ ” Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 147 (State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. bane 1995)).

2009In determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply, the question is whether the evidence was discovered “by exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2024The rationale for the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is that "the marginal or non-existent [deterrent] benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial cost of exclusion." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 .

2018Caballes and Rodriguez were cited in the order denying the Commonwealth's motion to alter, amend, or vacate. "[T]he harsh sanction of exclusion 'should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.' Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule." 564 U.S. at 241 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ).

2017However, the Supreme Court also held in Riche that “the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative proceedings to suspend or revoke a driver’s license.” Id. at 334, 336 ; see also Gordon v. Dir. of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Sullins v. Dir. of Revenue, 893 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995); Green v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988).

2010The reviewing court, however, agreed with the Director’s contention of trial court error: that the “validity of the arrest was irrelevant in this civil proceeding because the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil proceedings.” Id. at 850 .

2023See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 ("[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence."); State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Mo. banc 2011) ("Although this exclusionary principle is driven by dual considerations of deterrence and of judicial integrity, the deterrence 22 rationale is paramount: [t]he rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2021See State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 150 (Mo. banc 2011). 11 The state also argues the exclusionary rule should not apply because it was less intrusive to conduct a search at the sheriff’s office than to conduct a search at 13251 Highway O, Dixon.

2017However, the Supreme Court also held in Riche that “the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative proceedings to suspend or revoke a driver’s license.” Id. at 334, 336 ; see also Gordon v. Dir. of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Sullins v. Dir. of Revenue, 893 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995); Green v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988).

2004Pierre, 39 S.W.3d at 579 (Southern District section 577.041 case listing numerous cases relating to both sections 302.505 and 577.041 in discussing that Missouri does not apply the exclusionary rule to review of a license revocation); Gordon, 896 S.W.2d at 740 (Eastern District section 302.505case listing several cases about both sections 302.505 and 577.041 in stating that civil revocation proceedings repeatedly hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply).

1995The Supreme Court in Littleton stated “we note that evidence obtained in an illegal or unethical manner is not subject to an exclusionary rule except in criminal cases.” 719 S.W.2d at 775 n. 2 (citing Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., 378 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo.1964)).

1991The Supreme Court in Littleton stated “we note that evidence obtained in an illegal or unethical manner is not subject to an exclusionary rule except in criminal cases.” 719 S.W.2d at 775 n. 2 (citing Diener v. Mid-American Coaches, Inc., 378 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Mo.1964)).

2018"It is a question of law whether ... the exclusionary rule applies to the evidence seized" and "[q]uestions of law are reviewed de novo. " State v. Johnson , 354 S.W.3d 627 , 632 (Mo. banc 2011).

2016“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies”; instead, “exclusion has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (citations omitted). “[T]he exclusionary rule is triggered only when police practices are ‘deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system.’” State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Mo. banc 2011) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 240 (2011)); see also State v. Carr

2019The exclusionary rule states that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution … is inadmissible in state court.” State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).

2017The exclusionary rule provides that “evidence obtained as a , direct result of an unlawful search or seizure is considered ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and is inadmissible at trial.” State v. Lucas, 452 S.W.3d 641, 642-43 (Mo. App. 2014) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).

2018Caballes and Rodriguez were cited in the order denying the Commonwealth's motion to alter, amend, or vacate. "[T]he harsh sanction of exclusion 'should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.' Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule." 564 U.S. at 241 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ).

2018Caballes and Rodriguez were cited in the order denying the Commonwealth's motion to alter, amend, or vacate. "[T]he harsh sanction of exclusion 'should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.' Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule." 564 U.S. at 241 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (quoting United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ).

2017However, the Supreme Court also held in Riche that “the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative proceedings to suspend or revoke a driver’s license.” Id. at 334, 336 ; see also Gordon v. Dir. of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); Sullins v. Dir. of Revenue, 893 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995); Green v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988).

2004Our court determined that the exclusionary rule does not apply to section 577.041 revocation hearings when we considered this issue in Green v. Director of Revenue. 745 S.W.2d 818 (Mo.App.W.D.1988).

2024Stanton cites Kimber v. Director of Revenue, 817 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991), where 5 this court found that an arrest by a fourth class city police officer outside the city was unlawful, but that the evidence relating to arrest and the subsequent breath test results were admissible in an action to suspend the driver’s license pursuant to sections 302.500 to 320.540, because the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil proceedings.

2010The court there found that an arrest by a fourth class city police officer outside the city was unlawful; nevertheless, the court found that the evidence of the arrest, and the subsequent breathalyzer results, were admissible in an action to suspend the driver’s license pursuant to sections 302.500-.540, RSMo 1986 “because the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in civil proceedings.” Kimber, 817 S.W.2d at 632 .

2016See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (establishing the good-faith exception); State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Mo. banc 1985) (adopting in Missouri the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule).

2014Nevertheless, “evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant may still be admitted if the police officers conducting the search and seizure relied in good faith on the warrant.” State v. Trenter, 85 S.W.3d 662, 679 (Mo.App.2002) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)); see also State v. Sweeney, 701 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. banc 1985) (adopting in Missouri the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule).

2025This Court is primarily concerned with the correctness of the trial court’s result, not the route the trial court took to reach that result, and the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed if cognizable under any theory, regardless of whether the trial court’s reasoning is wrong or insufficient. 4 State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2023Specifically, he contends that the State failed to prove that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the sealed compartments of the backpack; therefore, the warrantless search of the sealed compartments of the backpack by the police violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 2 2 “Article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution provides coextensive protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Mo. banc 2018). 8 Because the Fourth Amendment says nothing about suppressing evide

2018Garriott v. Dir. of Revenue , 130 S.W.3d 613 , 615 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) ; see also Riche v. Dir. of Revenue , 987 S.W.2d 331 , 336 (Mo. banc 1999) (suppression unwarranted in civil license revocation, where costs of excluding evidence outweigh benefits of exclusionary rule).

2005In either event, the Supreme Court of Missouri “has recently reaffirmed that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil license revocation proceedings.” Garriott v. Dir. of Revenue, 130 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Mo.App.2004); see also Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Mo. banc 1999).

1999For example, in In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 , 775 n. 2 (Mo. banc 1986), this Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in an attorney discipline pro *334 ceeding.

1997See James v. Director of Revenue, 767 S.W.2d at 612 ; see also In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 , 775 n. 2 (Mo. banc 1986)(“evidenee obtained in an illegal or unethical manner is not subject to an exclusionary rule except in criminal cases”).

2019“And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule’s protections.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 (citation omitted); see also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to protect a defendant from violation of a co-defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment).

2004In that regard, the Court held that whether a challenged search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a defendant seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule turns on a “determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.” Id. at 140 , 99 S.Ct. 421 (emphasis added).

2025Where “the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use . . . is unwarranted.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1995) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

2016See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (when police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted "in objectively reasonable reliance" on the subsequently invalidated search warrant); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-350 (1987) (exclusionary rule does not apply to warrantless administrative searches performed in good-faith reliance on a statute later declared unconstitutional); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 14–15 (1995) (exclusionary rule does not apply where police reasonably rely in good faith on mistaken information i

1997See James v. Director of Revenue, 767 S.W.2d at 612 ; see also In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 , 775 n. 2 (Mo. banc 1986)(“evidenee obtained in an illegal or unethical manner is not subject to an exclusionary rule except in criminal cases”).

1991The issue of whether the exclusionary rule is applicable to driver’s license revocation proceedings has been addressed in Green v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818 (Mo.App.1988); James v. Director of Revenue, 767 S.W.2d 604 (Mo.App.1989); and Kimber v. Director of Revenue, 817 S.W.2d 627, 631 (W.D.Mo.App.1991).

2024State v. Carrawell, 481 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Mo. banc 2016). 2 We do not address Boehmer’s argument that the search of the small canister in Boehmer’s pocket exceeded the proper scope of a protective pat-down, known as a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because we hold the search was performed incident to Boehmer’s arrest and was not a Terry stop. 4 “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless an established and well-delineated exception applies.” Id. at 838 (citation and internal quotation marks removed).

2016“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies”; instead, “exclusion has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (citations omitted). “[T]he exclusionary rule is triggered only when police practices are ‘deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system.’” State v. Johnson, 354 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Mo. banc 2011) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 240 (2011)); see also State v. Carr

2019We note that when our Supreme Court addressed both approaches to avoiding application of the exclusionary rule, it stated that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to ensure that ‘the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been if no illegality had transpired.’" State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 151 (Mo. banc 2011) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).

2011As the United States Supreme Court noted in Nix , the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to ensure that “the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been if no illegality had transpired.” Id. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 .

2017The exclusionary rule provides that “evidence obtained as a , direct result of an unlawful search or seizure is considered ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and is inadmissible at trial.” State v. Lucas, 452 S.W.3d 641, 642-43 (Mo. App. 2014) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).

2017The exclusionary rule provides that “evidence obtained as a , direct result of an unlawful search or seizure is considered ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and is inadmissible at trial.” State v. Lucas, 452 S.W.3d 641, 642-43 (Mo. App. 2014) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)).

2020See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (holding the exclusionary rule applies to evidence discovered and found to be derivative of an illegal search and seizure, or “fruit of the poisonous tree”).

2015State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 19951 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939))).