exclusionary rule in Wyoming

2022Id. [¶36] There are three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine; the inevitable discovery doctrine; and the attenuation doctrine.

2022Id. [¶36] There are three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine; the inevitable discovery doctrine; and the attenuation doctrine.

2020The State argues that the encounter was consensual until Officer Lucus decided to write Mr. Kern a citation for not having car insurance or, in the alternative, that the exclusionary rule should not apply because law enforcement could have conducted a free-air sniff of the car even if Officer Lucus illegally detained Mr. Kern. [¶8] Citizens are entitled to Fourth Amendment protections when “the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Wilson, 874 P.2d at 220 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n.16).

2020The State argues that the encounter was consensual until Officer Lucus decided to write Mr. Kern a citation for not having car insurance or, in the alternative, that the exclusionary rule should not apply because law enforcement could have conducted a free-air sniff of the car even if Officer Lucus illegally detained Mr. Kern. [¶8] Citizens are entitled to Fourth Amendment protections when “the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Wilson, 874 P.2d at 220 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n.16).

2014Id., at 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 . 15 Applying those considerations to the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effect; it would not, in other words, be applied to convictions that were final before the date of the Mapp decision.

2014Id., at 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 . 15 Applying those considerations to the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effect; it would not, in other words, be applied to convictions that were final before the date of the Mapp decision.

2011Hyde, 769 P.2d at 878-79 .

1993Hyde, 769 P.2d at 378-79 .

2007"The penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn upon the public because its officers have violated the law, must bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve." Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279 , 98 S.Ct at 1061-62 . [T12] Application of the exclusionary rule and extension of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would serve no purpose here.

2007"The penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn upon the public because its officers have violated the law, must bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve." Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279 , 98 S.Ct at 1061-62 . [T12] Application of the exclusionary rule and extension of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would serve no purpose here.

1995Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).

1995Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).

1994"The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 38 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 2633 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979).

1994"The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 38 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 2633 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979).

1986In the opinion we quoted with *1086 approval from Vobill Homes, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 179 So.2d 496 (La.App.1965), in which the exclusionary clause provided that there would be no coverage for “injury to * * * any * * * products * * * sold, * * * or premises alienated by the named insured, or work completed by or for the named insured, out of which the accident arises * * We there recognized that the Louisiana court’s determination that this exclusion unambiguously provided no coverage for the enumerated property damage was in line with the general rule that such exc

1971The insurance company denied coverage because of a clause which excluded “ ‘injury to * * * any goods, products or containers thereof, manufactured, sold, handled or distributed or premises alienated by the named insured, or work completed by or for the named insured, out of which the accident arises * * *.’ ” The court in that case affirmed a dismissal of Vobill’s demand, saying it agreed with the insurance company that the exclusionary clause unambiguously excluded the enumerated property damage and went on to say, 179 So.2d at 497 and 498: “ * * * it has uniformly been held that a liability

2024Id. [¶12] We apply a two-part test to determine whether an after-hours search in violation of Rule 41 supports application of the exclusionary rule: Violations of Rule 41 alone should not lead to exclusion unless (1) there was ‘prejudice’ in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.

2024Id. [¶12] We apply a two-part test to determine whether an after-hours search in violation of Rule 41 supports application of the exclusionary rule: Violations of Rule 41 alone should not lead to exclusion unless (1) there was ‘prejudice’ in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.

2024Deen, 2015 WY 5 , ¶ 12, 340 P.3d at 1040 (quoting Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350, 355 (Wyo. 1993)); see also Shelton, 742 F. Supp. at 1502–03 (discussing the same two-part analysis applied in other state courts and in federal courts for violations of the identical federal rule). [¶13] In Deen, a warrant that did not include an express authorization for a nighttime search was executed at 10:18 p.m. 2015 WY 5 , ¶¶ 4, 9, 15, 340 P.3d at 1038, 1039, 1041 .

2024Deen, 2015 WY 5 , ¶ 12, 340 P.3d at 1040 (quoting Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350, 355 (Wyo. 1993)); see also Shelton, 742 F. Supp. at 1502–03 (discussing the same two-part analysis applied in other state courts and in federal courts for violations of the identical federal rule). [¶13] In Deen, a warrant that did not include an express authorization for a nighttime search was executed at 10:18 p.m. 2015 WY 5 , ¶¶ 4, 9, 15, 340 P.3d at 1038, 1039, 1041 .

2022Campbell v. State, 2014 WY 156, ¶ 31 , 339 P.3d 258, 265 (Wyo. 2014). 7 [¶35] “Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights cannot be used against them in a criminal proceeding.” Barney v. State, 2022 WY 49, ¶ 27 , 507 P.3d 459 , 464 (Wyo. 2022) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 619 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)).

2022The notion of attenuation or “‘dissipation of the taint’ of the prior illegality attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Shrum, 908 F.3d at 1235 (cleaned up) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). [¶38] We consider three factors in determining whether the attenuation doctrine applies.

2022The notion of attenuation or “‘dissipation of the taint’ of the prior illegality attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Shrum, 908 F.3d at 1235 (cleaned up) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 , 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2264 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). [¶38] We consider three factors in determining whether the attenuation doctrine applies.

2017Id. at 771- 72, 122 S.Ct. at 2533 . [¶23] The Court found that, although judicial impartiality may be a compelling state interest, the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

2017Id. at 771- 72, 122 S.Ct. at 2533 . [¶23] The Court found that, although judicial impartiality may be a compelling state interest, the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.

2014Id. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. at 3420 ; see also Davis v. United States, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2428-29 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (good faith exception applies to objectively reasonable reli-anee on binding appellate authority that is later overruled); Heiring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (applying the good-faith exception to bar application of the exclusionary rule in a case involving police error regarding a warrant). 12 .

2014Id. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. at 3420 ; see also Davis v. United States, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2428-29 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (good faith exception applies to objectively reasonable reli-anee on binding appellate authority that is later overruled); Heiring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 , 129 S.Ct. 695 , 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (applying the good-faith exception to bar application of the exclusionary rule in a case involving police error regarding a warrant). 12 .

2014Id., at 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 . 15 Applying those considerations to the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effect; it would not, in other words, be applied to convictions that were final before the date of the Mapp decision.

2014Id., at 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 . 15 Applying those considerations to the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effect; it would not, in other words, be applied to convictions that were final before the date of the Mapp decision.

2014Rohda , ¶ 2 n. 1, 142 P.3d at 1158; Page, ¶ 16, 63 P.3d at 911 .

2009In Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478 (Wyo.1988), we discussed the application of the exclusionary rule 3 in the context of excessive use of force.