exclusionary rule in New Hampshire

2005In Canelo , for instance, we adopted the exclusionary rule under the State Constitution because it served to deter police misconduct and “to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim.” Id.

2005We also declined to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because it was “incompatible with and detrimental to our citizens’ strong right of privacy inherent in part I, article 19.” Id.

2024See State v. De La Cruz, 158 N.H. 564, 566 (2009) (“The exclusionary rule is a remedy for the violation of a defendant’s right to be free from illegal searches and seizures, requiring any evidence obtained in violation of that right to be excluded.”).

2013If an arrest is unlawful, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the exclusionary rule require the suppression of any evidence or statements “derivatively obtained through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 268 (2010); see State v. De La Cruz, 158 N.H. 564, 566 (2009).

1995The Court has recognized that the exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy” and that as a “remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).

1983Generally, “standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the *467 Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search.” Id.

2023In Panarello, we adopted a “new crime” exception to the exclusionary rule, which we described as follows: “Under this exception, where the response to an unlawful entry, search or seizure has been a physical attack (or threat of same) upon an officer, courts have held that the evidence of this new crime is admissible.” Panarello, 157 N.H. at 208 (quotation and ellipses omitted).

2023We found persuasive the rationale that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by applying it “in cases where the accused has committed a crime against police officers in response to police misconduct.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2021Id.; see also State v. Beauchesne, 151 N.H. 803, 818 (2005) (“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is . . . to deter police misconduct, to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the unlawful search or seizure and to safeguard compliance with State constitutional protections.”).

2009The defendant argues that not extending Canelo to the facts of this case would contravene our decision in Beauchesne , where we stated that “we have unequivocally rejected a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” Beauchesne, 151 N.H. at 819 .

2009See State v. Gravel, 135 N.H. 172, 181 (1991). *568 Although society has a strong interest in protecting the right to privacy, creating an exception to the exclusionary rule in this case does not unreasonably intrude upon that right.

1995While we do not dispute that deterrence of police misconduct is a central aim of the exclusionary rule, see State v. Gravel, 135 N.H. 172, 181 , 601 A.2d 678, 683 (1991), we disagree that it is the rule’s sole purpose.

1982Thus, the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), does not apply.

1982Thus, the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), does not apply.

1987In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Poirier, 120 N.H. 422 , 415 A.2d 882 (1980), this court held that an exclusionary clause in a manufacturers and contractors liability policy which was virtually identical to exclusion (j) in the Hartford policy was “not a clear warning to the insured that claims of the estate of a deceased employee would not be covered . . . [and] that exclusion ‘j’ does no more than exclude from liability coverage those damages that are compensable under a workmen’s compensation policy.” Id. at 427, 428 , 415 A.2d at 885, 886 .

1987In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Poirier, 120 N.H. 422 , 415 A.2d 882 (1980), this court held that an exclusionary clause in a manufacturers and contractors liability policy which was virtually identical to exclusion (j) in the Hartford policy was “not a clear warning to the insured that claims of the estate of a deceased employee would not be covered . . . [and] that exclusion ‘j’ does no more than exclude from liability coverage those damages that are compensable under a workmen’s compensation policy.” Id. at 427, 428 , 415 A.2d at 885, 886 .

1976Kenison, C.J., concurring: It may be noted for future reference that in the more recent cases and commentary the rationale of the exclusionary rule has been reviewed (Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976)), it has not been extended in its application (Unite d States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976)), and in some respects may ¡ have been restricted in its application (United States v. Santana, 96 1 S. Ct. 2406 (1976)).

1976KENISON, C.J., concurring: It may be noted for future reference that in the more recent cases and commentary the rationale of the exclusionary rule has been reviewed ( Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976)), it has not been extended in its application ( United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976)), and in some respects may have been restricted in its application ( United States v. Santana, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976)).

2022The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of any evidence obtained derivatively through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution, see State v. Lantagne, 165 N.H. 774, 778 (2013), or the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963).

2022Although there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule, see Lantagne, 165 N.H. at 778 ; United States v. Dent, 867 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2017), the State does not argue that any such exceptions apply here.

2017See, e.g. , Holler , 123 N.H. at 200 -01 , 459 A.2d 1143 ; State v. Beede , 119 N.H. 620 , 629-30, 406 A.2d 125 (1979) (discussing inevitable discovery doctrine).

2005For example, the exclusionary rule does not bar the admissibility of evidence if the State proves that circumstances exist such that the taint of the primary illegality is purged, Hight, 146 N.H. at 750 , or if the police had an independent source for the evidence untainted by their misconduct, Holler, 123 N.H. at 200 , or if the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence, Hill, 146 N.H. at 573 .

2009It was not “the kind of willful or purposeful misconduct that the exclusionary rule was fashioned to deter.” Gotsch, 143 N.H. at 91-92 (quotation omitted).

2004We conclude that this was not “the kind of willful or purposeful misconduct that the exclusionary rule was fashioned to deter.” Id. at 91-92 (quotation omitted); see also, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (finding 'willful and purposeful misconduct where police arrested defendant for “investigation” and in a manner designed “to cause surprise, fright, and confusion”).

2003Instead, we adopted the reasoning of Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1998), and concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply to such proceedings.

2003Instead, we adopted the reasoning of Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1998), and concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply to such proceedings.

1990Defendant urges us to overrule this decision, but we see no reason to do so. “‘Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.’ Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 , 28 L.

1990Defendant urges us to overrule this decision, but we see no reason to do so. “‘Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.’ Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 , 28 L.

2022The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of any evidence obtained derivatively through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution, see State v. Lantagne, 165 N.H. 774, 778 (2013), or the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963).

1983“The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.” Id. at 485 .

2012We held in Canelo that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is “incompatible with and detrimental to our citizens’ strong right of privacy inherent in part I, article 19 and the prohibition against the issuance of warrants without probable cause.” Id.; cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (adopting federal good faith exception).

1995Id. at 916 .

2009Even though Levesque’s expansion of the scope of the stop was improper, his conduct did not “appear [to have] been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion,” nor did it appear to have “a quality of purposefulness.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 605 .

2004We conclude that this was not “the kind of willful or purposeful misconduct that the exclusionary rule was fashioned to deter.” Id. at 91-92 (quotation omitted); see also, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (finding 'willful and purposeful misconduct where police arrested defendant for “investigation” and in a manner designed “to cause surprise, fright, and confusion”).

2025State v. De La Cruz, 158 N.H. 564, 566 (2009); State v. Robinson, 170 N.H. 52, 57 (2017) (“The general rule is that evidence must be excluded if it is discovered as a result of police misconduct.”).

2022Although there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule, see Lantagne, 165 N.H. at 778 ; United States v. Dent, 867 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2017), the State does not argue that any such exceptions apply here.

2022Although there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule, see Lantagne, 165 N.H. at 778 ; United States v. Dent, 867 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2017), the State does not argue that any such exceptions apply here.

2016United States v. Morla-Trinidad, 100 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution); see also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 622-23, 626-27 (1980) (deciding, as a constitutional matter, that the trial court did not err by allowing the government to impeach with extrinsic evidence the criminal defendant’s testimony on direct examination that he was not involved in drug smuggling and the similar statements he “made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by” the direct e

2016“Rule 403 is an exclusionary rule that cuts across the rules of evidence.” State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 251 (2007) (quotation omitted); see N.H.

2016However, New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403 operates as “an exclusionary rule that cuts across the rules of evidence.” State v. Kuchman, 168 N.H. 779, 789 (2016) (quotation omitted).

2016United States v. Morla-Trinidad, 100 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution); see also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 622-23, 626-27 (1980) (deciding, as a constitutional matter, that the trial court did not err by allowing the government to impeach with extrinsic evidence the criminal defendant’s testimony on direct examination that he was not involved in drug smuggling and the similar statements he “made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by” the direct e

2013“If the evidence in question has been obtained only through exploitation of an antecedent illegality, it must be suppressed.” Orde, 161 N.H. at 268 .

2013If an arrest is unlawful, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the exclusionary rule require the suppression of any evidence or statements “derivatively obtained through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution.” State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 268 (2010); see State v. De La Cruz, 158 N.H. 564, 566 (2009).

2011See State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the conflicts-of-law approaches used by other states in deciding evidentiary issues); People v. Capolongo, 647 N.E.2d 1286, 1293 (N.Y. 1995) (discussing the split in jurisdictions between the exclusionary rule approach and the conflicts-of-law approach); see also 1W.

2011Jurisdictions following the exclusionary rule approach “adhere to the Federal view that the overriding purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful governmental conduct, and that one State’s laws have no deterrent effect on conduct of governmental agents of another jurisdiction.” Capolongo, 647 N.E.2d at 1293 .

2011See State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the conflicts-of-law approaches used by other states in deciding evidentiary issues); People v. Capolongo, 647 N.E.2d 1286, 1293 (N.Y. 1995) (discussing the split in jurisdictions between the exclusionary rule approach and the conflicts-of-law approach); see also 1W.

2011See State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the conflicts-of-law approaches used by other states in deciding evidentiary issues); People v. Capolongo, 647 N.E.2d 1286, 1293 (N.Y. 1995) (discussing the split in jurisdictions between the exclusionary rule approach and the conflicts-of-law approach); see also 1W.