exclusionary rule in Kansas

2026See Hicks, 282 Kan. at 617 ("Had the State pursued an argument regarding application of the Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, we would have entertained it on the merits."); State v. Nece, 303 Kan. 888, 897 , 367 P.3d 1260 (2016) ("Despite [the Court of Appeals'] suggestion that the good-faith exception might apply, the State did not file a supplemental brief presenting the argument to us and at oral argument the attorney for the State conceded that the State was not seeking application of the exception.

2025See Leon, 468 U.S. at 924-25 ; see also United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212, 216 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[R]esolution of whether there was probable cause supporting the warrant is not necessary to our decision . . . because . . . the agents' conduct clearly falls within the 'good faith exception' to the exclusionary rule.").

2024See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-40 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (The exclusionary rule is "'designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.'") (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 [1974]); State v. Moore, No. 119,521, 2020 WL 2602056 , at *12-13 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (Atcheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining deterrent effect of exclusionary rule as means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights of innocent persons).

2024See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-40 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (The exclusionary rule is "'designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.'") (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 [1974]); State v. Moore, No. 119,521, 2020 WL 2602056 , at *12-13 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (Atcheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining deterrent effect of exclusionary rule as means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights of innocent persons).

2021"First, we noted that the exclusionary rule was historically designed '"to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates."' Krull, 480 U.S. at 348 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 ).

2020"The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, designed to deter the government from engaging in unconstitutional conduct." Martin, 285 Kan. at 640 ; see Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 , 107 S. Ct. 1160 , 94 L.

2022Ed. 2d 677 (1984); State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490 , Syl. ¶ 7, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010) (adopting the good-faith exception announced in Krull). 7 "'The exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 45 L.

2022Ed. 2d 677 (1984); State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490 , Syl. ¶ 7, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010) (adopting the good-faith exception announced in Krull). 7 "'The exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 45 L.

2022That prior decision, Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625 , 176 P.3d 938 (2008), explained that the exclusionary rule did not apply in a driver's license suspension proceeding.

2022Compare Jarvis, 312 Kan. at 167-69 (holding that the amended language found in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1020 conferred upon courts the authority to set aside a driver's license suspension order if it arose from an unlawful stop) with Martin, 285 Kan. at 646 (finding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to driver's license suspension proceedings and a prior version of the statute, K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1020, did not permit an administrative agency to decide whether the stop was constitutional).

2020Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , 104 S. Ct. 3380 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (explaining fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine); State v. Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 598 , 533 P.2d 1328 (1975) (same).

2020Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , 104 S. Ct. 3380 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (explaining fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine); State v. Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 598 , 533 P.2d 1328 (1975) (same).

2024See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-40 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (The exclusionary rule is "'designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.'") (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 [1974]); State v. Moore, No. 119,521, 2020 WL 2602056 , at *12-13 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (Atcheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining deterrent effect of exclusionary rule as means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights of innocent persons).

2024See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-40 , 129 S. Ct. 695 , 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (The exclusionary rule is "'designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.'") (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 [1974]); State v. Moore, No. 119,521, 2020 WL 2602056 , at *12-13 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (Atcheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining deterrent effect of exclusionary rule as means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights of innocent persons).

2020See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914) (recognizing exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions in federal court); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule in state court prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment). 14 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to protect Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence, but it is not a personal constitutional right of a defendant.

2020See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914) (recognizing exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions in federal court); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule in state court prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment). 14 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to protect Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence, but it is not a personal constitutional right of a defendant.

2020Even if we had concluded there was not a sufficiently strong showing of other factors to overcome the near complete absence of corroboration of the C.I.'s information, it was not entirely unreasonable for the officers to believe the warrant was valid. "[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is 'to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.' Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 , 131 S. Ct. 2419 , 180 L.

2020Even if we had concluded there was not a sufficiently strong showing of other factors to overcome the near complete absence of corroboration of the C.I.'s information, it was not entirely unreasonable for the officers to believe the warrant was valid. "[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is 'to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.' Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 , 131 S. Ct. 2419 , 180 L.

2018But see State v. Epperson , 237 Kan. 707 , 718-19, 703 P.2d 761 (1985) (evidence discovered as result of Fourth Amendment violation subject to exclusion as fruit of the poisonous tree). *965 In addition, when law enforcement reasonably relies on a search warrant later found to lack probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not bar the evidence's use unless one of four exceptions applies: "(1) the magistrate issuing the warrant was deliberately misled by false information; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his or her detached or neutral role; (3) there was so little indicia of probable cause

2018But see State v. Epperson , 237 Kan. 707 , 718-19, 703 P.2d 761 (1985) (evidence discovered as result of Fourth Amendment violation subject to exclusion as fruit of the poisonous tree). *965 In addition, when law enforcement reasonably relies on a search warrant later found to lack probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not bar the evidence's use unless one of four exceptions applies: "(1) the magistrate issuing the warrant was deliberately misled by false information; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his or her detached or neutral role; (3) there was so little indicia of probable cause

2022See, e.g., State v. Doelz, 309 Kan. 133, 140 , 432 P.3d 669 (2019) ("We start with the premise that a warrantless search by a police officer is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the State can fit the search within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. [Citation omitted.]") When officers run afoul of this general rule, the courts exclude evidence from trial seized from that wrongful search under the exclusionary rule which "prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to deter future violations." See Sta

2022See, e.g., State v. Doelz, 309 Kan. 133, 140 , 432 P.3d 669 (2019) ("We start with the premise that a warrantless search by a police officer is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the State can fit the search within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. [Citation omitted.]") When officers run afoul of this general rule, the courts exclude evidence from trial seized from that wrongful search under the exclusionary rule which "prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in order to deter future violations." See Sta

2022If the State cannot meet this burden, the district court may bar the admission of the unlawfully obtained evidence at trial under the exclusionary rule—"a judicially created rule that safeguards against unconstitutional searches and seizures by suppressing illegally seized evidence as a deterrent to future violations." Powell, 299 Kan. at 694-95 .

2020"In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule should not bar the use of 'evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.'" State v. Powell, 299 Kan. 690, 700 , 325 P.3d 1162 (2014) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

2021Evans held that a judicial employee's mistake did not compel exclusion because the exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial misconduct; court employees were unlikely to try to subvert the Fourth Amendment; and it did not follow that exclusion would have any "significant effect" in deterring the errors. 514 U.S. at 15 .

2021There, the Court held the exclusionary rule did not apply when officers reasonably relied on an arrest warrant that a court's database erroneously listed as outstanding even though it had been quashed 17 days earlier. 514 U.S. at 4, 9-10 .

2026See Hubbard, 309 Kan. at 33 (outlining exceptions to application of the exclusionary rule).

2022The exclusionary rule, a judicially created remedy, protects Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence by preventing the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence against the subject of the illegal search and seizure. 309 Kan. at 32. "[The exclusionary rule] cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative techniques . . . ." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.

2020See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914) (recognizing exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions in federal court); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule in state court prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment). 14 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to protect Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence, but it is not a personal constitutional right of a defendant.

2020See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S. Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914) (recognizing exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions in federal court); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule in state court prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment). 14 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to protect Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence, but it is not a personal constitutional right of a defendant.

2022Ed. 2d 677 (1984); State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490 , Syl. ¶ 7, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010) (adopting the good-faith exception announced in Krull). 7 "'The exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 45 L.

2022Ed. 2d 677 (1984); State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490 , Syl. ¶ 7, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010) (adopting the good-faith exception announced in Krull). 7 "'The exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 45 L.

2022See State v. Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 598 , 533 P.2d 1328 (1975) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine "extend[s] the scope of the exclusionary rule to bar not only evidence directly seized, but also evidence indirectly obtained as a result of information learned or leads obtained in the unlawful search").

2022See State v. Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 598 , 533 P.2d 1328 (1975) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine "extend[s] the scope of the exclusionary rule to bar not only evidence directly seized, but also evidence indirectly obtained as a result of information learned or leads obtained in the unlawful search").

2026See Hicks, 282 Kan. at 617 ("Had the State pursued an argument regarding application of the Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, we would have entertained it on the merits."); State v. Nece, 303 Kan. 888, 897 , 367 P.3d 1260 (2016) ("Despite [the Court of Appeals'] suggestion that the good-faith exception might apply, the State did not file a supplemental brief presenting the argument to us and at oral argument the attorney for the State conceded that the State was not seeking application of the exception.

2014See State v. Hens ley, 298 Kan. 422, 431 , 313 P.3d 814 (2013) (under case facts the unidentified informant’s tip was entitled to no weight); Hicks, 282 Kan. at 614-15 (detailing how and why information from “concerned citizens” is to be tested for veracity and basis of knowledge); Nor can the conversation between the detective and Powell create the indicia of probable Cause necessary to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2020"But the exclusionary rule is not absolute." Pettay, 299 Kan. at 769 .

2019Cf. State v. Pettay, 299 Kan. 763, 772-73 , 326 P.3d 1039 (2014) (Johnson, J., concurring) (discussing other purposes served by the exclusionary rule).

2021Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , 104 S. Ct. 3380 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984); see State v. Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 598 , 533 P.2d 1328 (1975) (explaining fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). "'The exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 [1974]).

2021Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , 104 S. Ct. 3380 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984); see State v. Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 598 , 533 P.2d 1328 (1975) (explaining fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). "'The exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.'" Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 , 95 S. Ct. 2254 , 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S. Ct. 613 , 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 [1974]).

2020See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 , 107 S. Ct. 1160 , 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987); State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 498-500 , 242 P.3d 1186 (2010) (adopting Krull), cert. denied 563 U.S. 945 (2011).

2016We note that our Supreme Court considered the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for the first time on appeal in State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490 , 242 P.3d 1186 (2010), cert. denied 563 U.S. 945 (2011).

2019The Court reasoned that because the exclusionary rule is meant to deter police misconduct, invoking that rule in this instance would serve little purpose where, as the Court interpreted it, Fackrell simply made some "good-faith mistakes" in illegally stopping Strieff and his conduct thereafter was lawful. 136 S.Ct. at 2063 .

2018There are recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule that allow the admission of evidence initially discovered in violation of a person's constitutional rights when the " 'interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.' " Strieff , 136 S.Ct. at 2061 .

2026State v. Zwickl, 306 Kan. 286 , 294-95, 393 P.3d 621 (2017); see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).

2020The factual underpinnings for the district court's ruling must be supported by substantial competent evidence, "while the ultimate legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts will be examined de novo." State v. Zwickl, 306 10 Kan. 286 , Syl. ¶ 4, 393 P.3d 621 (2017). "'In determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule, a court should examine whether such application will advance the deterrent objective of the rule.'" State v. Oram, 46 Kan. App. 2d 899, 909 , 266 P.3d 1227 (2011).

2000The exclusionary rule reaches evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 84 L.

2000The exclusionary rule reaches evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 84 L.

2013Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23 ; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 (“To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.”)- The twin objectives of deterring unconstitutional searches and preserving judicial integrity made the exclusionary rule an essential remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.

2011Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (The exclusionary rule's "purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.").

2007Under the Leon good faith exception, evidence should not be excluded unless it is shown: “ ‘(1) that the judge or magistrate who issued the warrant was deliberately misled by false information; (2) that the judge or magistrate wholly abandoned his or her neutral and detached role; (3) that the warrant was so lacking in specificity that die officers could not determine the place to be searched or the things to be seized; or (4) that there was so little indicia of probable cause contained in the warrant that it was entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe the warrant valid. [Citation omit

2007Under the Leon good faith exception, evidence should not be excluded unless it is shown: “ ‘(1) that the judge or magistrate who issued the warrant was deliberately misled by false information; (2) that the judge or magistrate wholly abandoned his or her neutral and detached role; (3) that the warrant was so lacking in specificity that die officers could not determine the place to be searched or the things to be seized; or (4) that there was so little indicia of probable cause contained in the warrant that it was entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe the warrant valid. [Citation omit

2026The question is whether an objectively reasonable officer could rely on" the authority. 297 Kan. at 230 .

2015To remedy this situation, the United States Supreme Court judicially created the exclusionary rule. 297 Kan. at 235 (citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426-27 , 180 L.