exclusionary rule in Oregon

2014See, e.g., Tanner, 304 Or at 325 (Gillette, J., concurring) (“The vacillation and retraction in recent years in the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, leading to its inexplicable ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule * * * satisfies me that the ‘deterrence’ rationale does not vindicate adequately the interests to which Article I, section 9, speaks.”).

2014Citing Davis and McMurphy, the court declared that, “[u]nlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which has been predicated in recent years on deterrence of police misconduct * * * the exclusionary rule of [Article I,] section 9[,] is predicated on the personal right of a criminal defendant to be free from an ‘unreasonable search, or seizure.’ ” Id. at 315 .

2005This court has explained that: ‘The answer to the question of how broad is the exclusionary rule ought to be found in the reasons for the rule.’ State Forester v. Umpqua River *579 Nav., 258 Or 10, 18 , 478 P2d 631 (1970), cert den 404 US 826 (1971) * * *.

2005This court has explained that: ‘The answer to the question of how broad is the exclusionary rule ought to be found in the reasons for the rule.’ State Forester v. Umpqua River *579 Nav., 258 Or 10, 18 , 478 P2d 631 (1970), cert den 404 US 826 (1971) * * *.

2023For example, a person who correctly believed that his home had been unlawfully entered by the police could respond with unlimited force and, under the exclusionary rule, could be effectively immunized from criminal responsibility for any action taken after that entry.” See State v. Gaffney, 36 Or App 105, 108-09 , 583 P2d 582 (1978), rev den, 285 Or 195 (1979) (providing similar analysis in a case involving an illegal stop).

2023For example, a person who correctly believed that his home had been unlawfully entered by the police could respond with unlimited force and, under the exclusionary rule, could be effectively immunized from criminal responsibility for any action taken after that entry.” See State v. Gaffney, 36 Or App 105, 108-09 , 583 P2d 582 (1978), rev den, 285 Or 195 (1979) (providing similar analysis in a case involving an illegal stop).

2022The Supreme Court established the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule in Leon. 468 US at 922 - 23.

2002In Tanner , the court explained: “Unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which has been predicated in recent years on deterrence of police misconduct, see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 US 897, 905-08 , 104 S Ct 3405 , 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984), the exclusionary rule of section 9 is predicated on the personal right of a criminal defendant to be free from an ‘unreasonable search, or seizure,’ State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 231-37 , 666 P2d 802 (1983); State v. Laundy, 103 Or 443, 494 , 204 P 958 , 206 P 290 (1922) (adopting the former Fourth Amendment rationale expressed in such early Unite

2024See, e.g., id. (citing State v. Donovan, 305 Or 332, 335 , 751 P2d 1109 (1988) (noting that a “probation revocation proceeding invokes the criminal sanctions pending against the defendant” to justify extending the exclusionary rule to juvenile probation revocation); see also State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. W.

2024See, e.g., id. (citing State v. Donovan, 305 Or 332, 335 , 751 P2d 1109 (1988) (noting that a “probation revocation proceeding invokes the criminal sanctions pending against the defendant” to justify extending the exclusionary rule to juvenile probation revocation); see also State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. W.

1992But see United States v. Janis, supra, 428 US at 458 n 35 (“Judicial integrity clearly does not mean that the courts must never admit evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). 4 We need not decide in this case whether the sanction of suppression for violation of Article I, section 9, may be required in other contexts. 5 Petitioner did not challenge the juvenile court’s findings on the two other violations.

1987In addition to the examples given above, the following further illustrate this conclusion: United States v. Leon, 468 US 897, 916-17 , 104 S Ct 3405 , 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984) (White, J.) (“the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct”); United States v. Janis, supra at 446 (Blackmun, J.) (“The Court, however, has established that the ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct.’ ”).

2023See State v. Bistrika, 261 Or App 710, 714-16 , 322 P3d 583 , rev den, 356 Or 397 (2014), cert den, 577 US 828 (2015) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of what occurred after an emergency had dissipated because the evidence concerned conduct that threatened officer safety); State v. Neill, 216 Or App 499, 508 , 173 P3d 1262 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 671 (2008) (“That the police may have acted unlawfully in initiating the search did not free defendant to interfere with reasonable directions by the police designed to reduce the risk of violence and maintain safety once t

2023See State v. Bistrika, 261 Or App 710, 714-16 , 322 P3d 583 , rev den, 356 Or 397 (2014), cert den, 577 US 828 (2015) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of what occurred after an emergency had dissipated because the evidence concerned conduct that threatened officer safety); State v. Neill, 216 Or App 499, 508 , 173 P3d 1262 (2007), rev den, 344 Or 671 (2008) (“That the police may have acted unlawfully in initiating the search did not free defendant to interfere with reasonable directions by the police designed to reduce the risk of violence and maintain safety once t

2014See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1039 , 104 S Ct 3479 , 82 L Ed 2d 778 (1984) (“The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.” (Citation omitted.)). 11 That principle has unavoidable evidentiary consequences for the application of the exclusionary rule: An individual cannot escape a tribunal’s power over his or her “body” under a lawful arrest warrant despite being subject to an illegal seizure; in that r

2014See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1039 , 104 S Ct 3479 , 82 L Ed 2d 778 (1984) (“The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.” (Citation omitted.)). 11 That principle has unavoidable evidentiary consequences for the application of the exclusionary rule: An individual cannot escape a tribunal’s power over his or her “body” under a lawful arrest warrant despite being subject to an illegal seizure; in that r

2014And, the majority recognizes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to restore defendants to the same position that they would have occupied if “the government’s officers had stayed within the law.” Hall, 339 Or at 24 ; State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 234 , 666 P2d 802 (1983).

2014And, the majority recognizes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to restore defendants to the same position that they would have occupied if “the government’s officers had stayed 106 State v. Unger within the law.” Hall, 339 Or at 24 ; State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 234 , 666 P2d 802 (1983).

2005This court stated: “The nature of the causal relationship between unlawful police action and subsequently obtained evidence, which triggers the exclusionary rule, was considered in the leading case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court elaborated on * * * ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.

2005This court stated: “The nature of the causal relationship between unlawful police action and subsequently obtained evidence, which triggers the exclusionary rule, was considered in the leading case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court elaborated on * * * ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.

2023As the Court of Appeals noted in Lowry, there is no “hard and fast rule” for determining whether state involvement has been sufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule, and “[e]ach case must be evaluated on its own facts.” 37 Or App at 652 .

2022Compare Smith, 310 Or at 14-15 (no positive encouragement of the informant where the informant initiated contact with police deputies, the deputies instructed the informant not to question the defendant, the informant did not question the defendant, only listened, the informant did not ask for a deal and none was offered, and the informant did not know before his sentencing that the deputies would speak on his behalf), and Lowry, 37 Or App at 654-55 (the exclusionary rule did not apply where a detective told the informant that he was not interested in information on the defendant and that the

2026“The exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated and serves to vindicate a defendant’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 67 , 333 P3d 1009 (2014).

2026“The exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated and serves to vindicate a defendant’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 67 , 333 P3d 1009 (2014).

2014In State v. Nettles, 287 Or 131, 136 , 597 P2d 1243 (1979), for example, the court explicitly endorsed the federal court view that the exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to deter future unlawful police conduct and that the rule [is] not for the purpose of compensating for the unlawful invasion of a person’s privacy.” See also State v. Holt, 291 Or 343, 351 , 630 P2d 854 (1981) (“The purpose of exclusion is to deter unlawful police conduct by excluding evidence unlawfully obtained from the person against whom it is to be used.”); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d

1982Although it is always distasteful to suppress otherwise trustworthy evidence, there are times when the lesser of evils is to do so. *610 To quote from State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981): «* * * \ye have held that the exclusionary rule of search and seizure should be applied only as broadly as is necessary to accomplish its protective and prophylactic purposes.

2014In State v. Nettles, 287 Or 131, 136 , 597 P2d 1243 (1979), for example, the court explicitly endorsed the federal court view that the exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to deter future unlawful police conduct and that the rule [is] not for the purpose of compensating for the unlawful invasion of a person’s privacy.” See also State v. Holt, 291 Or 343, 351 , 630 P2d 854 (1981) (“The purpose of exclusion is to deter unlawful police conduct by excluding evidence unlawfully obtained from the person against whom it is to be used.”); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d

1982Although it is always distasteful to suppress otherwise trustworthy evidence, there are times when the lesser of evils is to do so. *610 To quote from State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981): «* * * \ye have held that the exclusionary rule of search and seizure should be applied only as broadly as is necessary to accomplish its protective and prophylactic purposes.

1985Thus, the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule, i.e., deterrence, United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338 , 94 S Ct 613 , 38 L Ed 2d 561 (1974), is not served by suppression in this case.

1985Thus, the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule, i.e., deterrence, United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338 , 94 S Ct 613 , 38 L Ed 2d 561 (1974), is not served by suppression in this case.

2015In explaining that rationale, the court first quoted State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 253-54 , 834 P2d 1008 (1992), an Article I, section 9, case: “‘This court has declared that evidence is suppressed for violations of the Oregon Constitution “to preserve *** rights to the same extent as if the government’s officers had stayed within the law.” State v. Davis, [ 295 Or 227, 234 , 666 P2d 802 (1983)]. * * * In the context of a criminal prosecution, the focus then is on protecting the individual’s rights vis-a-vis the government * * *. “‘This focus on individual protection under the exclusionary rule,

2015In explaining that rationale, the court first quoted State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 253-54 , 834 P2d 1008 (1992), an Article I, section 9, case: “‘This court has declared that evidence is suppressed for violations of the Oregon Constitution “to preserve *** rights to the same extent as if the government’s officers had stayed within the law.” State v. Davis, [ 295 Or 227, 234 , 666 P2d 802 (1983)]. * * * In the context of a criminal prosecution, the focus then is on protecting the individual’s rights vis-a-vis the government * * *. “‘This focus on individual protection under the exclusionary rule,