exclusionary rule in Florida

2024See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (holding that an officer's objectively reasonable reliance on an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination may preclude application of the exclusionary rule); Barrentine v. State, 107 So. 3d 483, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("Under [the good faith] exception, evidence seized in reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate is generally admissible." (citing Pilieci, 991 So. 2d at 895 )).

2024"The rationale behind the good faith exception is that the exclusionary rule 'is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.' " State v. McGill, 125 So. 3d 343, 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 ).

2026Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 248 (2011) (explaining that “the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right.

2026But despite the Supreme Court’s definition of the exclusionary rule as a “judicially created sanction,” id., and this Court’s reaffirmance that “the judicial remedy of exclusion of evidence [should] be applied for violations of Florida’s statutory knock-and-announce provisions,” Cable, 51 So. 3d at 435, 437 , the majority now concludes that this Court erred in Cable by inferring the remedy of exclusion for statutory knock-and-announce violations when it was not explicitly authorized by the Legislature.

2023See State v. White, 660 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. 1995) (“The exclusionary rule inhibits governmental breach of the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment by prohibiting governmental use of evidence seized in violation of the rule.”).

2019See State v. White , 660 So.2d 664 , 666 (Fla. 1995) ("The exclusionary rule inhibits governmental breach of the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment by prohibiting governmental use of evidence seized in violation of the rule.").

2016See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (recognizing and adopting the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, and holding that the exclusionary rule should not apply if “the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means”).

2016See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (recognizing and adopting the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, and holding that the exclusionary rule should not apply if “the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means”).

2016See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (recognizing that exclusionary rule’s primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct, not repair it, and thus, not designed to safeguard personal constitutional right of party aggrieved); United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (noting *490 that Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence weighed more toward preserving evidence for use in obtaining convictions, even 'if illegally seized, than toward excluding evidence in order to deter police misconduct unless officers engaged in deli

2016See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (recognizing that exclusionary rule’s primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct, not repair it, and thus, not designed to safeguard personal constitutional right of party aggrieved); United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (noting *490 that Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence weighed more toward preserving evidence for use in obtaining convictions, even 'if illegally seized, than toward excluding evidence in order to deter police misconduct unless officers engaged in deli

2016Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to “deter future unlawful police conduct,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 , 96 S.Ct, 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the rule has not been applied in certain circumstances, such as when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated statute, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987).

2016Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to “deter future unlawful police conduct,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 , 96 S.Ct, 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the rule has not been applied in certain circumstances, such as when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated statute, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987).

2016Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to “deter future unlawful police conduct,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 , 96 S.Ct, 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the rule has not been applied in certain circumstances, such as when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated statute, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987).

2016Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to “deter future unlawful police conduct,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 , 96 S.Ct, 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the rule has not been applied in certain circumstances, such as when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated statute, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987).

2024“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be 4 sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” Id. at 144 .

2024The Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule While the detective conducted an illegal search through the Facebook records, “[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009).

2016See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (recognizing that exclusionary rule’s primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct, not repair it, and thus, not designed to safeguard personal constitutional right of party aggrieved); United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (noting *490 that Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence weighed more toward preserving evidence for use in obtaining convictions, even 'if illegally seized, than toward excluding evidence in order to deter police misconduct unless officers engaged in deli

2016See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (recognizing that exclusionary rule’s primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct, not repair it, and thus, not designed to safeguard personal constitutional right of party aggrieved); United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence weighed more toward preserving evidence for use in obtaining convictions, even if illegally seized, than toward excluding evidence in order to deter police misconduct unless officers engaged in deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligen

2002In State v. Cross, 487 So.2d 1056 (Fla.1986), the Florida Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies in probation and community control revocation proceedings.

1987In State v. Cross, 487 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1986), the supreme court approved its prior holding in State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982) in which it held *531 that the exclusionary rule is applicable in a probation revocation hearing.

2016See Herring, 555 U.S. at 139-40, 129 S.Ct. 695 ; see also Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (exclusionary rule protects Fourth Amendment rights generally through deterrent effect); State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333, 335 (Fla.1982), Indeed, the deterrent effect is the exclusionary rule’s sole justification; “the exclusionary rule is not an individual right,” and it operates “only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’” Herring, 555 U.S. at 141, 129 S.Ct. 695 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed

2011The Fourth District noted that “[w]hen law enforcement does not comply with the procedural requirements of statutes like the ones here, the items obtained should be suppressed when law enforcement made no good faith effort to comply.” Id. at 873 ; see also Johnson, 814 So.2d at 394 (holding that the exclusionary rule may apply when the State improperly obtains a defendant’s hospital records in violation of section 395.3025, Florida Statutes (1997)).

2019See Holloman v. State, 959 So. 2d 403, 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also Lambert v. State, 811 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (discussing ineffective assistance in the context of a violation hearing for failing to seek suppression of evidence of a new law violation that was later shown to be subject to suppression in the proceeding related to the new charges and citing State v. Scarlet, 800 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. 2001), to conclude that the exclusionary rule does apply to probation -7- revocation proceedings).

2008But see State v. Scarlet, 800 So.2d 220 (Fla.2001) (holding that in the absence of a controlling federal decision, the exclusionary rule applies to illegally seized evidence in Florida probation revocation hearings).

2007Id. at 2167-68; see also State v. Robinson, 565 So.2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (suggesting that the use of the exclusionary rule as a sanction for knock-and-announce violations, which had been frequently employed by the trial courts since Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964), should be reconsidered).

2006The statute does not state that evidence must be suppressed when the police violate its terms, but the United States Supreme Court has treated this knock-and-announce rule as an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), and courts have regularly enforced this statute by invoking the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Richardson, 787 So.2d 906 ; State v. Robinson, 565 So.2d 730, 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

2014“Under the exclusionary rule announced by the United States Supreme Court, ‘the Fourth Amendment bar[s] the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure.’ ” Hilton, 961 So.2d at 298 (alteration in original) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (holding that the federal exclusionary rule applies to the states as well)).

2014“Under the exclusionary rule announced by the United States Supreme Court, ‘the Fourth Amendment bar[s] the use of evidence secured through an - 15 - illegal search and seizure.’ ” Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 293 (alteration in original) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (holding that the federal exclusionary rule applies to the states as well)).

2019Whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress also turns on the application of the exclusionary rule, which bars "from trial the physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).

2016This principle, first established in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), although not given its present name until Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), dictates that “the exclusionary rule bars the admission at trial of physical evidence and live witness testimony obtained directly or indirectly through the exploitation of the police illegality.” Wells v. State, 975 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963)).

2017Additionally, Davis made clear that the exclusionary rule is only to be applied if the underlying deterrent effect on law enforcement will be achieved, which was found not to be the case in Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (“Where suppression fails to yield ‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly ... unwarranted.’ ” (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976))).

2017Additionally, Davis made clear that the exclusionary rule is only to be applied if the underlying deterrent effect on law enforcement will be achieved, which was found not to be the case in Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (“Where suppression fails to yield ‘appreciable deterrence,’ exclusion is ‘clearly ... unwarranted.’ ” (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976))).

2014Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (discussing whether to apply an exception to the exclusionary rule and stating that “the burden of show ing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution”).

2014Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (discussing whether to apply an exception to the exclusionary rule and stating that “the burden of show ing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution”).

2019The Supreme Court held that “[i]f court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer record,” then the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because “the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction.” Id. at 14 .

2019The Court specifically stated that “the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees.” Id. (citations omitted).

2026Id. at 441-42 (holding the exclusionary rule should apply to statutory knock-and-announce violations even though the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), made “clear that the exclusionary rule does not apply to Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce violations”).

2024The State argues that given Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the exclusionary rule is no longer an appropriate remedy for violating Florida’s knock-and-announce statutes.

2016See Herring, 555 U.S. at 139-40, 129 S.Ct. 695 ; see also Utah v. Strieff, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2056 , 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (exclusionary rule protects Fourth Amendment rights generally through deterrent effect); State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333, 335 (Fla.1982), Indeed, the deterrent effect is the exclusionary rule’s sole justification; “the exclusionary rule is not an individual right,” and it operates “only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’” Herring, 555 U.S. at 141, 129 S.Ct. 695 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed

1995In State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982), the Florida Supreme Court further clarified that under the old version of Article I, Section 12, the exclusionary rule applied equally to probation revocation proceedings as it did to regular prosecutions: "A person's status as a probationer may be taken into consideration in determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable for constitutional purposes, but in Grubbs this Court unequivocally repudiated the notion that the article I, section 12 exclusionary rule may simply be ignored at a probation revocation hearing." Dodd, 419 So.2d at 335 (f

2008Subsequent case law has rejected this reflexive application of the exclusionary rule. " (Citation omitted.) We had said as much in Leon , a decade earlier, when we explained that "[ w]hether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, ... is `an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.' " 468 U.S., at 906 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).

2008Subsequent case law has rejected this reflexive application of the exclusionary rule. " (Citation omitted.) We had said as much in Leon , a decade earlier, when we explained that "[ w]hether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, ... is `an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.' " 468 U.S., at 906 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).

2026I Since this Court decided Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 , (Fla. 1964), in 1964, “the district courts of appeal have applied the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce statutes.” Cable, 51 So. 3d at 439 (citing Guerrie v. State, 691 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Kistner v. State, 379 So. 2d 128, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); and Moreno v. State, 277 So. 2d 81, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)).

2024See Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710 (Fla. 1964) (applying the exclusionary rule to preclude the use of evidence seized when the knock-and-announce statute was violated while making an arrest).

2005Under Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, evidence is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule if that evidence "would be inadmissable under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution." Under this provision of Florida's constitution—known as the conformity clause—Florida courts "are bound to follow interpretations of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the Fourth Amendment and provide to Florida citizens no greater protection than those interpretations." Soca, 673 So.2d at 27 (citing Bernie v.

1995"Indeed, an exclusionary rule that was once constitutionally mandated in Florida can now be eliminated by judicial decision of the United States Supreme Court." Bernie, 524 So.2d at 991 .

2026Chapter 933’s enforcement provision—entitled “[e]xceeding authority in executing search warrant; penalty”—states that “[a]ny officer who in executing a search warrant willfully exceeds his or her authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree.” § 933.17, Fla. Stat. (2025).4 Because section 933.09 does not itself contain an exclusionary rule and section 933.17 prescribes remedies for violations of section 933.09, we do not infer that the remedy of exclusion is available for violations of section 933.09.5 See Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130

2026Apartment Ass’n, 94 So. 3d 541, 553 (Fla. 2012); see also Jenkins, 978 So. 2d at 130 (noting that statute at issue did not expressly list the exclusionary rule as a remedy and, therefore, we do not infer that this remedy is available for violations of the statute).

2008We have rejected "[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908 [ 104 S.Ct. 3405 ], and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served" United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) — that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs,'" Scott, supra, at 363 [ 118 S.Ct. 2014 ] (quoting Leon, supra, at 907 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 .) See also Campbell, 948 So.2d at 730-31 (Wells, J., dissenting, Cantero and Bell, JJ., concurring) (If the trial judge determines that

2007We have rejected "[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, Leon, supra, at 908 [, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ], and have held it to be applicable only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served," United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)—that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs,'" Scott, supra, at 363 [, 118 S.Ct. 2014 ] (quoting Leon, supra, at 907 [, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ].) In the present case, the trial court found that the law enforcement officers "did nothing improper." In light of that finding, I co