exclusionary rule in Connecticut

2025In Marsala, this court considered whether our state constitution’s prohi- bition on unreasonable searches and seizures contained the same good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that the United States Supreme Court had recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

2025In Marsala, this court considered whether our state constitution’s prohi- bition on unreasonable searches and seizures contained the same good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that the United States Supreme Court had recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

2011For these reasons, the majority, in my view, does not give adequate guidance to courts or to law enforcement officials as to what is required to end an interrogation and inserts unnecessary confusion into the jurisprudence on this subject. [6] The exclusionary rule is intended to "make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person...." (Citation omitted.) Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2011For these reasons, the majority, in my view, does not give adequate guidance to courts or to law enforcement officials as to what is required to end an interrogation and inserts unnecessary confusion into the jurisprudence on this subject. [6] The exclusionary rule is intended to "make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person...." (Citation omitted.) Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2024Held: This court concluded, under the balancing test set forth in United States v. Janis ( 428 U.S. 433 ), that the trial court’s ruling denying C’s motion in limine was legally and logically correct, that court having correctly deter- mined that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable in civil proceedings, as the minimal deterrent effect of employing the rule in the circumstances at issue was substantially outweighed by the societal interest in presenting reliable evidence of animal neglect in actions under § 22-329a to protect the health and safety of animals.

2002Ed. 2d 344 (1998) (recognizing that [court has] repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials’ and holding that rule not applicable in parole revocation proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448, 454 , 96 S. Ct. 3021 , 49 L.

2021See id., 382 (‘‘article first, § 7, provides broader protection than does the fourth amendment against warrantless searches of automobiles that have been impounded at police sta- tions, even though probable cause exists’’); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 652, 653 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (under state constitution, unlike federal constitution, ‘‘what starts out as a consensual encounter becomes a seizure if, on the basis of a show of authority by the police officer, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed that he was not free to leave’’); State v. Geisler, supra, 222

2021See id., 382 (‘‘article first, § 7, provides broader protection than does the fourth amendment against warrantless searches of automobiles that have been impounded at police sta- tions, even though probable cause exists’’); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 652, 653 , 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (under state constitution, unlike federal constitution, ‘‘what starts out as a consensual encounter becomes a seizure if, on the basis of a show of authority by the police officer, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed that he was not free to leave’’); State v. Geisler, supra, 222

1999First, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is not served by permitting a challenge based on an informant’s false statements. “[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct; see State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 622 , 543 A.2d 750 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816 , 546 A.2d 283 (1988); and the limits on its application . . . flow from that purpose, namely, that it does not apply where the cost of suppressing reliable tangible evidence outweighs its deterrent benefit; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

1999First, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is not served by permitting a challenge based on an informant’s false statements. “[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct; see State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 622 , 543 A.2d 750 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816 , 546 A.2d 283 (1988); and the limits on its application . . . flow from that purpose, namely, that it does not apply where the cost of suppressing reliable tangible evidence outweighs its deterrent benefit; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

1997Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” (Emphasis added.) The independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine are recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule and are “closely related.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L.

1997Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” (Emphasis added.) The independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine are recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule and are “closely related.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L.

2025In the present case, the defendant argues that Reid is not dispositive because ‘‘[t]he court did not do a full analysis of the independent constitutional claim but simply adopted the rationale of Harris in a conclusory footnote.’’ The majority acknowledges that the court in Reid ‘‘lacked the benefit of full briefing or analysis of the issue based on the now familiar factors articulated in Geisler, which was decided approximately eight years after Reid,’’ but nonetheless declines to engage in a more robust analysis of the exclusionary rule under our state constitution.9 Part I of the majority o

2025In the present case, the defendant argues that Reid is not dispositive because ‘‘[t]he court did not do a full analysis of the independent constitutional claim but simply adopted the rationale of Harris in a conclusory footnote.’’ The majority acknowledges that the court in Reid ‘‘lacked the benefit of full briefing or analysis of the issue based on the now familiar factors articulated in Geisler, which was decided approximately eight years after Reid,’’ but nonetheless declines to engage in a more robust analysis of the exclusionary rule under our state constitution.9 Part I of the majority o

2005In State v. Anderson, 67 Conn. App. 436 , 787 A.2d 601 (2001), we stated that “it is clear that Connecticut courts, along with the vast majority of all courts, both state and federal, recognize the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule as formulated by the United States Supreme Court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 441 n.8; see also State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 433 , 512 A.2d 160 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 , 107 S. Ct. 423 , 93 L.

2005In State v. Anderson, 67 Conn. App. 436 , 787 A.2d 601 (2001), we stated that “it is clear that Connecticut courts, along with the vast majority of all courts, both state and federal, recognize the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule as formulated by the United States Supreme Court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 441 n.8; see also State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 433 , 512 A.2d 160 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 , 107 S. Ct. 423 , 93 L.

1999First, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is not served by permitting a challenge based on an informant’s false statements. “[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct; see State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 622 , 543 A.2d 750 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816 , 546 A.2d 283 (1988); and the limits on its application . . . flow from that purpose, namely, that it does not apply where the cost of suppressing reliable tangible evidence outweighs its deterrent benefit; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

1999“Third, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct; see State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 622 , 543 A.2d 750 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816 , 546 A.2d 283 (1988); and the limits on its application that flow from that purpose, namely, that it does not apply where the cost of suppressing reliable tangible evidence outweighs its deterrent benefit; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

1999First, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is not served by permitting a challenge based on an informant’s false statements. “[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct; see State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 622 , 543 A.2d 750 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816 , 546 A.2d 283 (1988); and the limits on its application . . . flow from that purpose, namely, that it does not apply where the cost of suppressing reliable tangible evidence outweighs its deterrent benefit; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

1999“Third, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct; see State v. Brown, 14 Conn. App. 605, 622 , 543 A.2d 750 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 816 , 546 A.2d 283 (1988); and the limits on its application that flow from that purpose, namely, that it does not apply where the cost of suppressing reliable tangible evidence outweighs its deterrent benefit; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

2020See State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994) (‘‘[w]e note initially that, unlike criminal trials, in which the exclusionary rule typically applies, in probation revocation hearings, the exclusionary rule typically does not apply’’); see also State v. Maietta, 320 Conn. 678 , 686, 134 A.3d 572 (2016); State v. Foster, 258 Conn. 501, 507 , 782 A.2d 98 (2001).

2020See State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994) (‘‘[w]e note initially that, unlike criminal trials, in which the exclusionary rule typically applies, in probation revocation hearings, the exclusionary rule typically does not apply’’); see also State v. Maietta, 320 Conn. 678 , 686, 134 A.3d 572 (2016); State v. Foster, 258 Conn. 501, 507 , 782 A.2d 98 (2001).

2025Thus, a probationer has the burden of persuading us that the exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571 , 541 A.2d 504 (explaining that ‘‘[t]he purpose of probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of his probation’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such pro- ceedings, the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded’’), cert. d

2025Thus, a probationer has the burden of persuading us that the exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571 , 541 A.2d 504 (explaining that ‘‘[t]he purpose of probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of his probation’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such pro- ceedings, the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded’’), cert. d

1999The suppression of such evidence would elevate form over substance and would undermine three decades of state and federal precedent that has sought to infuse logic and common sense into the exclusionary rule since its pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L.

1999The suppression of such evidence would elevate form over substance and would undermine three decades of state and federal precedent that has sought to infuse logic and common sense into the exclusionary rule since its pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 6 L.

2025Thus, a probationer has the burden of persuading us that the exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571 , 541 A.2d 504 (explaining that ‘‘[t]he purpose of probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of his probation’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such pro- ceedings, the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded’’), cert. d

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2025Thus, a probationer has the burden of persuading us that the exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571 , 541 A.2d 504 (explaining that ‘‘[t]he purpose of probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of his probation’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such pro- ceedings, the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded’’), cert. d

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2025Thus, a probationer has the burden of persuading us that the exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571 , 541 A.2d 504 (explaining that ‘‘[t]he purpose of probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of his probation’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such pro- ceedings, the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded’’), cert. d

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2005In State v. Anderson, 67 Conn. App. 436 , 787 A.2d 601 (2001), we stated that “it is clear that Connecticut courts, along with the vast majority of all courts, both state and federal, recognize the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule as formulated by the United States Supreme Court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 441 n.8; see also State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 433 , 512 A.2d 160 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 , 107 S. Ct. 423 , 93 L.

2005In State v. Anderson, 67 Conn. App. 436 , 787 A.2d 601 (2001), we stated that “it is clear that Connecticut courts, along with the vast majority of all courts, both state and federal, recognize the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule as formulated by the United States Supreme Court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 441 n.8; see also State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 433 , 512 A.2d 160 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 , 107 S. Ct. 423 , 93 L.

2018See State v. Brocuglio , 264 Conn. 778 , 786-87, 826 A.2d 145 (2003) ("As a general principle, the exclusionary rule bars the government from introducing at trial evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution....

2018See State v. Brocuglio , 264 Conn. 778 , 786-87, 826 A.2d 145 (2003) ("As a general principle, the exclusionary rule bars the government from introducing at trial evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution....

2025Thus, a probationer has the burden of persuading us that the exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571 , 541 A.2d 504 (explaining that ‘‘[t]he purpose of probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of his probation’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such pro- ceedings, the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded’’), cert. d

2025Thus, a probationer has the burden of persuading us that the exclusionary rule should nonetheless apply.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392 , 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 571 , 541 A.2d 504 (explaining that ‘‘[t]he purpose of probation revocation proceedings is to determine whether a probationer is complying with the conditions of his probation’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such pro- ceedings, the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded’’), cert. d

1992The Supreme Court in State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150 , 579 A.2d 58 (1990), after granting a petition for certification to review our decision in State v. Marsala, 19 Conn. App. 478 , 563 A.2d 730 (1989), determined that under Connecticut constitutional law, there was no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

1992The Supreme Court in State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150 , 579 A.2d 58 (1990), after granting a petition for certification to review our decision in State v. Marsala, 19 Conn. App. 478 , 563 A.2d 730 (1989), determined that under Connecticut constitutional law, there was no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2024Finally, in [Immigration & Natural- ization Service] v. Lopez-Mendoza, [supra, 468 U.S. 1032 ], we refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings, citing the high social costs of allowing an immigrant to remain illegally in this country and noting the incompatibility of the rule with the civil, administrative nature of those proceedings. [Id., 1050.] ‘‘As in Calandra, Janis, and Lopez-Mendoza, we are asked to extend the operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial context.

2024Finally, in [Immigration & Natural- ization Service] v. Lopez-Mendoza, [supra, 468 U.S. 1032 ], we refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings, citing the high social costs of allowing an immigrant to remain illegally in this country and noting the incompatibility of the rule with the civil, administrative nature of those proceedings. [Id., 1050.] ‘‘As in Calandra, Janis, and Lopez-Mendoza, we are asked to extend the operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial context.

2007In Marsala , we rejected the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 *276 (1984).

2007In Marsala , we rejected the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 *276 (1984).

2002In the past, we have stressed the importance of this factor as it “effectuates the deterrence policy of the exclusionary rule by providing an incentive for police to engage in lawful conduct.” State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 549 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986).

2002In the past, we have stressed the importance of this factor as it “effectuates the deterrence policy of the exclusionary rule by providing an incentive for police to engage in lawful conduct.” State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 549 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986).